 Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to the second of three panels in our symposium on Afghanistan. Today we will be discussing the regional implications of the Taliban control of Afghanistan. We have four speakers with expertise and a long history of study and work in the region that we are excited to welcome today. Mr. Sher Jan Ahmadzai is the director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He worked with the Afghan government before coming to the United States and served with the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Agency, then run by former president of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani. He later served as the scheduling manager for President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan. Mr. Altaf Ladakh is the chief executive officer of Roshan, the largest telecom company in Afghanistan. Mr. Ladakh has over 25 years of experience in international marketing and strategic development in the telecom industry. He's also worked with the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development and Strategic Development to further its telecoms and agri business strategy in Central Asia. Dr. Aisha Jalal is a Pakistani American historian who serves as the Mary Richardson Professor of History at Tufts University and was the recipient of the 1998 MacArthur Foundation Fellowship. She is the author of several books including Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia and Comparative and Historical Perspective. Dr. Jalal also co-authored Modern South Asia History, Culture and Political Economy with Shigata Bose. Dr. Oya Dursun Oskanja is the Endowed Chair of International Studies and a Professor of Political Science at Elizabeth Town College. Her research interests include Turkish foreign policy and transatlantic security, and she is authored a book on Turkish relations with the West which was published in 2019. Thank you all for joining us. And if you have any questions throughout the panel, please send them in the Q&A box to be answered at the end of the discussion. I will now pass it on to our moderator for today's panel, Ravi Patel, who is a junior and on the board of the Tufts Middle East Research Group. Thank you all for the introduction. I'd like to thank all the panelists for taking time out of the busy schedules to come and speak with us this afternoon. We have a diverse and highly knowledgeable group of speakers who will contribute to an excellent discussion on the regional implications of telebond control. As Dr. Oya Dursun Oskanja mentioned, if anyone in the audience has questions throughout the panel, you can send them in the Zoom Q&A function and we'll get to them in a latter half of the event. Could all of you please briefly describe the belief that Afghanistan, South Asia, running out of relevant topics, and the reaction to the fall of the Afghan government? Oya, if you'd like to begin. Thank you very much Ravi, and thank you very much for this kind introduction and having me as part of this distinguished panel. So I will be approaching this from an analysis of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the situation in Afghanistan. Turkey is a very important NATO ally since 1952, and it has the second largest military forces in the alliance after the United States, and it has the only majority Muslim population within the alliance as well. And Turkey has been very much involved in the military and diplomatic interventions in Afghanistan ever since 2001 as part of the NATO mission, and has maintained 500 personnel, non-combat personnel in the field in Afghanistan since 2001. And in the last six years, Turkey has been responsible for maintaining the military wing of the airport in Kabul, and as a result of its really strong soft power in Afghanistan, as it really enjoys quite a good amount of goodwill from among the ethnic communities in Afghanistan. It has been rarely a target of any military attacks in the years since 2001. And ever since the fall of the Afghan government and taking of control of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Turkey has been trying to position itself very centrally in terms of maintaining the, and running the logistic of operations in the Kabul airport. So Turkey has been in negotiations with the Taliban regime as well as with Qatar and to a certain extent Pakistan, in terms of running the Kabul airport, which really represents a very important strategic position for both the Taliban government and also for the international communities involvement in the region, because it's a gateway for the Taliban regime, for its access to the outside world, and also for the flow of international aid, it will prove to be a very significant and strategic location for the country. So Turkey has been really trying to position itself very strongly to run the airport and Turkish authorities and Taliban has been in the last couple of weeks, maintaining some high level negotiations and political meetings in terms of security, development, capacity building, education as well as health. And like I mentioned, because of the strong soft power that Turkey enjoys in the country, in terms of its relations with its close ties with different ethnic and political factions in the country, we are seeing that Turkey is really well positioned and on a very important topic that on which I have written quite extensively, and Turkey has not been enjoying very good relations with its NATO allies, as I have attributed significant number of chapters in my first book that I published two years ago. Turkey has purchased this 400 missile defense systems from Russia, and as a result of that it has been a subject to CAATS sanctions, countering America's adversaries through sanctions act. And so ever since then Turkey has been really working hard to present itself as a reliable partner for NATO as well as the United States and the rest of the western allies. And so this really Kabul airport presented itself as a great opportunity for the Turkish authorities to position themselves very centrally, and it's made strategic sense for the western allies to support that. And one final note before I end my remarks, there is a strong negative public opinion in the Turkish public opinion against the refugee flows, and ever since the withdrawal of the US and other allies in Afghanistan, we have seen about 50,000 Afghan irregular migration and asylum seekers that are coming into Turkey. Turkey currently has 4 million refugees in the country and the public opinion is very much against that, mainly Syrian refugees but considerably now increasing in numbers, Afghan refugees as