 These people are well known to you and eminent persons in their own right. I will just briefly introduce them and then I'll ask each one to make five minutes of remarks and then we'll dig into question and answer, which should be very interesting. We'll start off with the architect of many of the, I would say, much of the good things that have happened in the US Indonesia and the US ASEAN and generally the relations in Asia. Kurt Campbell, who has recently joined the private sector and is now chairman and CEO of the Asia Group. Most of you probably last saw him when he was assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific. Kurt looks like you're enjoying the private sector. You're tan and slender. Looking good. Next to him is Andy Bayuni, who is a good friend and senior editor at the Jakarta Post. Andy is sort of a foreign policy conscience of Indonesians and has spent a lot of time recently in the United States. He's back in Jakarta now and had traveled here to join us today. But Andy has a particularly well-advised view on the relationship. Next to him is His Excellency Ashok Mirpuri, who is a true treasure for the United States. And I hope we all understand what a treasure he is. He's the new Singapore, not new anymore. I guess he's been here for several months. But he's the Singaporean ambassador to the United States and one of the world's top Indonesia experts in his own right, having served there in two tours over his long career. And finally, the Honorable Stapleton Roy, who is one of our five-star generals in the diplomatic corps, ambassador to Indonesia, ambassador to Singapore, ambassador to China, an eminent person on the U.S.-ASEAN relationship, and many more things. But today, he asked me to make sure that I mentioned he's the chairman of the U.S.-Indonesia Society, which is a role where he provides incredible leadership on the bilateral relationship, working with David Merrill and thank you and David for your support for this conference. Kurt, I'm going to leave it in your able hands to kick us off. Great. First of all, thank you very much, Ernie. It's great to see so many friends here, just as Ambassador Wolfowitz indicated. It wouldn't be very long ago that you could have a meeting like this and, frankly, to have the room half full or such. I have to give enormous credit to Ernie, to Alex, others who have built these institutions over the course of the last four or five years that have played a remarkable role at providing the context for visits, strategic engagement, advancing dialogue, and a strategy for how to build deeper relations. So, kudos, Ernie, to you and to Murray and others working at CSIS in particular. I'd like Ernie thought that the Foreign Minister gave a very brave, quite decisive speech about the way ahead. And I think the thing that I'm most pleased about in terms of his visit is that, you know, in both of our countries we see changes of people and personality and really diplomacy is about looking forward. It's not about reflecting too much on the past. And it's wonderful to see the momentum carrying forward under the second term, Secretary Kerry and others. I think it would be fair to say that when you look at, you know, there's an enormous amount of discussion about what's the appropriate word, what's the meaning of certain aspects of American policy. But I think it is undeniably the case that over the course of the last five, seven years, the United States has stepped up its game, particularly in Southeast Asia. And I think we've already seen here at the outset of the Kerry administration with the visit of the Singaporean Prime Minister with the upcoming visit of the Myanmar President with the visit today and the continuation of the strategic dialogue between the United States and Indonesia that this commitment to Southeast Asia balances an enduring set of responsibilities in Northeast Asia, which are quite profound with the new leader in China challenges on the Korean Peninsula, uncertainty in the relationship between Japan and China. So I think this is positive and it's tremendous to see such a great group here today. I just want to say three things about what the Foreign Minister said and the way forward. I think, I'm going to just say just a word about the personal relationship that developed between Secretary Clinton and the Foreign Minister. I'm going to give you this because I think there are some almost metaphorical comparisons between the general relationship between the United States and Indonesia. I was present at every one of the meetings. All told, we met almost 20 times over a period of four years. But at the outset of the relationship, I think it would be fair to say that both Secretary Clinton and the Foreign Minister needed to find a language and a way to communicate in which they truly understood each other. And that took some time and we frankly began to count on Indonesia privately for counsel well beyond the dimensions of the US-Indonesian relationship about in 2010. And what happened in 2010, 2011 and 2012 was that the relationship became so deep. And again, this is not an exaggeration, that we would not initiate any plan or agenda in Asia as a whole, not just in Southeast Asia, without Secretary Clinton saying, let's call Marty and see what he says. And what I saw initially was again some reservedness on both sides. But by the end, frankly, the judgment that Marty had demonstrated time and time again in every aspect of our bilateral relationship, whether it was managing the most difficult and challenging issues of maritime security, or how to come up with a positive agenda that would propel US-Indonesian relations forward, that personal dynamic was critical. And my hope is that Secretary Kerry will establish the same level of trust and confidence in Marty that we had over the course of the last four years. So three quick things. As we go forward, it seems to me that I believe the strategic partnership has done a remarkably good job at building a series and a set of ties between aspects of our governments, particularly the foreign ministry, elements of the president's office. I do think, and again, I want to congratulate Ernie in particular about driving this point forward for the United States and Indonesia truly to reach escape velocity in our relationship. The next phase requires a deeper economic relationship and a different kind of relationship between our economic officials and ministries. It is striking that we are now finally developing those relationships around our presidents, around our leaders in our foreign ministries. But still, I think there is much that needs to be done in our economic agencies. And there are still a sense that we are faced with more challenges than opportunities going forward. Ultimately, I think the relationship needs a kind of romantic ideal that we aim for. One of the things that Indonesia really pushed for last year, which I thought was a very good idea, was to have something beneath the Trans-Pacific Partnership that unites the United States and ASEAN together more and does not discriminate as much with respect to different levels of economic development. That was launched in terms of the enhanced economic engagement initiative. Continuing that, not letting that lag, will be central. But ultimately, I think for the United States and Indonesia to reach its full