 Okay, good morning. So, Wittgenstein on following a rule. What I'm doing in these classes is only meant to be complimenting you guys reading this. There's no way I'm going to cover every single thing, or even most of the points of interest that come up. But as I said, I think there is one main point he's making all the way through these central passages of the investigations. I'm really just going to try and work through that. Once you get that, I think it's possible to work through the investigations and see lots of interesting incidental points that he's making. So let's start out looking at what he says about the connection between understanding a sign and having an image in your mind. It's anyone's first thought that understanding a sign is a matter of having an image in your mind. One way of thinking of what is general question here is to frame it as the question what keeps us all together? How does it come about that we all use words in much the same ways as one another? And using the words here has two aspects to it. One aspect is we all use the same words in response to the same objects. So what makes us say horse, what makes us say cow, we respond in the same objects in pretty much the same way. And we draw the same conclusions from a particular word applying to an object. Another basic framing question is how can there be such a thing as getting it right or wrong in your use of a word? And the natural way, the idea is that what connects these two issues is a notion of understanding. It's because we all understand the word in the same way that we all stay together in how we apply the word in particular occasions and what conclusions we draw from the word having been applied to an object. And it's because we all understand the word in the same way that there is such a thing as it's all getting it right or wrong. Your understanding of the word gives you knowledge of what has to be so for the word to apply to a thing. So it's when you understand the word, when you have the word in your vocabulary, so you know what's meant by the word in particular occasions when it's used. The key notion here is understanding. And then it's natural to think of understanding as a matter of having a picture before your mind. So if you're going to understand the word cube, then what is it to understand the word cube? Well, to understand the word cube, what you need is to have a picture of a cube in your head. And of course, sometimes you can explicitly define words in terms of other words, but when you come to these simple terms that aren't defined in terms of others, then for terms applying to concrete objects anyway, the idea that having the image in your head is a key thing is very natural. And then you'd explain what keeps us all together as being a matter of us all having the same picture in our head or relevantly similar picture in our head that we associate with the word cube. And that picture also tells you what has to be true of an object for the word cube to apply to it. So the use of the word will be right if the object fits the picture and wrong otherwise. And the biggest basic point here is that these images in the mind can't tell you how to use the word. They can't tell you what it is to get it right or wrong in your use of the word. I see a picture. It represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick. How does it do that? Well, might it not have looked just the same if he had been sliding downhill in that position? Pictures are inherently indeterminate as to what they're telling you about what's going on. Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture as the old man sliding downhill. I mean maybe on Mars that's just the way it works. Maybe the hills are just full of old guys sliding gracefully down a hill with the aid of their sticks. And so that's the natural way for a Martian to interpret the picture. It's not like that for us. Old guys walking up the steep paths leaning on a stick are usually struggling to get up the thing. But that really, the picture itself doesn't contain that information. The picture itself doesn't tell you which state of affairs is being shown. It's the context of the picture that's the important thing. So when you have the picture of a cube, the picture of a cube could suggest a certain way of using it to you. But that is only a suggestion. The important thing is the context. You could have that same picture being used in a different context and used in a quite different way so that someone using that picture might be applying the word cube to quite different objects than you do. So what is essential to see is that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application can still be different. So you see the picture of the old man walking up the hill with a stick. You have the picture of the cube. And if the context is different, if the use that you make of the picture is different, then the picture has a different meaning. It doesn't really matter what the intrinsic content of the picture is. All that really matters is the context. So the picture can't be what fixes when it's right or wrong to use the word. So it can't be right to say that when you use the word, you're trying to keep faith with the picture. Pictures of themselves can't determine the standards of rightness or wrongness for the uses of terms. And you might try this. This would be quite a picture, but you have a cube. I mean, let's say you have a square and you say, well, okay, I agree. I take the point that when you just draw this thing, that's indeterminate. So what meaning that's giving to the sine square. But you might say, well, look, I have a more complex picture in my head. I have not just the square. I have the square plus the method of projection. So when I see an external object, I've got to be able to project this one onto it like that. Something like that. You see what I mean? So let's say you have that in your head. So in your head, what