 Thank you very much, George, and thanks also to Scott for inviting me and speaking and also listening. It's been a fascinating morning so far. I'm looking forward to the afternoon. I always like, in fact, it's a great pleasure for me. Always has been, I hope it always will, to talk about policy rules, whether it's post-crisis or in-crisis or pre-crisis. In fact, I got started on the subject of policy rules and what I might call a pre-crisis period. It was a long time ago, it was in the 1960s when I started working on this subject. It was pre-crisis then in the sense the 70s were a crisis, high inflation, rising unemployment, leading to this terrible back-to-back recessions in the early 80s where unemployment got to 10.8 percent. It's higher than in the Great Recession. I don't think there's anybody, not even the Federal Reserve, who defends monetary policy at that time. It was erratic, go, stop, stop, go, discretionary. I call it unrule-like, it's hard to see anything good about it, and, of course, I think led to the terrible performance that we had. In some sense, the motivation for people like me working on policy rules back then was it wasn't working and it was going in the wrong direction. I think the post-crisis research in the sense of post-that period was remarkable because there were major changes in policy, and I think a lot of them were in the direction of more rule-like policy, more focused, less discretion. A lot of it began with Volcker, Volcker, of course, appointed by Jimmy Carter, but I think then continued through much of the Greenspan's term. The performance, I don't think there's much debate in this either, was good. I mean, not perfect, but we had economists call it the Great Moderation. When I first noticed this, I called it the long boom. I still like that term, but the Great Moderation became a more common term to refer to it, but business cycles were small, inflation came down, unemployment came down. There was a lot to write home about. It was a terrific period. Unfortunately, this I call more rule-like behavior morphed at some time into another pre-crisis period, and that pre-crisis period was when we seemed to deviate from these kind of rule-like policy before, and I pointed to the 2003, 4, or 5 period as indicative of that. You can see that with policy rules, some of the ones that David Papel showed in his charts, but it's all different kinds of policy rules that show that, and there's, I think, a very important paper that George Sodja and David Beckworth, along with Berek Balderer, did which looks at policy rules in which the interest rate responds to nominal GDP, not to separately to real GDP and to inflation, and they find the same kind of thing, and it was an off-track, off-the-rails type of policy, and so I think that's an important thing, so this is a, if you like, pre-crisis. But we had the crisis for whatever the reason, and now we're talking about the post-crisis. To me, given this experience, there's more evidence than ever that rules-based policies are what we want to strive for, and I think that's not just this empirical evidence. It's basically what I've been doing all my life, models that we work with, these dynamics to cast, whatever you call them, these models, they're just the kind of things where there's many, many reasons to think about, a better way to think about policy is through some kind of regular kind of a rule, strategy, predictable process, a lot of clarity about what's going on, and I think that's been even more apparent now. Now, at the same time, of course, while there may be more evidence than rules-based policy is good, we've got more and more rules, and in some sense, this discussion, this conference illustrates that. Perhaps there's a lot of agreement that the interest rate should be the instrument. Peter Arland is going to talk about, I think, a case for the money supply itself being an instrument, but there's less agreement, there's more agreement about that, but there's a lot of disagreement about what should be on the right-hand side, if you think about it mechanically, and what the functional form should be. I might add, I just, thinking about this, wrote this down, that back at the time the so-called Taylor Rule was being developed, there was also lots of policy rules out there, some of them are terribly complicated, that's one of the reasons why the Taylor Rule came about, but there was so many, and I got a quote from David Bladler, I wrote this down as I was thinking, so David writes, this is in, I think, maybe 90, we are left then with reliant on discretion in policy in order to maintain price stability, and I think that was a sense in which, where we are, and maybe we're going back in that direction, and it wasn't seem to me there's some concerns about that, but I still think this notion of having, and for many reasons, which I can go into while I have a more rules-based policy is important. Now, if you think about policy now, I think it's deviating from rules-based policy, okay? Some of it is even a little weird, what's going on, quite frankly, around the world, not just the United States, there's a wonderful headline, front page story in the Wall Street Journal, a couple weeks ago, stimulus efforts get weirder, referring to central banks, I think in