well. So that is presenting a significant challenge for the Turkish government to deal with the situation in a very sensitive way, and Turkish government has erected a wall in the borders between Turkey and Iran just to, you know, prevent the overflow of refugees, because of the upcoming general elections in Turkey that are coming up very soon in 2023 so with that I would like to put an end to my remarks but I look forward to the Q&A section, thank you. If I can go, should I go next, Ravi? Yes. Hi, good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to be on this panel. I'm coming from a business and economic perspective so I will give that view of my thoughts on where we are today in Afghanistan and where we've come from. I actually started working in Afghanistan in 2003, so I've been there for 18 years. We were awarded the second mobile telephone license to operate in the beginning of 2003 and started operations in July. We're part of the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, which is part of the Aga Khan network. So we actually have a social and economic development angle in what we do. So we're not, we're a for-profit agency but we're there as part of the development of the country as well. I just want to give you, and I think a lot of people hear news about what's going on from a political security perspective but just to give you a perspective of you on how economically the country changed particularly in the first few years of the government being in power with Karzai. From the telecom sector, telecoms was probably the first success story of private sector development and investment and there are four major operators apart from ourselves. One is an Afghan American company. The other two, one is Ed Slut, which is the UAE's national provider and very strong in the region and also MTN from South Africa. So again, two very large powerful companies in this region. Just to give you an idea of the investments that have been made in Afghanistan since 2003. And I'm talking from our perspective as Roshan, but if you multiply by four very quickly, you'll get the orders of magnitude. We have invested $700 million in the country in terms of network development to bring state-of-the-art technology, including 3G, 4G, fiber. We've paid over $700 million in taxes to the government. We've employed directly and indirectly 50,000 people in jobs. In our peak, we were 1200 people and then all the ancillary support services and we very much focus on hiring or building partners from the Afghan businessman who are very entrepreneurial. At the peak in 2012, this industry alone was generating over $1 billion in revenues. It's always been touted as one of the success stories of foreign direct investment and private sector development. However, I think since 2012, particularly as you saw the drawdown of the troops, the American troops in particular, there has been a significant decline in economic development in the country. And this is where I think the government has a role and it's not just now we're seeing that, but it's actually been over the last 10 years. What does that mean? As the troops were withdrawn, the security became worse. A lot of your Afghan businessmen left the country and stopped investments. The government was looking to raise taxes. The taxes, they came after private sector companies and telecoms was the only private sector company they could target. Today, we pay more than 50% of revenues in taxes to the government, which means we can't invest in the country. We've become, as we say, it's milking the cow, but that has stopped further investments in the country. What has also happened as we all know is there's been a lot of corruption in the country and that has also led us to, has impacted our investments as we've grown because we've had to deal with a lot of political issues. And why I'm bringing all of this up is that this is the role of the government in a country that was very fragile with lack of infrastructure. When we started, 30,000, 50,000 people had access to a phone. Today, it's 25 million people. And the role of private sector, the role of the government, the role of the international governments is to work together to drive infrastructure development. And I think the government and the international governments together have failed to do that over the last 10 years. So we're at an interesting point of time where what what happens now, this is a country that is very rich in terms of minerals, $1 trillion plus of minerals has a lot of opportunities. It has agriculture that can be exported. And there's a role for government play. I'm not saying I endorse the new government or the last government, but the role of the government today is critical and I think the role of the international community is also very important to provide, not just to the humanitarian aid, but also economic development and support the government today in terms of what the potential is of the country. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Appreciate your invitation and being part of this wonderful panel discussing Afghanistan and developments in Afghanistan, especially in the background of recent developments that happen to be a regime change historical event in Afghanistan for the last many years, especially when the United States was there for 20 years this happens to be a significant change, the Afghans and national community have experienced. This change has not only directly affected the people that are inside of Afghanistan, but also affected the people around Afghanistan. This would be how these changes have affected the citizens of Afghanistan, men and women, children and elderly. And what do we see as the political future for the people in and around Afghanistan, the dynamics that are in play or at play in terms of regional connectivity, regional effects implications of what happened in Afghanistan before the Afghan neighbors and the great powers in the region. There has been a power struggle by all great nations and the smaller nations around Afghanistan, what they could get out of Afghanistan, for the reasons every country has in their national security aspect. My work in the past government in Afghanistan under President Karasad before 2007 was an experience that gave me an opportunity to look into the country itself. Whether the country was ruled or served in different capacities and what it mattered for the Afghans when they came out of relatively different and darker era of Taliban, the Taliban 2.1.0 in 1990s. Now we see Taliban 2.0. They were expectations that after what the United States did with Taliban in Doha, everybody was