 Thanks for that. We sometimes forget that the region has three languages, and we tend not to speak them. I'll introduce myself as I go along. It comes out of the focus of my presentation, but I was very pleased to have an opportunity to present some work which I've been doing over the past couple of years in this venue. Using water, PowerPoint is for the presenter, not for you, so if you can't read it, that's tough. Present a piece of work that does something which I do quite frequently, which is use water, which is my background as an engineer and a former public servant in SA government and Mozambique government, use water as a lens to look at a particular topic. In this case, I'm looking from a water perspective, in particular at Southern Africa's energy value chain, because there's water implications in that energy value chain, and it illustrates some very interesting issues around regional integration. When I found the more I looked at how we integrate water regionally in Southern Africa, I was talking more about the challenges of the generic challenges of regional integration in SADIQ, and I found it quite useful to compare and contrast those. There is a slight academic tinge to this. I'm a professor, I understand, of the practice at the School of Governments, which is a hell of a good way to avoid doing that boring PhD business. I'll try and draw attention to some of the academic elements and the theoretical elements, and in the water sector, what's been interesting is seeing how a particular academic paradigm, a paradigm of environmental regionalism, has captured the SADIQ agenda for a couple of decades without people even really noticing it. One consequence of it is that the lights quite often go out in South Africa and all across the region. We mustn't forget that the rest of the region has low shedding as well as South Africa. One can actually relate what seemed to be a theoretical discussion in Europe to certain consequences in the energy value chain in Southern Africa, and I find that interesting. It's not dissimilar to what's happened in the broader discussion about regional integration in SADIQ, where if we look at what's been attempted and what the outcomes have been, and we question the paradigm that guided us, we find that perhaps what happened in water has actually been reflected again in the wider integration paradigm. I say there's insights to be gained by looking at water and looking at broader regional integration, using energy as an indicator and comparing and contrasting, finding that there's quite similar pathologies, finding that we need to question the nature and the role of the regional institutions we've set up, and beginning to ask questions about what kind of regionalism we really envisage for Southern Africa. So a couple of projects, I did some work for the African Development Bank, they deeply wanted to invest in regional projects to support regional integration in the water sector, I told them they couldn't find them, did a similar piece of work for the Water Research Commission and wrote a paper recently, which I tried, and this is all in the paper which is in the pack on your very clever flash drive, and I've tried to write up the history of at least the water sector from the perspective of both regional integration and the management of water resources in the region. So the proposition I want to put here is that in water and in general, SADEC has implemented strategies that didn't really understand and consider the context and the content. The consequences we've developed, inappropriate strategies which have been ineffective, and when we look at the outcomes we haven't achieved what we had hoped to achieve, and that's because the strategies were based on inappropriate paradigms, and then question where did these paradigms come from, and I've said they've been enforced in question marks through sometimes well-intentioned external leverage. I've spent a lot of my career fighting with donors, usually I've been on the winning side, but it's an ongoing tension trying to manage the relationship between external funding and the drivers of that, and internal use of external funding. But throughout this process, I would suggest that there hasn't been enough critical thinking from the southern African side about the paradigms that we adopt, and the excuse for coming here is that we're now talking about a regional industrialization strategy, and please let's not make the same mistake in one more sector as we've already done in a couple of others. Moving towards water, it's interesting watching where our ideas come from, and regionalism is no exception. In water, what I find going back now to the literature, having been a participant, you then stand back and you look and see where did all these ideas come from. They seemed perfectly sensible at the time. Now they don't seem so sensible. Where did we get them from? And I've been interested in the evolution of ideas about environmental regionalism. If we remember the 90s upsurge of environmentalism in Europe and associated upsurge of environmental scholarship in Europe, great interest in can we manage natural resources in a different way? Can we set up government structures in a different way to be more environmentally sensitive? In economic integration, we've been very much driven by an institutional paradigm modeled on Europe's current structures, but tending not to look too much at its history. And in both cases, if we'd interrogated the options more carefully, we might have had better approaches. So let me just start with water management, and I'll try and do this quickly. It's my area, but I'd say it's only useful here for illustration. The assumptions that have driven a lot of Saddick's water policy is that water is in shared rivers, all of it, most of it. It's scarce, and therefore we've got to cooperate to use it, because if we don't, things won't work, and we need to use tools of regional integration to do this. And a particular instrument that was chosen was to set up regional river basin organizations for the purpose. And there's been a substantial investment, and I'm talking hundreds of millions, setting up basin organizations in the Ocovango, in the Orange, in the Limpopo, in the Zambezi, very much encouraged and supported by the European particular donors who have an environmental orientation. But I have to add, USAID