you have is not just a picture of a square, but the picture of an object onto which the picture in your head is being projected. And that will tell you how to use the word square. But Wiggenstein says, does that really get me any further? Because obviously, you can imagine different applications of this schema, too. I mean, what, after all, is that telling you a Martian might have the very same picture in their head and interprets it quite differently. So when you think about what the implication of this is, the implication is there's only the use. All that's going on is, in certain contexts, you will apply the word to particular objects. You will draw particular conclusions from the use of that word in those contexts. That's true for each of us. And that leaves the puzzle then. How is it, how can you make the distinction between getting it right or wrong in your use of a word? And how is it happening that we all use the word in the same way? These basic problems have still not been addressed. We've eliminated the picture, but the framing questions are still there, plain enough. There's a very striking remark he makes at paragraph 15, section 154 of the investigations. He says, try not to think of understanding as a mental process at all, for that's the expression which confuses you. Thinking that understanding is the process that what goes on in your head when you comprehend a word. Ask yourself, in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances do we say, now I know how to go on? So if someone's teaching you the use of a word like read or add one, and you say, okay, now I get it. So what's happened then when you say, now I get it? In the sense in which there are processes, including mental processes, or characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process. That's a really puzzling remark. You might have thought that whatever understanding is surely something going on in your mind when you hear a word. But he's saying, well, what goes on when you say, now I get it? You might have something like a light intake of breath. You might say, I can do this to yourself. But those things are not themselves, the understanding. They're at best accompaniments of the understanding. What he means by a mental process is, something going through your stream of consciousness, some idea like that is what he's talking about. Something running through your mind. And what's running through your mind might be a lot of stuff like, I can't believe it took me so long to see what this word means, or I can do this, or this is easy. But these are not themselves, these are characteristic of understanding that you have those things running through your head. But the understanding itself is not one of the things running through your head. And that's really paradoxical and something that he spends a lot of time on, that it seems when you first come to understand a word, when you finally get what a word means, it's as if you could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash. Suddenly, the complete use of the word is available to you and you say, now I can go on. But remember this diagram from last time. This is my main contribution to Wittgenstein pedagogy, this diagram. So I hope you can bear to look at this one more time. So the point here is you've got a teacher, you've got a student, the teacher saying, a successor, add one. What that means is you go zero, one, two, three, four, I give you some examples. And then the natural picture is that in a flash, the student suddenly gets it. He's adding one, that's what he's doing. And then the whole use is laid out and the people can now march triumphantly on down saying, yes, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and so on. Guided by this understanding. This is the thing you get in a flash. This is the thing, the mental process of understanding when the rule suddenly comes into your mind and tells you how to use the sign. And the basic point about this is that that thing that goes through your mind can do no work. The way Wittgenstein was putting it just now for the images is that the image is ambiguous, the image is consistent with you going on in any way you like. And similarly, the rule here is consistent with you going on in any way you like. If the pupil suddenly starts going 96, 97, 104, 3, 22, 437, the people may insist, but that's the rule. I am just following the rule. You are not following the rule anymore. And just as with the images, what this is telling you is that that's not what's doing the work, is only the rule in context. But once you see that, you see too that it's actually the context that is doing all the work. If the student and the pupil manage to keep in step, if they both manage to use the words in the same ways, it doesn't really matter what's going on in the student's head. It doesn't really matter what's going on in the teacher's head. The important thing is the use is the same, not some mental process. So if you say what is understanding, it's not some process of grasping x plus 1 and then all this, just how you use the words in particular cases. That's just a consequence of that. Rather understanding the word, it just is a matter of being able to use the word in all these cases. There's nothing that lies behind the use of the word in particular cases that is telling you how to go on. You just do it. And we all do, in fact, use the words in the same ways. And that really is the end of the story. There is nothing more going on than that. So understanding is something that can't be exhibited in a flash. Understanding is something that consists in the ability to go on in the right way. That's all, but that's not something you get in a flash. That's not a matter of something going through your head. And similarly for, this is blue, that's blue, that's blue. All that matters is that the teacher and the pupil, in fact, apply the words to the same objects. If you have an image of blue in