 Today, for participants in Bonn, Toronto, Vienna, and Brussels, WorldNet presents a discussion on the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Now, live from our studios in Washington, D.C., here is your moderator, broadcast journalist, Paul Duke. The accident of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28th evoked a wave of concern over the future of the U.S. space program. President Reagan demanded an investigation and named an independent commission. Led by former Secretary of State William Rogers, the mandate of the commission was to review all the evidence and other aspects of the accident and to develop recommendations for corrective action. Five months later, the panel issued its report documenting its findings. With me today is Dr. Alton Keel, the commission's executive director who helped to draft the final report and its recommendations. Welcome to WorldNet this morning, Dr. Keel. Thank you. The report came out. It received a great deal of attention in this country. But there were some people who felt that commission's findings did not go far enough that the report was not tough enough. Well, Paul, I think it was obviously a difficult task, deciding exactly what the tone of the report should be. But on balance, all of us felt that the first priority, obviously, was determined what caused this accident and make sure we recommend the corrective actions to avoid any future accident of this nature and obviously any future actions of any type. At the same time, it was important, obviously, not to needlessly in any way try to attack the integrity or undermine the integrity of the NASA as an institution. NASA is terribly important to this country, in fact, to the Western world, as we see it, in terms of its exploration in space. So it was very important that the report be balanced. We didn't see there was any need to actually name names, if you will, or in fact, do we support now calling for any indictments or persecution? The important thing was establishing what mistakes were made and insisting that those mistakes be corrected and then move on from here in terms of putting the space program back into full action. Well, let's move on to our participants this morning and get their questions for a fuller elaboration of the space tragedy in this country. We'll turn now to our participants in Bonn, who are standing by with their questions. And I'd like to remind all of the participants this morning to please identify yourselves and your organizations as you ask your first questions. Go ahead, please, Bonn, first question. I'm John Brant, Federal Ministry for Research and Technology. I would like to ask Mr. Keele if he would like to comment on the question if he deems NASA report, NASA report on the actions following the shuttle accident as appropriate and manageable especially because the report seems to contain scores of activities which might cause a bit of a problem. Well, I certainly, NASA has just submitted the report that was alluded to by the questioner. This passed money to the President. The President asked NASA to submit to him within 30 days to report on implementing the commission recommendations. The, our own interpretation of that report is that it's a fairly fateful attempt to implement the commission recommendations. In fact, obviously the design effort is already ongoing on the major recommendation of the commission to redesign the flawed joint in the solid rocket booster segments. In addition, NASA has already announced and has indicated in the report establishment of a safety office headed by an associate administrator who reports directly to the administrator of NASA which was another primary recommendation of the commission. It's also indicated by September. It's going to establish a shuttle advisory safety panel that was called for by the commission. It's already started review of the so-called criticality list that is a list of the most critical elements and components on the shuttle system. That review in fact was started before the commission completed its work and that is going to be finished prior to the launch of the next shuttle system. The one thing that the report did indicate is that the target date of July 1987 for the next shuttle flight is now slipped and it now will be sometime after the first of 1988. But a lot of the recommendations that the commission called for by necessity NASA has indicated is established task force or task groups to determine exactly what has to be done to implement those. And so the full implementation plan won't be known for some time for all nine commission recommendations. Now the other thing that was alluded to by the questioner was in fact obviously the commission did call for a number of specific actions to be taken made up in nine specific recommendations. Obviously we felt all those recommendations were extremely important. Not all of those have to be completed prior to the next launch. For example some of the recommendations for the abort system changes some of the recommendation for the landing system changes those we anticipate will be ongoing efforts over some period of time. But certainly the most important recommendations that we call for needless to say the first one being and obviously redesign of the SRP joint those have to be completed. That does mean that potentially they'll be further delays. It does mean there's going to be a little more cost involved but