 the timing of the work on the EU global strategy and this consultation is absolutely vital. And in looking at this nexus of issues today, it seemed to me that it would be very important to highlight two sets of approaches, looking at the root causes of problems and looking at the interconnections between issues and problems, but also bearing in mind that we're operating in an uncertain, unpredictable environment. And probably, at all times in history, we're operating in an uncertain, unpredictable environment. But nobody predicted the Arab Spring. Nobody predicted the conflict in Syria. We thought as donors that the development of the first newest independent state in Africa, South Sudan, had finally reached the point where it was working one week before it fell apart. So unpredictability is also an element that has to be taken account of in your strategic planning. More parochial-y, it occurred to me walking down a Connell Street in the sunshine today that if somebody were walking down that very same street 100 years ago today, they would never have predicted that in eight weeks time that street's physical architecture would be completely ruined, destroyed, and in ashes on the ground. Or that the political and governance and societal architecture of the country would have been, quote unquote, changed utterly. So we live in unpredictable times as ever. Now, I think the point has also been made very clearly that this new global strategy isn't simply a matter of just replacing the European security strategy of 2003. We face crises to an unprecedented level across all aspects of the EU's external policy with severe strains internally. And the migration crisis that dominates the news is but a symptom of the building series of humanitarian crises over recent years, not just in the Middle East and to the East, but also across Africa. And I think we can say it's that developments and trends and relations with Africa will be vital for the European Union in the years ahead. And it seems to me that even for the purposes of just this exercise, we need to define Africa as our neighborhood, at least in order to understand the impact of developments and how we can respond in line with our interests and our values. And the danger at which the development of the global strategy can contribute towards a virtue is that we as a union will become defensive, short-termist, reactive, and frankly afraid. And that a strategy could over-focus on the security of our existing borders or even retreating borders in certain respects. So this must speak to a new relationship with Africa, a realistic relationship with Africa and, of course, with the EU. So within months of the adoption of the new framework for sustainable development in New York last September with 17th Sustainable Development goes to 2030, we've entered, those of us working primarily on development, a period of intense debate which you would think would have been solved by that process on the nature of development, its relationship to politics and conflict, and the still-existing divide between humanitarian work and spending in the face of evidence which is all too clear now that the two overlap and are interdependent. In development, but also across the range of instruments and approaches we've defined for ourselves in the EU, we are hampered, I think, by our own definitions and divisions between politics, security, conflict, humanitarian development, economic, and trade work which do not actually reflect the reality on the ground for communities that are vulnerable, for migrants, for instance, or the challenges facing governments in Europe and in Africa. So the global strategy is an opportunity to take an integrated approach rather than a unidimensional approach. And unidimensional is the way that very often we have found ourselves over the years defining our relationship and understanding of Africa, a continent which is every bit as complex and differentiated as our own. Europe has thousands of years of experience of Africa and I think it's often a major surprise to tourists who travel to Africa and, for instance, travel down the Nile to realize that the Greek civilization and architecture and temples that we are so proud of are actually derivative of the temples they see in Africa on the Nile. So we know a lot about Africa or should know more than we sometimes take into account. We know about the much more modern colonial era. But in recent times, we've rather simplistically looked at Africa in only one dimension. Maybe in the 60s, we saw it as a beacon of independence movements and new governments. In the 70s, we started seeing it as increasingly dictatorial and corrupt. In the 80s and 90s, we began to see it as a continent of misery, poverty, hunger, and hopelessness. We responded under the MDGs with massive aid for basic services, often defined by our inputs rather than the results and outcomes. And then more recently, in recent years, we reached a point where we started to define Africa by its high growth rates. With the suggestion by some, the trade and economic growth would lift all boats. And with the emergence of a new middle class would pull development and obviate the need for any more aid. So we've been a bit simplistic at times in the way we look at Africa. And sometimes in contradictory ways, in very short time scams. Some believe that the era for ODA was over last year. And that became clear within the EU, even as we were discussing the approach for the SDGs. Now, to many, if you're being simplistic and not looking at what has been achieved in Africa, Africa is sometimes seen as a threat to our borders in the medium and long term. A continent suffering the effects of climate change, humanitarian crisis, conflict, and inequality, but the reality is far more complicated. Yes, there are the effects of climate change, of conflict, but there's been huge progress. And the human development indicators show that in terms of education, extreme poverty, even hunger, and including the fight against AIDS. In recent years, as has been said, average GDP growth rates in Africa were exceeding five, six, seven, eight percent. Partly driven, but not solely by commodity crisis. Now this year, they should be around an average of three and a half percent. EU trade with