potential requires a deeper commitment on the economic side and some very hard work. And ultimately, I think that means considering how to aspire to the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the second round. And trust me, if Vietnam, if Japan can be considered in this consortium, this constellation of countries, then Indonesia can as well. And I think that's something that over the course of the next year or so has to be put on the table squarely. Secondly, it would be hard to exaggerate how important the role Indonesia has played and will continue to play in the complex relationship between the United States and China, particularly in Southeast Asia. And what Indonesia has done is communicate very directly with both Washington and Beijing that not only do we not want higher tensions between the two great powers in Southeast Asia, they do not want Indonesia in particular, but I think they are speaking for the region as a whole to create a context in which countries believe they have to choose sides. That we want an environment structured so that the most successful countries, the most stable countries, choose to have good relations with both Beijing and the United States as well as other countries like India and Japan, and creating that appropriate context is critical. And so not only does Indonesia remind continually the United States of the importance of Southeast Asia as our necessary focus in Northeast Asia, and frankly in Southeast Asia, as Ambassador Wolfowitz and others indicate, but that Southeast Asia continues to have manifest importance going forward. But this China dimension will be critical and how to effectively regulate issues, how to manage them in a way that does not spur immediate tensions and allows for creating a greater and a more effective context is really the Indonesian genius. To the extent that we have had successes in this arena, it is largely because of quiet work on the part of Indonesia behind the scenes. One of the incredible things that I don't think Indonesians have gotten as much credit for is their ability to do two things. One, not only lead ASEAN but increasingly have an identity beyond ASEAN and in doing that not threatening ASEAN members. And that role particularly in the context of the US-China relationship has been singular and that is joined by frankly the support that we've had from Australia and Singapore in particular. That's the second point. I think it is also third and finally important to think about the next stage and steps in institution building. And we're off, I think, to a good start over the course of the last several years. The United States has joined the appropriate institutions. You'd think that would be easy but you would be shocked at how challenging some of those decisions were. But now that we're there, I have high confidence that that will sustain and continue. The key here now is to think more carefully about how the existing institutions work together, what links are appropriate particularly between the ASEAN regional forum and the East Asia summit, and to also think carefully about the role of the secretariat. Now I know this seems hopelessly in the weeds and institutional, but if you look at the period in Europe in which institutions really started to take off, they were during the periods where secretariats gained greater traction and more work was done on a year-round basis as opposed to just spikes in activity around the ASEAN regional forum or the East Asia summit. The ASEAN secretariat is stationed in Jakarta. It will take Indonesian leadership to instill that institution with greater prominence, greater diversity, and more responsibility going forward. I think ultimately the savior and the most important dimension of security in Asia going forward will not be just the relationship between the United States and China or the role of outside powers in Southeast Asia, but actually the strength of the institutions that are still in their nascent forms. So I think we have a broad agenda ahead. It is thrilling to see the group of people so engaged in this going forward. And again, I want to thank Ernie for his leadership on this. I don't think there's any other institution in the nonprofit sector that has played such an important role in helping to advance U.S. relations in ASEAN over the course of the last four or five years. So thanks to him. Thank you very much, Kurt. Andy, what's the perspective from Jakarta? I think it'll take you automatically. Thank you, Ernie. Okay, let me just say that of the bad. The Indo-Pacific phrase almost doesn't exist in the lexicon of the Indonesian foreign policy establishment. When I got invitations from Ernie, I tried to find literatures from Indonesia on this issue. I know Google is limited, but I couldn't find any reference in Google about Indo-Pacific from Indonesian literature. Really do we hear us talking about Indo-Pacific? I'm glad Minister Marti this morning talked about a vision of Indo-Pacific. I think the idea is catching on and for good reasons. If you ask about the Indonesian perspective of Indo-Pacific in Jakarta, most likely you're going to get a blank stare. There was an Indo-Pacific company, a PR consulting company, but even then it was closed down. It was taken over by Edelman and it's closed down. Having said that, I think I agree with the idea that Indonesia should embrace the concept of Indo-Pacific into its foreign policy. I'm not saying this just to follow the Australian or Indian views because I know they're very passionate. They talk about Indo-Pacific a lot for obvious reasons. I'm not saying this just to please Ernie. I'm saying this for two reasons. I think the first reason was already given by Minister Marti about Indonesia's strategic locations, starting between two oceans. We controlled three very vital straits through which much of international trade passed. Straits had also linked the economies of East Asia with West Asia and also into the Middle East and into Europe. But I think the second reason that I want to emphasize here but something that maybe Marti was too humble to state is the fact that Indonesia is now already recognized as a middle power. One that is increasingly playing a big role in the region. And these stages as a middle power comes with a lot of expectations and responsibility. And as someone who has reported on the Indonesian foreign policy on my reporting days since almost 30 years ago, I believe that Indonesia is poised to take up that role and live up to its responsibility. There is no reason to believe, not to believe that. Okay, and the Indo-Pacific vision is not actually a novelty because as you may recall and I think that Marti also mentioned, Indonesia during the process of the establishment of East Asia we actually expanded the geographical definition to include countries outside the East Asia geography, so Australia, New Zealand and India. For the very reasons I think because we recognize that the evolution of Asia cannot exclude the three big countries bordering the region. So we brought in India, Australia and New Zealand. Of course later on we brought in the United States and Russia. Indonesia is as the fourth largest nation in terms of population. It's a middle power. We don't have hegemonic ambitions and I think something that Asia would be happy to hear. Well it's not in our DNA and besides I