obviously there is no option in order to put flight safety first and get the shuttle system flying again. My name is Helmut Schütz. I am responsible in the German Aerospace Research Organization DFLR in Cologne for safety, reliability and quality assurance. My question is therefore referring to your recommendation number four. And the first question is the position and the role of authority and responsibility of this new office which is headed by George Rodney and the second question is referring to the resources of this personnel at NASA. As we have heard from the president for example from Space Daily that NASA has been made responsible for a cut of this quality assurance personnel to a third in the last 15 years and my question is now to intend to increase this personnel. The safety office it's called for in the recommendation for and the commission is referred to by the questioner as I've alluded to in fact has been established now and it will be headed by Mr. Rodney which is and he will be an associate administrator for space flight and he will report directly again to the administrator of NASA Dr. Fletcher. That office will have authority for safety, reliability, quality assurance for all of NASA activities not just the space shuttle program but all activities throughout all the NASA centers. And it will be independent of as we call for in the commission recommendation it will be independent of other NASA activities such as any program pressures, any schedule pressures, any budget pressures for that matter. The personnel in fact have been cut over the last three or four years within NASA in this area just as referred to by the questioner. The obvious question is a good one. Are there in fact underway now plans to increase the personnel for these areas? The NASA administrator is now talking to the director of what we call the United States our office of personnel management and in fact they are now vigorously working out arrangements to allow NASA some flexibility to bring on more personnel to man these critical areas. Those final arrangements haven't been made but the obvious answer is that yes NASA will one way or the other be allowed the flexibility to bring those personnel in. All right. Thank you, Bon. Very good to get your opening questions. We'll be back to you in a bit. Let's turn next to Toronto. First question please from Toronto. This is for the Center for Research and Experimental Space Science at York University. Before I ask my question I'd like to say that I personally have the greatest regard for the NASA scientists and engineers with whom I have been working. My question really relates to delays. We recognize the space shuttle, the STS, as part of a system which will eventually lead us to space station and beyond but right now we do two things with shuttle. It's there for space applications, the launching of satellites and so on and it's there to do space science. I note in the report comments concerning delays involving the manifesting of scientific experiments and so on. Already it takes almost five years to get an experiment from inception onto shuttle if you're lucky. It looks as if that will be long drawn out. Those of us in the space science community in Canada are very concerned with the length of time taken to use the shuttle as an effective agent to do good space science. Have you any comment on the delays involved in existing projects like for example Hubble Space Telescope, WAMD which we have at York University and your thoughts for the future in that regard? Certainly. I think there are sort of two elements of your question. One is what will the obvious consequences be of the fact that we are now in a hiatus if you will in the United States with respect to launch capability not just the space shuttle but the Delta and the Titan and that obviously will mean delays in planned space programs. Needless to say those delays are certainly are simply going to have to be acceptable until we take the steps that are required to get the shuttle flying again. The other part of your question had to do with respect to the normal preparation planning, mission planning for a shuttle launch under normal conditions. It does take a lot of advanced planning and scheduling and as a consequence there has to be a lot of prior work before schedules are made. What the report referred to in its chapter called Pressures on the System was the fact that once you set up the schedule long and advanced inevitably you have changes in what is called the cargo manifest which means changes from a number for a number of reasons either in the payload, in the mission and the crew composition. And those changes as we referred to them in report inevitably caused pressures on the system because it meant that you had your planning and your training compressed into a much smaller time frame. So our recommendation in fact was that there be fewer changes in that cargo manifest once it's established. Now what that means is in fact that there is going to have to be this long range planning for scientific missions and those plans are going to have to be finalized prior to launch. And in fact to the maximum extent possible those plans are going to have to be adhered to. I have two questions. First did the commission have an idea of what would be an acceptable number of catastrophic accidents per flight following the approval of the recommendation if there is one in a thousand or