 Good morning again everyone. Thank you very much for for coming this morning I see lots of faces who have come from from from near and far, and I know it's a slog to get in This time of the morning too so thank you again for for making the trip and I would be remiss also as I was in my report not to more personally thanks those of you who participated in the working group series and Gave a lot of your personal time to help Educate as I said a liberal arts major about robots, which is no small task So I see in particular Colonel Bill Tartt who's in the audience Thinking about his next career phases and had the opportunity to go to your retirement a couple months ago and really drew home also everyone in the Air Force who has worked so hard after the over the past decade and in the other services thinking about Unmanned systems and I tapped a lot of you who have that hard one Experience and harvested your thoughts and hopefully reflected them in a in a helpful way. So thank you to all of you who contributed We are privileged to be joined on this panel by three qualified highly qualified experts to discuss with you What we've framed as the topic of US leadership amid commercial sector growth and changing global supply The panel opens for discussion a few of the major themes in our report The first is to consider how relatively important Unmanned systems technology and unmanned aerial vehicles systems RPAs whatever we'd like to call them How important is that technology not just the way it's being employed today? But the way that it might be employed going forward and not just by us But by other nations and non-state groups as well Is it transformative or revolutionary and does it deserve the attention? It's receiving including the proposal that we discussed earlier to elevate it to its own office within the Department of Defense Is that a is that a good idea? Is that helpful or is it not helpful? Related is doD effectively organized currently to harness the available benefits of unmanned systems This came up a lot in the panel But but going forward are we going to be able to take full advantage? And I think Dan's question got to the part of it Which is how else might we use them? Where might they be most beneficial and how is unmanned systems? Technology again being adopted by foreign militaries What role can and should the US play in shaping a more favorable outcome in this diffusion of military innovation? Stealing a line directly from my correlates What are the arms control considerations? Let me introduce the panel to you in the order in which I will invite them to offer their opening remarks Depending on time I might follow up with a few hard questions of my own and then turn it over to you all for a Q&A session Very pleased to be joined by dr. Lynn Davis who's a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation and also serves as Rand's director of the Washington office From 1993 to 1997 as many of you already know dr. Davis served as the under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs We are delighted. She's here today To discuss among other things the findings of Rand's new report armed and dangerous UAVs and US security Of which she was the lead author This is I will tell you if you haven't read it the best report I've read on the arms control Context and implications of UAVs and I would strongly encourage you to pick it up if you haven't and read it alongside the CSIS report Of course great compliment And while I'm assigning UAS reading let me turn to JJ Gertler Mr. Gertler is a specialist in military aviation at the congressional research service with a long and distinguished resume of government and research Service before that including a stint at CSIS Where he was a senior fellow and in January 2012 he wrote a report on US unmanned aerial systems That's a foundational to understanding on the topic and was very helpful to us as we conducted our research And finally, let me thank Mike Horowitz for making the trip down from Philadelphia to join us here today Dr. Horowitz is an associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania And he is a non-resident scholar here at CSIS In 2012 he served as a council on foreign relations international affairs fellow at OSD policy Where he toiled under people like Ken Handelman in the audience there And worked on among other things UAS export policy issues And he has just published in the current issue of foreign affairs a provocative piece titled the looming robotics gap and Another another must read that I will assign coming out of this panel and with that let me turn to dr. Davis For opening remarks. Thank you again. Thank you. Thank you Sam and also for the plug for our recent report. That was that was kind Let me just start by saying I'm going to take you to a slightly different level and pitch For the presentation that I'm going to make but we can come back to some of the more specific issues. I Will be talking about armed UAVs RPAs Drones UASs, you know what I'm talking about. So that's it's but it's the armed systems And I'm going to just describe to you a couple of the questions that provoked us into the study that we've just we've just completed And that is folks. We're talking about these weapon systems being transformative Talking about these weapon systems proliferating around the world with dangers that one could only imagine People were talking about Having to find arms control solutions that is to keep that proliferation from Happening and then others were talking about the arms control system non-proliferation system that's already in effect the MTCR is standing in the way of all that ever we ever wanted to do in terms of kind of developing these systems and Selling these systems to to friends and partners and so that was sort of the set or the context that Let us to want to kind of step back and say, you know, what do we think about those questions? And how would we answer those questions? And so in a just a couple of minutes I'm going to lay out the propositions or findings and if I don't provoke you along the way to a question or a Response I'll be a little surprised But basically I just want to share with you some of the thoughts that that you know came to us as we work through some of those