don't think we have the capacity, you know, militarily or economically to become a hegemon. But Indonesia has always, since the beginning of our independence, aspired to be a global player because we have an interest in maintaining the, sorry, the constitution mandates that Indonesia should play a role in the promotion of peace and stability in the region and globally. And I think now more than ever Indonesia is in that position to play the role of middle country, middle power, far, far more effectively. Thanks to the reforms that we have carried out since the end of the Soaratu era, we have enjoyed a long period of political and economic stability in the last 10 years. We have grown and we have prospered. I think we have also grown in our confidence in carving a bigger role in regional and international affairs. Our track records in diplomacy may not be much but there's something that we are very proud of, I think, at schools. We are all taught about the 1955 conference of Asia-Africa nations, you know, just emerging from hundreds of years of colonialism and Indonesia was able to pull that off and which then later became, or it was a precursor to the establishment of the Non-aligned Movement. More recently, as Indonesia played a role in the Cambodian peace process back in the 1980s and 1990s and then we have helped mediate the conflicts in the southern Philippines, in southern Thailand. During the recent conflict between Cambodia and Thailand on the border, Indonesia also came to the picture. And of course, as the largest member of ASEAN, our influence looms large. We have had many initiatives, some from Indonesia and some were actually with Indonesia's encouragement. Just to name a few, the expansion of the annual dialogues effect, which course is going to happen, this is going to be decided mostly by the United States and China. But Indonesia will play its role as a middle power and make sure that whatever world emerges, it should not harm our national interests. Nothing for Indonesia that means the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and in the world. If we are heading towards a bipolar world, if China and the US become locked in the Cold War, my message is don't count on Indonesia joining either one of the contesting parties. Indonesia is too big a middle power to be forming alliances with anyone. And I think that's another word that is not in the lexicon of the Indonesian Foreign Policy Establishment, alliances or allies. We are comfortable being regarded as a friend or partner of the United States, but never count on us becoming one of your allies. We can be good friends and we can be the best of friends. But I think that as far as it goes, and I think that's quite... Well, it's quite intimate being friends. One of the principles of Indonesia's foreign policy has been and continues to be active and independent. And this was hammered home by our Prime Minister at the time, Muhammad Hatta in 1948 in a speech which he gave at the beginning of the Cold War. And he used the expression also sailing between the two coral reefs for Indonesia to be able to navigate between the two contesting powers. We have stuck to this principle throughout the Cold War. Historians may argue that we have not done a good job because during the Tsukano years we lean more towards the communist bloc and then under Suha we lean towards the west. But we tried our best. And I think this principle will be called upon once again if we are heading towards a bipolar world. Basically what I want to say is that Indonesia and the United States we have shared similar concerns about why China is heading. That's a lot of uncertainty. But Indonesia, I think like Minister Mati said, Indonesia will be playing its role. He mentioned the three challenges, trust deficit, unresolved territorial conflicts, and managing change. I think Indonesia will be there with much more confidence in playing its role and address these concerns together with all the countries concerned. Thank you. That was excellent. May I now call on Ambassador Mirpore, please. Thank you. I'm the odd person out in this panel because being neither Indonesian nor American so I get invited here so that I can reassure the Indonesians that they're not going to be hegemonic power. But I've been working on Indonesia issues in our foreign ministry for about 30 years. And one of the first files I looked at, this was the days before electronic records, was about Konferentasi in 1965 between Indonesia and Singapore and Malaysia. Now that was in the pre-Asian days. And today in the Asian days, I think the whole dynamic of the region has changed very, very dramatically. And a very important part of that dynamic change in the region has been Indonesia's role very much as an anchor in Southeast Asia. When Indonesia is distracted, as they were through the financial crisis in the 1990s, Asian becomes distracted. Today, the past decade has been very good for Indonesia and it gives a huge amount of coherence to Asian. And that's a very important thing to understand that Indonesia plays a role as a natural leader of the region. But they do it in a very consultative while active style. It's not something that tries to impose on the other members of Asian. And for example, we do have issues where there are differences among Asian countries. But Indonesia takes it in a consultative manner and that's really been the trend not just under the current government, but since the time Asian was formed under President Soharto. And I think that's very much appreciated, particularly by the smaller countries of Asian. And Indonesia really plays that. When we look back at what's happened in Asian over the past decade of Soharto, the one critical year that we'd be looking at is Indonesia's chairmanship of Asian in 2011. Because that has set many, during that chairmanship year, and I happened to be in Jakarta through that year, Indonesia came up with ideas and perspectives and worked to pull together the other Asian members into seeing a region, a much more dynamic region. That was the time when the U.S. was invited to come and join the East Asia Summit. And it was a time when we were dealing with issues as the minister said earlier, the management of change. These were the time that we had to really think about that. So this, the 2011 meeting will be very, very critical. Indonesia, of course, has played a role in many other issues subsequently as well. Last year in the Asian meetings, when we couldn't come to any agreement on the language on the South China Sea and could not come up with a joint communique at the Asian ministerial meetings, it was Minister Mati going around, putting together the six-point principle and the South China Sea. And I think these are important things as we understand. Indonesia really playing a consultative leadership role in the region, pulling the region along, thinking about the future, and that's something that the rest of the countries of the region, Singapore in particular, appreciates very much. But I wanted to speak a little bit more on the economic role that Indonesia must play. To go in parallel with the political role that Indonesia has been playing, I think the minister hinted at this, Kurt hinted at this as well. It's time to elevate the regional economic leadership as well. And that's somewhere where I think Indonesia is starting