one in ten thousand as that's considered in engineering term satisfactory and two it seems that the notion of providing an escape system for the astronauts was dealt with with a fair degree of hand-waving that is the suggestion that NASA should look into this escape system in the first couple of minutes. If NASA comes forward and says we simply can't do it is that agreeable to the commission do you think? Well I think the obvious question without trying to deal with the question too cavalierly with respect to what's acceptable number of catastrophes I mean the obvious answer is none none are acceptable but to be more specific did the commission actually determine what a probability of failure was whether it was one in a hundred thousand or one in one thousand no we did not. There is an appendix that's going to be published hopefully within the next week to ten days when the final four volumes of the report are published that was the work of Dr. Feynman who is a member of the commission of course. He does in his own personal efforts review the probability analysis that NASA did and his own deductions are that the one in one hundred thousand estimate was too optimistic and I think most NASA officials if not all NASA officials will agree with that now but what the number is we certainly didn't determine and nor has NASA indicated any other probability estimates but obviously no accident is acceptable from a strict standpoint but we all recognize that risk with respect to space flight as we say in the report cannot be totally eliminated. With respect to your second question on escape systems I understand the spirit of your question with respect to the appearance of perhaps we treated it in a hand-waving fashion. Let me try to set the framework for that first as Paul indicated in the introduction of the program the mandate of the commission really was to decide what was the cause of this accident probable cause or causes and then determine what corrective actions should be taken based on the commission's determinations and findings. So it wasn't really a broad mandate to go and review all shuttle systems or even operational procedures for that matter but obviously the commission took let the investigation take it where it where it may and in addition had specific safety concerns brought to us for example by the astronaut office which led us to make recommendations outside the strict mandate of the commission. So we were a little bit outside the mandate when we went so far as to make abort system recommendations for this accident but specifically the recommendations that were made were number one that and there were some specific recommendations made that number one that for controlled glided flight that there ought to be improvements made for crew egress and that was a specific recommendation. In addition that NASA ought to develop means of using emergency landing sites when more than one engine fails. They only really have that option now for one engine failing and we think there are some software changes that involve avionics that can be done but with respect to the critical asset phase the first two minutes of launch when the solid rocket boosters are firing our basic conclusion was that obviously for this accident there was no option. There was nothing that could have been done. The crew had no warning and if it had had warnings there was really nothing that could have been done. In addition we concluded that there don't appear to be any practical systems, realistic systems within obvious constraints of payload and to some degree cost but principally payload that could be developed for that critical first two minutes of launch. That's our conclusion based on just our peripheral look at that but we did go so far as to ask NASA to look into that further and to investigate the developing technologies that might be applied but it's a very complex problem as I'm sure the questioner realizes but our basic conclusion again to reiterate is that there's not a peer to be in existence certainly and within the near future a practical system that might be applied for escape during that first two minutes of launch. Institute for Aerospace Studies. Dr. Keele do you foresee the possibility of an intermediate design fix that would or hopefully satisfy safety requirements that might indeed lead to earlier launches of the shuttle? I think the answer to that is no. And I think that's because frankly the design fix they're looking at now when NASA briefed the press on the second of July on its status of its design effort. Design fix it's looking at now could be called an interim fix. It's basically a redesign of that joint as opposed to a new design. It involves a so-called capture feature that's intended to decrease the rotation of that joint and involves taking out the zinc chromate putty that's been used as a thermal barrier. So that really is and I think in most minds an intermediate design. It's about the simplest thing one can do to that design is still use existing hardware and so forth. And even that design NASA has now determined that the certification of it is going to require a delay of that July 1987 timeframe. I don't think there's any other fix perhaps quick fix to use a vernacular that would be considered. The risk simply isn't acceptable in terms of flight safety. Thank you Toronto. Next we go to Vienna. First question please from Vienna. I'm rolling. I've got two