expecting that a new Taliban, a changed Taliban would come and provide Afghanistan a different path. The definition of difference is relevant to who you're talking to, but it is definitely different than what we had a month and a half ago. Now that happens to be the responsibility of the new people in the government in Afghanistan, what course of action and policy they choose for Afghanistan that would affect the economic growth of Afghanistan that has been there for the last 20 years. The social growth in Afghanistan and the political growth in Afghanistan that has been there for the last 20 years. In the last 100 years of history of Afghanistan, the last 20 years were significant, significantly different in terms of engagement. We have had the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but that was one big country, but the last 20 years we had more than 40 countries in Afghanistan and the National Coalition that brought in with itself a lot of opportunities and as well as challenges for the country itself and for the region itself. The withdrawal that happened and the way it happened has created a vacuum that is not going to be filled, neither by Taliban or China or Pakistan or any other country. The economic assistance in the United States offered to Afghanistan was so huge that if you look at the economic activity for the last many years that nobody can fill in that gap. Now Afghanistan needs to do a reality check. The neighbors need to do a reality check. What is required of Afghanistan and what is needed in Afghanistan. The people in Afghanistan have seen a different generation grow, born and grow after 911. This is not a generation of the 90s. This is generation more savvy, more educated, more traveled around the world. This is generation of Zoom. This is a generation of technology like Althaf talked about, where thousands of millions of people have access to phones. Different telecom companies are there. They have closer access to the world. They know what's happening in any corner of the world. They know what's happening at Tufts. They know about Tuft. They do not know about Tufts in 1990. Companies like Roshan, Afghanistan, wireless and many others have been part of this development. We cannot neglect the fact that we just switch off the power to these companies that they will have. No, this is a new generation. We witnessed Afghan youngsters who were not born on 911 demonstrating against removing the national flag of Afghanistan by Taliban soldiers in different provinces of Afghanistan. That says a lot about how changed Afghanistan is. And their need for reality check is by the current administrators in Afghanistan is they have to face what the Afghan people demand. And that has happened. This whole education, the social education that you see, the change that you see is because of the impassioned involvement of Afghanistan. That we cannot take for granted because it was not just a one-sided thing. It was demand and supply. The Afghan people needed that education and they got it. Thousands and millions of Afghan students went abroad and educated and came back. And they're not in Afghanistan with different mindset. Not that of Taliban, not that of the Taliban of the 1990s or the Civil War era or the era of 80s. It's a way different education. It's a way different generation of the Afghan. So we need to do a reality check. And of course the neighbors of Afghanistan do need to do the reality check. When we claim that Afghanistan, it depends how you define graveyard of the empires, that Afghanistan is the graveyard of the empires. So I consider it is the graveyard of the Afghans themselves. Afghans have the victim of that one. And when we say Russia, Soviet Union, the Brits, the Americans, as some people say, have been defeated in Afghanistan. No great power could survive in Afghanistan. Then why would you think a smaller power would survive in Afghanistan? Be that Pakistan, be that Iran, be that any country from Central Asia, why would we think the dynamics of Afghanistan would play well if they are involved instead of these great powers? The dynamics of Afghanistan is so complex, at the same time so easy. If you want to look at it from a different angle, then we would understand what Afghanistan is going through and how we can address some of the issues that Afghans have gone through. And how the region and some of the neighbors have to deal with this one. We have a saying in the United States, whatever happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas. That's not the case in Afghanistan. Whatever happens in Afghanistan does not stay in Afghanistan. We have seen this in the past. Afghanistan was a proper country in the 40s. The whole region was better. In the 50s and 60s, Afghanistan was one of the countries with constitutional democracy or monarchy. There was a constitution, there was a national assembly, there were elections. Women of Afghanistan had the right to vote. Countries around Afghanistan map. In the 1970s, for example, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, China were under the territorial system of governance. There was a minister of non-government or religious, but Afghanistan had a system that was built in a constitution supported by the people of Afghanistan. So those developments happened and then the dark era came by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. What it brought to Afghanistan affected the whole region. What happened in Pakistan in the United States getting involved in the 80s against the Soviet Union. And what happened after the United States withdrew and another vacuum was created. We saw that a 911 happened. So that's why I say what happened in Afghanistan does not stay in Afghanistan. And we have to understand, it's very important for us to know what Afghanistan can be. And we, a single country, whoever a smaller big country that we cannot deal with, let's let the Afghans be the owners of their affairs. And we say that great powers failed. I mean, it would be wrong to believe a smaller power could be victorious in Afghanistan. So, I'll be glad to answer any questions on this. Looking forward to the questions. Thank you. Thank you. Well, thank you. While it's still, I think, far too early to predict how the Taliban take over in Afghanistan will impact the region situation. I think it's possible to anticipate some likely scenarios. The first and one that I hope will not occur is the possibility of the regional actors working at cross purposes which they have been for decades, and continuing to do so with one. I mean wanting to fight a proxy war, something that they've also been doing in