 My name is Matt Fiddler. I'm here with Mark Webber Tobias. We're from security.org I'm a security researcher. Mark will give you his background But the talk today is things that go bump in the night and it's really an analysis of Bumping as a technique and as a new old threat As the introduction said I'm a lawyer, but I'm a security specialist. I wrote several law enforcement textbooks Probably the most well-known is lock safes and security Which is a treatise on the subject in my former life? I was chief of our organized crime unit in South Dakota with the Attorney General's office now. I travel around the world working with Clients looking at bypass mainly of high security locks, but of locking systems and security systems mainly in the physical world not in the logical world. I leave that to you guys and We find Problems bugs glitches that many of the manufacturers are not aware of should be but they're not Because the design engineers in the world learn how to make things work But they don't they don't learn how to break them and you can't design products if you don't know how to break them So I spend most of my time now. I do practice law, but most of my time lecturing and Working for various clients Figuring out ways to get into things. I'm not supposed to be able to And today we're going to talk about bumping in the context of a real physical security threat you folks have IT responsibility many of you and are Voisted with physical security responsibilities to protect your infrastructure A lot of you probably don't know or not really familiar with what we're going to talk about today We've received some media coverage on it of late Newsweek did a story this week and Posted on my website is a very detailed analysis of bumping as a threat to security I'd encourage all you to read it. There's also the legal issues involved in the United States You can download the PDFs. You should also look on Barry Wells website tool T zero T O O O L dot NL For additional information Barry's been really the leader in Europe on this issue And I've been shuttling back and forth It really hasn't received any traction in America until now I think that's going to change as of tomorrow and so we'll go through our PowerPoint and Matt Yeah, so we'll hold questions to the end again The PowerPoint is really going to go with a brief history of picking locks Now we're going to go into or of locks in general and then we're going to demonstrate What what bumping is the theoretical application of bumping? We'll go into some case examples that I think you'd be pretty shocked at we have some videos to show you and And I guess first of all if we can just get a show of hands of how many people know how to pick locks Well, that's a pretty good turnout Yeah, okay, and how many of you all have bumped open a lock? Wow quite a few but not really that many Yeah, exactly so it's another show of hands prior to the convention and the lockpick village and everything great That's been going on how many people know how to bump or pick locks Still pretty good. Yeah, okay. That's pretty good and Okay, so that works and And Basically the premise today is that you all need to understand the physical security risks So you can make your own security assessment not the architect not the purchasing agent not Not anybody that doesn't know anything about locks and security locks are the primary Security level there's a lot of layers, but locks are really probably the first one And so y'all need to understand so you can make your own risk assessments Not the locksmiths you're dealing with because they won't tell you most of them anyway So Matt so so briefly there's just want to review the types of locks that are available out there There's warded locks Typically you see these locks on barns or outdoors. There's no springs So warded locks tend to function well in outdoor environments hundred year old hotels use them also exactly Lever locks primarily used in Europe Wavefront disc tumbler you'll find these in your cubicles your overhead compartments storage bins Saves very inexpensive safes on pin tumbler locks primarily in the US It represents about 90 95 percent of all the locks that you'll use on a daily basis There's the hybrid locks combination locks that that employ multiple facets of lock technologies And again lever locks very common in Europe. We don't see a much Except for safety deposit boxes here all safety deposit boxes or lever locks And then again pin tumblers comprising 90 plus 95 percent and pin tumblers what we're really talking about today so 4,000 years ago the pin tumbler was developed in Egypt and then it was forgotten about and the original pin tumbler in Egypt is totally different than what it is today in the in about 1860 mr. Yale Figured out that if you put two pins in a chamber rather than one like 4,000 years before you had a very small very secure lock So that's where all this came from So the modern pin tumbler lock. There's always at least two pins in each chamber As Matt said they can bribe comprised 95 percent of the locks in the United States today and a lot in Europe They you can be found in all security applications and again, they're all based on the original Yale design There's billions of them and so to tell you how many just billions So in a perfect world locks can't cannot be opened without the correct key or code But the reality is there's just level of difficulties to opening these locks Either through physical destructive forced entry or covert methods of entry which which we'll discuss right and in my world I don't deal with forced entry very often. I teach it, but I don't deal with it My thing is covert and surreptitious entry So there's essentially no trace. You don't know somebody was there Which is the big problem, especially in information security if you don't know it's compromised. You can have a serious problem