 We're back on the record on age 610, draft 7.1, and Eric will do a quick walk. Thank you, welcome. Sure. Good afternoon, everybody. Eric has Patrick with the Office of Legislative Council. So over here this afternoon to talk about the new proposed strike all amendment to age 610, activating two firearms and domestic violence. See we're on version 7.1 now, and you probably have already noticed this if you had a chance to look at it, but we've continued with our process of using colors to highlight which changes are from had been made to the previous draft, and this one we have, I think we moved on to green. Yes, so the first ones were highlighted in yellow, then you have sort of a light blue turquoise. You're going to need a key. Second time around, I think we may. That's what you probably should have. There's no way to win this one. You either lose the changes over time, or you get things in Senate colors, which makes it really, lose the bad taste of it all. So I'll focus on the changes, but feel free to of course to jump in and stop me, if something comes up to me as to what has been earlier. I'm going to pass right over to section one. That's the default proceed section. The last time we talked about the fact that it's now a 30 day window as far as when the sale would be permitted to proceed without a response from NICS. That has unchanged from the previous draft. You see no green there. You will start to see some green in the release from the view boarder section. And in fact, as you may have already noticed, there's two. I believe there's a numbering issue with the sections. We'll fix that in the editorial process, but that actually should be section two, I believe, not section three. But the section itself is brand new in the sense that it was not in previous draft. This is a product of I think what has been termed the group that was meeting outside the committee room to try and come up with some proposed language and the various members of different organizations trying to reach agreement on what some language would look like. That's what this is in part of. And you'll see that it's proposing a new, there's an existing criminal offense known as impeding public officers, generally impeding a police officer with the statute covers. And you can tell what's underlined and what isn't because of the green. But subsection A there is not underlined. That means it's the existing law. So the existing law is subsection A, which basically provides a three-year felony. You see that on line five. It's a three-year felony for anyone hindering an executive judicial law enforcement civil or military officer acting under authority of the state. So this adds a new specific offense related to. And this is all connected to if you think about what's been going on in the relief from abuse order section. I'll let the witnesses explain more precisely this connection. But you'll see that based on the language that you probably recall that one of the aspects of the RFA section is that it requires relinquishment of firearms under certain situations when the relief from abuse order is served. And this relinquishment has to be done usually pursuant to the language you'll see, to instructions from a law enforcement officer. So that's sort of the operative language just to keep in the back of your mind. So this new offense is added or proposed to be added, I should say, that specifically deals with the service of relief from abuse orders under the site on line nine, 15 BSA 1103 and 1104. So the offense is if a person who's present at a location during a lawful search for or seizure of a or removal of a firearm pursuant to an RFA order is what that means. A person who's present when one of these orders is being executed, who refuses to obey instructions from a law enforcement officer to ensure the safe removal of firearms or to protect the safety of the officer or other persons shall be and then you have a two-year misdemeanor. So essentially it's prohibited conduct for someone who is present at the location while the order is being served and doesn't obey law enforcement officer instructions. That's the new misdemeanor that's proposed. Thank you. Where did the information for this new misdemeanor come from? In other words, how do we come up with what the sentence would be the definition of it? All proposed by the group that I mentioned. Is this just necessary because this is something related to a civil order? Or what is the reasoning for this? Are there other, you know, if I were to impede or not follow instructions with an officer executing a different type of search for, would there be a similar crime? My reading of, well, the first question is what's the reason and purpose behind this? I'm going to defer to the advocates for that part of the question. Well, I didn't mean for what they put it in there for, but sort of like why this type of misdemeanor, why this penalty? And that may still be a refer to the advocates, but I didn't know if there's like, you know, some existing law that we're basing this off of. Not that I did in this case. It was purely a basis for their proposal. As far as the second question. Well, maybe, well, it is within existing. Is that a new subsection to the system law? Right. Right, but there is a new crime we can create. Yeah. Yeah, I understood that. I thought he was just asking why was this particular penalty chosen? Yeah, sort of the other. I'm just trying to figure out the basis of the crime. But on the second part of the question. I would read the existing sub A if you would hinder a law enforcement officer acting under the authority of the state. Executing a warrant would seem to me you're acting under the authority of the state. So I think that at least in some cases, the execution of warrant could be punished under a three year family. Okay. So it may be a slightly lesser charge under this particular if you're acting under 1103 or 1104. Right. Why would the part two be necessary back? I think it's covered under A. I think it's a matter of sometimes it may be covered. You know, this has person present location because it might not always be a warrant. See, if I'm understanding relinquishment correctly. Sometimes the officer will come back and got a warrant. If I remember the way the 1103 and 1104 are proposed to be set up. There wouldn't necessarily be a warrant under certain circumstances. I think if I remember the one we can look at the language. If, for example, if the, that's the final order. If there's evidence that the defendant is in possession of other controlled firearms, it's not necessarily a warrant in other words. They're required to relinquish. I understand that. But going back to the other part, if I'm a person present and you don't have a warrant and I say no, you can't come into the house. Right. Am I just committed a crime? While the officer is executing an order, an RFA order, 1103 or 1104. Potentially. Yeah. Potentially. Assuming that, yeah, you gave it the other word you said. You can't come into the house. Right. Yeah. Potentially. Let's say book at a line 10. If the officer instructs the person say to, in fact, I think you could look at the definition. Ensure the safe removal of firearms and protect the safety of the officer includes instructions requiring a person to temporarily vacate a location. So I think that the officer says to the person. So we're waiting for a warrant in this particular situation. We're basically saying that if you don't have a warrant and I say you don't have a warrant so therefore you're not coming into my house. We're now creating a crime. Assuming the officer has the order. Has that order. Yeah. Okay. But in that particular instance, a warrant under this legislation would not be necessary. Correct. Thank you. So if if a person is just in that house and they don't know where the guns are and this person's asked if he knows where the guns are and they find out more. Can that person can find more guns? Is that person considered a hinder and could be arrested because they don't know if he's lying or not. So had they stared at say again say sort of the sequence of facts there. So someone in the house. There's a person in the house. Right. Say a relative. Right. I'll narrow it down a little bit more. Right. He he goes to says I know where this gun is. I know where that gun is. Right. And then there's other guns that he didn't know about. But they find him. They find in the more guns. Couldn't he be considered hindering to this? Did the person know it? Did the person never know? I mean assuming under your let's assume for the for the moment that the person didn't know about the other ones. As opposed to intentionally not telling. Right. I think the distinction of hindering is turns on intent. So I would read I'll do a little more research for you on this. But a court court would tell the part. Well, did he know or didn't he know? Right. Well, I think you're right that the court they would look at if there's any facts that the person actually did know. Yeah, potentially different situation. But I would read hindering as an intentional attempt to impede an investigation and that would require some knowledge. So the person knew didn't say I'd say that could be hindering person never knew just didn't know about it. I'm not so sure. Well, just clarification. At what point can officer enter a house? That's a very broad question. And there's all kinds of answers to that. Certainly there may be an officer can enter a house for the warrant. No, no, I mean in this with this bill. Oh, I see. Yeah. I'm sorry. Right. So I show up with our aerophage and I enter the house. Oh, I see. You have a lawfully executed order that says if the order says that