questions and Issues and the first sort of I think important thing to say about this whole subject is That it's really important to distinguish between Shorter range systems longer range systems low technology systems high technology systems for this Audience I don't think I need to say that but I think the debate often is at cross-purposes Because people don't start by saying I'm talking about short-range systems or I'm talking about unarmed systems Or I'm talking about long-range arm systems And so I think it's important as we think about how we answer some of these questions that be very very careful When we look at how these systems are going to proliferate There's no question that short range UAVs are going to proliferate There are lots of civilian applications the technologies for those are not that sophisticated And so we're going to see a proliferation of those kinds of systems but if you then focus on the longer range systems and Those that are armed They're really kind of reduces the set of countries and places that can develop those and will be likely to acquire those And I think in addition what we have to look at is that many of our Partners but also our adversaries when looking at these systems may actually find other systems that are more attractive Either a militarily or in terms of cost and so that sort of sets the boundaries if you will of What it means to say that these systems are are going to proliferate So then turning from the fact that yes, they're going to be around of different kinds and and different characteristics Are these systems transformative that is are they revolutionary are they game-changers you will you I didn't know Why we weren't asking that question quite frankly when we started but people said well people are out there saying that and so we better Try to answer that questions. And so we answered the question by saying no it's not transformative in the sense of nuclear weapons or even airpower is it sort of developed at the end of End of the First World War and on into the Second World War So we basically you can find the argument there So I've actually seen a couple of you know people shaking their heads So maybe I'm having an effect already in terms of what it is that we're that we're finding That's not to say that these systems don't are not very attractive That's you know trans it's a different sort of question as to how you would find benefits from employing these systems And there are clearly benefits and we go through the different types of benefits that one can see starting with long-range armed UAVs clearly they are very attractive to us in the circumstances that is the United States and the circumstances that we've been using them Against insurgents and insurgents without air defenses. And so they are in a very attractive System for that particular set of operations and we can and we would sort of move through other places where we could see their Attractions, but then we step back and say but then there's some sort of you know if you will sort of Sort of not Necessarily things not to make them useful, but they have their own sort of vulnerabilities and limitations And of course the the vulnerability of the longer-range systems is that they you know that air defenses are counter to those to those systems Again, I'm not really telling most of you what you don't already know But I think it's important to kind of set the stage for this for this conversation Short-way short-range systems That's what we were kind of talking about for the most part this morning and the first panel are you know have enormous sort of Opportunities for the mill for our military services for others. We could see their potential value the terrorists Not only just to have a sort of an effect a military effect, but maybe a psychological effect So it is the case that they are you know sort of you you have to think of the sort of Benefits and limitations of these systems Thinking about the particular missions that they might be Undertaking and so before I take up all your time on the panel I'm gonna take take the point of arms control something that I've spent a fair amount of time in my life thinking about and non-proliferation and so you know These these are are going to proliferate But they are not going to kind of create the same dangers That we saw with the proliferation of nuclear weapons or even with missiles long-range missiles In terms of the need to think about a regime, you know in terms of Their non or preventing their proliferation I think it's a very different situation With the respect with respect to UAVs armed UAVs Unarmed UAVs and I think it's important to see that distinction in my own mind These systems are more like conventional aircraft than they are like the other kinds of systems that we have sought to Design non proliferation regimes, you know to prevent the trade or the the transfers Now given that's where we are It's also the case that these systems find themselves already in a non proliferation regime in the missile technology control regime They are already part of that regime and they they are part of the the controls or the The ways in which we seek to prevent their proliferation and and so I'll make two sort of final points about About that and if I haven't provoked you by now I expect that I will in the next next couple of minutes one I see enough flexibility in the MTCR the missile technology control regime for us to be able to share and sell These systems to our partners and to our allies I think the regime itself has that flexibility built into it And I'm not one to say that somehow we undermine the whole regime by precedence in terms of the potential sale of those systems To our allies and to our friends But what's good about the MTCR is that it already has in place You know a consensus in favor of keeping those systems out of the hands of those that we find dangerous So we can use that regime to prevent the proliferation of these systems to potential adversaries and to Potential groups that could be dangerous to us So in a sense we have the the ability to to kind of make the policies that we need with respect to sales while controlling With our with our allies and those other members of the regime those that could be dangerous to our