to find its feet because the pivot that we speak about, the US pivot, everyone has said it's got to be a comprehensive pivot. The minister mentioned a comprehensive pivot. It's got to go hand in hand with the military and economic parts of it. And again, I think the region needs to see Indonesia step up and play a larger role on that. It is the only Asian member which is a G20, the only Asian country with a G20 member. It is a trillion dollar economy. The growth rate is about 6% a year. Among the G20 is the third fastest growing economy after China and India. And that's, now it's time for Indonesia to see beyond just its own growth and look at the whole region. It needs to help focus on the regional integration efforts. And this is starting to come in. So as we speak of the Asian economic community, Indonesia is very much over there. Indonesia is an active member of the regional comprehensive economic partnership, the RCEP. And as Kurt mentioned, we have the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And in Indonesia, while earlier they saw the Trans-Pacific Partnership as potentially something that was divisive within Asian, now I see a sense that they have to re-look at it. There's a re-thinking of where does Indonesia play a role because you cannot afford to be left behind in what is happening in the global and regional economic developments as well. This year Indonesia, now like the 2011 meeting which was very instrumental last year, this year Indonesia is in the chair of APEC. And I think we need to see some of that leadership come out in APEC as well that how does Indonesia play that instrumental role in shaping the Asia-Pacific economic community as well. RCEP, TPP, the Asian Economic Committee, pulling all that together. And that's I think where the challenge is going to be. It's looking beyond just narrow confines that we've always traditionally looked at Indonesia just as a part of Southeast Asia but really as a leader in terms of the political and economic agenda in Southeast Asia. Now Singapore is in a very interesting place in dealing with Indonesia because in many ways we are two opposite ends of the scale. Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia. Singapore is geographically the smallest country in Southeast Asia. And yet we have such a strong partnership. We work very closely together. Our leaderships work very closely together. In fact, earlier I was speaking to Minister Mati before we came in. A month ago our leaders had another summit, part of the annual series of summits which take place regularly. And these summits, they speak on regional issues. They also speak on growing and broadening the economic cooperation between our two countries. Singapore is the largest foreign investor in Indonesia. Singapore and Indonesia are each among our largest trading partners. And these are key elements of where we see that role that both of us can play together in pulling the regional economic perspective and the regional political perspective. Now the reason why we're here today, the reason why everyone is so laudatory about this conference is because of everything that happened in the last decade. I was in Indonesia through the 1990s when the crisis happened and you had a huge concern that Indonesia may potentially break up at the end of the 1990s. It has not broken up. It's gone from strength to strength. And today it's a reflection of those strengths that have emerged and why we're speaking about this. I think the challenges will come in the next decade. Every 10 years we go through these challenges and I think that Indonesia as it stays the course will really be that natural leader for ASEAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. Ambassador Roy. Just a few. It'll pick you up. Stay, it'll pick you up. It'll pick me up. Okay. My thanks to Ernie and to CSIS for giving us the opportunity to hear the earlier presentations. It was refreshing and heartening to hear the issues in the Indo-Pacific region laid out so cogently and so eloquently by Foreign Minister Nathalagawa and by Ambassador Jalal. If you read between the lines accurately, you would recognize that Indonesia does pose an enormous threat to Singapore. It used to be that only Singapore could frame the issues so cogently. I think that Singapore's hegemonic position in this respect is now under serious threat. The second point. This really is a special moment in U.S.-Indonesian relations. For the first time in U.S. history, we have elected a two-term president who has spent significant years of his childhood in Indonesia, has a personal field not only for the country of Indonesia but for the importance of the entire Southeast Asian region, something that you don't gain simply through reading books. But in his case, I think it's in his bones. And it coincides with the period when I think the recognition of the importance of Indonesia reflected, as others have commented on the turnout today, couldn't be more important. We not only have a president who pays attention to Southeast Asia because of its own significance in addition to all the geopolitical factors that require us to pay attention to Southeast Asia. But Indonesia is now a democracy. We no longer have the East Timor problem burdening the relationship. If you look back at the history of U.S.-Indonesia relations, there have been enormous problems that we've encountered over the years despite our recognition from the very beginning that Indonesia was an important country. We supported its independence not simply out of goodwill but because we recognized that with its large population and its very strategic geographic position, it was a country that was important to the United States. But to translate that into effective policies has not been easy. And there are still problems. But at the same time, I think the opportunities far outweigh them. I thought the comments today very usefully framed it. We're both very conscious of the significance for the region of the rise of China, the rise of India. But neither of us wants to contain rising powers. We want instead to avoid zero-sum rivalries and to contribute to peace and stability in the region. And I think that is the dynamic that is driving the Indonesian-U.S. relationship in the right direction at the moment. But acting Assistant Secretary Jo Yuen I thought touched on a very important point. There is a real deficit in the United States still of understanding of Southeast Asia and of Indonesia. The trend fortunately is now in the right direction. I was appalled at the degree to which Southeast Asia simply fell off our attention scope and our educational institutions, all abandoned Southeast Asian studies. Now we are having, Yusindo used to be the only act in town in terms of paying constant attention to Indonesia. Now there is competition all over the place. New centers of Southeast Asian studies are rising, but we have enormous catching up to do. Jo Yuen talked about some of the problems. We can only develop our relationship with Indonesia, for example, by understanding the importance for it of its independent and active foreign policy. That it prefers to work with partners, not with allies, in pursuing its national interests. This is not instinctively evident to Americans. And we can make enormous mistakes if we don't understand how we need to position ourselves in