 Today we are hosting former admiral Harry Harris. Harry Harris was an admiral in the United States Navy where he served in every geographic combatant command region. He was commanded of the US Pacific Fleet from 2013 to 2015. He then commanded the US Indo-Pacific Command until 2018. And most recently, he served as US Ambassador to South Korea from July of 2018 to January of this year. Today he is coming to speak about general East Asian and US relations specifically about US foreign policy in that area, especially with guards like the South China Sea. So without further ado, I'll give it up for former admiral Harry Harris. Okay, everybody. Thanks for the opportunity to speak to this allies group. I want to thank co-directors Hadir Ali and Konar Akhyama for the invitation to come to speak with you all tonight. Happy Cinco de Mayo Day. This is May 5th and those of you that you all are watching me instead of party hardening speaks highly of your interest and it's quite amazing to be sure, but I want to have a drink anyway. All right. Now I can't think of a better way to begin the beginning of the end of the pandemic. Get vaccinated if you haven't that's my public service announcement for the evening. In my post government life, then to share with you my thoughts on the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea, or are okay. Now before I get started, let me say just a few words on the deplorable events of January 6th in Washington. The violent actions of the mob that attack the US capital and attack on US democracy itself serve as a sharpest reminder of America's challenges but also America's ultimate strength resilience and longstanding commitment to democracy. This quote from Amanda Gorman's inaugural poem that our nation quote isn't broken, but simply unfinished and quote. President Biden is now the 46th commander in chief of the US. I emphasized to my interlocutors and South Korea, before I left last January, that the noble work of the Alliance will continue. To express my confidence that President Biden and his team will continue to work with leaders there to strengthen their relationship in all its dimensions, not just the security one paraphrase and Gerta divide and rule is one approach to governance and unite and lead is another. I'll also add that may is national Asian American Pacific Islander American Heritage Month. I bring this up in the context of the deplorable acts of violence. We see aimed at Asians and Asian Americans in our own country. So let's each of us commit to doing what we can to end this and all forms of ethnic violence and ethnic. Now as I've said on countless occasions in uniform and now in Mufti international relationships matter and alliances matter. They are the most integral element of US foreign policy. I hope you've had the chance to read the Biden administration's new interim security guidance, interim strategic guidance brother. It recognizes that alliances are not luxuries. They're essentials. President Biden calls alliances are greatest asset. Last month in a joint op ed, Secretary's Lincoln and Austin made it clear that alliances are vital to our national security. They deliver for the American people. In my opinion this guidance underscores that when working with allies, give and take is preferred to slash and burn. Case in point, they're almost 71 year US ROK Alliance was forged during a devastating conflict. It stood the test of town. I'm going to consider how much has changed in the world in general, Northeast Asia in particular, and North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, especially since 1950. Some changes have been for the better, such as ROK's miraculous growth into an economic and cultural powerhouse, a high tech innovation nation which is leading by example in a battle against COVID-19. South Korea faced a third wave of COVID-19 outbreaks at the end of 2020 centered in the capital and surrounding areas. Korea went on virtual lockdown when they had 1000 cases a day across a country of 52 million people. Now as of today, Korea has experienced a total of about 125,000 cases and only 1847 deaths since the pandemic began 15 months ago. Contrast those numbers with ours 32 million cases and almost 600,000 deaths. The approach in COVID-19 has been lauded, rightly so as a global model. It's not that complicated, follow the rules and follow the science. Other changes have been for the worse, such as North Korea's unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons. If the PRK may no longer be the ROK's official enemy, it's helpful to recall that in January 8 workers Party Congress Kim Jong-un talked about strengthening North Korea's nuclear deterrent and military capabilities. Just last March, the IAEA expressed real concerns about the trajectory of North Korea's nuclear program. And just last month, the US intelligence community formally assessed the Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against foreign intervention. And that over time, North Korea will be accepted as a nuclear power. That doesn't sound to me like KJU is willing to get rid of his weapons anytime soon. But throughout the years, the US ROK Alliance has remained and continues to be the bulwark against North Korean aggression and the linchpin upon which regional security and stability depend. There's a satellite photo out there of a nighttime view of the Korean Peninsula. This photo and the stark contrast between the beaming south and the pitch black north represents choices and their outcomes. What 