your mind and you say that's the mental process, that's the important thing, you can actually dispense with it. Yeah. So, yeah. Yes, right. You're just making trouble. Right. I see. So one possibility is that I understand perfectly well what blue means. Yeah. And by that you mean I get the image in my head. Yeah. And then I say, but I'm not going to do it right. Yeah. Is that it? So, yeah. Right. So there are two different pictures you could have of what's going on here. One is I've got it and that consists of me having the image of blue. But how I actually use the word is all wrong. Yeah. But I think what you want for your case is actually a little bit different because this description would fit someone like this guy. Yeah. This guy's got X plus one in his head, but what he does is all wrong. But this guy really doesn't understand. Yeah. You want someone who case by case gets it right. This is blue, that's blue, knows which ones are blue, knows how to apply the word in all the particular cases. It's just that they don't actually use that knowledge, that case specific knowledge. They don't use that to govern what they actually say. That's the case you want. And I agree, of course, that's possible. Yeah. That sounds like a lot of fun. You could do that. Yeah. But the thing is for that to be happening, it doesn't really matter whether the image of blue is there or not. Yeah. What you're describing is a phenomenon that's entirely at the level of the application of the concept of the term in particular cases. Yeah. Anything else on this? So similarly, as you were saying for cube, that the image of a cube doesn't contain within itself instructions as to how to use it. It just drops out. So that understanding here isn't a mental process. All it is is a matter of being able to go on and that isn't any account to be given of what keeps us together or of we do keep together. And that's just the basic fact that civilization depends on. But there's nothing that does the work of keeping us all together. It's important incidentally to see that someone said last time, this is Wittgenstein's subjectivism or something like that. It's important to see that this is not just Wittgenstein's picture that's getting laid out here. This is not Wittgenstein's, I'm not just trying to explain here Wittgenstein's take on things. This is a point that seems to be fundamentally correct. This is just right. What you make of it is it objectivist? Is it subjectivist? That's something that comes later. But don't think of this as Wittgenstein's take on things and you might wonder if it's whether you agree with it or not. This is, how should I put it, it's much more earthy than that. It's a basic datum that Wittgenstein discovered, it seems to me. You don't have to agree with that, but I just want to get straight about what the status is that I think this has. So are we all comfortable with the basic datum here? Datum, fact. Everything was all right until I said datum. Okay, so I just want to go over quickly the thing about custom and practice. It's clear that Wittgenstein thinks that the way you address these questions about what's keeping us together or when you're going right or wrong on your use of a word is by appeal to ideas like custom or practice. You don't have some internal yardstick against which you can measure your use of a word in each particular case. You don't have any internal standard against which your use of the word could be judged. So how can there be such a thing as getting it right or wrong? And the basic, this I think is much less, is much less obvious to me at any rate what is going on in Wittgenstein at this point. What I just stated I think is the datum. What you make of it, what comes next is harder to get for me at any rate. But it's clear that he's saying there's a basic mistake here which is that thinking that the standard of right and wrong is to be found inside of the mind of the person using the sign. Rather, you've got to look outside the person or the customs or practices in which the use of the sign is located. It's not that when someone says, I've got it and then they can go on using the sign, someone you're trying to teach the use of the sign suddenly picks it up and then they can run with a ball. It's not that they've got the right kind of inner state. It is rather that outside that individual there's a set of customs or practices and the individual is now able to join that customer practice. Anything that would be within your mind could only be some kind of process, some content of your stream of consciousness that's letting you interpret the sign. And that interpretation, whether it's an image of the old man with a stick or the picture of the square or a picture of a cube, that whatever it is that process in your stream of consciousness, that itself would have to be understood. And then you think, well, how do I interpret that? How do I explain what X plus 1 means? How do I explain what the picture of the old man with a stick means? If you give just another interpretation, well, that itself would have to be defined. How can a rule show me what to do at this point? Whatever I do is on some interpretation in accord with the rule. By interpretation, he means definition. And so any interpretation is going to hang in the air. Anything that might be running through your stream of consciousness is hanging in the air along with what it interprets and can't give it any support. Interpretations by themselves don't determine meanings. So if you take a signpost, the use of a signpost, when are you using signposts correctly? Well, when there is a regular use of signposts, a custom, then you can be said to be using signposts right or wrong. So the question that remains then is what is it to be using a sign in accord with a custom? We need a little bit of detail as to what a custom is. It's not a matter of just mentally associating the right interpretation with the sign, but what then