 Welcome, I welcome you all to this lecture in the course Introduction to Paninian Grammar. In this lecture, we shall study further the process of speech production. We have been studying this process as described in the Paninian sources in some lectures now. And we continue to study this further. It is very important to study this process as described in the Paninian grammatical tradition because the entire analysis in the grammar is based on this description of the process of speech production. So we studied this source called Paninian Shikha and the verses from it. And we said that in these verses, we can note down the following stages of speech production. Atma-buddhya-sametya-arthan, that is the first, mano-yunkte-vivaksaya, the second, manakkayagne-mahanti, the third, sapreayati-marutam, the fourth, marutas-turasicharan, mandram-janayati-svaram, the fifth, sodhe-rano-murdhyapyato, the sixth, vaktram-apady-marutah, seventh, and the eighth, and the final, varnan-janayati. Amongst these eight, we have been studying the very first stage so far and we shall study this in today's lecture as well. We can note that within these eight, these first two, they describe the internal cognitive process. Whereas the rest of the stages, they describe the physical process or the biological process of the speech production. So it is important to spend some time and study this process in little bit detail in the internal cognitive apparatus. So let us study in some more detail what is meant by this collection of meanings, atma-buddhya-sametya-arthan, simple derivate and super derivates, etc. We have studied this first bullet in the previous lecture. Let us also study briefly what is the concept of congruity and also study the concept of mutual expectancy. We shall study these two in this lecture. To take a recap, the human cognitive apparatus is endowed with the sense organs on the external most side and they function in their respective domains. Shrotra here functions in the domain of sound or shabdha. Thvakskin functions in the domain of sparsha or touch. Chakshas-eyes function in the domain of rupa or form. Jiva-tang functions in the domain of rasa or taste. Ghrana knows functions in the domain of gandha. This is what we have seen. And we also saw that there is a one-to-one relation between these domains and the sense organ. Now, based on this, let us study the concept of congruity, also known as yogyata. The basis for the principle of congruity exists on the basis of the cognitive process that we described thus just now. And the cognitive apparatus as well. And the specificity about the clear-cut divisions of the sense organ and the respective domain pairs that we saw in the description so far. Let us analyze it further. Let us study this further. At the simple level of the arthakash, items that form the link between the sense organ and its respective domain are said to have congruity. They are said to possess yogyata. And items that do not form the link between the sense organ and its respective domain are said not to have congruity. They are said not to possess yogyata. And we shall study this aspect with examples. For example, the action of hearing and sound being the object of it in which the ear is involved and soul being the doer. This is the example of simple yogyata, congruity. The action of touching and the spatial element being the object of it and also soul being the doer with the skin as the sense organ. These are said to possess yogyata. These are said to have congruity. Then the action of seeing and color for example being the object of it where in soul is the doer of the action of seeing and the eyes as sense organs involved in the process. This is said to possess yogyata or congruity. All these meanings are parts of arthakasha. Similarly, the action of tasting and sweet object for example being the object of it. Soul being the doer and tongue the sense organ involved. They all are said to possess yogyata or congruity. Similarly, the action of smelling and odor being the object of it. Soul being the doer and nose being the sense organ. They all are said to be congruous. They all are said to possess yogyata or congruity. Now if we look at the derivate part of the arthakasha we can say the following. The action of hearing and let us say the components of speech which were earlier listed down as the derivate of the arthakasha related to the sense organ here. They will have congruity no doubt. But this is not the direct congruity, direct yogyata, simple yogyata. They will have congruity via a certain path that goes through the simple arthakasha. Action of touching and emotions related to touch they will have congruity. But this is not a direct relation, direct congruity. This yogyata or congruity will be via a path that goes through the simple arthakasha related to the action of touching. Similarly, the action of seeing and say mixed color for example will also have some congruity. But this will be again via a path that goes through the simple arthakasha. Action of tasting and food ingredients will have congruity certainly but via a certain path that goes through the simple arthakasha. Action of smelling and animals working on order for example will also have congruity or yogyata. But this will be again via a certain path that goes through the simple arthakasha that is related to the action of smelling and the sense organ knows. This is how the derivate arthakasha will be said to possess the yogyata with respect to the sense organ and its domain. Now if we look at the super derivate part of the arthakasha and the yogyata we can say the following. Action of hearing and written symbols of speech for example can have congruity via an extended path that goes through the simple as well as the derivate arthakasha. But there is a possibility of having no congruity that cannot be negated. So possibility of having no congruity cannot be entirely negated. Similarly, action of touching and the figurative use of touch can have congruity via an extended path through the simple as well as the derivate. Possibility of having no congruity cannot be entirely negated. Similarly, action of seeing and