Afghanistan, which will have dire consequences for an already fragile political situation and not to mention a very precarious economic situation. What can happen if India, let's say, for instance, finds the change in Afghanistan unacceptable for its strategic interest India has invested a great deal in Afghanistan over the last couple of decades. I mean, with or without us, it may be tempted to try and forestall with the help of its, with its supporters and its allies in Afghanistan, the formation of a stable government under the Taliban. I mean, India doesn't have to do anything in the Taliban might yet fail because there's no certainty that they can even control their own rank and file but nevertheless, external intervention is not going to help matters. In such circumstances, if there is a proxy war one can expect to see chaos compounded with especially detrimental consequences along the Pakistan-Ukban border, as well as it has to be said the Central Asian states, which will be very, very badly affected. And so one because we could witness increased activity by Taliban allied anti-state militants like the Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan, while the ISIS scale tries creating havoc in Afghanistan and from there beyond. If a proxy war by competing regional powers can be prevented, then I think the current efforts by Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan may well possibly have some chance to keep the extremism of the Taliban in check by keeping them engaged with the international community. This is of the essence because this is the only way to avoid a repeat of the 1990s when an isolated and frustrated Taliban government flouted all norms of global engagement. Once it became clear that they were not going to be welcomed as a member of the international community, the international community would also for its part have to strike. Just the right balance between their distaste and fear of the Taliban and the need to have some modicum of order in Afghanistan. The Taliban need international recognition and the people of Afghanistan above everyone else need humanitarian considerations. The Taliban are desperately in need of funds, a need that should be used to extract concessions from them, even if there is no certainty that they can eventually deliver on their promises, given the divergent attitudes of their rank and file and the various groups within. If the Taliban fair, unfortunately, there'll be another round of hostilities before an alternative configuration can even emerge. The costs for Afghanistan and the region labors will be colossal. There will be waves of displaced Iran's waiting to pour into Iran and Pakistan. Both of which for some of you who might not know, most between Iran has 780,000 refugees from Afghanistan and Pakistan has some 1.5 million Afghan refugees. Under the 1980s, unlike the 1980s, when there was ample international funding for these refugees, the sources have now dried up. And so there's no desire on the part of the regional neighborhood with the possible exception of Afghanistan to take these refugees. So I think that's of some significance. I mean, Iran has already said that it will send them back when the situation in Afghanistan is right and Pakistan has threatened to close borders. I think it's also quite significant that Pakistan has withheld recognition from the Taliban and seems to be indicating its intention to do so in concert with other regional countries. Whether this signals a different tactic on the part of Pakistan remains to be seen. While the oldest, I mean, will the old distinction, for instance, between good and bad Taliban hold for Pakistan. Now that the TTP with its allies, Taliban in power, I mean, you know, will that change Pakistan's attitude and its long drawn distinction. The outcome is very uncertain. It already depends on what lessons of any have been learned from this forever war. And whether peace is really considered to be the interest of the of the concerned parties, I think I would question that as well. I mean, obviously at one level, one would like to say that pieces. There is there can be peace, which is, you know, win win for all. And that's the kind of peace that's the only kind of peace I see working. Recent history sadly does not give us cause for optimism. Afghanistan descends into a fresh bout of civil war. We can expect to see heightened Taliban related violence in neighboring Pakistan, a surge in foreign terrorist fighters with great consequences for Pakistan as well as for Iran and Central Asian countries, the whole region. This would be especially concerning from a regional security point of view, because even if the Taliban are not concerned about spreading their brand of Islam globally, their admirers in countries like Pakistan and also in some countries in Central Asia, see their success as an overture to what they could try achieving in their own countries. I think this is something that has to be taken account of very seriously as one of the regional implications. It will take concerted effort and constant vigilance by states in the region to ensure that their security and stability is not held ransom to the uncertain and highly volatile situation that has been created with the American withdrawal in Afghanistan. Thank you. Thank you all. To begin, I'd like to ask about the Taliban on a global stage. As we've seen in the past few days, the Taliban is attempting to achieve diplomatic mission via sea on the UN General Assembly. How will the Taliban engage in a global stage, whether it be an international institutions within economies and business. How will actions such as multinational corporations and states react to the Taliban's wishes for legitimacy. I'll talk if you'd like to begin. On one level Ravi, I think this has already been going on for a while and the Americans took the lead in this. So I don't think it's something unusual. It's a question of further furthering those negotiations and having the different kinds of discussions but it's not as if it hasn't is not being done. I mean, my view is the government is an instrumental part of the development of the country and in a country like Afghanistan which is still a very fragile state and has been declining in development over the last 10 years which was the point I was trying to make. What we saw in the if you look at the last 20 years, the first 10 years, a country that had nothing started to see development that started to be a positivity and and that has all reversed in the last 10 years. Businessmen are leaving businessmen have stopped investing telecoms has stopped investing. Two of the