that case they were talking about the ECB doing what the Japanese did, but there's, as I mentioned a few minutes, a lot of things going on around the world. At the same time, you're hearing a lot of discussion, at least I hear, of kind of a desire that we'd like to, by central bankers, we'd like to get back to normal, we'd like to get back, and they use the word back, back to a moral rules-based kind of policy, and indeed the current share of the Fed has indicated that in several speeches. She just says we're not ready yet, or going to take a while to get back, but there's a pretty clear sense of wanting to do that. So in that context, I think it's worthwhile making the case that we've got a lot of benefits already, from thinking about policy in a rules-based way. So first of all, maybe this is trivial, but we have had good performance during periods where policy rules were used, don't discount those, some of us were alive back then. It was pretty nice to have. Also, looking around the world is some countries that have moved more towards rules-based policy. A lot of that is in the context of inflation targeting. Policy rules adapted to make, to implement inflation targeting. You've got to have what you're doing with the interest rate. You can see that in Mexico and Chile and other countries. And that's been a positive. You can see that, I think, in India more recently. So that's a positive for billions of people. It's not the case all over. Brazil's had their trouble. South Africa's having its troubles. But again, that's kind of makes the case that we ought to strive for something more rules-based. If you look at what you might do to have a more consistent rules-based strategy or to get back to it faster, one important thing I note is that it seems to be unrelated, a focus on the U.S. now, to the degree of independence the central bank has. In the following sense, I just described the swings back and forth in my career of looking at policy rules. But all through that period, the de jure, the legal aspects of independence in the U.S. has not really changed at all. It's been just a constant. So you've had this very different kinds of policies within the same degree of de jure independence. To be sure, there's been shifts in de facto independence. And Alan Meltzer, or even good friend appointed that out. But the legal structure hasn't changed. So that to me suggests that we need something else to encourage more rules-like behavior, besides worrying about independence. Independence is good, but it doesn't seem to have been delivered in this particular dimension. So I began to think a few years ago that, well, maybe there's something else that could be done. And began to think myself about maybe there's some legislative remedies. People kept asking me, is there some legislative thing that you could do to move us back and have us not deviate in the future so much from policy rules? So I began to think about it in the talk I gave at the annual Kato Monetary Conference. I see Jim Dorn there. Five years ago, I decided I would talk about this, thought about it, scratched my head, did some research, looked back at the history of the Federal Reserve Act and came up with the idea that it probably is not, even though I like a particular rule, it's probably not a good idea for the Congress of the United States to tell an independent agency or government exactly what rule to follow. After all, there's differences of opinion about rules. You can see them right here at this conference. Wouldn't it be better if there was some legislation that just said to the Fed, pick a rule and tell us what it is? Pick a strategy and tell us what it is. And moreover, you know, we know the world is complicated, the things change and there are crises. If you need to deviate from this because the world changes, just tell us. Tell us why that's the case. Okay, so that's the idea. It seemed to me remarkably simple and perhaps for that reason it's now actually a legislation. And David Pappell mentioned that in his talk. It's passed the House of Representatives. Still pretty partisan and that's another question is why this subject has become so partisan doesn't need to be a lot of it is a kind of arcane at this point. But in the interest of being objective, let me discuss some of the concerns people have raised about this. One concern is that it's too mechanical. Central banks should not be changed to a mechanical rule. That's what Janet Yellen has said. I have a quote here from the economist who I'm not offended anybody. Algorithm should not supplant central bankers. I mean, who's saying the algorithm should supplant central bankers? So there's a sense of holding up false criticisms, false descriptions and criticizing on that basis. Another concern is that legislation like this would take away the independence of a central bank. I think it's exactly the opposite. If you have a set of principles and to me principles and rules and strategies are all sort of synonyms for similar for the same things. If you have that, it's much harder to deviate in a discretionary way or to do something that's against what the purpose is of a central bank or I've served in government. If you have some principles, it's much easier to say to know to some vested interest when they're asking