Africa has up 50% in the past 10 years. We, in Ireland, have seen the need for an integrated Africa strategy, as Adrian said. And the IMF have pointed out that to meet the needs of the population entering the workforce, Africa needs to create 18 million jobs annually, as Adrian stated, as opposed to the two million achieved over the past decade. So with high population growth rate, we can see both the achievements, but also the huge challenges by 2050, 25% of the world's population will be in Africa. It will be more urbanized, it will be younger. And it will be, if we want you to look at it that way, a source of potential future migration into Europe. And that is before we take it out of the effects of conflict. Conflicts have expanded in Africa in recent years for a number of reasons. For reasons that include climate change, governance, human rights, and even the basis on which states have been established. And the EU could be accused, perhaps, of not adopting an effective, integrated approach. Political, economic, development, and humanitarian policies are all too often separate and segmented and decided in different forms and rooms. The sustainable development goal is sure to provide the framework, if not full range of implementing instruments to look at our relationship with Africa. Agenda 2030 not only vows to leave no one or group behind, it provides a comprehensive integrated framework for sustainable development. It says there would be no development without peace and security and vice versa. Goal five is on gender equality and women's empowerment towards esteemed, peaceful, and inclusive state societies, access to justice for all. So as a free guideline, we recognize that the threats in Africa from conflict and extremism to poverty and inequality can be defined through a sustainable development approach, which addresses the cause and effects of conflict and bridges the humanitarian development divide. And when it comes to development, under the MDGs, ODA rose at its height two years ago, and probably last year, to about $135 billion. Under the SDGs, in order to reach those targets we have agreed for 2030, the least developed countries will require development finance of some 3.5 to 4.5 trillion per year. So that's not obviously, and nobody suggests it should, come from aid. Domestic resource mobilization is essential. The private sector will be essential. But domestic resource mobilization of that order is impossible without taxation. And taxation to that extent requires citizens consent and therefore good governance. And that shows that there's no such thing as a segmented development alone approach that the development does depend on good governance, peace and security. They are all linked. And the era of ODA, I think everybody now sees, is number over. There are countries that still depend on ODA, especially the least developed countries, and fragile states. The EU is by far the largest donor to Africa. The EDF alone, over the next six years, will require $38.5 billion. And Ireland, for instance, are about 80% to 85% of our goals to South Saharan Africa. So although migration is now recognized as a problem, it itself is not necessarily the lens through which we should view our relations with Africa, even if it sometimes is in these days the biggest issue in the media. But it's a reality which needs a comprehensive approach by the EU if we are not to increasingly react in the short term, year after year. So as I said, I don't think we need to redefine our development, security, or political approach through a migration lens. But we do need to understand why people become refugees or migrants. And probably in Ireland we're quite well placed psychologically to do this. And it doesn't necessarily help to make strong distinctions between refugees and migrants in trying to understand this. For whatever the immediate impulse, it's clear that all leave in search of a secure livelihood. They leave their homes because they feel they have no other option. The root causes are poverty and other development, lack of economic opportunity, politics and insecurity, climate change and degradation of farmland, and increasing urban slums, and poverty. They come to Europe only when there was the right mix of, to put it when there is an essential mix of hopelessness confirmed by time of the protracted nature of conflicts and perceived opportunity. So it is increasingly being realized that conflict is driving most of the humanitarian crisis, which are driving what we now call irregular migration term. I keep reading now and putting familiar with it before. We have to look at root causes. And this is recognized in theory at least for the pressure of events often dictates short-term emergency responses drawn from the same financial resources available for long-term work in Africa. And the complexity is such that if we focus exclusively on the misery of those presenting themselves in boats or on our borders, we are actually focusing on those who have the initiative and the funds to get here, because they can pay the smugglers. And we are leaving the truly hopeless behind in extreme poverty. So it is absolutely critical, and this is a debate that is happening very actively now of the development sphere to redefine our humanitarian and development approaches. And we have to do so by redirecting funding to bolster long-term gains because of humanitarian crises in Africa. I will go into it later, tell you the extent of those crises is actually increasing because of El Nino as well as conflict. And that's at the same time as recognizing the progress that has been made. So we have a big, big challenge in the area of development in looking at whether we're not the additional funding we know that. So we need to look more strategically at it. And I think the challenge then, and we need to look at the commitments we've given to providing between 0.15 to 0.2% of our GDP in aid to the least developed countries, even while we provide humanitarian aid for crises, such as in Syria. So finally, I would say that no global strategy with Africa will work if it fails to include or deal separately with the different dimensions of that relationship. Agenda 2030 will be tested for the first time at the World Humanitarian Summit in May. And at the