questions. The first one's very short just to clear up the point. Dr. Kiel, yours is the only signature missing in the presentation of the report. Does that mean anything? What that means quite simply is that I really was not a commissioner. I was the executive director of the commission and as a consequence I really wasn't required to sound the report or move over it really wasn't appropriate that I was signed the report. The commission did decide early on that I should be a full participant in the commission hearings and as a consequence I was as executive director. But I did not sign the report. That doesn't mean I don't concur with it however because I do. Thank you. Now my second question is quite apparent that the commission found the number of false mistakes flaws and so on. Not only concerning the launch of the 51L mission but down to basic design and management questions of both NASA and some of the NASA contractors. But it is also evident from the report that no single individual nor even a group of individuals for example the SRB officer Marshall gets blamed for the accident. The recommendations of the commission on the other hand are quite extensive. Do you think that these recommendations can be put to task with the same person in charge who were responsible for the flaws in design and decision right from the beginning of the shuttle program? Well as I refer to very briefly previously that the commission really didn't think it was appropriate to name individuals or groups of individuals if you will to assess blame. That in fact assessing blame really was in our responsibility. What our responsibility was was to determine where the mistakes were and to point out that in fact they had to be corrected. It's certainly a legitimate question that one can ask at least rhetorically can those mistakes be corrected with the same individuals involved. I think that's something that NASA has to wrestle with and I think it's something that NASA is wrestling with. We did indicate under our recommendation with respect to improving communications within NASA that is a transfer of information on problems, problem reporting, problem trends. That specifically there appeared to be a trend within the Marshall Space Flight Center out of the NASA centers to withhold information not in any intentional way of not keeping people informed but more on the basis of they felt they could solve their own problems. And we did point that out and we pointed out that changes had to be made there whether they were of a personnel nature or whether they were or reorganization nature or whether they were in the form of re- indoctrination if you will. So we did go so far as to make that kind of general recommendation but we again didn't feel as appropriate to name individuals or suggest changes on an individual basis. I will point out the obvious and I'm sure the questioner must be aware of this that since the commission in fact has finished its work in fact even during the time the commission was doing its work a number of personnel changes have already been made either on a voluntary basis or on the basis of NASA taking action. The Council of the European Space Agency were invited to discuss the future of the space program in the United States Space Program with him. As you may know, Austria will become a full member of the European Space Agency from January next year and we also participate in the so-called Columbus Program which is the European part of the Space Station Program. Now my concern is rather the future of the shuttle flights and the construction of the space station and with discussions of Mr. Fletcher we were left afterwards with some afterthoughts and I would just like to ask you what your opinion would be in the construction of the space station if you just have three orbiters available because we were told that the first priority in the future is given to have the space station ready in 1992. I think there's some bias towards the 500 years anniversary of the discovery of the United States, that is the Columbus and we have the feeling that it will be quite tough if you don't really think on constructing a fourth orbiter. There's also the question what would happen if another orbiter would fail? Now, we understood that with three orbiters you have 12 to 15 flights per year realistically and with four orbiters maybe 16 to 20 flights per year not as before as there were 24 flights per year foreseen. I understand that to construct the space station we need 16 to 20 flights of shuttle and therefore my question to you is how do you see if it is really realistic to have the space station operational in 1992? Well, I think there are two parts of your question. One is do you need four orbiters to actually go ahead with the space program? I think the answer to that is no. The other part of your question which is the way you phrase the question at the end is can we still make the 1992 date with four orbiters? That might be difficult. I think that certainly is a legitimate concern if you only had three orbiters as opposed to four. In fact, Dr. Fletcher has essentially responded to that question in exactly that way that the four orbiters aren't needed in order to continue the space program and with or without the fourth orbiter the United States will continue the space station program but that without a fourth orbiter there may be some delay and I think that's exactly the best assessment