the person's got to leave the premises, for example, which could be part of the order, then I would think the office could enter the house enter the house to effectuate the order. So search and see. Not necessarily search the house but direct the person to leave. Yeah. Okay. Then at what point can they search the search the house for firearms? You mean under the proposal that you're looking at? Yes. Right. I think the way it's framed up is that the possession of firearms by a person who's subject to either an emergency or final order is being made illegal under the bill. Right. Under the proposal is I think section four. Yeah, here it is. Actually, no longer section four. But the bill proposes this new crime. Right. A person who's subject to a temporary or final relief from a abuse order can no longer possess a firearm. Right. So the officer has probable cause to believe that the person actually does have a firearm. That's probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed. So in that situation, ordinarily, the officer would be required to go get a warrant. But if there's some exigent circumstances, maybe the officer suspects that the firearms are going to be hidden or taken away or something like that, it's possible that they could take it under attack. Well, the potential is definitely there. And I see it as a high of a potential that somebody's house could be searched and have the fire, the personal property confiscated with our warrant. If there, what could happen? It's possible. But again, I think you would have to fit into one of the exceptions that the warrant requires that we talked about before. Which is quite long. The warrant would put your... Yeah, that's not changed by this. Right. Right. So ordinarily, you have to get probable cause and a warrant. If they have probable cause to think that the person's got firearms and they're therefore violating the law, then in order not to have to get a warrant, we have to fit into one of those exceptions we've talked about. Exigent circumstances. Plain view. Consent. A person could consent. Hot pursuit. Just a species of exigent circumstances. You have to fit into one of those existing exceptions to the warrant requirement in order for the officer not to have to go to the warrant. Do we have any other laws where, I mean, this starts out as a civil thing where somebody ends up being charged with a two-year felony? Shall be? I think it's a shall. Yeah. I mean, yes, it's a shall. Yeah. I'm not sure if it's on my head. I can look into that one. I'm not sure about the connection between the civil violation and a criminal penalty. I do think that violation of a, a violation of a VAPO, a violation of a abuse prevention order, which I think is a civil order, but I'm not sure. That is a crime currently. So, I don't know. If this stays there, that shall mean prison is pretty stiff for that situation. I just want to make sure I understand this. So, in the situation where, looking at the language on page four, line eight and nine, not specifically line nine, in the situation where there's removal of firearms pursuant to 15 BSA section 1103, it's my understanding that essentially that is the individual consenting or one of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement. They go and they serve the, the order, presumably they ask about relinquishment at that point. If they consent, then they proceed and the person then has to obey the instructions from a law enforcement officer, which is defined on the next page on page five, lines 13 to 19, which actually defines what that term instructions from a law enforcement officer means. So, that would be that situation. The other is fairly straightforward seizure. That means there has been a warrant and probable cause. So, in that instance, they have to follow the instructions of a law enforcement officer. Do I have that right? Is that? I'm not sure that I read that. It's always, always having consent. Well, one of the other, one of the other exceptions. During the lawful search for or seizure or removal of a firearm pursuant to an order. So, I suppose, yes, because of the term lawful, similar to what I said earlier, that in order for it to be not pursuant to a warrant, it has to be fitted to one of the exceptions. Can this be, can we add some language that clarifies that? Since that seems to be some way of doing it. Yeah. Yeah. Are you doing a question? Yeah. So, could you describe what a lawful removal of a firearm, or get the word search? Because there's a lot of orders in there. I'm trying to figure out sort of when the lawful removal. Well, let's say, for example, the order required rail inquisition. Right. And they go to the residence. And the person says, all right, I got these two firearms. Officer would remove them. That would seem like a removal situation to me. Right. I assume that's what the line would refer to. But they would have to have it. So they'd be concerned. Or they wouldn't even necessarily enter the residence, necessarily. So let's play it out. So you come, there's now an order against me. Requires relinquishment. Right. The officer comes to my door for a lawful removal of those. And we'll take out the, we'll just say there's no order to vacate. So it's not, you know, I'm still at the house that I'm allowed to be at. Obviously, I'm not allowed to have those firearms under this bill. But you get to the door and I say no. The question becomes whether the officer has probable cause to think that when you say no, do you say, yes, I have firearms, but I'm not giving them to you? Or no, I don't have any. Play out, pull. Right. I think if it were no, I don't have any. In either case, probably, and with some exception to the warrant requirement applies, the officer's going to have to go back to court and get a warrant. Unless an exception applies. So maybe there's some kind of exigent circumstances or something under the, under the particular facts of a given case that made the officer to reasonably conclude that unless the firearms are seized right then, you're going to put them. Right. What I'm concerned about is if I say no, I don't have any. You don't have a warrant, but you do have an order under one of those two. I forget which one. Yeah. But I'm now, as the officer says, I'd like to come in to look and I'd say no. Right. If you don't consent. Then I refuse to obey instructions from the law enforcement officer to ensure the safety of the firearms. Am I committing a crime under this new mystery? And therefore, I shall be interested or find one of the two has to happen. We're both. So you guys see what you're saying. You're the, you're the person subject to the order. Right. And you're present during the attempted removal. You decline your consent. So you don't have any license. Right. Right. The officer then gives you instructions to. Step aside. Right. It may technically be true. I mean, it's a question for the witnesses as to whether that's the intended sweep of this, because it may be that this is only intended to get at other people who may be impeding the officer from the search, but you may be right. That's pretty broad. The person presents. Yes. It's written. I agree. Yeah. Or I mean, let's say other people. So you have something and you, the, you know, you come to the door and there's an order against me, but I'm not there. Right. Barb is there and she says, no, I don't know of any guns here and you're not coming in. But even if that's a person present that she could get caught up in that too, it seems in the same scenario, but the same reading. Right. So just some concerns. Thank you. So, I mean, I definitely think we have to make very clear that we're talking about a lawful removal or we can say lawful relinquishment and that means that one of the war exceptions has applied because then I think even the situation where it's not the person subject to the war, that person, unless they own that property and they own the firearms, can't consent to them coming in pursuant to that relinquishment order. But I think my understanding has not been to allow searches and seizures absent a warrant or an exception to the warrant. And I think that this obviously shows there's some ambiguity that that's not clear. Right. At least that's been my understanding. I'd like to hear from the witnesses what they've thought. Just a quick clarification. So I think Representative Trieber brings up a valid point, but I also think that it's, I mean, the majority of people lie to the police when they encounter them and at least from my school. And it's extremely difficult to prove that. And so it's not as if if a person just says no that they're automatically getting charged with this crime because you have to prove intent and proving intent is a very difficult challenge. Do you have to prove intent by this language? If I wanted, if hypothetically I was the cop and I needed to build probable cause, which you need to charge somebody with a crime, I would want intent. I'm only reading refuses to obey instructions. And I'm just talking about the necessary elements you need. I get it, but it probably isn't that hard of a bar to prove that I'm refusing to obey instructions for probable cause for that or intent that I'm intending to refuse to obey instructions. Didn't I also hear language that said attempting for intent to remove firearms, but I don't see it. Was that just said, but it's not in here? It's not in there now. I don't know if it was said. Is it said or am I just hearing things? Do you want me to answer that? Voices, lots of voices. Were you talking about the existing law portion? This is the section right here. And I'm not seeing it there, and that's why I'm questioning it. I thought I'd