migration summit, which the UN Secretary-General has called for the 19th of September. And the issues that we will address are those are exactly the issues which need to be addressed in our EU global strategy. Whether they be exclusively for Africa or not. And so I would just say we need to ensure the commitments of our political, climate, economic, development, humanitarian, and security interventions and approaches. We need to look at the role of the vulnerable and least powerful. And we need to look at the work we can do in areas such as agriculture. These are as valid and important as the security response. And a lot of them respond to our values and our reflections of our values. But if you look at it, they are also our interests. Because at its crudest, if migration is and regular migration is what people are afraid of, well, the pressures in Africa are going to ensure that if we don't work coherently and specifically with Africa, that's what you'll get is more irregular migration. And it can only be dealt with through the partnership approach. And I would say, within the European Union, a more coherent approach across our instruments. And I would also say, just to add to the other statement, we're at the other side of the phenomenon that Aidan mentioned about Africa talking to us about colonialism. We need sometimes to examine how we look to Africa. And so as an EU, perhaps we need to make even more progress than we have made already in ensuring that our approaches to different issues and regions in Africa are not predominantly seen through the prism of the former colonial power in that region. So we have worked to do it in partnership to understand it. I cannot emphasize how much I agree with the remarks that were just in your final points and how happy I am to be in Ireland. Our country is dear to my heart for personal family reasons as well. But also that I have been discovering myself. The ambassador mentioned Roger Casement and Latin American writer, Maya Vargas-Yosa has written a novel that is very successful and that I have read and that has very clearly established this connection between Europe, Africa, and the world that can be seen in very fresh eyes. And it has been said, and I think we don't emphasize it enough, Europe is very diverse. And even myself, when I work on Africa, just the fact that I am not French, that it helps. And I think as Irish, you have a lot of advantages because of your sensitivity towards famine, towards underdevelopment, towards the issues that have been mentioned. And also I would underline this aspect of religion because in European policymaking in general, and I'm not saying Western policymaking, mostly in the United States, we have a blind spot for religion. Because of our secular bias in government, because of our own history of states, we do not include proper analysis of religion when we do our policies. Now, you all know why this is the case in our policymaking structures, in our governments, in the way we even study and analyze the world and conflict. But this has led to a blind spot. And if we want to understand extremism, as you mentioned, radicalization, but also the positive and just inherent role that religion plays in countries of Africa, we will be just getting better analysis and better policies. And I think the Irish approach can help us with that as well. So get to see Africa through Irish eyes and get Africans to also see Europe through the Irish mediator, I would say, and not just the colonial power. It's really the interest of us all. Migration and security, just a few points maybe and then open up for discussion and invite those of you who want to know more details on some of the aspects. On migration, I would say, let's consider already for starters that as many people come from the south to the north every year, as from the south to the south. So mobility in the world happens as much from south to north as it happens within the south. And this includes also African mobility. Now I think our global strategy and in general, our strategy, our future world should be targeting in a world that has that third leader of as many people moving also from the north to the south. So the mobility opening up our minds and not just thinking about the world between the south going to the north or the world that also exists of the south having mobility within the south itself. But then we can also think that a more prosperous Africa, a more developed Africa is also in the interest for Europeans and for our generations that are global and that will be only more global, I think, in the decades to come. In the long term, I think this is clearly in everybody's interest, but in the short term, there is obviously an African interest to make migration safe, to make migration legal, but let's not kid ourselves as Europeans. There is not an African interest to curb migration. Migration is useful and positive for Africa as it is for us as well. But the remittances in the hard currency, the role that the migration has for the societies leads us to have a dialogue where we should really emphasize that the perceptions also in the short term have to be a fair debate about the midterm and the long term interest. Now, this is going to be hard, but I think both in the European Union and in the African Union we should be used to have hard debates as well. I would say that in the case of the EU, as in the European Union case, the capacity on an issue such as migration is limited. We're seeing the shortcomings of the EU, even if we have agreements of principle to implement them. I would expect that the African Union cannot do much better than the EU, in the sense that member states are still very much in control as our own European member states. So in our partnership with the African Union, we also have to be smart about the dialogues and be open about engaging with those who need to be engaged with. I would think that this is a case also for the European Union, seen from the African perspective. Of course, there can be the bilateral agreements, there can be also the long term perspectives of investments. And I would understand that in the especially south to south movements, intra-African movements, there's also in the European interest to work on this, to let Côte d'Ivoire