we can give now is that there may be some delay. But I think it's fair to say and I'm sure that you know based on your own experience that there may be some delay even with fourth orbiters on getting a space station up and operating by 1992 that inherently, technically complex and demanding development programs do lead to delays. For example, the space shuttle itself, excuse me, was delayed two years from the original planned first flight of the shuttle program. So I think to be fair, there may be some delay even with four orbiters in the space station but that the fourth orbiter isn't an absolute requirement in order to continue the space station and the U.S. will continue with or without that fourth orbiter. Now, let me make one other comment on some of the data that you indicated that namely perhaps we could do 12 to 15 launches with three orbiters and 16 to 20 with four. I'm not confident of any of those numbers at this point. I don't think NASA is either. It's very clear as a commission report indicates that in fact with nine launches in 1985 with four orbiters the system was pretty well stressed. And so without some of the corrective actions that we've indicated in the report, the notion of getting 12 to 15 with three is probably a little out of reach as is 16 to 20 with four perhaps. But there has to be a lot of streamlining and standardization if you will which costs money and takes time and planning before those goals can be reached. So I think that again that simply leads back to the obvious and that is that there's some prospect for delay. There may be delay with or without the fourth orbiter in terms of putting the space station up by 1992. Think about the possibility that you could lose another orbiter and you would be left with two. Of course, we pray and hope for you that it would not happen but what would happen if it is. No, of course, that's one of the considerations in making the decision to go to the fourth orbiter. Let me just make it clear. I'm sure it's well-known but the commission didn't make any recommendation on a fourth orbiter. It felt it was outside our charter. And hence there's no recommendation of the commission report with respect to purchasing that fourth orbiter. The administration is now the White House is considering that question and in fact perhaps as soon as the next week or two we'll make a decision or make a recommendation at least to the president. But certainly one of the considerations amongst a number as I'm sure the questioner knows in determining whether or not the proper decision, the proper use of resources, that's really the question is to purchase a fourth orbiter, is the prospect of losing certainly God forbid another orbiter. All right, thank you, Vienna. Please stand by. Our final stop now is Brussels. Please go ahead, Brussels. From a daily newspaper, La Libre Belgique, my question is, will you keep liquid or solid propaganda or will you test it vertically? First the booster really is not going to be a new booster. It as NASA now envisions it is simply going to be a redesign of the joint between the segments of the solid rocket booster that has been used. And in fact it will use for the most part existing hardware. It will require some new machining and some new forging of the segments in the joint area, for the so-called Tang and Clevis joint. But it still will be the same solid rocket booster design and of course it will still be a solid rocket. So that will not be a liquid rocket. Now I've lost track of the second part of the questioner's question. Would you please repeat the second part of your question, please? Yes. Yes, the commission recommended that, in the words of the commission, that full consideration be given to testing the redesign in a vertical position and as near to the flight configuration as possible. NASA really hasn't decided finally whether that can be done, whether it's practical or not. There currently is no existing vertical test stand to do that. But there are some perhaps innovative ways to do it in the absence of a test stand. Or one, in fact, could build a test stand for a relatively modest sum of money compared to what it's going to take to continue the US space program. That is perhaps $10 or $20 million compared to the $3 to $8 billion investment to restore the US space program. So that decision is still under consideration. The commission didn't make it a specific recommendation. It simply said that full consideration ought to be given. We still have some time left. And with that time, we'd like to return to our participants for follow-up questions. So we'll begin now with another question from Brussels. I have two questions. Your commission has discussed the concept of the space shuttle. Is this concept really the best one? Or if you prefer, can the shuttle become a completely reliable machine? Or is it not urgent to look for another type of space plane now? Well, again, the mandate of the commission wasn't to go in and completely reassess the space shuttle system or evaluate it or even determine the overall risk of the space shuttle system. That was clearly we didn't have the resources of the time to do that. Our charter, again, was determined to cause of this accident. Needless to say, in the course of the investigation, questions did come up. And the commission was made aware of considerations that are part of what the questioner has asked here in terms of is the space