attempt to remove is what I heard said, but I'm not seeing it in this language. Yeah, it's not in there. So that, unless there are more questions about this proposed new offense, we can move on to the next. We're now in the Relief from Abuse Order section because the new crime was entitled 13, which is where the crimes are. So now we're related to the orders themselves, not what, you know, someone allegedly hindering the removal of firearms, but the orders themselves. And you remember that it's a proposal was to add a couple of definitions to the orders. I'm going to skip forward just a second so you can see and when we redrap this, probably better to reorder these sections, something that language comes prior to the definitions, but I'm going to move forward a little bit to see where the language comes in. So remember that if the order, and I'm on line 13 now, if the order requires relinquishment of firearms, there are a couple of things that have to be in this RFA order. If it requires relinquishment, because not all of them do, but if they do, there's some other provisions that have to be in the order as well. So first of all, you see just one word added to this information about the firearms, just the number of firearms in addition to the type of locations. But in addition, subdivisions two and three, a Roman numeral two and three, line 16 and 18, requirements that the defendant relinquish firearms pursuant to the instructions of a law enforcement officer. And three, require the defendant to provide the law enforcement officer with some information, again, specifics, location of firearms, keys, combinations, locks, et cetera. And then the other information that will assist the officer to provide access to the delivery of firearms subject to relinquishment. Now, again, this is in response to information requested by the officer. But the key phrase, line 16 and 17, require the defendant to relinquish firearms, relinquish firearms pursuant to the instructions of the law enforcement officer. I just wanted to highlight that phrase, because that's what's defined up above. Relinquishment means to give up pursuant. Everybody see where I am? Line eight at the top of the page. So these are defining the terms that we just saw, defining what has to be in the order. Because the order has to provide for relinquishment of the firearm pursuant to the instructions of the law enforcement officer. Well, one of those terms mean proposal is relinquishment means to give up pursuant to the instructions of a law enforcement officer, possession or control of a firearm through a cooperating law enforcement agency, approved dealer or third party, approved by the court, met the other statute that covers third party holding firearms by a person subject to one of these orders. And instructions of the officer includes instructions related to location of the firearms production of location, production or location of keys, sorry, combinations to locks for firearm states and doors, time, place, manner and conditions of relinquishment and any other information that will assist the officer in the expedited access for trading fluid. So that is an attempt to, I think, flesh out the definitions of these terms that are defining what has to be in the order. Yeah, so before you move on there, I understand all of that. I'm just wondering, can we require, can we compel someone to comply with lines 15 and 16? I think that there's perhaps an argument that the person could assert a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in those circumstances. But that would be sort of an as applied situation. You know what I mean? That they might choose that, they might not. So who's, they're doing this to law enforcement, so they're not in court anymore, right? So we're not making a judge do this. I know there was concern about having someone in the court getting someone to potentially self-incriminate. Right. But this is asking a law enforcement officer that there could be some, okay. I'm not potentially, someone could argue that. Right. They're doing that to self-incriminate. Okay. Thank you. Yes. So basically there's this cycle or the circle where somebody chooses to plead the Fifth and does not provide the information to law enforcement, then they'll be arrested for impeding. Is that, is that correct? Well I think that goes back to the question about impeding. So who was that intended to cover? Whether it's the person who's refusing to provide the firearms because they actually are his or her own firearms or whether it's some other person who's present in the location who's hindering this attempt to remove them. But I think under a literal reading of it, yeah, you're right, it would seem to, at least the literal language would seem to cover both some other person at the location and the person him or herself. And then so that person pleads the Fifth and gets arrested, then the cops would have to get a search warrant. Right. In order to conduct their search. After the premises and search for the firearms? Yeah, unless there was some exception, some emergency that gave rise to an aggent circumstance. But barring that, yes. Thank you. So the language we were just looking at were the definitions for purposes of the order themselves. So we're going to move on to the substance of the orders. Again, this is the final order and we've sort of gone through sort of different formulations of this language of what will trigger relinquishment. Remember, initially there was all orders of ever relinquishment. Then in the blue, the first iteration of the language, if there's evidence that defendant is in possession or has access to firearms, then the order relinquishment is proposed when that was in green. If there's evidence that defendant possesses, owns or controls firearms, then relinquishment is ordered. And that sort of truth, possesses, owns or controls formulation is the same sort of series of words that have been used throughout the bill in different circumstances. And I think the idea here was it made more sense to be consistent with the terminology of when relinquishment is ordered. Thanks for clarifying that. That change helps a lot. Note that the word owns, though, is struck from, because this applies not only to firearms that defend it, possesses, owns or controls, but that another person has on behalf of the defendant. And upon further analysis, I think, it became obvious that another person may possess it or control it on behalf of the defendant, but they're not going to own it on behalf of the defendant. In that case, here's really the same concern so that word is struck. This, we just went through. I skipped forward a little bit. Remember, this is what if the order requires relinquishment, what has to be in the order. You're adding information about the number of firearms, requiring that the defendant relinquish pursuant to the law enforcement officer's instructions and provide the LEO with various information about location and keys, combination of locks, et cetera. That all has to be in the order. That was the final order. You see the emergency order. This is all just exactly the same. This is what we just looked at. The same thing that you add and you take out the possession of or has access to or replace it with possesses, owns or controls, but strike the word owns when you're referring to somebody else other than a defendant. Same language again here. That has to be in the temporary order as well. If the order requires relinquishment then there has to be a specific language requiring relinquishment and for the defendant to provide the LEO with various information that we just described. You'll see that lines 12 through 17 are struck. This is connected to the issue of once served, always served. We were discussing that issue of being able to serve the person by first class mail after they've been personally served the first time. That, you'll see later on, is being struck completely so they're not going to take the ability to serve by mail and to serve the person by mail and particularly if they've been personally for the first time. All that is struck. Therefore these notifications that involve that are struck also. Sorry. So all the discussion in this draft around the once served, always served and the notification in all the sections that relate to it that's gone. We're now back to basic service for all these. Correct. Thanks. In this draft. Yep. Okay. Can I turn over this way? I don't know what the, there was a lot of concern with the group in the past about speed and finding people. Do you know what changed in this draft for that? Yeah. It's coming up, I believe. I'm sorry? I think it's coming up. I'm to like, thought process behind it, not just the law. Thought process was, the concerns really from Judge Greerson and his proposal of instead having the temporary order stay in effect until the permanent order or final order is served. Okay. That was, it was the judge's suggestion. Okay. Thank you. And that language is right, takes 13. So the expert day temporary order remains in effect until it's either dismissed or the petition is denied at the final hearing. And one of those two things will always happen. Either it'll be dismissed and the final order will go into effect or it will be denied altogether. And if the final order is issued, the temporary order remains in effect until personal service of the final order. And again, all the stuff about striking all this language we just referred to the first class manual and stuff it out. Now this has to do with, we're now moving on to the return of service. So remember that's the, the form that when the order is served, the return of service form has to go back to the court and