security So let me stop there Thank you. Terrific JJ And let me pick up from there in a certain sense I can't certainly talk about the arms control aspects But more on the technology side and how widely this stuff is likely to proliferate Both Dr. Davis's report and Sam's and I'm happy to endorse them both having spent time at both Rand and CSIS My sister went to Penn. I can't claim any personal experience there but Both of those reports Indicate that the technology. We're talking about is not all that difficult The United States has been getting heavier than air Vehicles to deliver ordinance with some guidance to a remote location since 1917 Active guidance during the course of flight followed not that far afterward and hobbyists all over the world every weekend are flying devices larger than many currently fielded US UAVs some of which are jet-powered some of which can drop objects and They're flying them quite some distance from themselves. The technology is out there for the shorter range And it's not that terribly difficult to scale for longer range But there's a big asterisk on all of that and it is that while the technology of the air vehicle itself is not that hard The communications infrastructure for true global operations is reserved to a very few countries Colonel Callahan could sit in his office somewhere in the western United States and fly a UAV Halfway around the world because we've got a satellite constellation that spans the globe and provides connectivity Russia can do that China arguably can do that and that's the list of countries that can do it when we're talking about Transferring these devices We're talking about the ones that can be controlled basically line of sight Some other countries are developing the ability to do communications relay whether through aircraft or through other UAVs But that in some ways is the more challenging and far less developed technology than unmanned vehicles Remotely piloted vehicles themselves Is it all coming? It's coming all over the world There are over 70 countries that are developing one flavor or another of UAV a Smaller subset that intend at least or have declared an intention to develop armed ones One of the countries that's maybe not doing quite as much is the United States of America And I apologize for the small chart especially to the folks with cameras in the back The drones are coming the drones are coming well. This is DOD's plan for procuring UAVs through the current FIDUP We go from over 1200 a couple of years back to a running level of less than 30 per year Why is this it's because the United States is Quite consciously taking a strategic pause in UAV procurement really two reasons One for the types of environments. We've been operating in for the last 10 years We've been buying plenty of UAVs that are suited. We have a surplus on hand We have enough to provide the requirement of 55 full-time caps with a surge to 65 If any of you run across General Dave Deptula in your wanderings by the way You can get an earful on just how relevant a metric caps is but We have that technology already well in hand and fully bought the next wave of technology Faster stealthier There's currently not a procurement plan at least not one that comes out in the public budget documents to acquire such UAVs DOD is consciously waiting until that next generation is ready Before they go and start buying more UAVs in order to operate in different kinds of environments than we have been for the last decade That raises the question really of whether DOD is well organized to go ahead and do that You've seen the moves in Congress. You've seen the proposals to concentrate all UAV procurement in a or at least development in a central joint office From the Congressional Research Service perspective where we don't make recommendations or conclusions There's some merits to that. There's some demerits to that but When you had multiple services buying essentially the same platform or a couple of platforms from a very limited universe of Manufacturers, it's reasonable to ask whether there really need to be separate development Organizations doing that as opposed to those that are developing their requirements and subsequently fielding them So other countries are going to have UAV capability They are going to be able to drop things at least within line of sight control on adversaries How we go about controlling that regime? I'll leave to dr. Davis But whether the United States decides to take Action to begin defending our forces and whether that's more a function of something like network attack than physical air defense systems to guard against these Might be a good thing for a joint office to discuss or at least for think tanks Thank You terrific Mike Thanks a lot. Thanks for having me Sam. It's a honor to be back here where I first started after college as an intern I I find myself in violent agreement with much of what the two previous speakers Said and in the interest of getting to questions. I will I will try to keep this at least reasonably brief especially for a professor I Think that it's a mistake in some ways to think about this from a proliferation perspective is just a question of Reaper proliferation to start and Essentially asking the question will others how many people will be able to do with the United States can do now because I think that Misses essentially the military robotics forest for the the CT slash ISR Reaper trees and That we we have this current generation of UAVs that we've used to to great effect around the world and that we're now concerned with others Using but as the I think the previous speaker Mentioned the the the more important issue in some way isn't what we have now It's what it's what might happen next and in that way. I think that the trends from a proliferation perspective or not promising if you think about the Factors that make military technology a lot more likely to spread and spread pretty quickly Two of the most important are whether they're underlying commercial applications for the for that technology and what the unit cost of that technology looks like and In the case of most military robotic systems of which UAVs are a subset You're talking about a technology that that as others have said is actually pretty