order to work and develop the relationship with Indonesia most effectively. So this is an area where I'm pleased to see that the educational component and the comprehensive partnership is so important. And I would hope that it results in a lot more Americans going to Indonesia and not simply also revitalizing the United States as a place of study for Indonesians. It's important to the future of the region and to the management of the change that is going to be taking place in the region, as the foreign minister pointed out so cogently. We have an additional problem. We're a very rich country that cannot allocate our resources rationally. So we are funded for security, and we are not funded for all of the other areas that managing the change that's taking place in the Indo-Pacific region requires us to be heavily involved with. This means that it gives a military cast to our foreign policy presence in the region that distorts the actual balance of U.S. interests in the region. And part of the problem is we simply can't fund the other components. No matter what happens in the area, the only arm of the U.S. government that has the funding and the presence to be able to respond effectively is our military. This is not a healthy situation, and over time I would hope that Congress will begin to straighten it out. The State Department has bare pockets in terms of addressing a lot of these questions. We need to be strengthening our trade and investment role. Alex and the U.S. ASEAN business council is very focused on that question, but it also takes resources behind it. It takes trips to the region. It takes funding opportunities, and we are not, at the moment, properly funded for that. A final point. Architecture is important. Regional architecture. As someone who served in the Southeast Asian region before ASEAN was formed and watched the way that all of the problems bilateral and multilateral in the region lacked an effective framework for dealing with them and then seeing how the region has prospered and strengthened its relationships within the ASEAN context. We would see a very different picture in East Asia now if ASEAN had not been formed or if it had fallen apart after the end of the Vietnam War. But architecture is important, but not sufficient. And what we are seeing is that the big security problems in East Asia at the moment are in Northeast Asia. The Sino-Japanese rivalry, their relationship is the worst since they established diplomatic relations in 1972. We have the North Korean nuclear problem that the foreign minister correctly pointed out is going to create proliferation pressures, not simply in Northeast Asia, but they can spill over into other areas. And the architecture of the region cannot deal with those issues. In some ways it's because they are bilateral issues, but it also raises the question of whether we need some strengthened mechanisms for assisting management of disputes more effectively. This is very important to the United States because these issues, while it's a bilateral issue between China and Japan, we're an ally of Japan, and that means that we are part of the issue. But this extends elsewhere as well. So I thought it was very creative that the foreign minister laid out the concept of trying to expand a, in a sense, a security stabilizing mechanism that brings the Indo element and the Pacific element together. That's the type of thinking that we need, I think. We shouldn't simply think that the institutions of the past are adequate to deal with the challenges of the future. And for that reason, we need to think out of the box, and it's, again, refreshing to have Indonesia taking the lead and putting out ideas that I think deserve a lot of thought and attention. Thank you. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank the entire panel. We're going to move now into a question and answer. I'd like to use the prerogative of the chair to ask the first question. And that is that, you know, we've heard several things from the minister and from all of you that Indonesia is intrinsically itself important to the United States, that architecture is important. There's been the implication, I think, that Washington is sort of overgeared towards a China-centric view. Maybe also, I thought I heard between the lines an implication that the politics of foreign policy are a challenge in terms of allocating resources, maybe in terms of having the leaders of our countries include business more regularly in their engagement. I guess what I wanted to challenge you with, our goal in this conference, and that we will come out with a major piece of research from CSIS this year in time ahead of APEC by September ahead of APEC meetings in Indonesia in October. And I really would welcome your recommendations on how do we jump this hump, the challenge of resources and political, is trade, is Indonesia, is foreign policy sort of a bad word in the United States politically? Kurt, you must have wrestled with this plenty. And then I guess from the Indonesian perspective, how do you walk that tightrope of best friend but not ally? So I want to throw that out and see if anyone could react to it on the panel. First of all, let me say I just liked very much what we heard from everyone else on the panel today. I'll just couple of points. I think one of the challenges that we're going to face in the coming years will be if you look at the trajectory of American foreign policy after martial campaigns, there is a tendency for Americans to want to come home and to focus on domestic issues that happened after the Cold War, after the Vietnam War, after the Korean War, after the Second World War. It's really been a feature of American life and it is difficult, particularly in the aftermath of very challenging military campaigns, to sustain an internationalist course. And I think in terms of what we want to all see accomplished, which is a recognition that the 21st century, the history primarily is going to be written in the Asia Pacific region. And we want a major chapter of that to be written with the United States as part of the narrative. That the two things that will challenge us, I think in the near term, Ernie, one will be that frankly no one is arguing for us to up and leave the Middle East. We have huge responsibilities there that sustain American leadership. But the challenges that will keep us there, that will pull us back in issues like Syria, Iran, the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, they're not going anywhere. So there will be one pull that will ask us to remain. And let's be clear here, this is not an area where you generate lots of extra political capital. You are spending it every aspect of American treasure, sacred lives, huge amounts of money, prestige, you name it. So it's going to be very challenging. And on the other hand, we're going to have an enormous pressure to come home, right? And I think, I have to say this, I like the fact that this has been a very bipartisan panel. But the truth is one of the things that has sustained us for decades has been it has always been the base in the Republican Party, the strong internationalist base that has enabled us to have the kind of security commitments and elsewhere. That consensus is starting to fray. And you all have to look at a few new prominent books. One of the most important, a good