 So thank you very much for having me. It's a great pleasure to be here. My presentation will be about international corporate income tax reforms, and the views expressed in this presentation are my own personal views. I think before we start speaking about reforms, it's important to recall what triggered these reforms. There are three set of issues that pressured us, basically, to think hard about the taxation of the global firm. The first one is profit shifting. So multinational shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. In this area, we roughly know the involved magnitudes. So for example, Zakhman, Tosloff, and Vir find that, roughly speaking, about one third of multinational profit is shifted to low tax jurisdictions. This is among the highest available estimates. We also know that micro studies tend to find smaller numbers, in part because they focus on specific profit shifting mechanisms or because of some specific issues with the data. But by and large, and despite this variety of estimates, we know a little bit what's happening in terms of magnitude. What I would like to stress here is that beyond the direct revenue impact of profit shifting, it triggered public dissatisfaction. And that made the topic very, very salient. So this is one set of issues. The second set of issues, it's basically tax competition, and it's underlying deep problem. So if we think from a game theoretic approach, when countries compete to attract these multinationals, whether it's just the paper profit or the real capital and investment, we end up with a lower tax rate than what is optimal. So that's an uncoordinated equilibrium, which is typically inferior to an equilibrium with coordination. And the issue here is that when you read. So in one way to visualize tax competition is a chart with CET, which is the Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate. That's the famous downward trend. And basically, when you lower the tax rate, what happens is you lower the tax rate also on the immobile base, which is relatively inelastic. And you can make some efficiency argument that you like to tax it. But also importantly, when you lower the tax rate, you are lowering the average tax rate on the economic rent. And we know that a significant share of multinational profit is generated through economic rent. Economic rent is the portion of return above the opportunity cost of the investment. And again, you can make efficiency argument to tax it. But of course here, the difficulty is that the corporate income tax falls on both, on the normal return, on the opportunity cost of the investment, and on the economic rent. The third set of issues is digitalizations of the economy. And basically the question here is, which country should tax what? So it's an exercise of the allocation of taxing rights in a world where companies can do business without physical presence within the board of the country. So giving this pressure, the result was we have the base original profit shifting initiative, among other initiatives. We have 15 actions. The first one was meant to deal with the digitalization challenge that I mentioned. But it kept it open at the end for future work. And but basically the rest of the action is about anti-tax avoidance. It makes it more stronger, and then having transparency requirements, country by country, and so on, reporting by multinationalists, and so on. But we ended up, we have now the inclusive framework. As of today, we have 143 countries. And indeed, the inclusive framework in October 2021 reached an agreement. It's a two pillar agreement described by many as historic because it's the first of its kind for one century. Just quickly, just as a freshman, the first pillar is actually, again, meant to address the digitalization challenge that I mentioned. And it's meant to take the largest multinational, take a portion of their profit above 10% of their revenue, and then take another quarter of that, and reallocate it to destination countries, to the countries where the consumers are. What's important to note about pillar one that it needs a critical mass to work. And basically, if you are committed to it, you don't have a margin of response. You're just committed to it. Pillar two, in particular, the global rules, is a minimum tax of 15%. But it allows for a portion of income to be carved out, so there is a substance-based income exclusion. What is interesting about pillar two is so-called common approach, meaning that if you commit to the agreement, you commit to accept the minimum tax applied by other countries. But it doesn't say necessarily that you should implement a minimum tax, so that's a margin of response for the countries. There are other rules under pillar two. I would not speak about them in this presentation, but they are important for developing countries. For example, the subject to tax rule, which is a treaty-based rule to impose a cross-border withholding tax on specific payments, and simplification rules, which are still under discussions, which are particularly important for developing countries. But let's speak about the impact of pillar one and pillar two, and I think it's important to fix ideas here. So usually we speak about the static impact, and that's basically, we wake up in the morning and the reform is implemented, so nobody had any time to react, right? So that will give you the direct revenue impact. But remember, the underlying idea of this reform is to