67 years of our strategic alliance has brought to the people of the Republic of Korea. As ROK has changed and developed over the years, so too has the US ROK Alliance. This alliance is dynamic and multi-dimensional partnership reinforced by shared values, shared concerns, and shared economic interests and underpinned by the deepest people to people ties. It's lasted generations and will continue to thrive for generations to come, as long as we together nurture it, resource it, and remain committed to it. Today there are over 2 million Americans of Korean descent, including four members of Congress, senior officials in our military, US diplomats, state and local government officials, entertainers, and wildly successful business leaders. American music and movies have long been popular in South Korea, but now Korea is a cultural force in the USA and around the world. Last year, Parasite won the Best Picture Oscar, and this year, Yoon Yoo-jung was the first Korean actress to ever win an acting Oscar as she took home the best supporting actress Oscar at this year's Academy Awards. These strong and growing people of people ties not only constitute the essential fabric of our dynamic bilateral relationship, but also provide the resilience for us to overcome any and all challenges together. Naturally, there are disagreements within the US ROK Alliance, which should be expected in any co-equal partnership spanning over seven decades. The US ROK continue to work at the highest levels on issues such as defense cost sharing in the future command structure of Korean and American forces on the peninsula as envisioned by the transition of wartime operational control or OPCA. I'm glad we've reached an agreement on cost sharing. Now we can move on to other issues. The US is fully committed to this alliance and it stands firmly with the ROK. So I believe the outlook for the US ROK Alliance is good. This is important because as you are all well aware, North Korea and the PRC will continue to test the resolve of this alliance. We face to weaken our strong ties and so doubt in order to divide us. Now, while we hope for diplomacy with North Korea to be successful, we all recognize that hope alone is not a course of action. US ROK joint military training is designed to support peace on the peninsula and in the region, while ensuring that we maintain readiness and never let our guard down. The dialogue with the North must not be made at the expense of the ability to respond to threats from the North. Dialogue and military readiness must go hand in hand. Idealism must be rooted in realism. There are ample historical examples of what could happen, including what happened on that fateful day almost 71 years ago, if we're not ready. Just read TR Farmerbacks, This Kind of War, if you remain skeptical. It's unfortunate that North Korea has not yet embraced the opportunity presented by three US and three ROK presidential summits. The US continues to seek transform relations between Washington and Pyongyang, lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the complete denuclearization of North Korea. All of which were agreed to in Singapore in 2018 and will set the conditions for bright and future for the North Korean people. While I believe that Singapore was not a perfect agreement, it's a good starting point for which to pursue peace on the peninsula. I hope Chairman and now General Secretary KJU seizes this opportunity. And now a word about the People's Republic of China. I'm often asked whether the ROK is being forced to choose between its own security ally on one hand, and its number one trading partner on the other. This is a false narrative designed to sow doubt about the history and the strength of our lives. The US has partnered well with China on several important fronts, but the United States and Beijing fundamentally disagreed on how to approach the current international order. The Chinese government does not keep its word from its treaty with the British on Hong Kong to its human rights abuses against Uighurs, Tibetans and others to its attempts at commercial espionage and its quest to first isolate than dominate Taiwan. As former Assistant Secretary of State Dave Stillwell recently said, the Leninist Politburo that runs China wants to set the rules for the whole world, which is why it's essential to free nations exercise vigilance. This is why we've made it very clear through our Indo-Pacific strategy that the US rejects foreign policy based on leverage and dominance and seeks instead to strengthen relationships based on respect, equal footing and fair exchange. We believe in partnership economics. We won't weaponize debt. Instead, we strive to build environments that foster good productive market economies. We encourage every country to work in its own interests to protect its own sovereignty. As a former Secretary of State said, China's bullying in the South China Sea reflects a broader choice for nations in the region, coercion and control or freedom and the rule of law. By how to regarding dealing with Beijing was certainly changed with the Biden administration. I note that the fundamental understanding of the PRC has not. Consider the Secretary of State Blinken testified at his confirmation hearing that the previous administration's tough approach on Beijing is right. That what is happening in Xinjiang is genocide and the democracy is being trampled in Hong Kong. Secretary of Defense Austin testified that he's focused on the pacing threat posed