Yes, so covert venture methods of entry we have picking which obviously a lot of you know if you don't know about it go up to skybox 206 in the lockpick village tomorrow Impressioning is a technique using multiple mediums to take an existing key and Manufacturer a key from it or by introducing something into a key way to impression a lock and decode a key decoding again multiple methods of bypass There's been a lot of talk Over the last couple years about extrapolation of the top-level master key mark. Do you want to go with you? Yeah? Two and a half years ago Matt blaze at AT&T now with the University of Pennsylvania Really exposed this issue. He's really a cryptographer that's in the locks. I'm sure many of you know who he is Matt talked to me and we ended up in the New York Times basically Almost every master key system in this country can be compromised by a 15-year-old kid There and then they'll own your facility I don't like picking locks anymore if I don't have to I'd much rather Compromise the master key system have one key and I get to go anywhere I want and I know that I'm gonna get there now there's some There's some caveats with this and if you use the right kind of locks This is not true but Standard conventional pin tumbler locks if you're using them on your facilities you need to understand that they can be easily and Covertly compromised so that you can derive the top-level master key that'll open up every door in the facility now This is based on the availability of blanks Or keys that can be cut, but I also should tell you in my world We have little machines that we can take a photograph of keyways and go back and generate a milled blank That'll open your lock and so you do need to pay attention to this vulnerability As well as decoding impressioning and picking So we're going to talk about bumping today, but but all the above methods including bumping require all pins To move together and create a shear line And separate so that a cylinder will turn and the lock will open And and again much like picking it requires a tension wrench or turning Tension of the key to to allow that plug to turn and as we'll discuss that the issue is Is the skill that's required in picking as opposed to other forms of bypass So you need some prior intelligence as Mark talked about with master keys. You need to have access to the keys one of the keys in the system potentially there may be sidebars and sidebars is in a combination locking technique an additional mechanism that Is employed to either provide for key control or additional security And let me ask question. How many of you if you know use medical in your facilities? Do you know? Not that many. How about Schlage Primus? more These locks use sidebars how many use ASSA Not many at all Medical probably has the largest market share in the country in the high security market. I would estimate 70% they started it Schlage Primus is right behind them These locks use sidebars as we'll show you and they're essentially secure with some caveats So as Mark mentioned keyway information can yield a lot of Details about a lock leveraging an easy entry machine with a picture of a key or the keyway We can create a key. So that's you know our prior intelligence another method of opening is identifying blanks Or producing copies your own your own self Simulating the key clam shelling the key impressioning Manipulating components. There's a whole host of techniques To cut or produce your own key now you need to understand one of the techniques that we use is with silicone if I have your key for for Two minutes I can generate a copy of that key. I don't care whether it's restricted Basically, I don't care what the key is you could make a copy of it And so there's serious threats if you give other people your keys and don't park your cars and leave your key ring in the car So we're just going to talk about what a key is in a couple slides. We have a pretty good graphic that depicts what a key is The keyway is the opening obviously that the key is inserted the bidding is the actual cuts on the key Whether or not there's any secondary locking mechanism like we talked about sidebars checkpins typically used in Schlage Everest other types of locks Not necessarily an additional security component, but an additional component for key control a lot of locks employ interactive components sidebar sliders and Locks like the Eva MCS Introduced magnetics into their lock So this is really Mark and I's mantra for Vulnerabilities and exposures associated with locks and it's the 3t to our philosophy time tools and training and then repeatability and reliability and if all of these factors are low I E I can Pick or bypass or bump a lock very shortly under a minute I don't require any additional specialized tools and I can teach an 11 year old girl in five minutes How to how to bypass this? Repeatedly and reliably then we have a significant exposure Go ahead So we'll talk about bumping the threat will identify bump keys We'll go through a graphic talk about the term 999 where it came from how to train someone The difficulties making keys. There are some considerations. You need to know to produce bump keys Can you leverage bumping for covert entry? Again, is it something that's easy to learn and we have it now? Yeah, so why is bumping really relevant? It's a it's a new old threat. It was actually developed in Denmark about 25 years ago And it's you know as we said recently come of age from 2004 in the Netherlands With Barry Wells and his work. So how do we focus? How do we crystallize? Why this is relevant? This afternoon I was in the lock-picking village There was an 11 year old girl who's now figured out locks are an intellectual challenge Jenna Lynn she's in the third row stand up she's this This little girl is the star of the show today She opened a quick set and a couple other locks She really