 In continuation of the incentive design system, there are certain other issues that a designer can face during designing this incentive system. An issue in this regard is the total CEO's compensation. A CEO's compensation can be comprising of salary, stock grants and stock options, pension and health benefits, his office tenure and other contingent benefits like evergreen contracts, golden parachutes and golden handcuffs. Stock grants are the shares given to the CEO at a certain amount of price, whereas stock options are the rights given to a CEO to exercise to acquire a specified number of shares at a specified price at a specified period of time. By evergreen contracts means the automatic renewal of the CEO's employment contract once it is expired. Golden parachutes are the benefits offered to a CEO upon its dismissal if the firm goes for a merger. And golden handcuffs are the benefits given to a CEO if he remains with the company for a longer period of time. Empirical studies on relationship between CEO compensation and shareholders' wealth maximization shows a mixture of results. In some researches, there exists a positive relationship between the two items. And in other researches, the relationship does not exist between a CEO's compensation and the firm's shareholders' wealth maximization. An other issue in this regard is the setting of stretch targets. It is said that performance measurements should be relevant if it is related to the expectations. That is, the performance should be measured in relevance to the expectations. Any performance below the expectation will yield earnings below the cost of capital. But in this scenario, the compensation will be much higher. So, it is desirable that stretch targets relative to the expectations. And this cannot be achieved by small improvements. But it requires extension of oneself to the limits to actualize the things. It differs from ordinary toughest level to in two aspects. Number one, extreme difficulty. The achievement of goal is extremely difficult in this scenario. Like getting a 50% increase in the share market price over the next five years. And this stretching may also be in terms of novelty. How novelty may work? Let's say that in order to have a 50% high prices in the next five years in the stock market, one goal is to decrease waste by 80% during the next three years. But there should be some care that it is better to avoid setting for too much stretch goals as use of stretch goals is common in corporate world. But its success is seldom seen. Another issue in designing the incentive system is the incentive design across multiple time periods. This means that a manager may change his job from one period to another, from one organization to another, then how his compensation can appropriately be distributed. So, suitable allocation of managerial compensation may become difficult in the scenarios where frequent job changes by the firm managers are there because the decisions taken by such managers in the past have their effects at present. Another reason that managers vary in number of years before their retirement. So how we can distribute compensation among such varied number of managers? Also there exists some short-term managerial behavior under which managers act for a shorter period of time to enhance their performance temporarily. Also, this incentive system is less attractive for the retiring managers than for the newcomers. In empirical research, no evidence is in existence on the solution of this multi-period compensation problem where there exists a put for thought and that is the management can create a compensation bank system for the managers to act in the best interest of the shareholders. This compensation bank will work in the sense that the compensation of the manager will be transferred to this compensation bank and only a proportional amount will be allowed to withdraw and the remaining amount will be kept there. The other option is to share ownership control with the management till the retirement of the managers. We see that one-year performance measures guided by a long-run view to avoid short-sighted approach at the expense of the long-run, which means that while multi-period compensation problem exists, another reason of this issue is that a short-period phenomenon may exist for a longer existence.