by the PRC and he promised strong support for Taiwan. They'll be declared the son of Nagrata by Beijing also to protect the maritime domains. The US will continue to cooperate with their Indo-Pacific partners as we've always done to maintain freedom and navigation and other lawful uses of the sea, so that all nations can access and benefits from the maritime columns. In this time of COVID, there are concerns that the PRC is seeking to coerce its neighbors and press its provocative claims in the South China Sea, as well as to bully Taiwan. There are also concerns that the PRC will exploit nations in need of assistance by dangling medical aid in exchange for support of PRC talking points. We all must remain vigilant. Since the end of World War II, the network of US alliances and partnerships has been at the core of a stable and viable Indo-Pacific. No nation can shape the future of the region in isolation and no vision for the region is complete without a robust network of sovereign countries cooperating to serve their collective interests. So let me highlight the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan. It's crucial for our three nations to work together to enhance our security cooperation and preserve the international rules-based order. Now we're standing the current tensions between Seoul and Tokyo. The reality is that no important security or economic issue in the region can be addressed without both the ROK's and Japan's active involvement. Now folks, let me finish by saying that I was given an amazing opportunity to be the ambassador to Korea. Though some of you may beg to differ, I believe there's no better place to serve as a US ambassador and no better partner and strategic ally for the United States than a Republic of Korea. Finally, let me thank you all for your interest in America's national security. It's organizations like allies and people like each of you that assure that we have a well-informed citizenry of which Studeau Roosevelt spoke so eloquently. If Thomas Jefferson rather spoke so eloquently. And well-informed citizenry is indeed the best defense against Tehran. So thanks for your attention. And I look forward to your questions. I'll take 15 to 20 minutes for the questions. Over to you. Thank you so much for those remarks. As a Korean American myself, I particularly enjoyed all the comments about the great impact of Korean Americans. And my first question. Oh, by the way, anyone if anyone has a question, please feel free to raise your hand. I'll call on people. If you have questions. I'd like to start very quickly. And I was wondering if how if you could describe how it was like to take to become the ambassador to South Korea at a time so shortly after the domestic turmoil. What was it like today surrounding President Park, and how that affected your time in Korea and how that affected when you first. So that's a really broad question Jackson and I'll just just kind of talk a little about it and maybe it'll, it'll stimulate some, you know, more precise questions. So, you know, I spent 40 years in the Navy as you have hinted at in my introduction. You know, I ended up as a forester so that was a pretty, pretty, you know, rank in the military. And I went from that and pay calm has about 400,000 people in it. Take on then now into pay calm. And I went from that to the embassy and so which has about 400 people. So a little bit different in scale, but I will tell you that no difference in scope of responsibility. The scope of the job was completely, you know, as you'd expect different and into pay calm at pay calm in my time now into pay calm I was, I knew a lot. You know, a little bit about a lot of countries, you know, we have 36 countries in the pay calm or area of responsibility. And we have five treaty allies, a couple of major competitors and hotspots and friends and partners. So in that group of stuff. You know, I wasn't too deep on any one issue, but I knew a lot about a lot. I knew a little bit about a lot of the issues in Korea. It was all Korea, all day 24 seven, every day. Korea, North Korea, China and Japan. And it was really focused on that. The role of the ambassador in a in any given country is different than being a command and commander because you're the president's personal representative on boy, you know, the title is I'm very extraordinary and plenty of potential and all that kind of stuff. And, you know, harkens back to the beginning of our nation. So the ambassadors, my position title, the ambassador carries a lot of weight. And but, you know, so I tried to balance all that. And, you know, try to try to get along every day. At pay calm I had my own aircraft in fact I had to add a g five and a 737 tricked out and comms wise and accommodation wise for me. You know, so everything was short, if you know what I mean. But yet at you know when I flew back to states I did quite often before COVID. You know I flew back in 43d, you know I was sitting back in economy class sandwiched between two larger people. And you know I got used to that pretty quick, but that's just the scope of the difference. You know, the budget, you know, the DOD's budget is is almost a trillion dollars. And, you know, the State Department's budget is not so you know I had to get used to that aspect of it. And, you know, so there's a lot of different things in in the in the military. I was rarely attacked for who I was personally. I didn't like me because I'm an American I'm carrying you know I'm an American flag officer or