simple to build And where the technology is likely to proliferate further It's not that surprising that is thinking about it that way that Google purchased I think 10 to 12 robotics companies over the last 16 months and in fact is taking those that worked in the defense sector and pulling them out of the defense sector Think about how big the US defense budget is if if Google thinks that the US defense budget is such small potatoes That it's worth redeploying their robotics engineers to work on commercial applications What does that say about what the size of the commercial market is likely to look like and what the spread of this technology Is likely to look like I think what it suggests is that this is a classic example of a type of technology With lots of commercial applications. That's likely actually to spread very far And I think it's also likely to spread very far due to international military investment International military exports and there was the report that surfaced just a few weeks ago For example about Saudi Arabia allegedly purchasing an armed Chinese drone That I think is sort of fascinating and I'll get back to the implications I think for US arms export policy in a moment But I think what that suggests is that the the proliferation of longer range armed systems And and maybe I'll try to square the short versus long circle here and say maybe medium It might happen a little bit faster than we had anticipated Because it's not just that others will have the ability to build many of these systems because the underlying Technology is easier. It's pretty easy to get It's that there are others out there countries like China and Israel and others that seem willing Certainly more willing than the United States to export a lot of these technologies and in a combination of military necessity and in probably the the wow factor from US usage over the last decade has Generated a lot on the demand side with many countries around the world interested in acquiring advanced UAVs and For many of them Shorter range armed systems may be enough I think I think the whole panel shares the view that the proliferation of those kinds of systems is is inevitable But I would go a bit further and say that I think that the proliferation of longer range systems Maybe a little more inevitable than we've realized Keeping in mind of course that the that the ped tail and all of the processing challenges Involved in doing exactly what the US does is something that that others probably It'll be very difficult for for many people to do But that doesn't mean that especially as this technology gets cheaper and proliferates further That others won't have longer range systems able to do more and able to do things that are militarily relevant And that's why I think it's important for the United States to do two things One is I think that the as the last panel hinted at the Ongoing debate about the capabilities that the new u-class system will have I think in some ways is the the canary in the coal mine for exactly that that chart the hesitation that the the United States military has demonstrated when it comes to investing in next generation military robotics especially military robotics that get out of the coin CT ISR kind of box and those are the technologies of course that are the most challenging to existing constituencies interest groups in the service in the services those are the ones where we would therefore expect there to be a lot more resistance and So I think continuing to push the envelope on those technologies Especially in an era of fiscal austerity will be difficult, but something that the United States needs to do and And the second thing I is that I think the United States actually needs to lean a little bit further forward When it comes to our UAV export policy And I think that the United States should do this of course within the confines of the NTCR in a way that doesn't abrogate America's arms control commitments, but in an age of fiscal austerity Building partner capacity to substitute or supplement for American capabilities is an important national security priority And there's a strong demand signal from America's allies and partners This is a technology that that many are interested in including some of our closest allies around the world and I think it's possible for the United States to design a responsible export policy to close out You know that involves allowing more armed systems out the door to our closest allies and partners But the alternative here is not that if we don't do this they won't get these systems We like to think that Sometimes these are unique and special snowflake But given that we know that the US monopoly on on armed UAVs is over if it ever existed The alternative is not that if we don't sell armed UAVs Others won't get them the alternative is either that there will be incentivized to build them themselves To invest more in those sorts of development capabilities or that they'll simply buy them from others and I think in a world especially when it comes to the present generation of UAVs Well, we're interested in promoting responsible usage of this technology in a safe way that that complies with with the law of war international law, etc We have a much better chance of encouraging that with responsible exports Then by you know, you know throwing our hands up and saying we don't want to play this game and letting countries buy Systems from China or design them themselves instead and not getting access To the training and other things that will allow the US to shape the way that the rest of the world uses these systems I'll stop there Thank you very much a lot to chew on and before I turn it over to you Let me ask dr. Davis to follow up on a point that that Mike raised So if we assume that the proliferation or the spread of these systems is is somewhat inevitable At least in in terms of shorter range armed systems What are your thoughts about? How the US has an ability to set the standard on how they might be used or or do we have an ability? Will how how are other states likely to use them? Will they look to use them in the ways that we do should we expect? surprises and and then After after your thoughts on that JJ, maybe if you could pick up the question of Defense