operators are looking to exit the country so I think it's very important that the government is recognized also it has to be supported at the international level and if it isn't, then I think you risk losing any grounds that have been made and I think it shows on what Sherjan said, this is Taliban 2.0. What they have said to us as we've had meetings with them in the countries is they've said the right things. We're pro private sector development. We're pro infrastructure development, we're pro women working, we're pro education, we want to be legitimized and we want to see development in the country and the country has a lot of potential. My personal view is that the way the withdrawal was done the way that the government international governments are working today is yes there could be a carrot and stick approach to try and say you do this and they should. Right, but it's actually given them more power in my view of being able to have these factions in the government. And it's very important that the international government works together with the Taliban or the new government in whatever structure it is to try and find that legitimacy and to try and find the structures and the support that needed. I don't believe that they can do this on their own. I don't see that they have the necessary capabilities. And if nothing is done soon we're going to see the country go further in decline and eventually back to the way it was. A little bit of a different look at this situation there is no doubt in any country. There are two main players. The public the people of that country that are supposed to be served. And the government of that country that needs to provide policy and framework for those people and their counterparts out of that country. Many years had a framework had a structure that is no longer there that was designed helped and established by the deep involvement of the international community. And this international community involved all Afghan neighbors. That is no more there. The investments of billions of dollars by Russia on a WCC and many other companies, for example, are the result of those policies. Some of us too small to invest billions and billions of dollars that results in a mass corruption. There is no doubt on that one. But it did result in a framework in a structure that could have been sustained for a broader future development, not for letting businesses escape because of whatever reason they might have of course the insecurity the corruption. Those were major reasons why businesses are getting out of Pakistan. But more importantly, coming down to the question of legitimacy for any government. If we let international community let any organization topple one government and get another one and still be recognized by international community actually we are encouraging a wrong and bad behavior around the world. Any government should first seek its legitimacy from its people, not international community first. It's important. That's why international community, especially in the West that we are teaching in these universities. When we talk about my first right is my first amendment, I have to speak and I have to also select my leaders. When we believe in these rules in these rights, let's also project these rules to the people of Afghanistan. When we say there should be a legitimate government that is recognized by the people of Afghanistan, not just the Americans or international community. So that should be the first thing that we say we always promote democracy, democracy, not the Western value as the Taliban would define it but democracy that is compatible to the values of the people of that country. And every country that are universal values of principles of democracy that are accepted, Afghanistan is not an exclusive excluded of those things. There are mechanisms traditionally in the system of Afghanistan and traditional systems of Afghanistan. We should push for international recognition. There is no doubt for the sake of the Afghans and the Afghan government of the future must first gain its legitimacy from its own people. That's not from us. But those are some conditions you know it's a foregone conclusion we said we can we can we can not change a regime with we can change a regime or not, but it's already changed by including Taliban in a dialogue that was one sided. There was always full of giving Taliban more than asking them for more actually that was always at the cost of the very government and national community supported by blood and treasure in the last 20 years. So we should come to a different conclusion. What I what I believe in is prioritizing the people of Afghanistan and making the people of Afghanistan benefit from our engagement in Afghanistan rather than a group that is unelected and came by force. Keeping engaged is absolutely necessary but that engagement should not result in emboldening the bad behavior of the players. And I think that on that point, you know, I think this Taliban 2.0 is cognizant of the fact that they have to do certain things and acting a certain way to receive the aid from the international community for their own survival, not out of the goodness of their lives but for their own survival and perhaps it's a very key point for the international community's reaction to the situation that perhaps a condition of an internal peace process a transitional justice process of some sorts is desperately needed in order for for the situation to move forward in a peaceful manner in a very compromise based manner as well so yeah. I would next like to ask about India and Pakistan. How important is the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan. Well Pakistan seek to cause an ally out of the Taliban gene, whether they conflict over disputes in Prashtunistan and with the TTP. Additionally, how will the Taliban take over the impact the India Pakistan relationship. Well, I mean India Pakistan relationships are already on the ropes because of Kashmir so one is sensitive is just another layer, adding to the tension, I mean, you know that in the Pakistani military establishment which rules the roost in Pakistan. There is an intrinsic connection between Afghanistan and Kashmir. So I think you have to recognize that if the situation in Afghanistan slips further at this stage the Pakistan, I mean, you know, there is no real dialogue between the two. And clearly India sees this as a loss, because India has invested in Afghanistan a great deal in infrastructure and otherwise it was a backer of the Ashraf Ghani government. And so I mean, you know the question is we have to see how the two play themselves out I mean