maybe maybe before I was a flag officer you know during combat and all these things. You know, I didn't like me because I was American, but they didn't focus on the fact that you know I'm Asian American or something like that. I got it from both barrels in Korea, I got it primarily from China. I got I actually got it from China at the end of my time and uniform and I was back fleet. And then pay calm, because I took some strong stances against the PRC which someone which I alluded to my remarks tonight. And so they, they took me a task, not just because I you know I criticize them. And they didn't take me to task because I was an American, you know, flag officer, I don't criticize China they took me to task because I was Japanese American. And then in Korea, anytime that I took a position that ran counter to what they wanted, what the Koreans wanted politically, you know this is because I was President Trump's ambassador. So he took some, he had some very unpopular positions in Korea they loved that he was proactive for leaning with Kim Jong-un and try to bring peace to the peninsula and transform relations between the United States and North Korea they love that. But they didn't like that, that he wanted a larger share of for from them from for burden sharing cost sharing and things like that. So, you know, when I had to deliver the hard message, you know, we talked about Huawei and 5G. And, you know, how we wanted Korea not to, not to allow Huawei into their 5G infrastructures they were getting ready to do that. They went after me for being Japanese American, of course, I had a mustache then. And that was a particularly focal point for them, you know, it was the mustache that I couldn't believe it, you know, that that that a better facial would not create that much interest, shall we say. So, you know, that was a little bit difficult and unexpected. But you know the reality is the reality and you know you work through that. You asked about President Park I got there after President Park had been impeached. So I got there in July of 2018, a month after the Singapore summit. The Pyongyang Chang Winter Olympics. So President Moon had already been in power. So when I presented my credentials I presented them to President Moon. Okay, I'll stop there. You know, I'm not sure what direction, how far you want me to take this but I'll just wait for further on questions. No, that was great. Thank you so much. Sean, feel free to ask your question. Hey, good evening, sir. My question is, so a robust trilateral relationship between the US, Japan and the ROK is, you know, clearly a key to combating the security issues that we face in Asia. So there are historical animosities between Japan and the ROK, which is rooted in what happened in World War II. So, you know, trust is still a major issue. So how do you think these two countries can get over this, I guess, pump and able to reconcile and strengthen their relationship moving forward. You know, we can be helpful but we're not going to do it for them. You know, we can't want it more than they want it. And right now, you know, I don't see the one wanting it greatly because they have the domestic constituencies to worry about. President Moon can't be reelected because, you know, they have a single five year term for president in Korea, but he'd like his party to be reelected. You know, and so, you know, so relations with Japan plays into the body politic in Korea in a big way, especially in the run up to an election. Ditto in Japan, former Prime Minister Abe stepped down, Prime Minister Suga is now in control, elections coming up, you know, and so, you know, it's an issue. So I just don't see it happening anytime soon. I do hope though and there is hope that the two can reach an accord to the degree that that the relations with each other affecting the relations with us and other partners and allies. They don't have any other allies but with other partners and stuff won't be counterproductive. So we have it requires work. We have to continue to work at it but we can't want it more than they want. And so, you know, we went through this, this really hard spot in 2018 and beginning of 2019 over the the bilateral defense intelligence sharing between Korea and Japan where Korea threatened to pull out of this agreement. So we got involved in it because, as you correctly noted, this, the roots of this conflict between Tokyo and so are based on history. And it's the history of the colonialism, the colonial period where Japan colonized Korea from 1905 roughly to 1945 pretty brutal brutal colonization, and it was during that period that that that these attitudes hardened. And so, even after World War Two and the colonial period ended, and, and all of that, the historical animosities remain. And then these historical animosities, you know, rose up to the level affecting economic relations between the two countries and even then we said, Hey, you know what, we're not going to take you all need to work this out. And then, you know, Korea then threatened to pull out of the to somia that the information sharing agreement with Japan. And that then affects us security and the security northeast Asia of which we are allied with Tokyo. And so, you know, independently not not try later. And so the State Department at the time made a very strong statement, where we said that if Korea were to pull out of the information sharing agreement with Tokyo. Make our ability to defend the Republic of Korea under the treaty with Korea, and it