fail the court. The RFA has been served and here's what happened. And it has this details what information has to be in that return of service form. You see there's a couple of things. You've struck some and included others, not the proposal, but now the language sitting in front of you says, how many firearms are relinquished by the defendant at the time of service? So at the time the order is served, how many firearms are relinquished has to be in this, has to be stated in the return. As well as subdivision two now, they've been green, whether the law enforcement officer has intended to contact the plaintiff after service of the order and prior to the return being filed to the court. Remember, you'll see as we get to it. In the previous version, it had required that the law enforcement officer contact the plaintiff. That was the proposal. That struck. There was no requirement that the, that the LAO contact the plaintiff, but if the such, that the contact does happen, or sorry, whether or not the officer made that attempt, has to be just stated one way or the other in the return. Not a requirement that they do, but it just has to be stated. And that's, I think though, so now those are the two provisions that have to be in the return. How many firearms are relinquished from whether the LAO tried to contact the plaintiff? Court has to provide a copy to the plaintiff. And then after, this is subdivision C and green, line 13, after the law enforcement officer has made those indications. In other words, after they've indicated on the return, how many, how many firearms were relinquished and whether or not the plaintiff was contacted, then the return of service is filed at the earliest possible time. It takes precedence over other summons and orders. There's some clarification language, 16 and 18. They're just saying that if they don't actually make those indications, that's not going to affect the validity of the service. In other words, the defendant can't argue the service wasn't valid because it doesn't contain some information about how many firearms I had or whether the plaintiff was contacted. Now, so that's the return of service. Next, I remember is the warrant. So, again, there's been a lot of iterations of the warrant requirement as we've gone through different versions of this bill and committee. The one you're looking at here, in a sense, just sort of explicitly states what current law would be, which is that the court may issue the warrant under the subsection procedure of firements in response to an application filed under Rule 41, which is the way the procedure currently works now. That's the rule of the government's filing an application for a search warrant. And that's it. So, basically, the implication there is that the application for the warrant has to be filed under Rule 41, which is the process that happens anyway. And all they see is the struck language and included some specifics about what the court can issue this warrant if it finds probable cause to believe, and it listed some of these things. But those were, you may recall, originally came out of the New Jersey Supreme Court case that was tied to the fact that this was a civil warrant. But since the court isn't doing that anymore and it's only issuing warrants in response to Rule 41 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, you don't really need that language anymore. So that's how it works. What you have left is really just what the current process would be anyway. And we're now moving on to immunity. It's another topic, which essentially means providing law enforcement officers who act under these chapters to serve these warrants, execute the warrants rather, serve the orders, that sort of thing, with immunity, and that means they can't be sued. They can't be sued civilly or prosecuted criminally for some of their conduct. And you see some tweaking there. The blue language you had already looked at last time was a little bit of tweaking in green, that, again, you have the sort of general immunity for, this is like 11 and 12, for acts undertaken or admissions made in good faith reliance on the provisions of this chapter rather than section because the chapter is more inclusive. Yeah, just, is there any substantive difference between the words section and chapter? Yes. Yep, this chapter includes all the sections in the chapter. This section would be just acting under and pursuant to the service and warrants section, the section by 1105 by including chapter, you are referring to the 1103 and 1104 also, primarily, which is the actual service of the RFAs, the service of the orders. So they get immunity for acts they take in good faith reliance on the law that governs their service of these orders. It seems pretty wide is that and I'm assuming the intent is to be wide the intent of the proposers is wide. Yeah, I think it is broad. Do we in other places where we put immunity in, are we that broad, or are we typically putting immunity for law enforcement into a more targeted area? I think, and I can show you a couple of examples, I think good faith reliance on the provisions of a given law is not uncommon. I can think of the drone statute has similar language when I think the electronic communications privacy has similar language, so I think that providing immunity is the exception, not the rule but that when you do do it, that language is not mutual. I'll let you pick this one up. You're gonna love it. So, in the part that Matt just raised, the way it's written now, it almost looks like we're giving immunity whether I mean it doesn't talk about the good faith attempt unless it does from up above. If a law enforcement officer just was like, what the heck, I'm not gonna go do this. We're giving them immunity. Right? No, I think that language is key on line 12. It has to be a good thing. An intentional disregard of the law I would argue probably not a good thing. I'm just saying that, thank you. So, this doesn't circumvent the current provisions related to sovereign immunity for the police. Because they already have immunity unless there's gross negligence or willful misconduct. And so, this doesn't circumvent those elements, right? If you mean supersede, I think it does. It does. That's the way I read it. Yes, I think under existing law you're right. There's a body of law for when law enforcement officers have immunity. I think my reading of this is that it is broader than that and provides immunity in addition to what exists under current law. So, can I just provide a quick hypothetical scenario? So, let's say a cop has a grudge against a person who, and he's executing an RFA, or I'm sorry, he's executing one of these orders to seize the firearms. He takes the gun and intentionally damages it just because he doesn't like this person because they have a history of some sort. That will make him immune from the willful misconduct exception from sovereign immunity? No, because I think in that case it still wouldn't meet the good faith reliance test. This on mine, well, it still wouldn't be immune. But I think there might be situations, I can't come up with them out of my head, but there might be situations that potentially an officer might not be immune under existing law that they might be immune here. Not sure, but sometimes they're going to be the same like those example you just gave. Certainly not an intentional destruction of property. No way that's good faith reliance on this test. I wouldn't be immune to that. So, I guess I'm not sure how one can be acting in good faith if they're grossly negligent either. Frankly, the other standard right now under gross negligence. Yeah. Potentially. Potentially. So, does everybody get a sense of what the immunity provisions are there? So, again, that you're adding the proposal is to add also the word search for it, not just family to learn locate or see the fireman family to search for it. So, I added returning the seas for relinquish firearm. So, again, because sometimes if I'm given a voluntarily relinquish, it's not just the seizing that would kick in of the immunity. And there's some language added proposal to be added here as we saw in vision B line 17 chapter. It's a very similar concept to not be construed to create a legal duty for a law enforcement officer or agency to a plaintiff or any other person. Again, a duty would give rise to ability to be sued. So, since there's no legal duty, they can't be sued. No action can be filed against the officer based on a claim for which there's a liability. In other words, if there's immunity, you can't file a lawsuit against the person. So, let's... So, how does this interact with the current law under the plan of division 23, 20 BSA 2307 the immunity provisions this is a... where that has to do with seizure storage of firearms and that one specifically talks about recklessness, gross negligence or intentional misconduct if deterioration of the firearms comes to that. Is that still in place for the storage component or is this somehow conflict with that? I haven't examined that in great detail but I... If that provision, which I don't know, applies specifically to the storage whereas this doesn't, which nothing here I think does cover storage, then yes I would say that provision still applies to storage that level of immunity. It's stored or transported in this section. But it doesn't cover seized or just stored or a lot of transport. Yes, then I think that's right. This level of immunity would apply to seizure and the removal whereas the storage and the transport would seem to be covered by 2307. And that's a distinction that you mentioned that I believe is probably similar to the sovereign immunity that you're talking about