If these are spreading rapidly have we done enough to think about our vulnerabilities in in that environment? Sorry, I'm gonna go back again to say and I think we tried to keep the distinctions between short Fuzzed over a little bit to longer range But I think we think about arms sales and export controls We really do need to think about the distinctions and also when we think about sales to to partners allies the distinction as well I As I thought I sort of began to suggest is that you know sales of these particularly a shorter range systems Maybe even over into the longer range systems ought to be in my mind thought of more like Conventional aircraft that it is like other kinds of non proliferation Types of sales and if you do that then you're thinking about those in the same ways you think about You know a sale of an aircraft to to a partner and is that the best use of their money? Is it the best use of our? Sort of sales to them if we want to think about building partnerships or interoperability and all those all those different kinds of things So if you have I think that sort of if that's on your mind as you think about this And I think you have a way not necessarily, you know Simple way but a way through the issues having to do with export controls and and transfers And that's the way I think the debate ought to be to be structured as we think about arm sales Of course the argument is made that we would potentially have more Control like you say over the use of those if we are actually the folks selling them rather than they're developing them on their own Or they're coming from Chinese the Chinese or whomever And here the the last part of our report really does talk about how we ought to see the own our own use of these systems As a sort of motto for their potential use to others which takes the additional step Beyond how we might be able to sensitize our allies and and friends as to their use if we're in the arms sales business But then beyond that to how our own use and we talk about the different ways or the different Foundations that you might set for our own use over time so that others would use them Following along those same sorts of principles and I think that's a discussion that started by the the way the Administration has started to talk about its own use and sort of you know post-Afghanistan now in a world in which You know terrorism is more you know more more global But still with the value of these systems do that particular set of missions and contingencies And so as we as we try to think through our own use and how we place it in the larger Environment to start thinking about you know whether there are ways in which the US can take a leadership role in Establishing international norms for the use of these longer-range system arm systems And whether or not there are ways that we can gain a consensus among those who would be operating those into the future Thanks Thank you With regard to defenses United States forces don't tend to like anything flying over their heads that isn't ours and fortunately we've operated in a lot of environments In the last 50 years where there hasn't been anything flying over our heads that wasn't ours And we are optimized to defend against many types Take the whether it's an inhabited vehicle out of the question if it flies at a certain altitude at a certain speed We know how to shoot it down What is unusual about the UAV challenge in the air defense is first you have some that are very small and fly Very low in an area that we haven't traditionally optimized our defenses for But second you also have some other tools that are applicable Electronic warfare becomes a much more relevant tool if you're trying to disrupt an unmanned vehicle Network attack becomes a much more relevant tool if you're trying to Disrupt an unmanned vehicle so there are opportunities of available to us One of the reasons in fact this may be a decent argument for that joint Organization is because the threat to each of the services is different from UAS But some of the tech underlying technologies that you would use in addressing that threat are very common Whether that would come out of a UAS office whether it would be charged with defense as well as offense Is a separate question? But when you start looking at things like EW and network attack You're looking at basic technologies and then refining the application service by service rather than having to develop the technologies in parallel Of course our adversaries have those same opportunities against our systems as well So you're in the sort of classic way of doing it and then we get to the question of should we export that? Mike did you want to jump in? I've got another one for you if you if you okay great the the question for you is based on your research on historical diffusion of military innovation and watching how Militaries do and do not successfully integrate new new technologies What is your assessment of how DOD is doing with this technology? How how's it how's it going and in light of sort of next wave technologies? We anticipate to be intersecting like autonomy What what what are the keys to? Maintaining our edge That's a great question and and in some ways I think it gets back to the the great point that the issue for each service is somewhat different that the challenge is presented by unmanned systems and even unmanned aerial systems or vehicles or somewhat different the you know what we all we all know what we don't want we we don't want the US to end up you know in the way in the sort of stylized military history fact sort of like the British with the aircraft carrier Where they they're the inventor of the technology even have some systems that work pretty well But essentially don't figure out the force employment They think about it more as a spotter for the battleship rather than as the the mobile airfield that we've come to think of the carrier as and In you know in some ways the you know to throw a little sci-fi out there Hopefully, you know sci-fi the the worst case for for the country like the US is Imagine a you know a future contingency in you know in a place like East Asia where the United States US is fighting against another country's Air Force say to use the Air Force as an example and