shuttle system the best concept. But that was outside our charter, and so we made no recommendations there. Again, the administration, as it's considering where to go from here, if you will, in terms of putting the US space program back on sound footing, is taking an account to some degree those kinds of questions because it does mean a large investment, as I mentioned before, something in the range of $3 billion to $8 billion. So part of what the administration has to address in answering that question is where do we transition to in our space program? What comes after the space shuttle? Because it is a significant investment, if you will, in sort of a midterm timeframe in terms of the life of the shuttle. So the administration is wrestling with that, and that's an appropriate question for them to consider and their deliberations for making that decision. But the only other comment I would make is that, obviously, in addition to the US space station effort and the cooperation with Europeans in the space station effort, the US has, in fact, initiated a development of an aerospace plane, the so-called Orion Express. So there is some commitment in the long-term basis to a new space plane. Tina P. Scholl on behalf of RTL Television. Could you comment on the setback in the US space program in view of the Soviet Union's continuing commitment to space? How badly will the US be lagging behind in the next decade? Well, needless to say, there is some setback in terms of not being able to get payloads into orbit and, in fact, having essentially no medium or heavy launch capability now. It's not as much of a setback, frankly, in my view as has been portrayed by some, including James. I don't think the Soviet Union is 10 years ahead of the US in space exploration. The only way you can come to that conclusion is by looking at some fairly rough indicators, if you will, such as total number of launches and total time in orbit. I think you have to look beyond that and look at systems and system capabilities. After all, the Soviet Union is now developing a space shuttle system. We already have one in operation and have taken, obviously, some lumps, if you will, with respect to this accident. But we're going to learn from that. And I think the shuttle system is going to be even better when we get it back up and operating. So there is some setback. But I think it's only an interim basis. And it means the greatest effect of it is delay in launching critical payloads in the orbit. And that backlog is growing. And that's a concern. But I think it's something that obviously is going to have to be accepted under the circumstances. But I think it's something that we can clearly recover from. A follow-up question. In view of the setback, and you were mentioning before that eventually the launching schedule had been a little bit too heavy at the time, isn't it inevitable that part of the market for launching satellites is going to go to unmanned launchers either like Arian or to private companies? Could you comment on that? Well, I think the answer is, of course, yes. In fact, part of the commission recommendation was, or commission recommendations, was that it had been a mistake for the U.S. to rely so heavily on one launch capability, namely the shuttle launch. And that shouldn't be done in the future, meaning that you ought to have more than one launch capability. The obvious option, and in fact, the one the U.S. is already committed to, is the so-called expendable launch vehicles, or in other words unmanned, or in the case of Dr. Sally Rod, unwomanned vehicles. So the U.S., in fact, is going to make more use of unmanned vehicles or expendable launch vehicles. That decision actually was made 18 months to two years ago when the U.S. committed to purchasing more expendable launch vehicles. And now that decision has been reinforced by this accident, and both NASA and the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, support that as obviously, of course, as does the President, and that's consistent with the commission recommendations. So yes, more launches are going to go to unmanned vehicles. They're going to go to unmanned U.S. vehicles. I think another consequence will be that you may see some further development of a commercial U.S. space launch capability. I think overall that's good. My own view is that President Mitterrand had a useful suggestion when he was in the U.S. for our Independence Day celebrations and 100-year anniversary of the Statue of Liberty, when he suggested that the Europeans and the U.S. sit down and look at the future of space launch capability where this window, if you will, regrettable as it is, where there have been a number of incidents, obviously with U.S. systems, but also with the French systems, offers an opportunity for all of us to sit down and perhaps have some discussions on where the Western world wants to go with space launch capability. I think that's probably a noteworthy recommendation. Thank you, Brussels. Let's get more follow-up questions now. And at this point, let's return to Bonn. Go ahead, please, Bonn. Physics and space research at Bonn University. My question concerns the schedule for the next missions in space science in astrophysics in particular, taking that the new missions will be resumed, let's say, in February, 88. Is there already a schedule, even in a preliminary form, at what times the next space science missions will