is that there are exceptions for gross negligence and intentional misconduct in 2307. Whereas the aren't here. And this language actually for A and B I think it's similar to that language in 2307 as well. So that's something we may want to follow up on. I'm just noticing this is something that I've not noticed before. Which is that as originally this language has been in there from the beginning. This is the existing... And this language tracks the immunity language represented along the EUA Dismentions. And I think that was originally in the bill to provide a level of immunity. But now, since in this new draft you're proposing the proposal is to add more detail about the immunity. You may want to strike that to avoid inconsistency. I've been back in for a while. No, this is the new couple. That makes sense. B, I mean A can probably stay. The community is just saying that it's more of a method but B, about immunity. Right. Now you've got to be potentially inconsistent in places. So I probably want to strike back. Yeah. So last week it seems like we were talking about the number of firearms that could potentially be confiscated. And I don't remember who said it but somebody said something about a U-Haul storage unit. Potentially to what's that? So anyway, under this immunity say if it came that there was a thousand firearms at somebody's house and the only place that they could get them to right off was a U-Haul storage unit. And they brought them to U-Haul, and and somebody broke in and stole them because it's not going to be as safeguarded as a police station or whatever. What's the story of the immunity there? Or even if somebody broke into the police station and stole them, I guess it really wouldn't matter. It's really going to turn on the team. If the damage or deterioration occurred as a result of recklessness, gross negligence, or intentional misconduct by the law, so it's really if it was ordinary negligence, just it's hard to say you could sort of put a couple of hypothetical facts out there as to what can sometimes turn on the difference between negligence and gross negligence Let's say, for example, the law enforcement agency knew that there had been break-ins at that particular facility before and had not properly secured a particular storage facility, then I'd say that would probably rise to the level of recklessness and gross negligence that they wouldn't be immune. On the other hand, let's say they didn't. There was no reason to think that necessarily the robbery would happen in this particular fact. They'd probably be immune. That's probably no negligence there. So I think if it's been said enough, we can pretty much expect that more firearms are going to be confiscated with this bill. So if law enforcement doesn't have proper storage for these and there's deterioration let's just go with deterioration because there's not proper storage, isn't that in itself recklessness and gross negligence by confiscating these things and not having a proper place to store them? Interesting question. I don't know, maybe. I see what you're saying. If they're aware that they don't have proper storage that will not prevent deterioration, is that conscious disregard of their own risk? Arguably. But that's existing law. That provision is in Title 2307 already. I mean, I guess this one regardless of existing law. Right. And to me, it would be reckless to go back to U-Haul and they say their climate controlled. Well, maybe the climate is the humidity is too high in their climate controlled. So Wait a minute. I have to ask a question. Yes. So there's no facilities out there at all that's quick to handle what firearms could possibly be confiscated from this film. That's why the U-Haul, I assume, got brought up, right? Because there's not enough That's a question for I don't think that's a legal question for Eric pertaining to the law. Right. And that's a question for for instance, the commissioner who talked about taking care of storage and that storage is according to his testimony no longer an issue but that's not a perfect area to answer. So I think that brings us to that's the end of the RFA section and that brings us to the extreme risk protection order for this section. You remember that Representative Donahue was in testifying about that and that's in response to that testimony and discussion committee had where we will see new language on page 20. With emergency or emergency temporary orders that you remember the proposal is that the ERPO extreme risk protection order can be filed for not just by the state attorney or the AG but by a family or household that's the proposal in the most recent amendment in the bill. And Representative Donahue was in here and after that discussion some language has been added to make clear that when the petition is filed the emergency petition is filed by a family or household member. So this only applies when it's filed by a family or household member not when it's filed by a state's attorney or the attorney general. In that case though when the family or household member does file it it can only be based on an allegation of online for them that the petitioner poses an imminent and extreme risk of causing harm to another person and shall not be based on an allegation that the responder poses an imminent and extreme risk of causing harm to himself or herself. So generally speaking ERPOs can be based on either one causing an extreme risk of harm to another person or to him or herself. And this just sort of carves out an exception to that and says well if it's the family member filing it it can only be based on risk of harm for another person not to the person and so for herself. Any questions for Eric? I don't believe there are so that's it as far as the changes between draft 7.1 and draft 6.1 Any questions for Eric? Well it's not a question about this language but I'm just wondering if you or someone else can direct I think the citation that representative Donahue shared led to like somewhere other than she intended about existing law around voluntary commitment essentially and how it would intersect I think she was making the case that um so anyway there could still be there could still be in voluntary commitment of a person based on the petition of an interested party because the person is at risk of causing harm to themselves I think is what she was saying even though he couldn't have his firearm you just tell me where it's in title 18 it's a 75 it's off the top of my head I guess I would say I don't think I need this right now from your watch rail but just as we move into further discussion on this I would really want to understand more about that provision and how I'm going to be extremely brief but I would welcome any questions It's been represented in email I'm sorry Vermont Traditions Coalition Firearms Policy Analyst It's been represented in emails from the leadership that our organization opposes this bill in all its elements that's accurate I have repeatedly turned down the offer an opportunity to testify because of this being such a moving target of Eric Davis on behalf of gun owners Vermont and Chris Bradley twice three times now have testified to all the technical aspects and constitutional concerns that I could possibly repeat I've just spent a lot of time going over their recent testimony in particular to make sure that I can make that statement accurately my concern from the beginning of this process has been that an individual civil right a God given natural inalienable right as described in the Heller decision as an individual right if anyone harbors any collective right illusions you should dispel those but this individual right is being treated to a disbarment to a separation to an alienation in constitutional terms through a civil action with no representation in a non adversarial process because the defendant is not present now welcome to be present nor is he invited to provide any representation on his own behalf or her own behalf as the case may be so we have a civil matter to issue an RFA these are very important civil prosaids they're meant to be streamlined and effective for one purpose and one purpose only separate two individuals one of whom may be a danger to the other as these advocates will testify and a good attorney that is a finely tuned process which has been tested in the courts over the years for its constitutionality I'm not here to dispute that I'm actually here to support it law enforcement has stated repeatedly and I believe at times some members of the court that confusing that process and making it more complicated hinders its ability to respond in a timely manner to offer the protection that the RFA and other similar orders are designed to offer which gets back to my underlying premise of this bill you have an inherent and alienable individual constitutional rights similar to that of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association freedom to worship that is being subjected to scrutiny and alienation from an individual in a civil process again forgetting that we're complicating the relief from abuse order system we're talking about a constitutional right this is so similar to the civil rights violations that were treated upon post reconstruction blacks in the south where things grew out of those errant laws without due process, without a criminal court without representation such as not allowing them to have firearms such as not allowing them to vote such as tests for voting rights I don't think it's a reach for me to go into that realm and say this is a very similar thing where you take a civil matter you take a low level bureaucratic process and try to apply it to something cherished in an individual