we Toss up F You know fifth-generation aircraft F 22s and F 35s and they shoot down our adversary systems at a ratio of say 8 to 1 or 10 to 1 but suppose our adversaries deploying unmanned systems that they build at a cost differential of 15 to 20 to 1 That's a cost curve that the United States would be on the wrong side of and despite having what would still be the best pound-for-pound Aircraft in that case in the world That would be a conflict that I would be extremely nervous about and That's the outcome that I think a lot of people you know I think in in this room and we think about these issues seek to avoid in That I think that the DOD the Department of Defense has done reasonably well up to this point in investing in some of these technologies But the big challenge moving forward is going to be integration and I mean integration in two arenas I Think the first is it's no doubt and in some ways think the comment on the previous panel that that you know You take you know our kids sitting on a couch and they are quick to twitch reflexes and computer skills over anybody else in the world Point well taken the the challenge is taking the technologies that are being invented and Moving them into the services making them regularized parts of how the services operate I think that's both true for unique military capabilities for platforms the services develop and I think it's especially true for the integration of commercial advances Think about how long it takes us to build anything. I think that Developing a faster ways to integrate commercial robotics Especially as that market explodes over the next several years will be crucial to sustaining America's edge Yeah, and I should say following up on both the the defense point and on the exports point We have a lot of experience and understanding of air systems We haven't been talking nearly as much either here today or in the community as a whole about Underwater vehicles and land vehicles. What are the potential controls on those? What is the desirability of controlling those? What is the United States interest in defending against those? My perception not being an expert in that field is that the international development of those systems lags behind us even more Significantly than in the air, but it might be some since the subject is unmanned systems and not just aerial We might want to give some thought to those Great, and let me open it up to audience questions, and I will take two of them at a time This is a great innovation because then we can pick which ones we want Jake Carney might start doing this too So sir in the front and if you wouldn't mind just waiting for the mic Sam's bringing it to you and identifying yourself Hi, I'm Richard Whittle. I'm an author and a fellow at the National Air and Space Museum And I'm wondering especially based on Dr. Horwitz's last remarks Going forward is part of the reason the Defense Department is investing less in UAS That it's investing so much in the F-35 the F-35 is supposedly the last manned strike fighter and The u-class I guess is the first unmanned strike fighter So are those two programs complimentary or competitive? Great question, and we can take one more if anybody has one sir Bill Greenwell American Enterprise Institute. I want to follow up on the commercial side And and obviously there is a lot of investment a lot of interest going on at what point you know And obviously we still have the FAA to figure out how we're actually going to employ these things and that could take a Few a few years to say the least But at what point does the MTCR become a barrier to the deployment of say Unmanned cargo aircraft it seems there's going to be a range and a Capacity that's going to inhibit not only cargo aircraft but possibly some of the things that Google is thinking about in networking Thanks, who would like to start it might even keep Amazon from delivering my stereo Well, we'll have the tenured professor take the F-35 question sure the I think the I think the F-35 and u-class should be Complementary rather than then competitive I'm not sure if it's necessarily good to end up that way if you think about you know service cultures and the potential for For people to think that they're sort of competition between them and this gets to whether the u-class will look You know more like a reaper on a boat or more like a you know more advanced You know sort of next generation system, but I think that we tend to I mean there I think there are basically three different ways that we can imagine the integration of unmanned systems And I think this is true both in the air and air and beyond the first is the way that we've often been thinking about them Which is essentially one-to-one substitutes, you know either you'd have an F-35 or you'd have a u-class But the second and I mean Boeing demonstrated last summer some of the possibilities here through the remote piloting of an F-18 is essentially man-unmanned teaming the possibility for say An F-35 up in the air with a bunch of unmanned fourth generation systems working together And then the third is of course the you know swarm Which means something we know it's important, but we're not sure exactly Exactly what it means And I'll leave the MTCR question to the arms control expert JJ did you want to add in first on the first question, and then we'll go over to dr. Davis here? Only two things one is in a competitive in a limited budget environment such as we have today every program is competitive with every other Program I haven't seen signs that DOD is consciously trading off F-35 against unmanned vehicles or the other way around but You're trying to fit all of these programs through the same soda straw, so naturally there is some competition And the other oh the other part was regarding the notion of controlling other UAVs Those of us who've been around a little while remember when the army Comanche was going to be the quarterback of the digital battlefield If you conceive of an F-35 Controlling for UAVs in concert those loyal wingmen we heard about in the first panel Isn't that the real definition of the quarterback of the digital battlefield? So I think you were were you discussing our own development or the potential transfers of systems So let me come