philosophizing can have congruity via an extended path that goes through the simple as well as the derivate arthakasha. Again, possibility of having no congruity cannot be negated. Similarly, the action of tasting and the aesthetic principle described earlier can have congruity. Yes, but via a certain extended path that goes through the simple as well as the derivate arthakasha. Once again, possibility of having no congruity cannot be entirely negated. Similarly, the action of smelling and the figurative use can also be safe to have congruity via an extended path that goes through the simple as well as derivate arthakasha related to the action of smelling. Again, possibility of having no congruity cannot be entirely negated. This is how the yogata is related in or within the arthakasha that is simple derivate as well as super derivate that is related to the pysense organs and their respective domains. This is the core, this is at the base related to the human cognitive apparatus. Similarly, let us study the concept of yogata now because we studied the concept of congruity or yogata. We looked at the very basic, the very core of arthakasha which is possessing yogata with what? With in relation to the sense organs and the domains. Now, in order to make it more clear, let us also look at which items cannot be safe to possess yogata with respect to others as far as the arthakasha is concerned. The arthakasha related to this cognitive apparatus is concerned. So, the action of hearing and ear namely the sense organ and sound the domain can be said to have incongruity or yogata with the following. Say action of touching plus skin plus touch and its derivates and its super derivates. The action of hearing plus ear per sound can be said to have incongruity with the action of seeing and eyes and form and its derivates and its super derivates. Similarly, the action of hearing plus ear plus sound can be said to have incongruity with the action of tasting plus tongue and taste where tongue is the sense organ taste is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of hearing and the sense organ ear and the domain sound as part of the arthakasha can be said to possess a yogata or incongruity with the action of smelling and the sense organ nose and the domain odor. And its derivates and super derivates as part of the arthakasha. Similarly, the action of touching which has skin as the sense organ and touch as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of hearing and ear and sound and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of touching and skin and touch can be said to have incongruity with the action of seeing and eyes as the sense organ and form as the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of touching and skin as the sense organ and touch as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of tasting where tongue is the sense organ and taste is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of touching and skin and touch can be said to have incongruity with the action of smelling where nose is the sense organ and odor is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of seeing where the sense organ is the eye eyes and the domain is the form can be said to have incongruity with the action of hearing where ear is the sense organ and sound is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. The action of seeing where eyes is the sense organ and form is the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of touching where skin is the sense organ and touch is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of seeing and eyes as the sense organ and form as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of tasting where tongue is the sense organ and taste is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. And the action of seeing with eyes as the sense organ and form as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of smelling with nose as the sense organ and odor as the domain. Similarly, the action of tasting with the tongue as the sense organ and taste as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of hearing where ear is the sense organ and sound is the domain. The action of tasting with tongue and taste can be said to have incongruity with the action of touching with skin as the sense organ and touch as the domain and its derivates and super derivates. The action of tasting with tongue as the sense organ and taste as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of seeing with eyes as the sense organ and form as the domain and its derivates and super derivates. The action of tasting with tongue as the sense organ and taste as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of smelling with nose as the sense organ and odor as the domain and its derivates and super derivates. And finally, the action of smelling where nose is the sense organ and odor is the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of hearing where ear is the sense organ and sound is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, action of smelling with nose as the sense organ and odor as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of touching where skin is the sense organ and touch is the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of smelling with nose as the sense organ and odor as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of seeing with eyes as the sense organ and form as the domain and its derivates and super derivates. Similarly, the action of smelling with nose as the sense organ and odor as the domain can be said to have incongruity with the action of tasting with tongue as the sense organ and taste as the domain. So, these are the examples, clear cut examples where the incongruity exists within the arthakasha related to the cognitive apparatus the human being possesses the sense organs and the domains and the respective actions involved. So, in conclusion, we can say that in this way items in the arthakasha can be showed to be arranged in a structure, it is this structure which is at the base of the collection of meanings. Generally, only those meanings are collected which have congruity. Generally, only