be launched like the Hubble Space Telescope or Ulysses going into high ecliptic latitudes or even Galileo going to Jupiter? Particularly, the Hubble Space Telescope will be of major importance for basic science, even attacking those important questions like the origin of matter in the universe. And thus, we are very eager for our own schedules here, for our own participation in the observations with the Hubble Space Telescope, to get an idea at what times we really can expect that Hubble goes into orbit. Well, there may be such a preliminary schedule way down in the NASA system, if you will. But there is not any such schedule. It has anything near any official standing. What Admiral Truly, who is the Associate Administrator for Space Flight for NASA, has indicated, and properly so, is that the next launch will be a conservative launch. It'll have a payload similar to payloads that have been carried before. There'll be no new payloads introduced. And the next server launch will be basically hearing to that philosophy. So it's a little premature to indicate exactly when specific scientific experiments and payloads are going to be launched. As I said, I'm sure there's some consideration of a very tentative nature being given down in the lower levels within the NASA agency. But they certainly have been made public and they certainly aren't official. A shuttle experienced a catastrophic disaster in, say, 10 flights. Is that it for the shuttle? Does it have to be safe for a certain number of flights in order to get over this trauma? And question number two has to do with the tension between research and the commercialization. And this is not just for the shuttle, but for the space station. Has it NASA built in or hasn't the US built in this tension inherently and won't one continually face issues of having to get the payload up and pressures on the part of people who want it up in a certain time frame? And if this is part of the problem, won't this be a continuing part of the problem? Well, obviously to answer your first question would be quite speculative. I can only say that needless to say one of our greatest concerns is that there would be another accident, not just from the standpoint and obviously of the tragedy with respect to the human loss. But certainly I think one can reasonably conclude that if there's another failure, whether it's the next 10 flights or the next five flights or the next 20 flights, that it is going to be a trauma with respect to the US space program. And whether or not the shuttle system per se could recover from that is I think it's certainly open to question. Your second point I think is certainly a valid point. And again, it's something that's treated and I'm sure you're aware of it, treated very thoroughly in the report. And that is that yes in establishing the shuttle system as quote operational unquote and presenting it as routine and the first priority is to make it cost effective did inevitably put a sort of relentless pressure on the system. Our recommendation is that that can't be done, that the shuttle system is in fact still a developmental program and will be by its very nature of having a few vehicles and really a few number of flights on the scale of any other aircraft developmental program. So it will always be developmental in that sense and hence that there have to be special precautions taken special measures made to assure flight safety first. So our recommendation is that that's what has to be done and the and the embodiment of our recommendation for the most part addresses that. So in answer to your question isn't it inevitable that that in fact there will always be that pressure. I say no that if you take the kind of steps we've recommended we pointed out that that was a mistake in the pressures. But if you take the kind of kind of steps that we've recommended you can avoid that those pressures in in our view. Dr. Keele will the blame NASA had to take for the challenge accident revive an old discussion private enterprise versus national enterprise. Could you for instance foresee that space business will be taken away from NASA and be given to the private sector with NASA remaining only as a space science agency. And question number two we were talking about expandable boosters. What would that mean in terms of payload design because many satellites have been constructed in design for the specifications of the shuttle payload base. Yes. Two very very pertinent questions. I think that that one consequence again of the recommendation that we've made in report is that we shouldn't rely on one system a consequence of going to more expandable launch vehicles that in fact will make it more attractive for commercial launch capability. So I think that that there needn't be a struggle. Our view is there ought to be that kind of tradeoff and our view is that if in fact the shuttle system is operated as a research and development system not mean that it doesn't take commercial payloads because it will. But if it's operated with with the thought that flight safety has to be first then there is going to be more than enough demand in terms of for launch capability. Then then the shuttle to provide for our support both the shuttle system as well as expendable launch vehicles as well as some commercial launch capability. So I don't see it as a conflict or a competition. It has been in the past to a degree do in part to the over emphasis