 Governments first start off by asking a really basic question, why should we care about FGI? What does it matter? If you think about investment, clearly you can finance, you can have investment mostly for domestic investment and FGI might not be important in this whole story. I would argue that FGI is important for economic development, economic growth through at least three mechanisms. One mechanism is that FGI brings investable resources to a country where there is a lack of domestic resources. Many low income countries face a problem increasing investment rates. If you look at Sub-Saharan Africa, investment rates there are around 15-20 percent. Look at East Asia, 30-35 percent, China's got about 35 percent GDP investment rates. So if you want to get investment rates around 30-35 percent, which we know using a simple model of economic growth, you've got to get investment from somewhere and FGI can provide some of that. The second reason is that FGI can be very important for technology transfer, especially if you have joint ventures. Technology is difficult to get to the market, to a market-based transaction, FGI can allow you to bring technology in, which is very important in today's globalized world. The third mechanism is that FGI, and this is a very good work on this in economics, can lead to technology spillovers, knowledge spillovers. If you imagine a company coming into a country investing in, say, particular industrial electronics, the spillover effect with the workers working in that company might go somewhere else, a domestic company, and they'll bring their human capital that they've learned, they picked up through that initially working in M&E, and the country can benefit from that. Non-spillovers are actually, in my view, perhaps the most important mechanism. I'm much less convinced about the investment resource argument because FGI's official GDP is around 4-5% and we saw some data on that on technology transfer, depends on the industry, depends on the licensing that we have with water nationals, but knowledge spillovers, the work I've seen and which I've done work on, there's no doubt about it, that knowledge spillovers are very important, which means that FGI can and has the robust evidence on this in economics, can lead to significant economic growth. However, there's one thing that I'm going to talk about in this discussion on the UNCATH report, that it's not an unconditional relationship. It's very much conditional institutional quality. So we see it and I've done some work on this, that FGI effect on growth depends on whether the country has good institutions or not. The country has weak institutions, FGI does not seem to impact on economic growth very much. The country has strong institutions, FGI is much more stronger. So in other words, the responsive of growth through FGI is not unconditional, it's conditional institutional quality. So that's something just to keep that in mind. Now, I'm going to go back now to this question about the global minimum tax and here are some things that I'm going to be a slightly dissenting voice in this issue because I do think from a development point of view, there are important questions. First question I would ask is that if you think about two companies investing in multinational, investing in countries. One could be Shell, BP, investing in oil and gas. The other could be several Korean FDR companies invested in labor-intensive manufacturing, Chinese companies, Japanese companies. And the difference is that if you're in a resource-intensive sector, the tax ETR, the effective tax rate, doesn't really matter because there's so much rents in that sector, so much profits in the sector. But if you're a foreign, if you're a Korean FDR company coming into multinational export, labor-intensive manufacturing, that tax can bite. Right? Because the profits in labor-intensive manufacturing is not very much, especially a lot of volume. Profit per unit of production or sales is not very much. So at that point, it can bite. So then the question is that if this, the global minimum tax, leads to a situation where countries will need FDI, fall about intensive manufacturing. And not, we might find out either multinational decide to reinvest their own countries. So it's not outsourcing, they have on-shoring, which has already happened in the U.S. Versus a situation where you have FDI, and coming mostly to the intensive sectors, because they don't really care about the ETR. So I do have a concern that, will this push away the possibilities we've seen in East Asia of export-intensive manufacturing driven a lot by FDI? Look at Thailand, look at Cambodia, look at Laos, look at Vietnam, look at Bangladesh. So I'm also in South Asia here. So there is a concern I have that we need to be worried about sectoral distribution of the FDR. We cannot just say, look, this is something that is not independent sectoral differences, because we do want countries to get FDI, provide FDI in the sectors that matter of economic growth. So that's my first point. The second point is that I want to say is that there is a difference in inward-looking FDI and outward-oriented FDI. To be very honest, I much mean to say outward-oriented FDI, export-oriented FDI. Because if you are a company coming in to invest in that country to produce the domestic market, you already have quite a high rents. There's usually protective markets there. So you have a higher profit per unit sales. If you're exporting, you're exporting against other companies that are in the same space. So as I said, governments, for example, there is a difference there. And what we want to make sure is that we protect export-oriented FDI. So again, with the global boom tax, FX tax distribution between inward-looking FDI, which in my view is not very debilitating, but it may not have debilitating positive applications versus export-oriented FDI. So again, there's an important question about which way is the FDI going in these countries. The third point I want to make is that I want to bring the question of institutional quality. So imagine you have two countries with same global minimum tax, 15%. But one country has weak institutions. The other country has strong institutions. What we're going to see, we're going to see countries move their investments, move their investments to the higher and to the higher social quality. But also we know that low-income countries are the ones with weak institutions. And again, then there's a question here that if institutional quality matters, and I'm going to see this movement away from low-income countries with weak institutions, we need to be worried about that. So these are things which we need to have more research because I think that these are questions where we need to have empirical evidence that can explain exactly what are the implications of this minimum tax on the broader development questions that we need to ask. And I think if we don't have that evidence base, I'm still not completely convinced about how the global tax might work. That's sorry.