become a new powerhouse, the powerhouse that used to be West Africa. It was a pinnacle that recently opened the newest largest shopping mall of Africa. And I haven't been there myself yet, but I've heard that there you can buy Ivorian chocolate. Now you would think that's, oh, how can that be news? Actually it is news because as you know as well, coffee and cocoa is exported so that the chocolates are made outside of Africa, but now you can buy Ivorian made chocolate in the shopping mall, in Abidjan. So we also, with these examples, need to change our image of Africa. And that this is in our interest that the industrialization that grows towards services in these economies is what the world really needs, African, Europeans and all. I still think, and I am not an economist, but I still think that the idea of the traps that were analyzed by Professor Foucault a long ago in the bottom billion and the resource course economics set. And it was mentioned Carlos Lopez as well, analysis of watch out the economy, the macroeconomy of Africa is in a very fragile position. Also need to be kept in mind. Moving on to security, I'll make three points. Terrorism, which is of course very much in our interest. I would say that a few years ago, maybe 10 years ago, African leaders taught terrorism was a Western problem. 2001, so now it's obviously no longer the case. This is a problem in Africa where African leaders have also realized there is a challenge. But I still think this is a bit of a wild card. We don't know how terrorism is gonna play out differently. In Somalia, from Mali, from how it can expand into Tanzania, other East Africa places, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, which have been spared for the time being that we know can be very easily targeted. So it is still an area where fragility is only on the rise and the complicated picture that you were depicting, I think, is only going to get more complex. This is because the radicalization and transformation of Islam is also something that these societies maybe don't seize and are themselves living as they go. We are observers here. We need to learn from what is being told to us and from what the analysts locally tell us. I think the best expertise I get on radicalization in West Africa is from policing in Senegal, in Sa'lui. Also Algerians, also in Mali, we have to see how they see their societies and they can teach us about the potential evolution. Same goes for West Africa, differently from East Africa. The problem of Kenya is not the same as Ethiopia. Kenyan friends get a lot of pressure because they say, oh, how come Ethiopia hasn't got attacked while we are constantly attacked and the Shabab really fester in the coast of Kenya? And of course, there are reasons that explain these in the nature of the religion, of the social and ethnic composition of Kenya as a state, but also in the governance and the structure that made it as an authoritarian state in the case of Ethiopia a stronger, even more resilient state of terrorism, which brings a complication. It means that when you have strong, resilient states, they might be authoritarian states. I come from Spain, a country where we know authoritarianism. We also know extremist religions. So to a certain extent, it is complex but not unheard of and not something that should be impossible to think of. This is tied in the European Union, African Union case to the capacity building agenda. I think this kind of being disconnected from politics and from the fact that the security forces in the African countries are also very often regime forces. And that maybe in the case, of course the case of South Africa is a wonderful exception that we can see as almost an ideal to have this cooperation for capacity building in the rest of Africa. Better than having Spaniards or Irish that have gone and see as these commissions will be to have South Africans or other Africans. But the fact that not all security forces and with these we go not only to militaries but also the security forces of police and so on are not democratic or from democratic states, poses problems. That poses problems for our cooperation with the African Union. Why? Because of issues related to international law. International law with humanitarian law as well. So loss in the war. Think for example of the Chaldean army fighting Boko Haramian terrorism. The Chaldean army is a very effective army in the fight against terrorism. It has been very effective in the Dachat region. And it's one of the main partners for the French and the others who are active fighting terrorism in the Sahel. But thank you. But the Chaldean army makes no prisoners. Nobody survives. So this is completely rolling over. So don't go as far as human rights, humanitarian law, where are the prisoners? Where are we gonna judge? No. So that poses a problem. It poses a problem also right now the possibility of financing UN operations or African Union or UN. Because the UN traditionally does peacekeeping and what we are asking African Union to do is to enforce peace. To enforce and to do peace building, not just peacekeeping. So we have that issue also of the tradition of the UN information and security, international security to sort out. I would say that as it was also underlining the first panel that the main conflicts in Africa are still the kind of inequality agreements within conflicts. So it is not with the fight against terrorism that we will get rid of violence and conflict in Africa. And I would say as a final point of the example of Libya, which is a meeting between those two, the internal conflict, the terrorism or risk of terrorism, but also the geopolitics. When the Libyan crisis, if you want to write from the Gaddafi poll took place, Africans came to see us and said, we told you the African Union, the African states were against this intervention, some European countries' intervention in Libya. We didn't listen, we have a mess. Maybe we should listen because the fragility of Chad, of Sudan, of Niger, of Central African Republic, these countries, they know their neighbors, they know each other without. So I am coming here with the same criticism that I just mentioned about Chad, a legitimate engagement on assay in peace and intervention for security in their regions.