right which is now recognized by the court if you just simply take the heller decision and read it for the essence of that right and essentially self-defense in the home that should bring you up to a level of scrutiny that just simply despairs you from applying this type of order in a civil process it should be immediately elevated to where it is an individual who is notified of the threat to have their rights removed in a court some sort of representation and informed of their rights proves we made an exception in the red flag law for ex parte orders we grudgingly supported or at least failed to oppose that statute being instituted in a remont for the simple reason that it did afford some due process we fought for stronger due process but this committee reduced that the law did pass and to some degree we supported its ability to address those situations the situations described in this bill should be addressed in their posts they should be addressed in further criminal charges against a person who poses a threat but to layer these two things on top of each other an individual right if I came to you and said you've published a hate speech web blog and you're being charged and here's an order to cease and desist your publication under the law and oh by the way we have an order here that says I can take your computers I can shut your network down I can order from your servers they're all deny you service and by the way we did this in a civil action you weren't represented you weren't even notified that it happened I can only describe individual rights the way the Supreme Court has often described them and that is that they are inherent, pre-existent and unalienable that means that without due process this bill does not describe any due process so that's my brief statement I would like to hit on a couple of items before I end it's impossible to prepare testimony in any gory detail for a bill that changes once a week in a highly technical manner only attorneys can truly understand the gory details of it Eric was put on the spot this morning an added section completely new to the bill by the way this latest version because it had an added section due to the bill I was just wondering what the vote count was to amend the bill in that order what was the vote to include that new section have there been any votes to hold the public hearing any votes to do any of the amendments at any stage of the game in this process take that as a no there have been no votes to amend the bill I think that's a fair statement fair but also the bill has not been amended no amendments so these are all they've never been voted on to advance them as amendments correct that's what I'm saying yeah 610 is still so just briefly on the new section it's clear that there hasn't been a detailed discussion on what the implications of creating this new crime are it's also clear that it seems to attempt to create a warrantless search exception that may be actually applied on a person who happens to be present at the location if a neighbor were there at the front doorstep when the RFA is being issued and that person seemed to have some knowledge of firearms in the building but simply just stated what I said I don't have any interest in helping you with this I'm not going to answer your questions I'm not going to give you any knowledge of firearms in the building I could be charged under this it creates a third party endangerment to put someone at peril of law up to two years who until they stepped foot in front of the officer I had no understanding whatsoever of the situation at every single turn in the process of this there's a complete lack of Fifth Amendment capability in fact it's almost an implicit denial of it if you refuse under this new section to participate in producing information that could place you at peril of other charges including the one described in this new section it's circular to catch 22 you are putting yourself at peril by declaring your constitutional rights to not self incriminate this all under a civil order the threat of a criminal order the threat of a criminal charge the threat of a justifiable warrant served by the court at the door front applies to the person and the specific items places time and manner the court issued the warrant under you can't create an exception because someone refuses to participate in the officer's service of that warrant if they ask a question and someone doesn't answer it you've created perils for that person and they're in a bind there were no answers to these questions this morning clearly this has not been vetted as to the remainder of the bill I will simply repeat that we support the positions both expressed by the federation and gun owners of Vermont and that in order for this bill to move forward it's time for some votes it's time for you folks to vote on some of these sections by section as to whether or not you wish to have them to be part of the bill we're looking at a public hearing where sign up begins in one hour after six weeks none of you have voted or gone on record as to which sections of this bill you propose to support or which amendments to which sections you propose to support and I would submit to you that most of us on this side would not have wished to have a public hearing under these circumstances and so the message that you will hear tonight will be based on the best information that your citizens have at their disposal and after this morning I believe it's clear that even the committee members are not well informed by the implications of this bill and with the new sections that aren't vetted I would submit again that the public hearing will only be an expression of outrage on the general principle of taking an individual right with no due process no representation no potential for self-protection against self-incrimination it is going to be detrimental to not only the image but the ability to serve these orders and it will create confusion that will create danger for officers as it has been also testified to there are so many other methods by which this committee through its broad jurisdiction could effect real help to the potential victims and the victims that are involved in these domestic disputes not the least of which would be resources to assert some help in processing verbose in a timely manner I leave you with this last comment I basically withdraw from supporting the air bows as long as the section of the bill that allows family members to bring them remains we are now technically as an organization of concept but it should be initiated only through officers at the court through due process with notification and ability to represent oneself and if that is hindered or watered down in any way we can no longer support that period I look forward to a lot of the technical problems with the new section being answered by smarter people than me people with the technical training and judicial temperament to speak to them and at which time I would like to comment further thank you so we are continuing with 8 6 10 welcome David thank you David share with the Attorney General's office as I mentioned last week we had reviewed the EPA's proposal and we had no objection to all of the sections but we do and I had not testified to this yet but I understand the committee is curious about the impeding statute and I did want to give the Attorney General's office's position on that and our position is that the addition of the second section to the impeding statute would be unconstitutional and the reason for that is that it would be too vague and so the constitutional doctrine that that indicates is void for vagus that's the term that the courts use there actually was a court case that came out just in 2019 and it was a court case interpreting the impeding statute as it currently exists the Vermont Supreme Court yes sorry Vermont Supreme Court interpreting Vermont's impeding statute as it currently exists and the court noted in that case that in order to remain constitutional the impeding statute does have to be read narrowly because if it isn't read narrowly it's potentially criminalizing a lot of ordinary behavior, behavior that might happen somewhat routinely in that case a driver refused to turn over their license and registration upon request which is itself a civil violation not a criminal violation and in doing so did hinder the officer's ability to carry out their job and defied a lawful order the court noted that on its face that may have violated the impeding statute it said look it did two things that you need to have an impeding statute violation one it did violate a law and the person did violate a law and in violating that law they made it to the officer couldn't carry out their duty but the court said that because the impeding statute is a felony and I realize that we're talking about a potential misdemeanor here but because the impeding statute is a significant criminal liability the statute read fairly cannot have meant such a low level violation in that case the violation was a civil violation of traffic infraction it can't be the case that the legislature meant to include such low level behavior and turning it into a felony and so they were basically saying look all the person did was do a traffic violation and now you're making them a criminal and they basically said and we don't read the statute that way where so that's sort of actually all that way of background and that's to say where the court went next with this statute was to say or with this case was to say not only do we not read the statute that way but we believe that we are constitutionally required to read the statute narrowly and they did an analysis of the void for vagueness