 Okay. The title of my presentation today is called Planning for Climate Resilience, Learning from the Grass Roots. Funding for this research was provided by the Rockefeller Foundation through the Asian Cities Climate Resilience Network and through in cooperation with the Climate Change Coordination Office in Binding Province and the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition. Between 2 and 3 November 2009, why is it cut off the edge of the screen there? Can we move the thing a little bit? It seems like it's cut off the edge of the screen. Anyway, between 2 and 3 November 2009, a severe flood caused by a powerful typhoon hit the city of Quy Nhan in central Vietnam. The flash flood began in the mountains west of the city and spread out across the delta of the Hattang River at a depth of more than 2 meters, causing roughly $21 million in damage and costing the lives of 7 people within the city alone. Given that the areas hardest hit by the flood were in the city's agricultural suburbs and that these agricultural suburbs were scheduled to be urbanized, we decided to examine whether and how the recent landscape changes had contributed to the flood and to ask how build-out of current urban plans would affect the flood's impact under the conditions of climate change. Let me see. For some reason it's not. Let me check this. I'm not going to change anything. Sorry. We'll just move on. So this shows you where Quinyuan City is. On the east of the Quinyuan City is the East Sea, also known as the South China Sea. And these are the areas where we did the research. That's Nianfu, Nianbeng, Dongda, Ward, Tui Fook, and Ziuchi Town. And the flood map you see is from Relief Web and that's two days after the flood. Methods and rationale. We proposed a people-first grassroots approach, beginning with open discussions with residents in 21 sites in the Hattang River delta. Our discussions focused on flood cycles, agriculture adaptation, the chronology of the 2009 flood, personal losses, and probable causes for the flood severity. In later stages of the research, we used satellite images, hydrologic modeling, flood damage data, and urban plans to confirm, dispel, and add details to key points from these discussions. What you're going to hear today is a very, very brief summary of that research. So first of all, let's talk about the explanations for the severity of the flood. The first and most common explanation was that the residents of the delta had no warning in the mass media. As I said before, the flood started in the afternoon around 4 or 5 p.m. in the mountains west of the city, and it didn't reach the coast of Tinai Lagoon until around 10 p.m. During that entire period, there were no official warnings in the mass media or any other way. So some people were warned by friends upstream who called them on their cell phones or sent images on their cell phones. This really points to the need for an early warning system and community level participation. That was the first priority project that we developed and is now being funded and implemented under ASUR. And I'd like to show you a very, very brief clip from one of our interviews. No? Have no sound? This same story was repeated to us many, many, many times. Basically, people told us if they had at least two hours' warning, they would have been able to prepare. I mean, these are people who lived for many generations in this flood-prone environment. The second explanation for the flood was infrastructure and infilling. Physical barriers created flood cells in the delta and water backed up behind these flood cells causing increased flooding. And this is a little bit longer clip and it's with an elderly man named Mr. Tin who explains this for us. He starts off a little quietly but he gets very angry. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. A lot of our research after we did these interviews in 2011 was trying to understand actually what people taught us out of their own experience. And now I want to talk to you a little about what we did following this. So one of the first things that we did is we got information from the city on damage assessment from the flood. And I'm sorry, I don't know why the aspect ratio is like this. The whole thing seems to be moved over. But I'll go through this step by step anyway. The first one is the coastal fisheries boats and tackle. It's roughly $375,000 in damage. And 88% of that damage was in physical damage to fish ponds. Fish and shrimp in this area are all harvested before the flood season. So that's one of the adaptation strategies. Industrial zones. About $10 million in damage to industrial zones. And 95% of that was in one industrial zone in Nguyen Bing which was probably placed in the wrong spot. The IC is placed in the floodplain and borders of river. Next housing. About $1.3 million in damage. And 90% of that damage was in Nguyen Phu Ward where the rivers flow into the delta. So it's basically at the junction where the main river channel divides. Dikes, roads, a similar situation but now also including another ward, Phuk Mi, which is upstream and in a highland area. In the same case where the rivers meet is where the damage is worse. Agriculture and livestock. This to me is the most interesting story and it confirms what we heard about lack of warning. About $3 million in damage. And the damage was primarily to rice that was held in storage because the farmers all harvest their rice before the flood season begins. And loss of livestock so buffaloes, cows, pigs, chickens and ducks. And the farmers all told us if they had at least two hours warning and as I said the storm started in the highlands at around 4 or 5 p.m. and didn't reach the lowlands to 6 p.m. so they did have time. If they had two hours warning they would have been able to prepare. And finally forestry. There's about $2.7 million in damage to forestry. And this was all in Phuk Mi Ward which is about, consisted of about 19 square kilometers of loss in forests. Primarily through uprooting of young trees that had been planted for reforestation projects. And this is kind of indicative of the whole upper watershed. Okay so we took the information that we had and we began to ask the question could we use a hydrological model to see what the impacts of that infrastructure were. And what we heard from the community turned out to be correct. That anything that restricts the flow of water into Tinai Lagoon increases flooding. So what are those things? Well there was a road system that was upgraded from roughly 40 to 60 centimeters to roughly 2 meters in height. A new dyke system had been put in place since the previous heavy storm about 34 years earlier. New urban construction including two universities and industrial zone and three new urban residential areas and a new bridge. And what was the impact of this infrastructure? It increased the flood by 11 centimeters here. 3 centimeters here. 70 centimeters here. And 7 centimeters here. So then we asked ourselves what would be the impact of carrying out of the implementation of a Nyunbing area plan. So you can see the Nyunbing area plan here on the map. It takes up about one third of the wards area. And it reduces the floodway to this narrow channel here between a new highway and one barrage, one of the remaining barrages. Our hydrological model also predicted that the area plan would increase flooding by 33 centimeters, 50 centimeters, 70 centimeters, and 76 centimeters. Now remember that the flood in 2009 was roughly 2 meters deep. So we're talking about 2.7, 2.8 meter deep water. Then we asked what would happen if we took the same model and we used it to assess the B2 climate scenario and sea level rise to 2050. And we found again 41 centimeters deeper here, 77 centimeters deeper here, 90 centimeters deeper here, and 89 centimeters deeper here. So we're talking in some places roughly 3 meters deep flood. And many people in these areas died in the attics of their houses where they had retreated because they couldn't crawl through the roof tiles or they were trapped up there in the tiny airspace. So these increases in floods are potentially deadly. So what did we learn from this project? Well, the first thing that we learned is that the observations of people who experience these extreme climate events is a means of understanding the causes of their severity. The second thing that we learned is that they can also add detail and explanation to other available data sets, like data set on damage. Third, we learned that hydrological models can be used to confirm, dispel, and quantify common observations or community observations. And finally, we learned that video and motion graphics offer a means of persuasively integrating community observations and technical research. So thank you very much for your attention.