you to do something. So I think it preserves independence. There are, of course, many policy rules. That's a negative or a positive is many kinds just every product in the world is many kinds. I think that's a good thing and we can find ones that work better. There is, of course, uncertainty. People point out the uncertainty of the equilibrium real interest rate, the uncertainty of the potential GDP. Yes, absolutely uncertainty. But why should those uncertainties be more difficult for policy rules than for discretion? I think they actually make our analysis of those uncertainties more coherent if they're done within a particular strategy, not just in a willy-nilly discretionary way. Now I do think that this discussion of this maybe because of this legislation maybe because of where we are now with weird policies in many countries, there's a rejuvenation of the old debate about rules versus discretion. We've heard a little bit of that in a historical discussion by the Davids this morning and that's good. I feel there's a lot of deja vu for me about going over those same discussions again, but that's okay. Let's have them. Let's, I think, the rules view will win. We've got some theory, we've got some history, we've got some political economy, we've got behavioral economics going in that direction. Now I do think there's also some concerns that people have raised about this legislative approach which are serious and need some thought. One of them is how could a committee decide on a strategy, maybe put it abstract, a rule of how could they do that, all those differences of opinion, different views of the world, how are you actually going to come to come to some statement about what our strategy is at the Fed? And here it seems to me there is some precedent in history. There was in 1977 the Federal Reserve Act was amended partly because of the monetarist influences to require that the Fed report its growth rate for the money supply. And of course the Fed objected, Arthur Burns was the chair at the time and objected strenuously, but eventually they saw the handwriting on the wall and it got into the act. And they figured a way, but they figured a way to deal with it. For what I understand it was not there then, people I've talked to. It was actually quite a healthy thing. The whole system, the Federal Reserve system came together to debate what should we report on these money growth numbers and it wasn't just a few people and so, but they did come up with some numbers. It was a range, maybe a range would be the way the Fed would implement these projections now. The fact that that requirement was removed from the Federal Reserve Act in 2000, which it was, the Fed no longer had to report its money growth statistics. That's probably a problem in itself because I think money grows very important, but it should have left a void and in some sense this legislative suggestion is just a means of filling that void. So I think that it's not completely impractical for the FOMC even to come perhaps with a range to answer this critique. It would be harder to do than to just say what the funds rate is going to be tomorrow, but not that much harder. You do have dissents. Dissents are possible in the Federal Reserve Act. Maybe some people won't agree to that stupid rule you decided on. That's okay, you dissent and find a way to dissent. That's in the way the Act is written at this point. But in the interest of trying to make this work, there are perhaps some other approaches. And one was referred to briefly today, I think, by Scott. There's this other way than have rules that is not an instrument rule. I like instrument rules because I think they're more accountable because you can see what the central bank is doing right then and there. That's why Milton Friedman, by the way, liked instrument rules. But there's other ways to have rules. And one way that has been advocated by the Norgus Bank, Young Vickstead, or Lars Fensen at the Riggs Bank, are these inflation forecast targeting rules. So in that sense, for inflation forecasting you show that your particular model, your particular setting of the instruments is consistent with a forecast. Say of inflation or a forecast of nominal GDP, or as Michael Woodford has suggested, a linear combination of inflation and GDP gap. Whatever it happens to be, you say that your forecasts, your dot charts for the interest rate are consistent with that. I think that would actually probably be consistent with the legislation that is drafted right now. I'm not a lawyer. I don't know for sure. But it would certainly allow for more wheel room at the Monetary Policy Committee at the FOMC. And I'm not sure that's ideal, but I think that's reasonable. It would be much more disciplined than a pure constrained discretion, which constrained discretion, you just announce your goal and you say, we'll figure out how to deal with the goal. It's all goal, no strategy. This at least has more strategy built in along with the goal. The Federal Reserve's statement of goals and strategy, by the way, is all goals. There's nothing about a strategy in there. So I think this would help tremendously. So there's a couple ideas that I think would make this legislation more palatable. At least we could have a discussion, which is not circling