would make it would put us forces, you know, we have 20,500 troops plus your families on the peninsula will put us forces at greater risk. And that is a very strong statement for the United States to make not taking sides, but saying hey don't be pulling out of this agreement because it affects our ability to defend you and it affects our ability to to protect our people. So that that was a strong statement. I had to deliver that statement. And the outcome was, you know, that and other things contribute to no doubt. But the outcome was South Korea did not put out the information sharing agreement. That was a good thing. So, you know, that's kind of where we are. There's this talk about the quad and whether South Korea will get into the quad the quad is this informal. It's the black-minded nations. It's United States, Australia, Japan and India. It's not an alliance. There's no treaty. There's no rule set. There's no codification of this thing. But should Korea be a member of the quad? You know, and so that's an issue that's playing out in real time today. Thank you so much. I believe Simon had his hand raised next. Thank you so much for coming. This has been super interesting so far. My question is about your involvement in the deployment of FAD in South Korea. And I know back in 2017 that you said that you thought that it was useful as a deterrent to North Korea. Do you think that position you still take that position? Do you think that it's now mostly designed for deterrence against China because of the sort of range issues with it? Or like how do you say? Great question. So I was deeply involved in the deployment of FAD to Korea as the PAKOM commander. And then as, when I got there as the ambassador, FAD was already in place. There was a lot of protest activity against it, resupply of the FAD battery, the troops that are down there, and all that kind of stuff was a challenge, big challenge. I said in 2017, as you correctly stated, and I still say today that FAD exists for only one reason, and that's to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles, short range, intermediate range ballistic missiles. FAD had no capability and has no capability against Chinese missiles. You know, and it's a single battery. I mean, it doesn't, but even if it did, you know, the Chinese could overwhelm it easily just in numbers long. And so FAD was never designed against the PRC and has no capability really against PRC. It is there to defend southern, the southern South Korea against the North Korean missile threat. Not the Seoul area, not the Gizma, the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, because there are other weapons systems in the Gizma to do that. We're talking southern, central and southern South Korea, where all the espads, the seaborn ports of debarkation, the APODs, the area ports of debarkation, where all the stuff that's going to flow in to Korea if we go to, if the war resumes with North Korea. All that stuff is going to come in. And so that is there to protect that and the people who live in southern Korea. That is the only reason we have that is there for a big reason. And it has everything to do with North Korea, nothing to do with the PRC. Okay, thank you so much for that answer. Nicholas, I think you had your hand up next. Hi, yeah. I wanted to ask a question about our foreign policy towards North Korea. I guess, in regards to the options of either maintaining like a really hard line stance against North Korea, or trying to pursue some kind of cooperation, which would you think would be more advantageous in the future. Yeah, so that's a really important question. So let me just kind of parse it a little bit here. So, first thing is to understand what does KGU Kim Jong-un want. And you know, we had to, before that I understand that Kim Jong-un is in control of North Korea solely. It's not, it's not a power sharing thing. It's not a, it's KGU himself. So what does he want? I think he wants four things. He wants sanctions relief. He wants to keep his nuclear weapons. He wants to split the US ROK and lands. And he wants to dominate the peninsula in a way that the whole peninsula looks like North Korea under his control. So those are four things he wants. I think that sanctions is very important. I think the hard crushing sanctions is what brought Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table in the first place in 2018 in Singapore. So I think it's important that we maintain sanctions. I think that those voices that are calling for sanctions relief or easing of exercises, military exercises with South Korea and the United States. You know, that sort of thing as an enticement to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table is a completely flawed approach. If we keep the sanctions on and encourage Kim Jong-un to come to the table again. And if as a result of negotiations, there are some lessening of sanctions, there are some reduction of or elimination of certain exercises and all of that as an outcome of the negotiations, I'm all for it. But let's not give away stuff just to get him to negotiate. I mean, this is, this is Einstein's definition of insanity, right? You know, you repeat the same experiment and hope for a different outcome. We've been down this road before it has not worked. It hasn't worked, whether it's a Republican administration and Democratic administration, whether it's a progressive party, conservative party in Korea, South Korea, I mean, it hasn't worked. So let's let's have the