is it? That's more or less where we left it. So custom is like a semi-technical term that we really need to get a fix on what it means. Is everything clear today? There's something very minimal we can say here about what a custom is. It's clear that if there is going to be a custom of using a word, there have to be more than one case in which the word is used that way. This is taking you very slowly and carefully, right? But you can't have a custom of using a sign in a particular way if it's only used just once in that way. It's what we call obeying a rule, something that would be possible for only one man to do and only once in his life. This is, of course, a note on the grammar of the expression to obey a rule. So if you thought understanding the word a particular way is a matter of what mental process is going on when you use it, then you might think, well, I could have that kind of mental process associated with the sign just once, and I use that word in that way just once. The point is, if you take these basic notions anyway, like red or green, cube, add one, take the successor, then you couldn't have that happening just once. There's nothing running through your mind that's fixing what it means. The only thing that's fixing what it means is the custom in which it's located, and that requires that there be a whole bunch of other uses of the word. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion in which somebody obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion in which a report was made and or they're given or understood. You can see the idea that if you go to, you know, Papua, New Guinea, and deep in some valley, you find a hitherto unknown people, and you start to find out about their language, and they say, oh, we don't go in for orders. You can't give orders in our culture. Once, back in 1960, someone did give an order, but it was so terrible we never repeated it. That's like saying, I don't know, you could have a religious, you could have the idea of a sacrament being administered or some sacred rite being followed just once in history, and the idea is that doesn't make sense. These things only make sense against a much larger background. You can't have only one occasion in which someone gave a report. Since following a rule is not an interpretation, it's not a matter of having something in your stream of consciousness, letting you interpret it. Obeying a rule is a practice. Following a rule in your use of a word is a practice, and thinking you're obeying a rule is not the same thing as obeying a rule. It's not a matter for your individual decision, whether you are not authoritative on whether you got it right in your use of a word. So it's not possible to obey a rule privately. I couldn't have my own secret language in which I use words just the way I like, because if I had my own secret language and I used words just the way I like, then there wouldn't be any such thing as me getting it right or wrong. I don't have the resources inside my own mind to assign meanings to words. Meaning is get assigned to words only in the context of a custom or practice. If I try to do it all on my own, then there will be no saying whether I was getting it right or wrong. My thinking I was obeying the rule would be the same thing as obeying the rule. You just have lost the distinction between getting it right and getting it wrong. But while I think there's some reasonably intuitive, there is a really basic puzzle about this, which is suppose we agree I can't do this thing on my own, I can't have it happen just once, then I use a sign and get it right or wrong. Well, how does having a lot of other cases help? I mean, if you're trying to lift something heavy, if you're trying to lift this table, for example, you might say, well, I can't do that on my own. I need a whole bunch of other people. Then you can see how having other people would help. It's just heavy lifting and you need that physical power to get the thing into the air. But we're right or wrong in the use of a word. I can't on my own generate the existence of standards of rightness or wrongness. You can't on your own generate the existence of standards of rightness or wrongness. But then we get together and we generate many uses of the word, and now there are standards of rightness and wrongness. How did that happen? I mean, what's a custom? The trouble is, it's natural to think of a custom in terms of everyone engaged in the custom having running through their head the same mental process, the same picture as to what they're about in the use of the sign. But that whole picture is what we've just thrown out. So if we throw that out, then what we've left with is something pretty stark. We're just left with many cases in which each of us is applying a word. So where are standards of rightness and wrongness coming in? There must be more to there being a custom than the mere existence of many cases in which we apply a word. We still have, I mean the basic puzzle is where do these standards of rightness or wrongness come from? And we still haven't got it just by saying a custom is when many people or there are many cases of a word being applied. There's something about this. There's some picture in Wittgenstein that there's something about the way a custom is part of our form of life so that we find it natural to use the word in a particular way. The word slots into the rest of human life, slots into our pattern of interest and concern, our sense of humour, our sense of what is an insult, of what is a joke, all that stuff. And it must be part of our whirl of organism in Covell's phrase. But what exactly does that come to? How is that generating the existence of standards of rightness and wrongness? What is the connection between these ideas and the notion of rightness and wrongness? That's the basic puzzle. I want to carry on with a question what exactly is meant by a custom on Friday, but right now I want to