trigger behavior response. So you want countries to react, either to implement the rules or part of the rules or even broader reforms. You want also company to react. So you want that profit-shifting behavior changes, and maybe also investment would change. So all that need to be taken into account. And there will be also, of course, administrative and compliance course, giving the administrative complexity of the rules. I'll not speak about that, but of course if you wanna have a full assessment, you would need also to speak about compliance and administrative course. So let's speak about the revenue impact. This is a static impact. So for pillar one, I think we can reasonably pin down the in-scope companies, and these are about 100 multinational group. There is a discussion whether they are 90 or 110, but you know what? In the grand scheme of things, they are about 100 group, okay? And we can also reasonably capture the amount of profit that will be reallocated. So you go to commercial databases, you look at the consolidated account, you do the computation, and it's roughly one to two percents of the global multinational aggregate profit on this planet. That's the way I like to present it. Many impact assessment will present a dollar amount, we can do that. So we find it's 150 billion to be reallocated, and there is a discussion whether it's 180, 190, but again, you know what? It's 1. something percent to be reallocated. Now then you will have the first step is to say where is it? And here you would look at country by country reporting, you would need to do some assumption. There's some uncertainty, but more or less most impact assessment would agree that it's currently in low tax jurisdiction. And the cost will be around 2% of corporate income tax by reallocating this tax base from them to other countries. But that's step three, what is the other countries? And here you would entail more uncertainty because ideally you would like to have the firm level wait so you would like for each in-scope company to see the share of each country in its sales. We don't see that, so we do some approximation using some country by country weights and others. And what we will find, it's up to 1% increase in corporate income tax in the other countries. So the bottom line about pillar one I would say is that it's limited in-scope in terms of companies, in terms of the definition of profits, and hence in terms of corporate income tax revenue implications. However, what is novel about pillar one is that it introduces the destination-based principle. And that's something economists tend to like because it's robust toward profit-shifting and tax competition. On pillar two, again, we can kind of roughly identify the global amount of profit that is currently taxed below 15%. And this is around 15% to 17% of the global multinational profits. In terms of dollar amount, it's roughly 1.5 trillion. We find that it's currently taxed at around 5% on average. So if you want to collect a top-up tax that is 10% of 1.5 trillion, it's around $150 billion increase in revenue. So that's the bar you see here, the dark blue bar at 5.7. So that's about 5.7% of global corporate income tax. If you ignore, of course, the substance-based exclusion, you will go up to 7.6%. Now it's natural at this stage to tell me, OK, but which country will collect the revenue? And here I would like to raise an important, what I would say, caution. We can reasonably compute the amount at the global level. But to compute it at the country level, because the top-up tax is the same, whether it's collected by the headquarter country or by the source country, it doesn't really matter. But in order to present country-specific estimates, and I know some impact assessments do that, and this can be useful, but you need to do more assumptions. And I really think we need to be very clear about these assumptions we make when we start saying which country will get what. Because as I said, countries will react, firms will react, and it is not 100% clear which country will collect how much. To show you the last bar, just to explain a little bit the dynamic effect. So if we think about putting a floor on tax competition, because we have the 15%, so all low-tax jurisdictions will go to the 15%, including the zero-tax jurisdictions. From game theoretic approach, you would think then the high-tax country, they can react to that. So we have a tax rate reaction function. And usually what we think is that the tax rates are complemented. So if a country cuts its rate, I am more likely to cut my rate. But if a country erases its rate, I am more likely to raise my rate. And if we do this exercise, we estimate the slope of this function, and we see how much high-tax country will go up. We find that the revenue implication will be about 8%. So that corresponds to about increase in the average corporate income tax rate globally of 2 percentage points. So basically, all what you need to do is to have the downward trend that I showed you to stop. And it will slightly go up. I think, though, the main point of this exercise is just to say that the dynamic effect as such might be larger than the static effect. Although, of course, it's also surrounded by a lot of uncertainty. So we talked about the floor-on-tax competition. What about profit-shifting? So this is based on a paper, a policy paper published last March. Again, you can do some back-of-envelope calculation. And you can say the