has a particular interest in the Botswana-Angola border, who would imagine. River basin organizations are an expression of environmental regionalism. Concepts got a long provenance because natural boundaries, mountains and rivers seem to be sensible governance boundaries. And go back to the 1930s, the U.S. Depression, Russa felt looking at ways to lift USA out of its then economic mire, was very attracted by a river basin approach. And the Tennessee Valley Authority is one of the flagships of what you can do managing water on a cooperative regional basis, albeit in that case it was an interstate region in the United States. And I'll come back to that. In the 21st century, with much greater concern about environmental sustainability, river basin organizations again look attractive because they're a way of putting a ring round governance issues which forces political debates into an environmental context. And incidentally, if you read the sort of internal literature and environmental organizations, they quite like the idea of making other people come to their meetings rather than they have to go to other people's meetings. It's a way of locking out other stakeholders and strengthening the influence of environmental actors. So in 1995, which is really a peak of this sort of thinking, we see SADC's first technical protocol, the water protocol. Crazy. Why did water come first? Well, there was a lot of pressure from a lot of institutions for that and an attempt to put many water management functions in the region at a supranational, at a SADC level. This was kind of modified a little bit in 2000 where a lot of the sort of attempts to force institutional architecture were rejected and the 2000 revision of the protocol softens them a bit which actually reflected what happened in Europe at the same time. Now, you know, that's the background, that's what we've done and what's interesting is to now look and say, well, what was the actual context? What were the water challenges in the region at the time these decisions were taken? So the first thing to say is actually very little of Southern African water is actually used. There's no scarcity in the major basin, certainly not the Zambezi or Covango even the Orange isn't particularly scarce. Countries which are downstream, which, you know, like we always think of Egypt at the bottom of the Nile. Well, it's only Egypt at the bottom of the Nile that is a downstream country, heavily dependent on upstream countries and very water scarce. In almost all the countries of the region, the priority is actually to do stuff internally at national level and there's no major constraint talking to neighbors, no constraint in using the resource. What's necessary is you talk to neighbors just to explain what you're doing so they don't think they're being robbed, to cooperate on data, it's kind of useful to know if a flood's coming down the Zambezi so you can open the Cabora Bassa spillway early which reduces the flood downstream in the Zambezi. But you don't need large permanent institutions. The flood management in Mozambique was best done by telephone. When they established telephone links between Cariba and Cabora Bassa it dramatically transformed management. It was interesting at the same time that this was going on in Europe an attempt to set up river-based organizations as a sort of statutory element of integration was rejected even by Germany which was the sort of capital of the environmentalists at the time. And the Tennessee Valley Authority, if you now read the literature, turns out to have been a scam. The federal government in the USA was not able to promote economic development activities in individual states. And the president's lawyers advised him to use the river basin as a strategy to overcome state powers in the federal system to enable him to do what were essentially later described as socialist interventions as an economic measure. But the technical argument for river basin organizations was rejected in the states in the 30s and continues to be rejected in the states. They've closed down a whole lot of those organizations. So on the one hand, Africa has been encouraged to set up a set of institutions while the donor communities are actually turning away from them. Just to illustrate it, water scarcity is water scarce The most water scarce countries in Southern Africa are Lesotho, Malawi, and South Africa. You didn't know that. This is in terms of available water per capita. The countries which have got most water per capita part from DRC are countries like Namibia and Botswana. You didn't think that, did you? But that's because they have quite a lot of water around their boundaries, quite small populations. In terms of water per capita, they have no problem. So, you know, water scarcity is not really a major issue. If you look at how much water countries use Angola 0.2%, Botswana 1%, Lesotho 2%, the only country which really uses a critical amount of water in South Africa at 30%, you normally start getting worried when you get to 40%. Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Malawi are the others that use semi-intensibly their water resource. And so where does this notion of scarcity come from? Well, the CGIAR institutions have coined this term water scarcity which says you've got water but you haven't got the money with which to build infrastructure to make it available. Therefore, you're not short of water, you're short of money. That's quite a useful concept. So, you know, the empirics actually back up the story which I'm telling you, which is essentially our context is not water scarcity. Our context tends to be much more economic constraints on using the natural resource that we have. And the dependency story, you can't see this, it's in the paper. Basically, I then looked at and said, okay, which countries are water scarce and which countries are dependent on upstreams? And the interesting thing is that the countries which are dependent on their upstream neighbors, Botswana and Namibia, have quite a lot of water per person, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Mozambique, not actually short of water particularly. It's when you get to the Lesotho's, you know, where you've got very water scarce, you've got water scarce in terms of water per person that you now say it's okay, Lesotho isn't dependent on an upstream country. So, the water scarce