back and say it's really important to and we try to do this in the paper And for those of you really wanted to get in the details. I that's what we were we were trying to do Because you're right to say it really does depend on both the range and the you know the capability of the system to deliver a Payload so you have to start there and you have to see whether it falls within those parameters or not In order to get to the MTCR kind of categories, you're not talking about line-of-sight kinds of Vehicles you're really talking about these more sophisticated higher technology vehicles so the ones that Amazon may be deploying or the ones that they're deploying over movie sets and all that probably not gonna fall within The categories of those but notwithstanding that The regime itself is an export control regime It's not like a treaty that that bans weapon systems like on the nuclear side So it's an export control regime in which each nation has it's you know keeps its own prerogatives to sell and transfer and In my view there's technology. You know there's flexibility within that system to make those kinds of transfer sales You know as they if if they seem sort of warranted in our national security interest And so I think this whole idea that MTCR is a block is Really not the way to think about the regime Bottom line Great next question Patrick Tucker Thanks for the call out. Yeah, Patrick Tucker defense one so To me it seems like the cost effectiveness of these machines goes up as autonomy is introduced and there are a lot of things to talk about in terms of Increasing autonomy. There's ethical considerations. There's clear cost considerations anyone in AI will tell you there's technical considerations It's really hard to do and it might be years away having said that that's where you're going to perhaps realize the greatest amount of Bank for the buck in the future development of these systems So I was wondering if you would address Briefly, what should we think about when we talk about spending more to increase the autonomy of armed UAVs? What are we missing and what should we be focusing on? Thanks? Why don't we just take that one because I have a feeling that's gonna inspire some spirited response who would like to take it first Mike Not gonna say no to talking the I Think how the United States deals with the autonomy question writ large and I'd push that beyond UAVs Is an enormous question and I'd say I say beyond UAVs very explicitly because I think the the underwater realm is What is one that potentially? particularly ripe for The use of autonomous systems, but I think it's important to distinguish between Automation and autonomous weapons and that automation means automating Automating more and more tasks say if a UAV loses satellite connectivity. What is it programmed to do? Whereas autonomous weapons is you know, we all start getting worried about the terminator on the on the battlefield The I think you know as the as the DOD directive on autonomy states the United States I think you know is not it's not deploying any autonomous weapons right now I think the the United States will probably Go slow on these systems pretty deliberately precisely because they raise these very complicated ethical and Technical challenges and that very simple autonomy if you think about something like the Israeli harpy Isn't all that hard to do it's building an autonomous system that can strike a target Precisely with the level of confidence as an even an unmanned system that that I think is extremely Is extremely difficult But I think there are reasons to to imagine that lots of countries around the world may be interested in this and that One could imagine for example autonomy as a potential potentially attractive Place to go for countries concerned about about anti-access area denial environments about a to ad and what do you do in? General in a world where you think you might have to continue fighting even though you've lost connectivity So I think this is going to be up. I think this is the the bleeding edge of where we need to be thinking I think it's important as we there's another distinction that that I think it's important To remember and that is you know when you're talking about Autonomous systems we have some of those a cruise missile rate So we have some you know that go on a one-way mission and just go and then there's those that go and then come back and so and The going and coming back is what's very difficult if you just take a something That's not very high technology you want to crash it into something and surprise somebody or you know have sort of Psychological effect those things you know has belies used something like that you know against the Israeli So I think it's again to make you're not talking about that. I know but just again for purposes of clarity What it is that you're actually meaning? Sort of right here and just one moment Sam will bring your mic her Jim Katke with National Defense University Following up on this Fully autonomous theme here one of the things I find most interesting in this whole area in the private sector is The do-it-yourself community So you're having you know these communities now people sharing plans for different things. They're 3d printing them. They're sharing control systems It's very rapidly evolving. I wonder if I could get your thoughts on potential threat spectrum going ahead from non-state actors using these types of systems terrorists or even lone wolf terrorists And let's take one more right in the front, sir Evan Wallach from GW law school. I teach a course in this stuff um Let me ask dr. Davis. Would you consider it transformative in your area? if you looked at these things from the viewpoint of command responsibility that is eliminating the fog of war and the ability to go in afterwards when you investigate and Determine exactly what the device did and how it was directed to do it. Would you like to start with the response to that? uh We're looking at the this is a you know kind of a first defense Which is that we weren't looking at the specifics but more that general sense of you know Is it like the weapons that we we called to be transformative in the past? And is it a useful thing to talk about these systems as transformative or more