doesn't understand the process yet. She will But she opened the locks and she opened them in a few seconds From a legal standpoint from a risk standpoint. That's a serious problem. That's why we're here today And so actually I'm just kind of itching to ask The CEO of quick set just exactly. What is the term maximum security on your packaging mean? Now does that mean that a 10 year old can't open it But an 11 year old can because I'm sure all the consumers would like that question answered So this is a picture of a bump key Again, you need a key that fits the lock that you're going to be bumping and all the cuts as in this picture indicate our cut to code For their deepest allowable depth the 999 key terminology came out of Denmark 25 years ago There were some locksmiths there that found that keys duplicated by code Well the the deepest depth is in Denmark with their most popular lock Which is where I learned to bump is a 9 so the numbers ran 0 to 9 and you have to understand all of the manufacturers code each Depth increment for the pins with a number so that keys can be replicated by number not by a physical key So if I have your code number off your keys, I don't need your key All I need to know what the blankie is or the key way I can go make a key So some locksmiths figured out that if you took a key and cut all the the cuts down to nines stuck it in the lock and and applied energy you could open it That's where it started So and that's that's why we call it a 999 key or a percussion key or a code 12 key But it's all the same thing right and that and at that time they weren't Employing hammers or any striking method. They were actually striking the key on a desk Right, this is when they had a cylinder that was locked that they had to open quickly They didn't want to pick it they slammed it on the desk or their tabletop with a special blank or whatever they opened it So here's our graphic that depicts Basically the lock components the key that's in here is not actually a 999 key You see varying depths of cuts in the bidding, but it's descriptive of The type of cuts that you need to make so here we have I don't know if you can see my mouse moving here Yeah, probably this is the deepest cut allowable for this lock per code So there's really two components of cutting this that is the depth So in this case it's zero through nine and the spacing Between the cuts that need to be applied There's two methods of bumping the legacy or old method is one of just creating a 999 key with no other Modifications to the lock the new method that's really been reinvigorated by Barry Wells and tool is the negative shoulder method and in the negative shoulder method a Little bit of material is milled off or ground off the shoulder of the key right here About a point two mill along with a little bit off the front of the key And in this case a negative shoulder method allows you to insert the key into the cylinder and just begin wrapping the key Applying tension turning lock and opening it this legacy method by not trimming down the shoulder or the tip requires you to pull Out the key and there's certain locks that you'll identify through practice and trial and error that Respond better or worse to either the negative shoulder or the legacy method So training you know what's really required you need to again understand how to position that key Where it needs to be placed if you have a negative shoulder lock or it's the the legacy method How much force is needed and the reality is it's it's very little The common correlation I hear is the amount of tension that it takes to turn on a light switch So you're applying very little tension to the key as you're turning And applying some kinetic energy or bump to to the lock and then ultimately how to reliably repeat this process There are some difficulties making keys There's the availability of the keys whether or not the keys are restricted Any key however can be modified to to fit your lock So if you're an apartment complex your key to your apartment Assuming all the other the other apartments in the complex have the same lock When configured as a bump key will open every key in the complex Yeah, it's not like a master key if a master key system is designed properly then There's one at least one cut above all the change key cuts So either you build up the key with solder or whatever, but it's not quite so simple Otherwise change keys are not supposed to be modified to master keys in the bump key environment This is totally different any key can be made into a bump key You have a slide in there on where we get the keys. Oh, yeah, we do yeah So covert entry via bumping obviously there can be noise There have been some techniques that have been published as of late of bumping Really wrapping with your fingers or the palm of your hand to reduce the noise It's not very repeatable or reliable, but I have seen it accomplished. So you are going to produce noise Obviously covert entry depending on the condition of the lock if you go up to the lock picking village We have some demo locks that you can bump But you'll realize quickly that some of them have been been pretty much beat to shit and the pins are smashed The springs are gone and they're not opening But as our 11 year old proved sometimes only one strike is required And I should make a note that and maybe we have a slide but security pins mushroom pins The number of pins Restricted key ways it doesn't have anything to do with bump resistance Spring bias. There's a whole host nothing into it So again, it's trivial to learn and we'll demonstrate this we have some videos of a reporter opening a lock But there are variables that do affect bumping, you know I talked about the condition of the the lock availability of the blanks There are restricted blanks that you just can't get anywhere. Do you want to talk about that mark? There are