the wagons and say this doesn't work at all. A couple things that I wanted to mention, actually Scott asked me if I would. When is the zero bound? Okay, so a lot of people say these policy rules can't work in the zero bound. We deviate from them because of the zero bound. Well, first of all, the zero bound is not the only reason policymakers have deviated. There was no zero bound problem in 2003, 2004, and 2005. They were again way low by many, many, many measures. There was no zero bound problem in the 70s. So a lot of deviations that are seriously damaged don't occur because of a zero bound. Moreover, there are rule like ways to deal with the zero bound. And the one that I have liked for a long time is actually by a 1999 paper by David Ryshauer and John Williams. And what they say may be too complicated. I don't think so. They embed a policy rule, Taylor rule, in a mega rule. And the mega rule says that if there's a time where that formula brings the rate below zero, you don't do anything. You just leave it. You leave it. You can't go below zero. Go back to that a minute. You can't go below zero. So you say that when the time comes to raise interest rates, we will keep them extra low for a while. So that's a rule. You can actually say for the number of quarters the rate would have been below zero, we will keep it above, we'll keep it below the required rate in the future. So it's a mega rule. It's a rule. It's a strategy. It could be or you can write down algebraically if you want to. You don't have to. And so I think that is a way that could deal with the zero bound. I think it's the kind of thing that Janet Yellen talked about in her Jackson Hole paper, but it's not completely clear to me that it is. I think it is. She also talks about quantitative easing as a way to augment a policy rule. I don't think that's necessary. By the way, I think quantitative easing is more extreme than it has been for much of history, especially internationally. And one of the main problems I have it with, I don't think it works, but besides that it's very hard to make rule like. How do you make these gigantic purchases rule like? And the Fed has tried. I have tried. It's just completely, you don't know their impact. They're talking about very small changes related to huge amounts of interventions. And then of course another way to deal with the zero bound is to think of a possibility of negative rates. And Miles has worked on that. I think it's also worthwhile thinking about, at this point, thinking about money growth rules, as Peter Ireland has talked about. I sometimes feel guilty that I drove money rules out of business. They were pretty popular back when the Taylor Rule was put in place. The Taylor Rule was a form of an interest rate. I did it because I think velocity was variable and technology was changing things and wanted to have a policy rule that reflected something realistic. But at the same time, that took emphasis away from money growth rules. And I think it's time to be thinking about those as an alternative. And what I mean now is that's the instrument. You focus on that as the instrument. That instrument can respond to events in the economy. The thing that's going on, inflation, not all GDP, GDP gap, whatever it happens to be. In fact, for what it's worth, sometimes people say we never change. I spent, when I was talking about starting work on policy rules way back when the 60s, they're all money growth rules. Really, I'm not kidding. There were modifications of Milton Friedman. That lasted to me until the early 80s. And so then I switched. I changed my mind. So there's no reason why we can't emphasize that more. Unfortunately, we're a ways from that. I just spent a few days at the annual Jackson Hole conference a week and a half ago. Central bankers from around the world. I didn't hear the word money mentioned once in the whole period. So it's not good. So then there's the R-star issue. R-star is the equilibrium real interest rate. And we've had a lot of discussion of that already. I don't think there's any reason why you couldn't take into account a moving R-star in the policy rule framework. David Papelle showed about how that could work, I think, as well as Scott. And of course, that's what Yolans talked about for a while. Why couldn't you do that? Well, you don't want to go too far because if it's all R-star, then it's completely discretion. You don't have any sense of process or rule-like behavior that's going on. But I don't see any reason why that is a reason to abandon policy rules. Again, if anything, it's a reason to have a more rule-like policy. I might add, from my own perspective, I'm a little suspicious about the almost a group thing now that R-star has gone down. Just two and a half years ago, the FOMC Dots had an equilibrium nominal funds rate of around 4%. It's plummeted to 3%. Maybe there's a lot of more evidence of that. I don't think it's been that dramatic in such a short period of time. But it's moved very quickly. I've done some work with Vocal Wheelan that says that if you do a lot about William's type of analysis, taking into account other factors, you don't see that decline in R-star. I think the main thing I should say here is very uncertain. It's very important not to just drive policy on the basis of if you know it's 3% nominal or 2% nominal rather than 4% nominal. 