doctrine and again I went back to the notion that if you read the impeding statute broadly under the plain terms of the impeding statute it could criminalize a lot of behavior that wouldn't otherwise be criminal like just choosing not to tell an office or something something like that again if you read this broadly under the plain terms potentially including sleeping up a lot of behavior that we would normally think of as not being unlawful and they noted the standards that they that they looked to when interpreting void for vagueness and so I'll read you one of them one of the ways that they put it the doctrine of void for vagueness generally stated requires that penal statutes define a criminal offense with sufficient certainty so as to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of conduct which is proscribed or forbidden and such that arbitrary discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged under our reading of the current of the proposal and the proposed addition to the impeding statute it would subject somebody of criminal liability who has not broken a law who is potentially lawfully in a residence of whatever the location might be isn't themselves subject to early from abuse over or any order and maybe has not done anything except or stood in a place and not moved it then becomes the officer's decision as to whether or not the officer subjectively believes that that person presents a threat or you know a threat to their safety or makes them unsafe then they can tell the person to do something believe the house to stand there to move or it might be and if the person disobeys that request they would now be a criminal or potentially depending on how the court case perceives the issue with that is that any ordinary person who has not themselves broken the law who has not themselves subject to an order who has not made any affirmative move to impede an officer has to make a guess as to whether or not this officer believes them to be a threat to safety or is just saying that they would prefer them to move or would rather them be somewhere else and this there's two sort of two sequential issues here one is that the choice to subject somebody to criminal liability is solely within the officer's purview the person cannot do or not or refrain from doing something to avoid potential criminal liability because it is solely within the subjective decision as to whether or not this person poses threat of safety and then they give the order to make a request and now that is what potentially makes the person subject to criminal liability but there's nothing that person can do again they're they're just there by whatever stroke of bad luck and they they are now at the complete discretion of the officer as to whether they are potentially going to be subject to a crime now of course they won't actually be subject to a crime unless they disobey an officer's order but it will not necessarily be clear to a person so I would actually argue let me stop right there to say that by itself the fact that criminal liability will only attach because of an officer's subjective belief about their own safety is by itself a significant constitutional problem again the person can't control anything about that and that's the sort of basic standard we have when we talk about void for ragness doctrine a person has to be able to know or to know how to behave in order to avoid being a criminal or being charged with a crime and here they really can't control it they are where they are for whatever reason when this person comes in to serve a RFA order and there is nothing they can do to avoid an officer's concern reasonable or not so now an officer and then I should say let me down move to the next step of the analysis we already have a significant constitutional concern secondary constitutional concern is that when the officer issues and that person does not necessarily know whether or not they are actually being issued an order or the officer saying it would be better if you went over here now with the officer and saying so motivated by a concern for their safety if they are motivated by that and again this is in the officer's head not necessarily something that an ordinary person can know what's going on in their head if that is motivated by safety now they are subject to the crime if it wasn't motivated by a concern for safety if it was a request of convenience or whatever it might be to the crime because in the officer's head it was not in order motivated by a concern for their safety as required by the proposed statutes so you have a sort of secondary issue with respect to value for vagueness and ordinary individuals not knowing whether or not they are subject to criminal liability and again there is a nice outline of all of this in Steve B. Burrard which is on point with respect to the impeding statute very recent case in 2019 and I think that's a jumping off point for the committee and we certainly, now Burrard again was about the current impeding statute but it is an important signal in terms of how courts are going to interpret this in that it does require the current statute to be read narrowly and we believe that a significant expansion as proposed here would not be looked upon favorably by the courts and does have a way for bank fraud I appreciate that Could you say the case name again in the citation? Yes Steve B. Burrard and I don't have the modern citation but the old one will get 220A3D759 so my question is, I mean this focus is on officer safety is what I'm gathering from this expansion and what you're saying is that as written it seems like it could be unconstitutional so if this were to be changed and to clarify that police at a scene like this have the authority to control the movement of people while executing this order would that be considered unconstitutional? off the top of your head, if you can I mean I hesitate to make those kinds of decisions without being able to read potential language I certainly understand the concerns about officer safety and we've worked very hard to address them and throughout the bill and it made many changes to do so I think that with respect to serving the order officers will certainly still retain discretion as to whether or not they should serve the order whether they should apply for a warrant they could certainly choose to do that and once you're serving a warrant officers have much more control of the scene and that may be the prudent thing to do and we understand that thank you for the record Brian Greerson chief superior judge testifying draft 7.1 of H610 and the senate committee chair indicates otherwise I'll just confine the remarks to the new green sections and obviously the first one deals with the issue Mr. Shearer addressed a few minutes ago as well as the prior two witnesses as the committee knows I cannot testify or don't offer testimony with respect to policy nor can I offer legal opinions no advisory opinion no advisory opinion so I cannot comment on Mr. Shearer's testimony where the prior witnesses testimony is to the issue around the constitutionality of I'm looking specifically on page 4 lines 8 through 13 as I read the bill that would be new law for the preceding section lines 1 through 7 is the existing law I think I can safely say that perhaps consistent with some of the testimony you've heard the way this language appears it would certainly expand the net of people who could be subject to criminal prosecution if that remains in the bill having said that and even having in mind the idea of expanding the net of potential criminal defendants I do not see this as having a significant impact on cases coming into the court in the sense that do I expect there to be a high volume of cases with this chart I would expect as you've heard from the previous three witnesses something coming in under this provision would probably be very heavily litigated but I do not see in terms of volume that it would have a significant impact in that respect and I'll just continue to go along unless there are questions and I'm looking on page 5 which now adds a definition of order linkushmen which certainly both the law enforcement and the individual subject to the order to understand the obligations what I would say is that if you're going to adopt that definition I do not see the need for that same language I'm looking now at page 7 the order calls for that language to be included I don't think it's necessary that the language then appear on page 7 this is talking about the order if I accept this right in other words it's merely repeating all of the definition of relinquishment so if you've already ordered relinquishment as part of the order the definition would follow that order without necessity and you begin repeating that same language of the order itself and that's more of a matter of form than subject but I do not see the need to repeat it so more of a matter of form than subject so so it's more matter of the order it's more about that in the sense that if you have the definition of relinquishment which is extremely broad in itself particularly when you add in the section looking at line 18 any other information that will assist the officer in the expedited access, retrieval or delivery of firearms it literally allows the police significant discretion in what they're asking the individual to do for relinquishment of firearms it literally is anything and so this is I would expect would be addressed on a case by case basis it's going to be hard to compare one to the other and if you're going to have the definition or adopt that definition the officer can respond to the able to respond to the facts before them in an individual case without the necessity