those meanings are not collected which do not have congruity. When meanings which have no congruity are collected such a speech is either termed as invalid or becomes subjected to correction or is considered as having the poetic form. This is how the yogita structures the arthakasha. This is the very basic, very core aspect of arthakasha and this is how the yogita then rolls down into derivates and super derivates and so on and so forth. And then as we can see we can also define what is poetic in terms of this yogita that structures this arthakasha. After having studied yogita, congruity that shapes the arthakasha, let us now closely take a look at what is mutual expectancy or akanksha as it is called, akanksha. So, when we talk about atma buddhya samet yarthan, when the meanings are collected by the atma or soul as the first stage of the process of speech production, we say that in this collection of meanings as part of the arthakasha, meanings which have congruity behave in combination. One of them let us say x can be said to have an expectancy of the other, namely y. So, those items which have congruity, the action of seeing and form and the sense organ eyes and its derivates and super derivates. If one of them is termed as x and the other one is termed as y, then x can be said to have an expectancy of the other that is y. And the other y can be said to have an expectancy of the one namely x and x and y can be said to have mutual expectancy. They can be said to have akanksha of each other. Generally the atma, the soul collects meanings which have such mutual expectancy, such an akanksha. This mutual expectancy creates a template of meanings to be collected. Meanings which are part of simple arthakasha are natural examples, the one that I described just now. The other example would be the action of hearing with ear as the sense organ and sound as the domain and this is the description of the simple arthakasha. And so, meanings related to them, they will have mutual expectancy, they are the natural examples. Now, meanings which are derivate can be said to be the real examples where there is some distance, where the congruity is existent through certain path that goes through the simple arthakasha. Yet it is expecting some simple arthakasha to fall back upon and so, these derivates can be considered as the real example where there is some distance yet there is some expectancy. So, the simple arthakasha would obviously expect the simple arthakasha as well as derivate arthakasha as well as super derivate arthakasha and vice versa. Meanings which are super derivates may not always explicitly have expectancy from simple as well as derivate arthakasha. This is just in case, otherwise in general even the super derivates will have expectancy. Now, sentences with only one of the elements of the arthakasha expressed in audible speech are able to still communicate because the mutual expectancy will give rise to the other elements in the arthakasha. This is a common experience and this mutual expectancy giving rise to the other elements in the arthakasha be it simple or derivate of super derivate will complete the required link even though the word expressing that required link is still not explicitly expressed in the audible speech. For example, if in the explicitly expressed audible speech only white is the meaning that is expressed now that can give rise to the action of seeing because white is the description of a color which is related to the form which is then related to the action of seeing and the sense organ eye or eyes etc. And so in this fashion we can say that a sentence having only the meaning white expressed by a word can still complete the action of communication because the mutually expected meanings will be given rise to and the expectancy will be fulfilled. So to summarize in this lecture we have studied in brief the yogyata as well as akanksha, congruity as well as mutual expectancy as important principles which structure the arthakasha. To summarize what we have discussed in this lecture we can say that yogyata, congruity and akanksha mutual expectancy are very much part of the arthakasha which is located in the buddhi. So yogyata and akanksha can also be said to be located in the buddhi or cognition. Meaning which possess both yogyata and akanksha are collected by the atma as a first step of process of speech production. This is a by default situation and this is the programming of the expressed speech that is audible. This is also said to be the cause of the process of speech production and that is why spending time understanding this particular stage is extremely important because this is the cause and what is audible is just an effect. So we should understand the cause and then we shall be able to understand the effect as well relatively easily. So this stage also serves as the cross check reference for the self validation. So the audible speech which is produced can be heard by the same speaker and if something goes wrong because of some external conditions and so the audible speech deviates in a way then the speaker can cross check that audible speech with the internal programming structured by the concept of yogyata and akanksha which is stored in this first stage. Now this stage also involves control how we shall see later. One thing is sure that clarity at this stage causes clarity in the subsequent steps of process of speech production. So if you want the clarity as far as the externally audible expressed speech you need to bring in clarity at this internal cognitive first stage of the process of speech production. And finally reaching this stage of arthakasha in understanding a communication is indeed an aim of communication. But we observe that in the reality this remains a distant dream is in most communications resulting in people not understanding what other people want to say which is a very sad state of affairs which causes lots of problems and so on and so forth. So if we understand this cognitive stage we will be able to understand what the communication wants to communicate. We should note this down as a very important point. Thank you for your attention.