2% real is what I chose a long time ago based on some of the same factors people now say should be lower, like potential growth being lower. Same kind of ideas. Let me conclude with a few thoughts of the international aspects of this, which has always been an interest for me in my research. So as you look around the world, you see a lot of similarities in central bank behavior. This is something I've observed just by looking at reaction functions. You can see that one central bank will react, usually to the FAD, a big central bank or the TECB, by moving their own interest rate around. By more than is optimal for their own economy. And again there's lots of evidence for this empirically. There's also evidence if you talk to central bankers. I talked to many central bankers. I remember one of the first conversations I had about this was with Mervyn King when he was at the Bank of England and the Governor of the Bank of England. I said, you notice how your interest rate's moving somewhat by what the Fed's moving. He didn't bat an ash. Well we have to worry about the exchange rate, John. What do you think? And so it's been there a long time and it's very clear. There's also a, that's kind of a contagion of policy. I think it's accentuated by the unusual policies. I don't think it was, we've noticed it more because of these very unusual, use the word weird, policies again. And it's particularly noticeable with respect to quantitative easing. The quantitative easing, it really began big time in the U.S. Abe ran in Japan on the idea that they needed a quantitative easing. He appointed Haruka Karoda and they got quantitative easing. The exchange rate moved just as they thought. And then Mario Draghi said, what about us? And they do, and they still are doing quantitative easing. So there's an aspect of contagion there too. I think it's kind of a zero sum game and we need to have some reform about this. People have called for reform, including Volcker, Paul Volcker. So my idea for reform is actually very simple. It's based on a lot of research. I think it's based on experience. And that would be that each central bank, it's not going to come as a big surprise, each central bank announces and clarifies what its policy rule is. It makes it public. They could come together in a powwow and do that, a G20 mean, it doesn't matter, BIS, but they say what it is. They could have the same kind of escape clauses as in this legislation. Other countries don't have such a large role for the legislature as we do, but it could do the same way. In that way, I think you'd eliminate a lot of the contagion. It wouldn't be something where you'd pressure say the Bank of Japan do something different, what's optimal for Japan. They would do what's optimal for them and we have results that say if each country did that, the world would perform better. It would be more, it would really be more like a rules-based international monetary system. And I think here is, again, you can learn a lot from history, looking at what happened at things like the Plaza Court, looking at what happened at things, the formation of the IMF and the Bretton Wood system. Why did that happen? You can learn a lot from that. And so I think it's worthwhile considering. But let me just conclude in my last three minutes with two points that I think to me reinforce why we should have a rules-based system for monetary policy. It's another benefit of these. So if I observe economic decision-making inside and outside of government, I see that the discretionary policy, the kind of policies we have now actually reduces the likelihood of real fundamental reforms, tax reform, regulatory reform, budget reform. Because many of the people who are in charge of those will point to the central bank saying, hey, they're doing that. We don't need to have tax reform. We don't need to have regulatory reform. They're thinking for some reason that these policies are going to get the economy growing again. They're not. Actually, I think they're kind of productive because they're not rule-like. They're very hard to understand. So they're not working, but at the same time, they can still be pointing at them. And so that's a discouragement from probably the most important thing we should be trying to strive for is more reforms, more free market reforms, if you like. And then the second aspect of this is I've observed a correlation across policies, across different kinds of policies, across monetary, fiscal, regulatory, tax. And they all seem to go in the same direction. That's what this book about first principles that George mentioned. And so I think if you have a less, I call it less interventionist, if you like, but more rule-like, more limited monetary policy, it would tend to influence other kind of policies. It would reduce the very active stimulus types of policies on the fiscal side. I think it would tend to make regulatory policy more, I'd say, market-based, if you like. And I know cost-benefit analysis would be used more. So those are two things they're harder to prove, that's for sure. But I think they're very important, maybe more important than the other things I mentioned, because what we really do need to have around the world