restricted blanks and for example the medico m3 with it's goddess. How many guys know what the m3 is? Few okay the m3 is a standard biaxial medical it came out last year it extended their patent another 17 years 20 years, I guess It's got a side projection on the side that that drives a little slider that provides a third layer of security This blank you're not going to get Obviously if you really go to a lot of work, but that's not what we're talking about here You can come up with it, but it is a seriously restricted and patented key way The Everest blank with Schlagg that's integrated into Primus That's very difficult. There are some keys that are very difficult, but The availability of most blanks for most locks is not a difficult problem So we talked about secondary locking mechanisms with With medico with Primus there are noise tolerances spring conditions or by biases that definitely affect the locks Lubrication, you know if it's a really old lock if the springs are all gummed up If someone's attempted to use something like WD 40 or something else that should never be used in lock You're gonna have trouble opening it and one question I get asked are new locks easier than older locks to bump open There's it's not much difference although new locks. I find it pretty easy I mean because they're not there's no where issues or they open So, you know one of the big variables is whether or not you have concerns over forensic indication a lock That's bumped singly in one hit Pretty much yields. No forensic indication of opening Again our locks that we have up in the village have clear indication of opening via bumping Yeah, okay, but it's a key that fits the lock and it will open the lock. So Initially, there's little or no damage over time. There's excessive wear and tear and excessive damage Whether or not you have depths and spacing info info for the key blank that you're producing for bumping The majority of this information for all the keys is available on the internet It's publicly available information and for depth and spacing, but the reality is you can produce these keys yourself by eye So, you know from a vulnerability perspective, it's it's pretty severe. That's the problem. It's not difficult and that's the risk On the shoulder and tip modifications. We spoke about certain locks that require a negative shoulder method You know, you're going to have better luck with the legacy method on some and negative shoulder on others and through trial and error You'll be able to figure that out whether or not the lock manufacturers introduce solid cams at the end to negatively affect bumping or If they've deployed anti bump mechanisms shallow pin cuts There's a whole host of things popping up on the market in Europe not yet in the US That we've seen yeah, this is going to be a huge retrofit problem It's a little different between software and mechanical locks and you know, as I said There's probably a billion locks in this country. And so this isn't going to be a quick fix misinformation Not all locks can be bumped open Because of all the publicity in Europe Everybody might think that every lock can be open especially because of the stuff on German television Not exactly and if you all read the white paper that's on our site It'll really go into detail on on myths and reality as far as bumping At the end of the day 95% of the pin tumbler locks can be bumped open But you still have to secure the key that will go into the keyway And and herein lies one of the issues we'll get into in a couple minutes the legal issues here If you're provided a pre-cut code cut bump key So all the depth and spacing is correct exactly Then that locks going to probably be open unless there's some mechanical problem with it and this is the problem So basically you need to understand Pin tumbler locks conventional locks that are not sidebar driven or or otherwise that is Primus, Medico, ASA They're going to be opened and so if you're a facility if you have facility security Responsibility you need to pay attention to the locks that you have in your facility. Yes So just another quick show of hands. How many CIS SPs are out here? Quite a few one of the ten domains obviously that that you know is physical security and you're responsible as an IT professional Sarbanes oxley GLBA HIPAA all have Components in them pointing to physical security And that security is just not in the virtual world. So You're responsible and you need to take heed of this writing So, you know, we talked about 90 95 percent. What does that mean? That's your apartment your office buildings hotels elevators colleges mailboxes Postal service it really goes on and on and I guess the question we want to pose to you. Is it really a threat? We believe it is So we're going to show you a case example. We did some research Both mailboxes, etc. And the UPS store along with in the United States post office post office rental boxes Yeah, and let me just talk about this real quickly I looked at the postal service and and actually Brought this issue to the attention of the postal inspector where I live and in it rapidly got escalated There's about five million rental post offices boxes in America and more on our military bases worldwide These are all subject to bumping in seconds So then the postal inspector said well, what are you picking on us for once you got your UPS? Says well, why don't I do both of you? And so I went and rented a Mailboxes, etc. A box in Sioux Falls and then went and bumped that open no problem We'll go through that the the takes by the two groups are very different the postal inspection service instantly grasped the problem and I dealt with them for three months and I've trained some of their people and so We talked and I didn't publish until They they said okay, you know, we're on this issue It's going to take them a long time to deal with this, but they're