distance between countries in terms of tax rate is going down, right? Because the low-tax restrictions go to 15%. And then if I know that the difference between my tax rate and the average, word average, is got smaller, there is less incentives to shift profit. So we can assume an elasticity of reported profit with respect to this tax differential. If you are above average, you will lose less profit. If you are below average, of course, you will get less profit-shifted into your country. And doing this exercise and assuming some elasticities, we get that the increase in the global corporate income tax will be around 1% globally because of profit-shifting. Of course, it's, again, surrounded by some uncertainty, but just to get the feel of the involved numbers. The investment impact, I think I'll leave it to Mick to speak a little bit more on that. He has a nice paper on this coming out soon. But what I would like to say is investment will be impacted because the rate will go up. We have low-tax restrictions going up. Maybe high-tax countries will go up. And also, profit-shifting is less. So all that means that the effective tax rate on investment will go up. But it may not go up so much as in a textbook story because usually you say, you raise your tax, capital will go out. But here, remember, many other countries are also raising their tax rates. So you are leveling a little bit the play field. So you need to factor in this impact. I suggest really this report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was published in 2022. It's a great report that lays out all these investment channels. And one of their conclusion is that FDI may decline by about 2% because of the raise in the effective tax rate. I will skip, in the interest of time, the other issues. But I would like really to conclude on two points, which are important. One, what is the strategic reaction for countries? And I think there is one point I didn't mention. It is a so-called qualified domestic top-up tax. And this fancy name basically says, if you apply this at your own rule, you as a source country will become top on the line, kind of the first to collect the revenue. If you don't apply it, it's the headquarter country that will collect the revenue. So in that sense, it's a dominant strategy for your reaction to just apply it as a defense line. But abstracting from these exact pillar two rules, I would say that it's an opportunity for broader reforms. And the word tax incentives has been mentioned multiple times throughout this conference. So now we know that the design of existing tax incentives in terms of effectiveness and efficiency is unfortunately not encouraging in many countries. And now yet we have one more reason to rethink the design of these taxes. Because if I offer a tax holiday for an in-scope company, I am generating revenue in the headquarter country now. So I am basically exporting revenue. Of course, there are some exceptions. Some companies are not in scope. There is the substance-based exclusion. But by and large now, it's time to rethink the design. And I would think of it as a stronger argument against profit-based tax incentives. So if we are really serious in designing tax incentives to encourage investment, then you can move toward more cost-based. So think of cash flow taxations or refundable tax credit if you can afford that. And I think the major issue here is if we have something like a cash flow tax or some kind of, if you think in the language of incentives, incentives targeting the normal return, targeting the expenditure side, that makes us think of the entire design of the income tax because we would like to target economic rent, which is really something if we can target without taxing normal return, we can even increase our rate, our tax rate, and possibly efficiently kind of raise revenue. So that's the famous kind of topic of tax incentives. I'll be happy to follow up in the discussion. The second point I would like to conclude on is basically, oh, so I was a bit quick, but I'll be happy to follow up also with discussions, is the financing needs. OK, so it is welcome step. It's an important step in the right direction to coordinate on the taxation of multinational. And maybe we can raise 0.3, 0.4% of GDP. So that's a welcome contribution. That's important for all sorts of reasons. But if we look at the financing needs of developing countries, it's certainly not enough. It's just one component of many other things we need to do. If you look, for instance, at the middle blue bar here, this is 8% of GDP that we need if you follow some tax capacity and tax efforts estimations. There was a session in this conference on this. If you look at the SDGs, it's even larger, the number that we need. If you look at the last bar, which is just if you try to bring the average tax GDP ratio of low income countries to the emerging market level, it's 5% of GDP that we need to raise. So in short, no matter what we do on the international corporate tax front, other tax reforms remain important. We need to improve the VAT. We need to improve the entire tax collection in order to respond basically to the financing needs in the future. So it's important, but certainly there are other things and there are other reforms that we need to worry about. So yeah, so I actually spoke a little bit quick. I'm really sorry about that, but I would be happy to follow up in the discussions after the presentation. Thank you.