countries are not dependent. The water rich countries tend to be dependent on upstream flows. So, the whole notion that upstream-downstream relations are difficult at a national scale doesn't apply either. And then we sort of look and see what's happened in terms of developing the resource since, let's say 1990, and we find very little effect of cooperation across the region, none related to river basin organizations. Lesotho Highlands Water Project is a bilateral process. There's a couple of bilaterals between South Africa and Swaziland. Everything that has actually happened has happened outside of this multilateral governance structure that we've spent hundreds of millions establishing, but no major developments have happened. And I use the indicator of the Zambezi. Approximately 10,000 megawatts available. That's how many two-and-a-half Madupis have been sitting there. Saretsi Kamin, his introduction to the way forward for Southern Africa in 1980, talked about the potential of regional cooperation to generate electricity to meet the region's needs. Back in 1980, and in 2015, we haven't effectively done anything post-colonialism. I'd suggest that Southern African integration has followed a similar trajectory. We had pathways for economic integration. The Honourable Rob Davies, as opposed to the hard-working Rob Davies, talked about that yesterday. We were given a roadmap of how regional integration should happen, and it hasn't happened. There were unrealistic macroeconomic targets, a complete disregard of the political economy of the region, opportunities for mutual benefit in particular were not well identified, and the outcomes have been very much like water. We've done a hell of a lot of work. We've built a nice new headquarters in Khabaron, but we haven't met the goals, and we haven't delivered the trade, the intra-regional trade, and, incidentally, we haven't delivered the hydropower, which should have come from regional integration. And I'd suggest that the approach was informed by a misunderstanding of European integration processes. Just three minutes, that's great, okay. So that was the timetable we were given, and as Rob Davies pointed out, we got to the FTA and we stopped right there. It's important to recognize that there's alternative regional strategies, and it's, I think, important for us to consider whether we should be talking political economy or economics, because when it comes down to it, we've got a choice between an institutional approach, we'll build the structures of regional integration, and everything will flow once we've got those structures, or you look at practical opportunities, you build practical cooperation from the bottom up, and you can only make the choice between those two strategies if you understand well your national actors and their interests. What's going to move political decision makers in the 15 countries of static? You know, and we know that the economics tells us all about reduced barriers to trade, and regional integration will promote trade, and trade will support regional integration. But look at Europe. Where did European integration start? It started with political objectives of integration for political reasons, and the functional cooperation was the entry point, and the institutions developed later. We seem to have missed that picture. And since static states, don't show a great deal of willingness to cede sovereignty. Approaches to regional industrialization, that's suggested, would much better focus on practical functional opportunities rather than one more round of institution building. Infrastructure is helpful, but what's going to happen once the roads are built and the railways are linked? We've got some examples of, let's call it micro regionalism, local functional regionalism along the corridors. We've got some measure of commodity and supply chain regionalism, although as we will see from the sugar example and the bioethnal stories, from the electricity stories, we've got more failures than we've got successes in the areas where there are opportunities. And part of the story is we haven't really talked about the actors beyond governments, who are the informal powers in governments as well. We haven't done enough work identifying opportunities bottom up and not top down. So just to conclude, it really has an appeal to talk about the political economy of regional integration and therefore of regional industrialization. The criticism is that SADIC followed an institutional approach. It built institutions with limited clarity about the benefits that were going to flow to individual actors and interests and the political dynamics behind that. Driven by very often external advice, inadequately analyzed and internalized in many cases. In water, what we've found is that we've done an awful lot of work on regional cooperation. But the one thing that we really needed, which was some reliable energy we didn't deliver after 35 years, the outcome overall is we've failed to promote regional economic trade and growth. And back to the suggestion, much more important to have a functional focus that looks for productive benefits that yield results for a number of actors and interests and consider how the regional industrialization strategy is going to be developed. Certainly much more scope for some critical thinking as we approach this. We've now got 35 years of history. We should learn a little bit from our history. And the last picture, it's always very important. This is the third bridge, as Thomas Salomar, who sits at the school of governance with me, always reminds me. This is only the third bridge across the Zambezi River. It's being built at Kaia and Mozambique. It's now complete. It's a very important link in the regional economy. You can now drive all the way to Tanzania quite easily. But there was another economy on the side. There was a very vibrant economy at Kaia of people waiting for the ferry, waiting for the river to go down, waiting for the ferry to be fixed again. And the contrast between the interests of those local actors, the little guys in the canoes and the small ferry going across, and the big actors, the Portuguese company which built the bridge and the funders who funded it, we always need to try and understand the balance of interests and how decisions get made if we're going to take the right decisions as we move forward. So thanks.