perhaps of of the shuttle system being being a routine and cost effective system. I think in the future with the proper emphasis there will be more of a complementary basis in a competitive basis. Now your your point again is a valid one in the question you raise obviously since we've been relying in the U.S. on the shuttle launch capability a number of our cargoes most of our cargoes in fact have been built design and of course the integration that between the payload and the and the vehicle has been to shuttle specifications. So as a consequence there are going to be some payloads where there's going to have to where they simply are going to be limited to the shuttle system because there's no other options. There are going to be some payloads where some some rework has to be done and where that's cost effective that will be done. So but there are still payloads which are compatible with both a Titan class for example expendable launch vehicle as well as a shuttle system to recover the patient. I'm sorry. I didn't get the second part of your question. Could you repeat that? Modification of the space shuttle. Yes. Modification of the space shuttle. Right. Thank you. The first question with respect to when does the commission go out of business soon I hope the the commission's mandate was to which it met was to report to the president on the 6th of June and of course that final report has been submitted to the to the president. The commissioners have essentially been released. I'm still there finishing up publishing the remaining four volumes of the report which are supporting documents to the to the to the main commission report and I have a core staff that's there. We according to the executive order will go out of business by by August the 3rd if you will and I think we're going to make that date right now it looks like end of this week or early next week that we'll have these final four volumes to the printer and hopefully we'll have them published in another week. So early August the commission will including its staff and executive director will be out of business with respect to the specific cost to complete the testing and redesign effort of of the solid rocket booster. It's the final cost has been determined of course and won't be until the we get a little further along in the redesign effort but the estimate simply for the redesign effort of the solid rocket boosters alone not talking about redoing the brake systems or any abort systems or anything of of that nature is going to be on the order of a half a billion dollars 500 million dollars. And I think that that estimate will probably hold up certainly within within 20 percent or so. Aerospace Research established your presentation that a probability analysis had been prepared recently. I have the following questions. Does this analysis cover only the recent design or will it also have calculation figures for the redesigned subsystem and second question will this paper be available for distribution. Yeah it perhaps in my previous remarks I misled the the viewers with respect to the sophistication of this probability analysis. It actually was a treatment by Dr. Feynman as I referred to before but it basically was simply going back and reviewing if you will the kind of probability analysis that NASA had had done in establishing reliability of the shuttle system and that review as opposed to a new analysis if you will is being published as part of our appendices. So we expect that to be published within about the next week to 10 10 day time frame. But it's not a new probability analysis is simply a review of the analysis that NASA had done in establishing reliability of the shuttle system. We now have time for one more short question and also I must ask a short answer from you Dr. Keel and we'll take the question from Toronto. Keith I wonder if you'd be prepared to hazard a guess as to when NASA will be in a position to officially announce its new schedule for the revised space program. Well it's it's already animated just this past Monday that as far as the next flight that the original target date for July 1987 in the view of NASA is no longer achievable and that the the most likely date will be after the first of the year 1988. Now that's there has been some indication much earlier in testimony of what the number of launches might be for the first 12 months of of of flight after the initial flight and for the next 12 months and so on and so forth. But those are we're terribly speculative and I don't think NASA really wants to be helped by those at this point. So I so I think the only thing we can say now is that the first launch is going to be after the first of the year 1988 January February timeframe. That's probably a reasonably doable goal and that it that from a conservative basis that we shouldn't expect perhaps more than four to six launches the first year and that the the increase is probably going to be conservative in terms of number of launches after that but but that's only my own personal view having been having spent the past five months of intensively involved in the shuttle system but as I said previously NASA really and appropriately hasn't committed to any specific launch schedule. Well our schedule of time is up for today. That time always arrives. I want to thank you for a most enlightening presentation this morning on WorldNet Dr. Keel. I'm Paul Duke for WorldNet in Washington.