going to deal with it UPS mailboxes, etc. They've taken the attitude that as they were quoted in Newsweek this week We don't have a problem. We've been in this business 26 years And it's not an issue. Well, I would differ with them. It hasn't been an issue It may be we want to prevent it from becoming one and so obviously there are millions of mailbox users at risk for identity theft surveillance of male unlawful interception or Interjection of dangerous substances or explosives. This is the issue. Don't tell me your Mac I don't know I get a demo program. That's okay. Not a Mac Okay, so keep going all right So obviously there's 38,000 locations Mark mentioned five plus million mailboxes It is a threat the the reality is the Post office along with mailboxes mailboxes, etc. And UPS are protecting your mail with $1 lock Yeah, I mean we I've talked to the vendor that makes locks for both the postal service and and mailboxes, etc This is a picture of the Mailboxes, etc. A lock. It's a cheap lock. That's made in China. It's less than a dollar They're not going to change it at least as of right now and this is what they think will protect your mail I don't think so. That's my opinion. These can be opened in seconds as you'll see So this was UPS mailbox mailboxes, etc. Response that they take from a security perspective That they they take security very seriously And their security individuals felt that it was a real problem. However, the PR folks their response was absolutely ridiculous They said we know our customers Both mark and I as part of this exercise rented mailboxes at UPS mailboxes, etc They have no clue who I am. No, they don't want to know who he is And so they then they said that because they lock the facilities But they give everybody a key and in the case where I live It was a Schlag see key way that you can go duplicate at the hardware store And they never changed the lock because that would be a logistical nightmare with all their clients So the bottom line is there is no real security So not only could we bump the mailboxes, but we could bump open the front doors. Yeah, right Go, I mean and again, they have no plans to to upgrade this. This is currently UPS mailboxes, etc's position This is the postal service lock again, not much better than UPS It's a $1 lock. Yeah, it's yeah, it's a couple dollar lock. It's you know, it's not a bad lock But it's a conventional pin tumbler lock. It's a restricted key way But God love our government you can go on eBay and buy the locks and the keys Because they're surplus doubt from our military bases and so You know, it's a restricted key way granted. It's a felony to break into a post office box But that hasn't stopped the identity thieves There's a huge problem with keys to collection boxes and major cities getting out They're selling for anywhere from $50 to $6,000 and the real problem is those keys will also get you into a Apartment buildings because they have keykeepers for the mailman to get into every building to drop the mail off And so it's a serious serious security problem. The postal service is addressing that Actually with Medico, but it's all part of the same picture Right. So as Mark said, you know when we first started this exercise Obviously, there's federal statutes for key control on these these keys and we're like oh shit How are we going to get these locks and enter eBay? So no problem. It's pretty nice But again, every key can become a bump key So if you create a bump key for a single post office, you have access. Yeah to every single Yeah, and then and you go rent a box This is the problem that I pointed out to him you go rent a box that give you keys you modify it It's a bump key. All right So the postal services response was much better than UPS mailboxes, etc They were aware of the problem. They are going to upgrade the locks. They're going to ensure security It is a huge task and it's going to be very expensive for them So before we go into legal issues, we just want to show you a quick video and if I can get this sound, okay That sounds good Everybody has a key that has to access their box on a 24 hour a day It's a standard bump key that's been cut for this lock. These are produced by a variety of vendors But as you'll see it's a few seconds to open it up I'm a box runner at this facility. So I have a key to enter That was opened in It's a $1 lock These are typical of mailbox, etc Locations throughout the United States and around the world And they are not secure Now obviously that's my opinion And and as you can see it's open that's a that's a USPS box lock that's used everywhere And it's open and as you can see in one wrap that was open This is the CBS affiliate for our state reporters And this reporter did it in just a few seconds Did you get it? Yeah, there you go Wow Yeah, wow We I figure if we get enough media attention, they're going to change some some statutes to deal with this issue in the Manufacturers some of which I deal with on a regular basis are going to pay attention Some the folks I deal with they are paying attention to this the problem is they have an embedded base of millions and millions of Locks to deal with so we're trying to get through this quickly Talk about current statutes trafficking and pre-cut bump keys. We'll show you some sites today They're actually selling bump keys on the internet Whether or not the manufacturers are liable for knowingly Producing locks that could be bumped open and what are the insurance companies doing if you suffer a loss via bumping? So current statutes mark. Yeah, there's several federal statutes We'll all summarize these pretty quick the mail statutes control what's mailable and non mailable through the post office UPS DHL basically anything in interstate commerce. So all these sites That are selling bypass tools picks whatever The statute actually says they can't send them to