friend, Richard Haas, has written a very important book called Foreign Policy Begins at Home, which is really a treatise about needing to spend more time on the domestic front. Now, it will be misinterpreted in a number of ways, but I think you're going to see those pressures as well. Lastly, I very much agree with State about sort of the challenge of appropriating money in the U.S. government to appropriate ends. By and large, although, frankly, I have to demerit me and others in this, just a challenge in both interpretation and presentation. Over the last four years, the lion's share of the engagement in Southeast Asian Asia was really diplomatic, not military. But somehow 600 Marines got really a very disproportionate amount of attention. The truth is that just as we have enormous challenges figuring out how money goes to our diplomacy, we have colleagues from the Defense Department, we have the same issues on the military side. We can't come up with the necessary money for military construction. We have hugely strained budgets on certain kinds of exercises. So the problem extends, unfortunately, beyond simply our diplomatic reach to every aspect of our government. I am struck that almost all the most innovative things that we did over the course of the last couple of years were, frankly, public-private partnerships where we worked with the business community. Our government is basically constructed to prevent that. So I had more lawyers trying to make sure that that didn't happen than actually able State Department officials making sure that we were effective in this approach. And anyone who comes into government who thinks that we will go back to that era where you come up with a good idea, work with your compatriots on capital here, put it in a budget, and it goes, that era is over. It's finished. To be effective, we're going to have to work much more effectively with the business community and foundations and other countries in terms of advancing an agenda. And most people who go into government just don't think that way. And our institutions are designed to demerit people who think in those terms. Thank you, Kurt. Great insight. Anyone else want to come? I don't pretend to have the answer to the question about the funding. But my assumption is that the fund comes with regard to when you put priority to the relationship. Naturally, I guess, well, you should put money and resources into the relationship if you think that's important. And I'm happy to say that I've been observing this relationship evolving in the last 15 years and that the Indonesian United States relations have grown, have become stronger for the right reasons. It's something that goes back even before Obama took office. I think Ambassador Cameron Hume did a good job in building the relationship away from just nearly security. And so I see that the relations are evolving on a kind of natural path, not something that is being pushed by certain aspects of the relationship. For example, I think this is how it's been played out sometimes in the media. Indonesia has become important to the United States because Indonesia can be an ally or partner in containing China. I think that would be the wrong approach and would send the wrong signal. And I don't think that's how the relationship has evolved. Like I say, it's probably most likely just the media playing it up. But those who have worked on this relationship understand that it's much, much broader than just that important but not the only one that define our relationship. Thank you. Let me see something about the business community. There's so many friends from the business community over here. And actually I'm not sure whether the business community actually needs such a strong engagement by the government. If you look today, there is a larger amount of U.S. investments in Southeast Asia than there are in China. Even without taking very strong efforts. And maybe that should be the way to go. The businesses know that there is a calm, there is a peace, there's a certainty that appears in Southeast Asia. So even before the think tanks got into the Southeast Asian mode, when they were looking very much from Washington and Middle East and Northeast Asia, the businesses were already out there. So I think that we need to encourage them to do more. We need to encourage them to say that what you're doing is the right way to this. And in fact, then governments follow behind. A month ago, my prime minister, he spoke in his very room. And his advice to the American government was trade is strategy. And as you build this trade, that's where your strategy will come with it. That's a great point. Let me open the floor. I see Amitabh there. And Wayne, you're next. Could you please just identify yourself for the... I'm Amitabh Acharya. I chair the ASEAN Study Center at American University. One of the new centers in Southeast Asia Ambassador Stapleton Roy spoke about, except that we believe in ASEAN, so we call ourselves the ASEAN Center. So a couple of very quick questions. Kurt Campbell complained that it was very challenging for him to decide what is the appropriate institution for the U.S. to join when he was assistant secretary. Now we have the potential for another institution, or at least a treaty. And the foreign minister, Marty, just proposed the idea of an Indo-Pacific TAC, Treaty of Amidian Cooperation, which is not an institution, but has the potential to evolve into one. How do you feel about it? Would the United States support the Indo-Pacific TAC, given that ASEAN already provides the United States and other institutions, other countries to actually sign on to TAC as it exists? The second question is to actually Ambassador Mirpuri. Now, Indonesia and Singapore have a historic difference, a friendly disagreement, but it is nonetheless quite significant for those who follow Southeast Asia. So Singapore always believed in a very strong American military presence in the region, as the cornerstone of Singapore's national security, as well as regional security. Indonesia always wanted what NDE, by the way, just said, kind of balancing, or at least non-alignment between the two. And Foreign Minister Marty just said this morning, pivoting should not be too little, not too much. So how do you see Singapore sees that, and also I'll be very interested in your campus response, is pivoting getting too much? What is too much? Okay, Kurt, that sounds like it was... Oh, sure. That's a good idea. I have a couple questions. Wayne, I saw you had your hand up here in the middle, and then we'll move over to Rick, Dick. Thank you. I'm Wayne Forrest of the American Indonesian Chamber, and just briefly, Kurt mentioned, and so did you, Ernie. The size of the group here today, I can remember my organization in the 1980s sponsoring conferences at the State Department before U.S. Ocean, before Yusindo, before any of the other groups were really founded, and we'd maybe get 200, you know. And these were briefings on, all-day briefings on Indonesia. We'd have a minister speak, and so this is a real testament of the change that we've seen. My question really has to do with fundamental systems and differences between systems. The rule of law is well-entrenched in the United States. It's well-entrenched in the thinking of businessmen, corporations. When you go out to Asia, there's a more