say, given that we have a little bit of time, I want to say just how this blows up the whole picture of meaning that we've had so far. And a whole picture of meaning that we've had starting with Frager, Russell, who also we have, Frager, Russell, Sel, Evans, Putnam, Kripke, all these guys, Dretschke, Fodor, everyone is thinking of meaning in terms of truth conditions. The basic way you assign meaning is by assigning conditions for sentences to be true. And what we've been looking at when we were looking at reference is taking that thing, you know the ideas, you know the meaning of Lanage Blanche, when you know that it's true, just as snow is white. So the general notion here is semantic value, that the semantic value of any term in a sentence is how the term contributes to determining the truth or falsity of a sentence containing it. So you've got a sentence like Raleigh Smokes. If you suppose you don't understand the sentence, what do you need to know in order to understand it on this classical picture? Yes? A causal chain. Okay, that's a deeper answer that I really had in mind, but you're right, that is a classical answer. What you really want to get out is what it would take for this sentence to be true. And the way you get it, what it would take for this sentence to be true is you need to know what the object is that the name is referring to. And for Smokes, you need to know what you can think of blank Smokes as a function mapping objects onto truth values. So run lots of different objects through this spot and you get truth values out for each of them. Some of them are master truth, some of them are master falsity. You put somebody Smokes in there and you get truth out, you get somebody who doesn't smoke in there, you get false out. I don't mean anything very complex here, but is that plain enough? Okay, so that's the whole way we were thinking about meaning right up until, right up until we run into Wittgenstein, that for each term there is going to be a semantic value and the whole puzzle is to explain how it is that a term like Raleigh gets hooked up to a semantic value. That's what these description theories or the causal theory that you just mentioned, that's where they come in. They explain how signs have their semantic values, how they make contributions to the truth or falsity of sentences containing them. So just to elaborate this a little bit, suppose you said, took the sentence good or was human. What do you need to know of that sentence to understand its meaning on the classical picture? Sentence true? Yes, is that what you're going to say? Good, right, right. You need to know what would make that sentence true, good or was human. And on the classical picture that was guiding us all the way through, all those happy days looking at sermons, Evans and all that. We've got these two parts, good or first to good and is human applies to an object if and only if the object is human. Goodal isn't human. Goodal gets kind of out of time in this class. It's not really... Anyway, I can't really back up any of this you understand. Okay, but suppose you take goodal isn't human. That's going to be true if and only if goodal isn't human. So we need to explain that as a consequence of the components having the semantic values they do. So that will be a matter of goodal referring to goodal and is human being something that maps an object onto truth only if that object is human. Yes, that's all right. If I'm explaining this correctly, that should be very simple. Is that indeed very simple? Yeah, okay. What I mean is if it doesn't seem very simple then pause me immediately. Okay, just as a massive of interest if the semantic value of a name is the object and the semantic value of the predicate is a map from objects onto truth values what is the semantic value of not? Is it an object? Does it not refer to an object? Is it a map from objects onto truth values? Is it a map from objects onto truth values? No, of course not. What is it? A map from truth values to truth values. You're both right. There you go. So not takes... you've got a sentence P that is true or false and then not P maps true onto false and false onto true. So for those of you who are happy with truth tables for and, and not, and or and so on which is many but not all of you the truth table for a sign this kind of map from truth values onto truth values that stands to a sign like not or and as reference the object Rolly stands to Rolly there are all ways of explaining how a sign makes a contribution to determining the truth or falsity of a sentence containing it. Can you put your hand up if you know what I mean when I say a truth table? Oh wow, okay, that's much better than I expected. Okay, so is it very clear to you does that make perfect sense that a truth table stands to and or if just as the assignment of reference to a name? Yeah? Can you put your hand up if that's pretty plain? Can you put your hand up if you don't see we see why that makes sense? Boy, okay. So there is the whole classical picture of meaning very powerful picture of meaning and on this picture knowing the meaning of a term is knowing its semantic value knowing the meaning of a term is understanding for a name which object refers to or which map from objects onto truth values or which truth table you have. That is the picture of understanding as a mental process. That is the picture that Wittgenstein is attacking. This is the picture on which when I say that's a chair and there is some definite map from objects onto truth values that I have in mind and what I'm saying when I say that's a chair is I'm saying that objects gets mapped by that function onto truth, yeah? So this is the picture Wittgenstein is attacking and in terms of that diagram in terms of this kind of diagram the bit in the middle the bit that keeps dropping out on Wittgenstein's picture that is the knowledge of the semantic value of the term. And then when you know the semantic