their relationship and Kashmir is so dire that I don't see how that will not play itself out in Afghanistan in the future. So I have a fear that that will be a problem but the fact that Pakistan currently is working with Russia and China and Iran gives some cause of hope, not too much hope, but some hope. And so I was I mean my first sort of concern is that another proxy war will be somehow avoided. I'm still not hopeful enough about the ability of the Taliban to pull it together I think there's a distinction between those who have been the field and those who've been negotiating with the international community a huge difference of attitude. And so promises made to the international community may well be difficult to translate into practice. On top of it, if the Pakistani handlers or some of the Taliban also have a role and a dislike for what is being imposed, then things could get difficult in implementation so I do think that we need to keep the complexity of the situation in mind not hope for too much. I think there's a tendency to let your expectations and preferences get the better of you. I think you have to look at the situation on the ground and what is achievable I think it's an if America couldn't achieve it for 20 years to expect any government, yes, the Taliban to achieve it is, is, is colossal. Well I think I'm going to discuss a number of things here in response to your question is Taliban and Pakistan and Pakistan and India Dr. Jalal really will orchestrated the problem between Pakistan and India the Kashmir has been since 1947 there is no doubt everybody knows that. It's going to contain and that's going to be like that forever. I don't see the reason why I say forever because we've not seen the submission last 72 years, and the next 72 years are not going to give us a good idea if they're going to solve the problem, unless there is a medical that happens between Pakistan and India and they really form a good relationship. So one part of from my perspective why Pakistan and India have had this problem the other part is of this whole dilemma is how Pakistan sees Afghanistan itself, excluding India, there, there is no, no, no, no, no doubt that Pakistan always. In many cases have looked at Afghanistan's through the Indian Prism, the India forbear that has been present in the birth of Pakistan unfortunately has also caused a relationship with neighbors especially get one of them because it has historical relationship with India we went before in Pakistan was not there. On top of that, there's also the question of the cultural identity in the connection between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan has a significant population of Pashtuns in the Baloch, who naturally, I don't say I don't claim I cannot claim that they would opt for citizenship of Afghanistan or no, they can never do that because they're better off in Pakistan than Afghanistan, who naturally came claim for an identity inside of Afghanistan. That is, ethnic identity inside of Pakistan, that is scaring Pakistan of such a move, which could be repetition of the 1970s of Bangladesh, if there is not ethnic identity that is not contained within the geographic of Afghanistan. That is one part why there is there are two full policies of Pakistan towards Afghanistan when is the Indian India phobia India sandwiching Pakistan, and one is the identity crisis that have been seen, I lived in Pakistan for 20 years, I grew up there actually. So, my life there, and understanding the posture in the Baloch population of Afghanistan will always looked for their historical identity inside of Afghanistan, not Pakistan. That is a scared note when we see 1971 Bangladesh becoming a separate country as caring when we when we see the Islamization of the of the Pakistan society on superimposing that that identity of we are only Muslims. That tells you a lot about how some policymakers especially the military is really scared of any ethnic identity that could that could supersede any other thing. That's from my perspective. I'm going to give you one example of how reactionary this approach has been toward Pakistan towards Afghanistan for Pakistan. After 2002 Pakistan did not have a designated channel TV channel for the Pashtun population. Everything was done through PTV and it has a six o'clock regional news and you would sit and watch that one. After 2002 they started the hybrid ATV channel for for for Afghanistan specific in Pashtun. Why there was no need felt before that. But felt after a Pashtun government in Afghanistan was there and we see a reactionary approach and then a lot of other stuff under Musharraf came up. There's a worry behind among the Pakistani establishing positive makers against the ethnic identity that prevails in Pakistan and this identity crisis. We had this out of identity in the in the sixties under a upon or others in Pakistan we have to know Arabic. And because we're Muslim nations and blah blah blah and then recently we have the Turkish high identity we have to watch Turkish soap operas and we are Muslim we're closer to Turkey and and all those that tells you a lot about this this uneasiness of identity itself. And if you look at it from from anthropological view that gives you different opinion of how those things have have come up to present itself in terms of their foreign policy with the neighbors. Well, there have been worries of question is done that has been a thorn Tony topic in Afghanistan and Pakistan relationship that has been a topic of the viewer line, which is an authority topic between relations of Pakistan and Pakistan and Pakistan stick with the Pakistani policy makers forever. And that's why the Islamization of identity has always been there. That's why the superimposing the establishment of identity whatever, whatever it came from there, the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, since 1973 has been supported by circles. Prime Minister for quality but even till now. When we see it, I always ask one question from from from my fellows in academia and in everywhere else. They say Taliban are indigenous movement who can yes they might have indigenous characteristics. They toppled the government of Afghanistan national community was tired getting out of Afghanistan but one question I asked. Do you think that one could have done all of this without the support they got from Pakistan. That would answer a lot of questions from from different perspective. So, so depending on how you look at Afghanistan. It's the internal dynamics that have that are designing the foreign policy of a country, especially in Pakistan. If the if there's a balance if