negotiations. Let's build on Singapore. You know, there's four outcomes pretty pretty darn good outcomes case you signed on to them. And let's build on that and go forward. I like what I've read. I haven't seen it in writing. But I like what I've read in the newspapers and the media about the policy review that the Biden administration just finished. I think they finished it last Friday, Jen Psaki, the spokesperson talked about it. It's sort of a position between the previous two administrations positions. If you think, according to them, that the Obama minister or the Trump administration's approach was all or nothing. And the Obama's administration's approach was strategic patience. The Obama's approach is somewhere in between that diplomacy is important. Let's have a discussion. Let's encourage negotiations and go from there. Thank you. Lionel, you want to take it away. Hi, yeah. Thanks very much. I'm more habits for speaking with us. I'm Lionel one of the first allies online. I sort of had two questions for you going off your marks. The first one speaks more specifically to the quad and five eyes arrangement. So just in the other New Zealand Prime Minister is currently under coming under a lot of flak for her pushback over expanding the ambit of five eyes to counteract China. I want to hear what your view is on the use of entities like five eyes and the quad to counteract China. And you see this as reflective of some of the challenges perhaps peripheral countries might face and maintaining their relations with China. That's the first question. Let me ask that question and then we'll get to it. If I let you continue on, I'll forget the first question or I want to answer it all because it's a harder question. Thank you. There is every reason to have these formal and informal groupings the quiet as it is today is an informal grouping five eyes is a formal grouping. FPD I the five powers defense arrangement, which Singapore is a part is a formal grouping. And this is a formal treaty. You know, we, we decided we the United States decided not to afford treaty protections under and just to New Zealand, even though the NZ and answers is New Zealand, because of their stance on nuclear powered warships. But what's what remains is about is a treaty with Australia and defense treaty. So there's every reason to have these groupings they're helpful, they're helpful in in hard scenarios and not post 911 Iraq Afghanistan all that they're they're helpful in humanitarian assistance disaster response scenarios you know we're not part of FPD as you know, but but that that organization does really really good work. There are there are other groupings in the region. And important this is not getting into TPP and RCEP and CPTPP and all that you know these are more more defense oriented I guess, and in certain their origins. They're not. Most of them are not certainly not in their beginnings anti China, you know they existed before China. It's the empire that it is. Some have come along, because of China, in my opinion, because countries recognize that China left to its own devices and its own wishes will set the conditions and set the real set real real set for the international real space and we see that playing out in northern India and on the frontier, we see it in Tibet. We see it as I mentioned in my remarks, certainly in South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, I mean you name it, and China's actions and activities in the region are not helpful for the good of the order. And it's not just in the region right we see China's activities in South America and even in Europe, and, and on the continent of Africa. So we see these issues. I think to get it that to provide an answer to your specific question yeah there's every reason, good reason to have these formal and informal groupings of like minded countries. And I find them all helpful. Thanks. So my quick second question is regarding us form policy towards China under Biden. I mentioned this previously and how you know the fund, the fundamental understanding towards China hasn't really changed. And mainstream understanding has also been that there have been more continuities under the Biden administration towards China, then there have been differences since Trump's administration. I don't really expect any differences, you know, in Biden administration's approach towards China as we move forward as the ongoing administration continues. I don't know why you think that I could answer that question right I mean I'm not part of the Biden administration they haven't reached out to me to ask my advice on things. You know, all I know is what I read in the papers. And you know, and one of those things is, is, are some of those things are those statements that Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin made. I know the players. You know, I was the military guy who traveled with the Secretary of State Clinton and Kerry before I went to Hawaii in 2013. So, you know, I know Kurt Campbell very well he was my professor when I was at the Kennedy School. He was assistant secretary for East Asia Pacific EAP in the Clinton State Department. A bright bright guy, Jake Sullivan, a bright bright guy. You know he was the, the George Kennan job, you know SP at the State Department, when Secretary Clinton was the secretary. So, I mean these are really bright people that really understand the public sense. You've got some Kim who's the acting assistant secretary or state for EAP. And he's going to be replaced