informal decision-making process. So in diplomacy and thinking of these partnerships, these other forums for the advancement of engagement, what is the role of the rule of law and the interpretation on either side? Maybe you will have views from the Singapore ambassador, and obviously the United States leads with the rule of law, and that's sometimes incompatible. What's helpful is that the United States understands these cultural differences now, I think much better than they did 20, 30 years ago. I can see it in the character of Kurt Campbell's remarks. I don't know you, but I've met many of your predecessors, and believe me, it's not always been the case that that kind of sophistication of difference. So that's really my question is, where do you see the rule of law playing in diplomacy now? Thanks. We're going to go right over here to Dick Drobnik. Thank you, Ernie. Dick Drobnik from the USC Marshall School of Business. I've got a question for Stap. I'd like to quibble with him for a moment first. Our business school never abandoned Southeast Asia in general or Indonesia in particular. We've been developing deep, deep relationships with the Indonesian business community for 30 years. In fact, in 10 days, we'll be sending 13 undergraduate students for the third year in a row for eight-week internships with the Indonesian business community. In August, I'll be taking 35 of our executive MBAs to Jakarta to mingle with Indonesian business and government leaders also. Stap, my question, if I heard you right, was that the United States is not thinking about trying to constrain the rising powers of India or China. If I heard you right, do you believe that's true of our Defense Department? Okay. Let's go with these. A range of questions. The Indo-Pac-Tac, what do you think? Singapore's perspective on the military, rule of law, and Dick's question to Stap. Thanks. And thank you very much. I very much appreciate the work that you've done over the years at your center and the role that it's played in promoting academic excellence with respect to the role of ASEAN. I hope I didn't come across as complaining, but one never knows very much about your tone. But what I was trying to say is that any decision that involves the permanent use of the American president's time over a sustained period of years is something that a lot of people have views on, right? And I think an interesting phenomena that occurs in every administration, and I'm sure Ambassador Wolfwoods and others are not here, but there is a tendency right before big trips to Asia, right? That the foreign policy guys just, we just palpitate. I mean it's very anxiety producing because basically you hear rumors of talks in which political advisors, nameless, faceless, in the West Wing raise questions about why it's inappropriate for the president to be traveling for X amount of time to countries that no one in Iowa has heard of during X-Christ, Y-Crisis, right? And trust me, it's just the level of anxiety. You just can't imagine it. You're meeting with your colleagues, you're explaining to them, no, no, you trust me, the trip is going, but you yourself are trying to convince yourself that that's the case. So what I was meaning to suggest is that a decision to choose a venue and then also commit forever, oops, forever, that that's the case. That's what some of the challenges are going forward, but I'm very confident that we've made the right choice. Look, the interesting thing about today for me is the concept of that I'm hearing more regularly Indo-Pacific. I will tell you that it is not without controversy in policy circles in the United States. A lot of people have concerns about it, are uncertain about what it means. To be perfectly honest, I think at a very general level, the recognition of the connectivity between the Persian Gulf, between the countries of South Asia, and the growing importance of Asia for energy and the like, I think that is clear and that is manifest. But when you take that a step further and try to figure out how you create an architecture that combines India, Australia, China, Southeast Asia, in this current set of opportunities and challenges, I worry personally about getting a little bit too far out ahead. And the general tendency in ASEAN has been, or in Asia in general, rather than really focusing on the existing property and making sure that all the systems are up to date, it's always the next property over the hill. Let's build that one. I don't think the timing yet or the agenda is ripe for establishing this involving India, Australia, Indonesia, and other countries in Southeast Asia. I just don't think that there is the understanding of what it was set to accomplish. And frankly, I spend a lot of time now obviously with Chinese friends. They have a lot of questions about it. And frankly, China's role and views on this are going to be critical going forward. And frankly, their participation will be essential as well. Ambassador Mirpoire, you had a question there. The questions were meant to see if there is any difference in thinking between Indonesia and Singapore on the pivot. Listening today and listening to Minister Marti about not doing too much, not doing too little, I then wrote down on my notes that what we need is a Goldilocks pivot. Goldilocks pivot. Not too hot, not too cold, just right. And it's fine-tuning it, that is always a challenge. And there will be differences among between the U.S. and the region on how to fine-tune it. There will be differences within the region on fine-tuning it. And we're just trying to find what is the most palatable type of pivot that is significant for all of us. But I think the most important point is that everyone in the region feels that the U.S. has a legitimate right to be in the region, to be part of the region, and we want the U.S. to be present. If we did not want that, we would not have asked for the U.S. to become part of the East Asia Summit. And that is whether you have little differences here and there, and you know some of the countries, some of the claimant states in South China see have a different view on how they want to see the U.S. present over there. The non-claimant states like Indonesia and Singapore will have slightly different view. Getting that fine-tuning will always, there will always be some gradations in it. But in terms of the general thinking, having the U.S. present I think is the key. Next, Dave, you had one from Dick. Right. Dick, you're right about USC. It never neglected Southeast Asia, and I saw this in Indonesia when there were annual receptions of returned students from USC. So you're the exception that proved the rule. As for the question of containing China, I served for nine years on dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. So I know something about containment policies. The high point of our trade with the Soviet Union was in 1979 when we had $4.5 billion of trade with the Soviet Union. We now have over $500 billion a year with China in our bilateral trade. 