there's if there's a strong identity that could practice could play on that one and live on that one. I don't think there should be worried about others. They have nuclear bombs, why should they should be worried about us that are in that that's a strong return policy. I do think that Mr MSA is, Dr MSA's position is rather simplistic on Pakistan I just don't agree with what you're saying, for the most part, largely because I don't think you account for the extent to which a good chunk of the country is operated into the state of Pakistan. I mean, I think you presented as a threat by the party. I mean the point is that the Pakistani state is a military dominated state. It has the most reliable Taliban Khan, as they say, working for them so they're not worried about that at this stage they are they were always worried about India. I agree with you that this was a concern, which got revived at the time of the saw revolution, but they have been more I think it's a much more I think you'll have to take a nuanced approach to it, rather than to say that this is the primary reason. I think it's India. It's a primary. I mean on Afghanistan the army calls the shots and it's an India focused concern. So I agree with you there but I think that this. The army guys are of tune themselves and so they have a different vision. So I think that that's become a little bit more complicated. But clearly I think where I disagree with you is your your analysis which says that Pakistan's intervention is the primary cause of Afghanistan's disrepair, but that American intervention was not. American intervention was actually good and the point is that that intervention and what was sought to be achieved in 20 years collapsed because of the nature in which that intervention occurred so I think you need to consider what was done wrong in that intervention. Because clearly you are again asking for international support, but I think there needs to be some circumspection of what was done wrong if it was all done perfectly. How do you explain this collapse the spectacular collapse. Absolutely I did not compare the interventions of the United States. I was just focusing on one part of the of the dynamics there is no doubt the Americans division was unfortunately have had it. And to the bond conference, Taliban were unnecessarily not part of that equation, they must have, they mean they should have been there present in Germany, talking with them, Taliban approached the African government in 2003 and many in 2005 when I was in Afghanistan. I was wondering, the United States did not let that happen. That's a different dynamic. I'm not talking about comparing the US intervention how, which happens to be after in the 80s in, then in 2000, but overall, as neighbors, Afghanistan Pakistan have no other option but to live. Absolutely there is, but there is a problem that I've been pointing to which the international community led by America at under Indian pressure wants to wants to deny Pakistan which is that they have been concerned in the security paradigm of Afghanistan is related to Kashmir, but the no move, no, no, no, no, no sort of mention of Kashmir policy does not work it doesn't help Afghanistan since Afghanistan is such good friends with India or was the previous government. I mean they should have moved them towards some sort of a resolution because it's come to the point where it's getting untenable. So I think that's the problem. I mean you can't expect the ordinary people of Pakistan to do anything in a military dominated state. I mean they might be allowed to vote but they don't have much say in defense policy. So I think this did require some mediation role by the United States and also by the international community. Maybe the Pakistan's friends the Turks can do something that none of the others can do have been able to do maybe China, but I do think you need a different tactic. Even if you think that they're wrong we need to do something about it you can't have this festering soul of Kashmir, and then expect a dramatic change of attitude on the part of the park army towards Afghanistan. Well, I think that we are caught in a in a in a in a in a real twist because of this. Absolutely. I mean, Kashmir has been the issue. I was not discounting that part but I was actually adding in explaining the component to the argument. We're running low on time. Thank you. Thank you very much for the audience q&a. You can continue to send questions via the q&a function. And if you're in cabinet please send it questions to Carolina. I have one question from Ian who is in cabinet, and is too active towards Altar. He asked, How will Afghanistan's who's full as well affect foreign countries economic and trade policies towards the Taliban government. You mentioned that Afghanistan has up to $1 trillion in natural resources. And if you could please keep your answers extinct that would be ideal. Sorry, could you just repeat the first part of the question you cut out. Um, how will Afghanistan's who's full as well affect foreign countries economic and trade policies towards the Taliban government. You mentioned that the that Afghanistan is sitting on up to $1 trillion in natural resource wealth. I'm sorry I can't get the first you're cutting out on the first. Yeah, I can type it in the chat and send it to you. I apologize. So he wanted to know how the, the wealth the natural wealth of Afghanistan will impact the foreign policy by Taiwan. Yeah, I mean, I think, as I've said is I think there's a lot the opportunity, where it's going to play out is who comes in to Afghanistan from the regional powers. There's a lot of aid required a lot of money required for the economic development. And I think this is going to open up the door for China to come in because there as a new regional player in Afghanistan they have been cozying up to the new government quite, quite recently, and as seen as a positive influence they have a lot of money and they're going to bring that money into the country. The Chinese have been very, they actually had the concessions for the mining sector. A few years ago and started to develop the mining sector. What happened was due to the securities secured insecurity, and they were targeted, they actually left and stop those the mining industry from growing. My view is that they, that's one of the areas they're going to come into and start developing and become a critical player in, in Afghan policymaking as well, and how the government is seen and I think that'll change. And I think my colleagues are more understanding of the political situation will change the dynamics quite significantly over the