of that language being repeated in the order but it seems that it's serving a more the purpose it's serving in the order is to instruct the defendant as to the defendant's obligations that they're to relinquish this pursuant to the instructions of law enforcement that they're supposed to provide certain information so maybe we don't need them both but I would be inclined to get rid of the definition of the instructions to the defendant which would be in the order I was going to have one I would suggest by having the definition but you're assuming that the defendant will have access to that definition I mean yeah I know we assume that people understand what the law is by when you have a clause such as the last clause that allows the police to any other information that they need in order to relinquish the firearms that should be sufficient for their purpose again it's I'm not telling the committee to include it or not include it I don't think it's necessary I think if you have a definition as broad as that that gives the law enforcement the ability to exercise their discretion in the field depending on the particular circumstances and it's not necessary to be in the order can I ask you a slightly different question so if it's included in the order that you require the defendant to relinquish the firearms pursuant to the instructions of the law enforcement officer and provide other information if they don't do that do we then have a violation of the use prevention order if they don't do what I'm sorry follow those instructions that would be in the order relinquish the firearms pursuant to the instructions and providing this various information but they don't follow the officer's instructions they're going to be violating the order right if it's in the order I'm saying if that language that has right now is in that order if they thereafter do not follow the instructions of law enforcement officer I think they would be violating the order in a way that without that language in other words the definition of the addresses what relinquishment means and it's a very broad definition of relinquish the order but I guess I'm still concerned about the notice of the defendant of what is expected and perhaps a valid issue for the committee to resolve on the bottom of page 6 keep in mind that at that point in the process remember that's the final order which at least in the bill comes before the emergency order that language upon reflection the language that speaks to evidence that the defendant is in possession of firearms when they're controlled is not as significant as the final hearing as it is in the emergency hearing the simple reason that if the order is granted on any basis in the final hearing the law requires relinquishment at that point and it would be essentially be mandatory in federal law so this language you'll find also in the emergency order and that's where we specifically wanted in the emergency order so there has to be some evidence before the court of possession of control of firearms upon an emergency basis to justify their relinquishment on an expertly basis and it comes in for a final hearing if the order is granted an order of a final order because of the implications of federal law you could still order, you would still order relinquishment even if there was not evidence of firearms so it's more to clarify the standard doesn't have to be the same at the final as it is on an emergency basis are you okay with the need in there as far as if there's evidence I'm okay with it as long as someone doesn't interpret it without that evidence you can't order relinquishment it doesn't say that it doesn't say that but remember to interpretation I mean it's saying that if the evidence is there for a shallow issue you ordered with relinquishment it doesn't say anything that if the evidence is not there it doesn't give it the court it doesn't say don't do that but I'm not going to tell you that somebody may not interpret it okay so I'm a little bit lost here so on the bottom of page 6 that's where this turns into a final order is that just where you were yes so that language here turns into a final order are you saying is your question that it changed to make this section with the final just somehow or another I'm just trying to follow that hopefully maybe this will clarify if you go to page 9 beginning in line 5 this is where we're really talking about an emergency order remember it's the way the bill is structured actually it's the way the statute is structured so that's part of the confusion but if you focus in on how this comes into the court it'll come in on an emergency basis which begins on page 9 the language says and you remember the discussion very early on in this bill that on an emergency basis if you remember witnesses were going back and forth whether the court should require the plaintiff to disclose information or whether the plaintiff should have the option of disclosing information about firearms and so this was a way for the court to exercise its discretion in a given case with evidence of firearms then they could mandate representation on an emergency basis and that language and that was the reason for because on an emergency basis or an expatriate basis there may not be information about firearms and so it allowed the court to exercise its discretion on an emergency basis but then when you go back to page 6 that's really a final order and the circumstances are different because if you grant a final order of relief from abuse there is a federal prohibition against possession of firearms and real English would be mandated or else the person would be violating okay so then didn't I just hear that relinquishment wasn't in there but it's on the page on the top of page 7 right it is it's just the circumstances under which I think what we talked about earlier is that if the court found abuse that they would they shall order relinquishment as part of the final hearing so that word abuse if they issue the final order they shall order relinquishment okay thank you yeah I just want to make sure I was clear so I understand federal law that makes one a prohibited person if there's a final RFA issue does it say I don't recall that the federal law requires relinquishment of firearms it says you're a prohibited person right and so you can order relinquishment because you've now issued the final order the issue we were wrestling with earlier in the testimony was the discretion the court had at the beginning right so but if there's bill it will also be you'll have the same situation for a temporary RFA except it's state law that was prohibited person from having a firearm not federal law so that analysis that rationale could apply for both the final and the temporary but I think we put this in here on both the final and the temporary because if there isn't any evidence of firearms we don't want to have necessarily unless the court has some other reason to put it in there that order which then is going to activate law enforcement to enforce that component of the order so that's kind of the rationale behind why it's set up this way and I guess that was an explanation to make it into a question I'll ask you to comment on understanding of that if I follow your question or your statement that became a question I think in an earlier draft and I could be wrong but my recollection was that at the time of the final hearing the draft indicated that the court issued a final order that they would mandate so that's why I wanted to make I mean if that's what the committee's choice was that's their decision it didn't the rationale for this statement evidence of firearms wasn't important from my perspective on the emergency order and more so the more we looked at it it was like well that rational makes sense state prohibition but we went one step further and said what does it make sense to make sure there's evidence of firearms in either of those and that's why we've ended up planning here I just wanted to make sure I understood why okay on page 7 again line 16 beginning on line 16 that's the language that we talked about earlier that would be part of the order my view is that it's just not necessary but again that's a decision for the committee committee to make and if you read the reason I thought I was redundant in part was if you look at the language beginning on line 16 of page 7 it says require the defendant to relinquish the firearms pursuant to the instructions of the law enforcement office and if you read the top of page 8 paragraphs pv any other information that will assist the officer that phrase basically saying whatever the law enforcement officer says an individual has to but again I think the next page I have with changes in the brain this is the emergency order and again it repeats that same language the definition of relinquishment reading down in addition to reading I have some aqua blue if I can use that term I'm not sure what the significance of the blue is on immediately that's an added word my concern and I think I made note of it in an earlier comment was on line 13 where it says adhere to the provisions of the subsequent order immediately I'm sorry can you please tell us what page you're on sure I'm sorry page 10 I'm sorry page 10 on line 13 it looks like the word immediately is added in this draft I think we're looking at a different version what's draft I 7.1 at 129 yeah that's what we have here well immediately it's added with blue on line 13 page 10 no yours is struck right as a whole section is mine is struck 11 maybe only the brew 12 through the whole thing is struck in your I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 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