value of the term you know what has to be so for the use of that term in any sentence to be correct then that gives you the yardstick against which you measure particular uses of the term. But that's what Wittgenstein is blowing up. That's what I think the datum is, that just won't work. We can't have it that we can't say that what drives your use of a term is your knowledge of its semantic value because whatever you think knowledge of semantic value might be it's going to be something running through your mind and anything that's running through your mind could in principle be interpreted in endlessly many different ways. We can't make anything of the idea that what drives your use of a term is your knowledge of its semantic value. So I said earlier when we were talking about Fodor that it really is a pity that the whole causal theory seemed to crash the way it did. But if Wittgenstein's picture is right the whole idea that meaning is given by truth conditions and the meaning of a term is given by its semantic value was just a mistake to begin with. This knowledge of semantic value here the knowledge of what blue is the whole idea, the whole appeal of having the image of blue there is it tells you what has to be the case for the term to apply to that object it tells you what the function is from objects the truth value is here and if that goes the whole idea of understanding the meaning of blue as a matter of knowing its semantic value just vanishes we can't say what knowing the semantic value blue might be same for cube, if the knowledge of semantic value here drops out as not really playing any significant role in the process then we're just left with the uses in particular cases and we don't have any work for the knowledge of semantic value to do. Similarly for x plus 1 we're just left with the use in particular instances the whole idea of truth the whole idea of reference these drop out as not of any basic interest in explaining how language works language works because of the existence of customs or practices knowledge of reference, knowledge of truth conditions they are not drivers of the working of language this needs to leave us in this round where language and communication is just coincidence we happen to use the same words to refer to the same things and the same patterns whether or not those patterns exist so that's troublesome for me good it should be you haven't really understood this if you're not deeply troubled by it but when you say it's just coincidence that's right it depends exactly what you mean by coincidence it's a coincidence in the sense that there is no explanation of why we all use words in the same way it doesn't rest on anything the whole idea of the bit in the middle here the knowledge of semantic value the knowledge of what has to be so for something to be the reference of the term or the predicate to apply to an object of the truth table the whole idea of knowledge of semantic value was that explains the fact that we all use the words in the same ways but when you say that can't do the work that's like a fifth wheel that doesn't drive anything else it doesn't make anything else happen these facts about how we go on they're not explained in that way then it seems like there is no explanation to be given all is all going on in the same way in that sense it's just a coincidence but it's a coincidence on which everything else depends the whole of life depends on that it's really basic and really pervasive facts about psychology psychology and neuroscience I've had that in the middle that's where the psychology goes what's the psychology here? I don't know it seems really weird to think that that seems to be very natural and just right that it's our brains there must be something right about that that your brains are relevant and the fact that we're all human and have pretty much the same kind of brains that must help somehow but the trouble is very difficult to see exactly how it's helping and maybe or rather to put it another way maybe there isn't another way to put it the point is, is not helping in this way the natural way to interpret the significance or the fact that we're all human we're pretty much the same brains is you give us all this kind of sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 we'll all come up with pretty much the same interpretation and then that will drive as all using the words in the same ways that's a natural way to interpret the significance of us all having the same brains but when you say we'll know that's not it that's not the right picture Wittgenstein is right about that just dropping out the psychology could be making us all come up with the same thing there but we might then all go on in lots of different ways yeah so then you say well what is the significance of us all having the similar brains maybe there's no psychological interpretation to be given of that something running through our minds maybe the only significance is that people with the same brains tend to go on like this tend to go on like that right sorry it's not explaining why these same brains generate it's not even saying what the phenomenon is if you see what I mean because you can't specify the sequence except by giving the first few examples and hoping your listener will be able to take it from there a martian with a different kind of brain might not be able to get this kind of sequence at all okay but there's much more to say about I mean you're right there's much more to say about this and we'll carry on on Friday, thanks comment oh I'm sorry I had meant to give out the exam questions today they have all been emailed to each of you I just forgot to carry over the hard copies if you want to pick up a hard copy at my office hours this afternoon you're very welcome or if you want to come back over with me to my office right now I can give you a hard copy of the questions but they should all be in your email anyhow so sorry about that