anybody but certain classes of individuals that is locksmiths Car repossessors manufacturers this statute was written originally about 70 years ago. It's way out of date It specifically excludes bump keys the way I read the statute All keys are exempted which is a problem for you folks Because there's a lot of websites now that are popping up selling pre-cut bump keys for specific keyways And so I'm dealing with the postal service for them to look at changing these statutes to control this a little more To folks that need to have these keys by the way law enforcement isn't included in this so they can't buy these either So maybe spoke about traffic again bump keys our position is that bump keys should be restricted Everyone should not be able to buy these they should be restricted to locksmiths Security professionals researchers involved in identifying vulnerabilities and exposures But average citizens should not have access yet. You can go to lockpicks.com Purchase a bump hammer and bump key for the good price of twenty six dollars or Holly lock supply and Get arrow quickset master national wiser Westlock Titan Yale a whole host of keys Ready ship to your house for forty four and you're ready to open the locks So these are available today, and they're not currently Covered by the statutes. We think this is a significant problem Manufacturers you want to go manufacturers liability in two minutes I don't know that they have any but my suggestion is and I've recommended it to the folks I do work for I think the packaging on the lower level locks ought to tell the public That there is a problem the public needs to understand the vulnerability So they can make the assessment and the decision whether there's a security issue And they can decide to accept the risk or buy more expensive locks if you spend the money You can get locks that cannot be bumped open, but the everybody ought to know about it And that's why we're here today go So if you suffer a loss if you must show proof of entry Then thefts may not be recoverable your insurance carrier may not Bind coverage for that. Yeah, this is going to change because this whole issue now is coming to the front It has in Europe already and again in some cases insurance clauses require forensic evidence And as we demonstrated early or spoke about forensic indication for single Instance bumping is not evident right So really this is the end of our talk if you I don't know if we have time for questions or not We have about 10 minutes a couple links here. We have the links to the bumping paper Along with a detailed write-up on the legal implications Also go out to tool.nl For additional information on bumping locks, and I'll be glad to talk to anybody offline. So we'll Matt any questions Thank you You've given an excellent presentation, but you've done everything to tell us how Bumping causes the pins to align along the shear line. Oh, it's my friend Isaac Newton from 350 years ago The key actually makes contact with the base of each pin when you strike the key The energy is transmitted to the bottom pin the top pin Splits just like pool balls on a pool table. So you hit the left one the right one moves They split and there's nothing to stop the plug from rotating. It's pretty simple next For people who are trying to learn more about this This type of sport or hobby and security and locks in general other than websites Do you have any ideas on where people can get books and other resources reading my book? Lock safes and security the multimedia edition. I actually brought some of them here that if you really want to know about this That's the reference a Comment and a question and for my PO boxes if somebody gets the wrong mail they just stick it in the door So you don't need a key sounds good and also yeah, it's great and also have you tested Graphite lube for difficult to bump locks. Yeah, it doesn't affect it really. Thank you next What about on like car doors because I've locked my keys in my car a whole bunch And I have to use a coat hanger can car door locks not the ignition just the door Not unless they're pin tumbler most of them are laser track now and you won't bump those or any older wafer locks Yeah, if they're wafer locks, you're not gonna bump them open. Thank you next You mentioned that these kind of locks is kind of one or two dollars, right? How much would it cost to replace one with something that's of adequate security per lock? Actually, you could put a wafer lock in that may present other issues, but it's not going to be bumped open from this threat Listen for five dollars seven dollars eight dollars. It would be quite adequate I represent a client in Europe that makes a slider lock You're never gonna bump that open and they're you know six seven euros. Okay. Thanks next When I moved into my apartment complex They specifically made a point of saying that the keys are more secure because there is a second a Second set of ridges along the at the side of the key right and I was wondering if that how that factors into this Discussion it depends depends if it's medico or ossa primus. It is not Who is it? You know, you know, I actually don't have the key with me right now I'd have to look at it. I but you know, it can make it more difficult But if you have those that ridge pattern, then you're probably gonna open it Okay, thanks This is an ossa and these some of these can be open Next you given some examples of strong commercial locks for commercial installations, but what about for consumers who are looking to Secure their homes medico and primus You can buy either you can buy them. They're just expensive They are expensive I just built a house and I chose to put medico m3s in all the doors Obviously, they're still, you know thieves still get in through the windows, but right anybody else No, thanks so much. Thank you very much everybody. It was a pleasure say