100 times greater than we ever had with the Soviet Union. If you don't trade with enemies, you do trade with friends. Trade is a basic form of cooperation. We didn't train hundreds of thousands of Soviet students in our universities. We've done that with China. The rise of China, unlike the rise of the Soviet Union, has benefited the entire region around it. So all of our closest friends and allies in East Asia now have larger trading relations with China than they have with the United States. The bulk of China's rise has gone into developing and raising the living standards of the civilian economy, not of the military. The military is getting part of the larger pie. But in the Soviet Union, you didn't have paved roads outside of Moscow. You had a depressed standard of living far below what many Americans understood, whereas in China it's quite the opposite. I just rode their high-speed rail system, which is now nationwide built in five years. It takes us over six months to repair one escalator in our subway system. So if we are implementing a containment strategy against China, we are either stupid or devious. And I don't think we're either. So therefore, while we are obviously determined to ensure that our security interests are not damaged by the rise of China, we do not see containing China as the best way to pursue our security interests in East Asia, in part because there's no support in East Asia for a containment strategy, because all of the countries of Asia want to cooperate with China when it behaves responsibly and want the United States to be providing reassurance that we will remain in the area when China behaves irresponsibly. That's not a containment strategy. It's a selective way of trying to create incentives for China to behave responsibly as it grows more powerful. And aligned or not aligned on rule of law with Indonesia? I think that's Wayne's question. As trade arrangements expand in Asia, the importance of rule of law is clearly growing. But rule of law is meaningless if you don't have judicial systems that can adjudicate the rule of law. And this is a problem in Indonesia where the judicial system is not as strong as it could be in terms of being able to have contracts that matter. This is a problem throughout East Asia, where in many ways the traditions have been to use non-rule of law methods for assuring the sanctity of business arrangements. But the modern world requires a movement in the direction of rule of law. So I think that everywhere you look in Asia, there is some strengthening of the rule of law, but the level of development of the institutions necessary to underpin a rule of law varies widely in the region. I'm going to give the last question to Ambassador Laporta. We have time for one last question. Thank you very much, Ernie. And I'd like to just explore the flip side of State's comments and discussion on the containment strategy. The Chinese have been talking about, both publicly and privately, about a new kind of relationship with the United States, a closer relationship, a special relationship. It's been a lot of some inks spilled on a G2 concept. And indeed, the Australians' recent defense white paper gives some substance to that argument and support to that. How would this be viewed in the region generally, and how in particular would it be viewed in Southeast Asia? Kurt, do you want to start? Thank you, Ambassador, and thank you for your service as well. My sense is that the most effective U.S.-China relationship has to be embedded in a larger regional context, and that those who believe that Asia is like a pinwheel, that if you get U.S.-China relations right, then everything flows from that. I think that is from another time, and that in the current environment we need a strong cooperative relationship with China, but we also need a highly diversified set of arrangements and relationships, not just with the other Asian countries, but countries who are playing a larger role in Asia going forward, Europe, India, and the like. I think one of the valuable things about some of this commentary in China of late about a new kind of great power relationship suggests that we have transitioned from the dominant strategic commentary that existed in China from about 2007 to 2009, not the kind that we heard as much publicly, but animated most private conversations and strategic assessments. That was a belief that the United States was in the period of a rapid descent and decline and that we would be out of the region quickly. Now, I still think there are those in parts of their government, military, conservative think tanks that have a desire for a certain kind of American departure, but I don't believe that most now in the strategic leadership believe that that is the case. And they recognize that the hard work for the United States and China over the course of the next 20 or 30 years is coming up with both rules of the road, concrete realistic practices about how we can work together in the Asia Pacific region. It is big enough for the both of us, but both of us have structural, cultural, political dynamics that frankly have made it difficult for each of us to have certain kinds of power sharing arrangements. Ultimately, I believe that there is a momentum in both countries that recognizes that we must get along and that we really do not have a choice, but to find a way forward. I'd be interested in what State has to say about that. I basically agree with that. Any views from the region on the question? Well, just a quick sort of agreement. The U.S.-China relationship, the whole region views that as a very critical part of the entire architecture. For the architecture to work, you must have a calm U.S.-China relationship. The economic links as Ambassador Roy mentioned between the U.S. and China are good for the whole region because we benefit from all those connectivities that take place because companies from the region are then working with Chinese and U.S. companies quite a bit. The political connectivity that Kurt spoke about, all these fit into what the region is comfortable with. It's very different from, say, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union when the region wanted to cut itself off and say, we're going non-aligned. We don't want to be involved in this. What Andy spoke about, 1955, we wanted to stay away. We didn't want to get involved in this U.S.-Soviet Union conflict. Today we see ourselves as part of the architecture. We want the U.S.-China relationship to work well. I think the whole region is comfortable with that. Can I say one last thing, Ambassador? I would also say that the most important precondition in establishing stronger relations between the United States and Southeast Asia is, ironically, a good relationship between the United States and China. Southeast Asia gets anxious when we cannot manage our relationship with Beijing and then they inhibit their interactions with us. Well, before I ask you to join me in thanking this panel, let me make a couple administrative announcements. One, for those, I understand we have thousands of people watching this online, so for those of you who are in Asia and know it's approaching midnight, but we're going to break and have lunch here. I want to encourage all of you to go out after this break and get your lunch in the corridor and then come back in. We're going to dig into a very interesting and dynamic part of the relationship, which is trade and investment. We've got an incredibly good panel. So get your lunch and come back in. But please join me in thanking this outstanding panel for their comment. Thank you. You did a great job. This is fantastic. Thank you very proud. Thank you. Appreciate it.