by Dan Crittenbrink, who's the ambassador to Vietnam who was in the, in the Obama White House and then security staff for Asia. Assuming he gets confirmed I don't want to want to make, you know, put a jeopardy as confirmation, but he's been nominated for that job. These are really bright people that understand Asia. They understand the, the, the challenges. They got to, they have the right site picture on, on China. And I think that, you know, their approach is going to be different. I think they're going to based on based on my understanding and reading and just, just as you couldn't understand to read. You know, they, they, the Biden administration and President Biden himself places great reliance on alliances far more than, than President Trump and his team did. So, President Biden, you know, alliances matters, alliances are essential. You know, they're not luxuries, they're essentials. And so that's going to be helpful. You know, and crafting this policy review on North Korea, they reached out to Japan Prime Minister cigarette. I know they reached out to interlocutors in Korea, even though President Moon and President Trump hadn't, I mean, President Biden hadn't actually met, you know, that, that meeting is going to happen at the end of this month toward the end of this month. And so, you know, so they're going to listen to the Biden team is going to listen to America's allies, friends, and partners to get their view. So I think that's encouraging. I think it's the right thing to do. And I think it's helpful. Thank you very much for that answer. I believe Harrison, you're next. I'm going to answer the seven second class Charlton. So with the increase build up and forces in the region from the bracing aircraft carrier to the Philippines, sending warships into the South Chinese sciences, Vietnam sending more warships in Japan increasing their naval capabilities from building new helicopter stores to a full flexibility the first aircraft carrier since the second World War. So do you believe South Korea will have a more martial role in the future, or do you versus the PRC or do you think they're going to be focused more upon the North Korean threat as forces like from around the world start to build on the area. I don't see South Korea focus using the PRC as a raison d'etre for having a strong military. I think they'll have a strong military because that's the right, and the expectation of every modern industrial, technologically savvy country, which South Korea clearly is one. And their best interests to have the ability to defend themselves against all threats, whether that threat is from the north, or from the west, the corner direction west, not the west. Right. So, I think that that they are going to increase your military capability. For sure. And they're doing that now. You know, they have JSF, Joint Strike Fighter of 35s, they have Gullhawk, P-8s, you know, Aegis destroyers, modern diesel submarines. And there are voices in South Korea that are arguing for nuclear submarines, in South Korea rather, arguing for nuclear submarines and greater capability and that kind of stuff. But they haven't done that yet, but they have modern diesel submarines. As does Japan. We see Japan building up its capability because it faces some very real threats. So, you know, I'm encouraging all of this. I think it's good for every country to have its own enlightened self interests and heart first and foremost. Thank you for the answer. That was very wonderful. Heather. My question is going to be on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. I mean, by this administration is going to be like, I believe the fifth administration or all that's going to make this a top priority. But how likely do you think that's actually to happen? Like, what was the situation that you can see where Kim Jong-un would actually agree to that and actually follow through on that? I mean, any analysis I've seen has been like, this is like keeping the nuclear weapons is an essential Korean goal. And there's nothing that you can actually get them to give it up. Yeah, so I agree with with with your basic premise. I mean, it's going to be really, really hard. As I said, I think Kim Jong-un, as I mentioned earlier in response to somebody else's question, that one of his top four priorities is to keep his nuclear weapons and split the alliance, you know, rule the peninsula and get sanctions relief. Right. So I mean, that's, I believe that that's what he believes. I believe that's what he wants. So it's going to be really hard to convince him to give up nuclear weapons that to have an independent free South Korea on his border that doesn't threaten him. I mean, he's threatened the South Korea, but South Korea is not threatening him. So it's hard. But as hard as it is, I think it's okay to be called trying. Right. I mean, we ought to try if we can. And we ought not to give up. And that's why you have diplomats. That's why you have, you know, a lot of people that are putting a lot of brain power to it. COVID might encourage North Korea to come back to the negotiating table. I mean, you know, I don't know why I say that, you know, they haven't had any COVID cases according to Kim Jong-un. You know, I think COVID and the sanctions and the decrease in productivity and decrease in illegal trading and legal trading for that matter. All that combines to create a situation whereby negotiations and leading to sanctions relief is a real possibility. Possibly is a darker one, right? And so