in the United States is higher long-term economic growth. So let me stop there. Thank you very much. That question's good. Happy to take questions if anybody has any. David? John, thank you for the quote. I think that was in the context of the period when money growth rate rules were breaking down because of all those institutional changes. Now, I don't want to go back to money growth rules again, but like you, I'm really concerned that central banks don't discuss money growth. And I did indeed like the device that Oatma Ising had at the European Central Bank of a reference value for broad money growth, which acted as a kind of check on what all the other models were telling them. And if there was a discrepancy, then they dug into the data to try to find out what was going on. They gave that up at just the wrong time, as the history of European monetary policy in the last few years changes shows. But if you are going to go back, and I thought I heard you being sympathetic to taking notice of money growth, you're going to have to worry about what determines it, and you're going to have to worry about what you might do about that. And that is going to take you back to the quantity of high-powered money. And if you are going to worry about the behavior of the quantity of high-powered money, it seems to me you are going to have to worry about the necessity in some circumstances, particularly near the zero lower bound, of indulging in what used to be called open market operations, and now we call quantitative easing. So I wonder if you could comment on your hostility to quantitative easing, just given these considerations. Maybe I misread the degree of your hostility. No, I don't think you misread it. So first of all, open market operations and quantitative easing I distinguish by the magnitudes, number one, but also the disconnect between those decisions and the policy rate. Right now, actually since the fall of 2008, the Fed has made a disconnect between the policy rate and high-powered money. And it occurred originally because they finally gave up on sterilizing, and they let the balance sheet rise, and the interest rate plummeted. It actually plummeted well below their FMC targets. And at that point, they said, well, for the future we will use interest on excess reserves to affect the interest rate. So they have severed that. I don't like that as a long-term proposition. Didn't mention that in my talk because I think that it answers your question to some extent. That disconnect pulls that interest rate decision away from the quantity decision. You can do whatever quantity you want of QE, trillions, and affect the policy rate by interest on reserves. That's what the Europeans are doing. That's what the Bank of Japan is doing. And it also allows, whether you like it or not, negative policy rates because that's where the central bank has the ability to bring it down below zero. It's just a reverse in the sign on the interest rates. To me, that adds a lot of discretion to monetary policy. So I like the connection as part of what I mean, that connection between the quantities and the price, quantities and the interest rate. We've had it for a long time. It makes regular people. It makes sense. The central bank is deciding things on the basis of its quantity, its supply, and also, if everything's based on interest on excess reserve, that is really an administered rate. It's not a market rate. So it has all the problems that we worry about using the market less. And I think it adds a lot of expansion, expanding the role of monetary policy. I'm an independent investment advisor. Should we return to the days of a single mandate for the Fed? And should we permit such flexibility regarding price stability by the Fed? More specifically, is there an empirical basis for believing at a 2% rate of inflation is better for the economy than zero inflation or, for that matter, 5% inflation? So on the second point, the 2%, actually, believe it or not, that comes from the Taylor rule. Sometimes I feel guilty about that one too. And the reason was that it was thought to be pretty close to zero. The notion that the inflationary had to be low enough that it was interfering in people's decisions, the bias upward measure and the bias of inflation, maybe two was too high, one and a half, not a very attractive number. So that's where it came from. I do worry about it sometimes in retrospect, though, because I think it creates an asymmetry or creates a misunderstanding. For example, right now, I frequently hear, A, the inflation rate is less than two. Why shouldn't we have zero interest rates? There's a notion that because it's less than your target, you have to have your foot on the floor. That's not what policy rules tell you, but it's sort of a common thing that happens in sophisticated people as well as people who are just looking at this casually. With respect to the dual mandate, I, in my deepest of thinking, worry about the unemployment part of that mandate, because I think it has generated, it tends to generate more activist interventionist policies. For all of Volcker's term, for all of Greenspan's term, they never talked about the dual mandate. The communiques from Washington to New York didn't talk about the dual mandate. That started in 