like the norm you know kind of weapon systems that you understand and we've dealt with before And therefore having done that we can sort of apply the ways we've done that before to these systems And so I I can't I can say we didn't address that specifically I'm I'm thinking that you think it is by asking the question And if so then give him back the microphone for a second and let him tell me why Sure, um The former Yugoslavia tribunal Worked on imposing command responsibility on civilian leadership because They said well you had the ability to control and investigate now supposing When mili takes place that Lieutenant Kelly can be downloaded and Costa and president johnson and everybody in between Can determine exactly what was done under the treaties certainly under the protocols They have an obligation a criminal obligation to then investigate and punish and if they don't do it It's a war crime. That's what i'm thinking But then i'm not an expert But my colleagues are as to whether that's any different than from some of the other systems we have as well My interest is eliminating the fog of war though that you can't say we Until we get to a regime that Where autonomous vehicles are being employed where they are making their own judgments and revising their actions based on the circumstances around them Somebody programmed Somebody steered it to a particular place somebody told it go here do this That is one of the really confounding things getting back to the autonomy question about When you start to give devices The ability to change their own orders on the fly based on the combat environment they find themselves in Yes Presumably you could still go and download it But somebody along the way programmed the logic that makes the machine do what it does So there it is always traceable back Somewhere How far back you start to get into legal questions that are beyond certainly my competence and i suspect Those of most of the people in the room except perhaps yourself, sir Who would like to take the diy community slash non-state actor question the threat question Only that we've already seen it There was the gentleman arrested for planning to fly uav into the pentagon. I believe It's exactly the example The other the other side too is that if you think Think about the different ways that terrorists could employ or Gain either military effect or psychological effect There are a whole lot of other ways that they would find easier and potentially more effective than this one So you're actually I think and we write through that so you can go find that as well I think it's just important as we think about each of these uses to think about the alternatives that exist to the use in this particular way And we've got time for one last question if somebody has one and they can keep it short Hi, i'm major ryan sims headquarters air force. My question is regarding the um the mtcr again Uh in the past we've seen a similar scenario occur with the development of satellite technology with regards to the us controlling export imposing, you know those types of prohibitions and then it inherently drives a side industry of Other countries like the french for instance who who sort of take pride in the fact that they can develop an itar compliant satellite and sell it to Other countries and so thereby, um, i'm wondering if you are seeing any parallels with regard to this technology Um the proliferation of uas technology across other countries that are taking interest in it Um the united states imposing strict regulations and then thereby inherently creating a side market Which we no longer can control or have any oversight of Great question mike I think the the potential analogy between unmanned systems and in the satellite industry is is potentially harrowing from an american perspective No analogy is ever perfect But and in some ways this gets back to the previous question about cargo aircraft In some ways and that if the united states makes the decision to take itself out of the market That doesn't mean that the demand won't exist And we can be comforted by the fact that right now we're ahead but That market will exist and other countries will work on the technology to fill that vacuum and the profit motive is very strong And so other countries technologies will get significantly better Which in some ways i think is why it's important for the united states to To lean forward a little bit when it comes to unmanned exports right now to lock in our advantage and And in some ways discourage some some other actors for maybe even getting into the game In the first place because we know from the satellite case that if we step back Others are going to get involved and their technology will end up being pretty darn good And we know that from the uas case as well I mean while the united states has exported to britain, italy Looks like france and is considering japan Germany bought israeli The russians bought israeli And the chinese are Evidently willing to sell to just about anyone who wants so The market's out there already for the non-us systems saudi and ua allegedly have bought chinese Final word final word I think the asat is different in the sense of Where it falls in terms of regimes and how you would think about arms control or non-proliferation So I think that's why it's not analogous you are making an analogous as my colleagues are as to How it is that if we don't sell others will will take the market That's a debate that goes well beyond either space or well beyond uavs But to conventional aircraft and the debates we have about what kinds of sales we make on conventional aircraft What kinds of technologies we associate with those who will be in that market if we're not in that market You know, we have a lot of experience about that. We have a lot of processes that go in place to try to make those decisions I've sat there with a pen at times making those decisions. They're not easy decisions But I think that's the route that we should be taking with these systems and thinking about it sort of individually and in that context Thank you very much and thank you. You've been a great audience. Thank you for the mini conference Experiment we've done here two panels back to back and please join me in thanking the panel