don't know what direction Kim Jong-un is going to take. We have to be ready for the darker possibility, but we ought to encourage and support the more positive. So do you think like in that view, like the U.S. is just going to keep trying, but we're just going to be in the situation where we're nominally still trying, but we just come to the acceptance that North Korea will never give up its necks? Yeah, I don't know. I mean, you know, that's looking in the future. And if I said yes to that, it'd be a defeats kind of a look, right? So I think we should continue to try until Kim Jong-un takes that darker path or we come to the realization that nothing is going to work. And if we come to that realization, Kim Jong-un might be driven to that darker path, right? So you might have an inverse causing effect thing going here. So I think we continue to try and we continue, and South Korea for sure is trying. I mean, President Moon and his team are out there, you know, trying to figure out how to bring Kim Jong-un back to the table and how to provide some relief for the North Korean people that don't run a file of the United Nations sanctions. And so, you know, they're trying really hard. China would like the tensions on the peninsula to be reduced and sanctions to be relieved. Well, I mean, you know, we've said what it's going to take for sanctions to be relieved, to be reduced, eliminated even. So, you know, it's right now, it's up to Kim Jong-un. You know, it always is at the end of the day, I suppose, but more so than ever. You know, the arms are open arms are extended, you know, at the height of the of the short range of provocations during the during the Trump administration after Hanoi, even after the snap summit at Pyeong at Pyeongchang. And even with all of that, President Trump extended the open hand and not the closed fist to Kim Jong-un. So, and so the door is open. He has to walk through it though, you know, we can't reach out there and grab him and drag him through it. So he's going to have to walk through it. Okay. Thank you so much for answering that. I will ask a final question unless anyone has any objections. I think I think we're good. I think it's time for one last question. My question is more of a broader, more not necessarily predictive but just more general question. How would you describe do you think the trajectory of US Korean relations and also especially Korean and Japanese relations and how do you think that this relation will evolve in the future not necessarily how it could get better but how when you say Korean and you mean South Korea North Korea. Yeah, sorry, I mean South Korea. Yes. You know, as I, as I really said in my remarks, you know, any, any co equal relationship over seven decades is going to have its ups and downs and Korea today is completely different than Korea. In 1953, and throughout the 60s and 70s, and most of the 80s. I mean Korea has been a democracy only since the late 80s, which is kind of hard to believe right I mean you know I look at the picture behind me I look at Korea I think wow, Korea has always been democracy has not been. There was only until the late 80s that it became a democracy so it's a young democracy. The relationship with Korea in that sense has had its ups and downs on the on the alliance sense the military alliance security alliance. You know at the heart of military relationship between the rock armed forces and the US armed forces manifested primarily by US forces Korea. Korea has been extremely close and extremely strong. And now we're at the point, you know, at one time, the US four star had command of had an operation control of everything that the rock armed forces did you know peace time and more time. And that's being looked at to have a path toward returning operation control of the Korean military and more time to the Koreans, and that the combined forces commander the commander who's responsible for us and Korean forces would shift to a Korean general at some point in time. And so, you know, that's how far the military relationship has grown over time and all in a positive way. Now the second part of the question, are you is it US Japan or our okay Japan. Okay, Japan. Yeah, so it's on a batch trajectory right now. The military relationship is good I mean, you know, Japanese forces and military forces and Korean military forces interact a lot. You know, globally, you know, they're in the Gulf of Aden counter piracy North Arabian Sea, maritime security operations there together, not, not, not working in one for the other, but they're working in the same water space, you know same regional area together and they work together really well. So they share a lot of common systems, right he just just strike fighter. All a lot of common systems so the military and military relationship is good, but the military to military relationship is hampered of course, in a democracy or respected in a democracy by the national relationships. The military relationship in my view today is on a downward trajectory. So, and we're encouraging both countries to stop, stop the downward trend, and, you know, come back up together because of the shared interest share threats share concerns, and all that kind of stuff. I'm not pleased with the direction that I see Japan, Korea relations today. Okay, thank you so much. And thank you for joining us this evening. Yeah, everybody. Thank you everybody for coming. What you're doing. Thanks for all that you're doing. All right. Have a good night, everyone.