2008, really. So for what it's worth, I worry about it. As a practical matter, though, I think why fight that battle when the battle about policy rules, in a way, because most policy rules respond to both things, to respond to real variables. Why not just have the debate about that rather than to get into this more complicated part of the dual mandate? So that's where I am at this point. Larry White from GMU again. You mentioned Janet Yellen's desire to get back, to re-normalize the conduct of monetary policy. But she's also said that she doesn't want to shrink the Fed's portfolio, which has gone to $4 trillion from $1 trillion. Do you think the two things are compatible, or do you think that the Fed's QE has to be reversed in order to get back to normal conduct of monetary policy? Yeah, I think that they're incompatible for some of the reasons I just mentioned to David Laidler. The connection between reserves that the Fed supplies and the interest rate, I think, is an important one to have with respect to monitoring monetary policy, explaining monetary policy. It worked for a long time. So I think that's important. It also, if that's your modus operandi, it reduces the chances of these gigantic quantitative reasons, which I worry about myself. So partly it's your modus operation doesn't include that. Of course, it could in some emergency. But I think as a normal way of doing monetary policy, it is not good. I mean, it would be, in principle, possible to get the balance sheet back to normal levels and then do QE. So it's possible. I think it's less likely than if your balance sheets there are ready to do the work at any time in both directions. In the paper that Janet Yon presented to Jackson Hole, she had that in there as an instrument you would use in certain circumstances. So it wasn't just abnormal policy. It seemed to me to be normal policy. And that's what I think is not good to do. Now, this is like so many other things. There's lots of debate about that. A lot of debate about whether the Fed should have a large balance sheet. Some are saying it's necessary for liquidity purposes. Some are saying that there's a reason for the government to provide liquidity at that very short end of the market. Treasury could do that, but I think just fine if they wanted to. It doesn't have to be the Fed. Last question. Sorry. Two questions. So I'd love to hear your reactions to this. So it seems to me that the way people think and talk about Hawks and Doves is really very conducive to discretionary policy. And it seems like that's really a sign that the rule-based thinking hasn't taken hold. Because if I understand right, the way a rule should work is if given the inflation target and given what's happening on the real side of the economy, if you're going to have a higher rate in some situations, you're going to have to plan to have a lower rate in other situations. And so this whole ideological almost separation to Hawks and Doves seems like a real indictment of how far we are away from a rules-based approach. Yeah, I think that's right. I think that if you're going to generate everything on a higher inflation target, that may sound good now, but there's another point where it's not going to be good. I also have worries about the level effects for the same reason. But also your question is just sort of another sense in which the whole intellectual apparatus that surrounds unconventional policies or weird policies I think is counterproductive for many other reasons besides the policies themselves. And if I some people as Hawks and some people as Doves, that means a failure of rule-based policy. Yeah, I'm sorry. Yeah, so actually I also have a blog and one time made the claim that we should distinguish officials at central banks between whether they're rules-based or not rules-based, not whether they're Hawks or Doves. I completely agree with that. Yeah, one more. Dan Griswald with the Mercatus Center. Dr. Taylor, you briefly mentioned foreign exchange rates. If your vision were to come true and we had a rules-based system here at the Fed and that major central banks around the world, what would be the effect on the foreign exchange market in terms of stability? What sort of information would foreign exchange rates be conveying? So I think it would be conducive to more stability, partly because I think the unusual policies create capital flows. They create movements of exchange rates. They create contagion of policies in other countries, all of which seem to me increase volatility, capital flow volatility and exchange rate volatility. That's how I view it. And in many respects, what I'm just suggesting here is a combination of flexible exchange rates, open capital markets, and policy rules. Those three things, which I mean, and Milton Friedman wrote about that. He would take many growth rules, open capital markets, and flexible exchange rates. And I think to the extent we could get back to that, maybe the rule is going to be different, but the other two parts are just fine. We have another long way to go in capital restrictions because right now there's a movement to have more capital restrictions globally rather than less. And I think that also is not the international system we want to look for. I've got to stop. Okay. Thank you very much.