next few years. Thank you. And we have one final question for you. What does Turkey seek to gain from its limited engagement Afghanistan, such as the protection of the Kabul and cooperation with Pakistan to assuage the refugee forces. How will other South Asian states react to Turkey's aims to spread its influence in Afghanistan. I think that Turkey is trying to use this as a, as a way for its economic gain because the Turkish economy is really experiencing a very difficult bottleneck right now. You know, Turkish lira really lost much of its value vis-à-vis the West dollar just today, actually, because of the recently announced fiscal policies of the of the Turkish economic authority so what we are seeing is I think Turkish construction sector would really benefit directly with Turkey's greater involvement in the reconstruction in the Taliban era in Afghanistan so there is some sort of an economic gain that the Turkish authorities are anticipating from their direct involvement there, I think, and also the flow of Turkish goods and service sector in Afghanistan is another anticipated gain from a greater role that can be played by Turkey in in the country. Thank you. Looks like that is all the time we have questions today. Would all be like to make a short one minute closing statement. Professor Jalal, if you could begin. Yes, well, I mean I can only hope that we have learned some lessons I know we haven't learned all the lessons of history, but I would hope that the regional actors, and even the players within Afghanistan have learned that peace should be given a chance and and we should move towards a win win situation for everyone. So everyone has a stake in the peace and prosperity of the people of Afghanistan enough is enough. I think that Pakistan, certainly the people of Pakistan have also paid a very heavy price and I think that the military establishment there should be engaged with by the international community to try and find some sort of an agreement that will be for Taliban and I mean at least the people of Pakistan I mean I mean the Taliban has just become a reductive term at this stage I mean this is this isn't we need an Afghan government that can deliver for its people. And that's what the Pakistani army whatever if they have role and we hear they do they should play their influence should be used by the international community with some promises vis-à-vis India. I mean this is what is the best hope, but we have to work together this is not going to work if people start pursuing their own interest in Afghanistan, it will be a disaster, not just for international peace but for global peace Afghanistan matters, even more today than when the US was in Afghanistan. To piggybacking on Dr. Jalal's word last words that we have to work on or to be constructive, not our own interests. We just because you say Afghanistan is not the, not going to be problem of itself but the whole globe, which have we have seen a lot. If we are allies that we have to act like allies, we should not be be once ally and then trying to to jeopardize the whole process, it should be a win-win game where our global interest should be protected rather than interest of a single country or a single individual in Afghanistan because we have seen this as they say Afghanistan is the heart of Asia. Actually, it sort of proves that if there is no peace in Afghanistan, if there is no peace in Afghanistan, there is no peace in Asia, and that has been seen, if there is no peace in Afghanistan, it is not letting connecting the Central Asia with South Asia and that's a loss for the people of Pakistan, for the people of India, for the people of Central Asia, 1.8 billion people are at loss. So we have to work together for a win-win solution for the interests of all people and primarily at this moment for the people of Afghanistan. So if I could just carry off on that, I think I agree with what both panelists have said. I think it's, we're at a very interesting time and I think there's a difference between now and 20 years ago, where a lot of the youth today have grown up in a Taliban era. And as Sherjan said, they have been used to the latest technology, they're very savvy on social media. We have what we call the social media activists who pick up on issues and complain about what the government is doing, what the private sector is doing, and looking after the interests of people. So I think we have a very different dynamic on the ground. The government has to be looking at how it can do infrastructure development. I think the one thing we are saddened about is the role of women going forward and I know the next panel is on women. We had groomed a young Afghan woman to be the CEO of the company, who today she can't. She started off 20 years ago working with us as a receptionist, grew into becoming our HR director, had to move her family out to Tajikistan because she was threatened, and her family was threatened because she had to fire Afghan men. And she was groomed, unfortunately today she's not in that role, but I think we still have hope that there are the youth of today, the women of today who are very strong, very powerful. We'll be that dynamic change that's required at least in Afghanistan to change things so we can only be hopeful as to what will happen. And I would like to echo all my fellow distinguished panelists and say that a very sincere genuine internal peace process is what is needed with the help of the international community. But here I would like to raise a precaution in terms of external, you know, external impacts of certain external actors, such as China, which is famous for pursuing unconditionality actually when it comes to dealing with regimes who have poor human rights track record so this really raises a lot of red flags actually in terms of this, you know, the Chinese government's involvement in the, in the new regime, because they are known for their no conditions approach in foreign policy, when it comes to implementation and making a good track record of human rights principles so that really raises an important flag here and the important thing to remember is to have a comprehensive and all inclusive type of a peace process that is going to be listen, you know, willing to listen to all sides concerns and willing to compromise reach a compromise for a working solution so thank you very much. I would like to thank the panelists for taking the time to come speak with us and the audience members for participating in the back. The next panel is in collaboration with women and I and will discuss the impacts of Taliban control and Afghan women. Thank you very much. Thank you.