 Good morning and welcome to Vermont House to destroy committee. It is Wednesday, February 24. And the first thing we're going to do this morning is we are looking at a part of a committee bill from the committee on corrections and institutions, and it's regarding the sexual exploitation of an inmate. And we have attorney bring hair here who will walk through this section. And also, if you're able to give us a little bit background as to how, how this section came about the work of the commissioner do see commissioner his leadership on this issue as well as a report that has been filed and regarding, you know, sexual exploitation and issues that have been going on in our correction. So with that, I morning and welcome bring thank you. Good morning committee. Bring here from legislative council. And thank you for that introduction. So I will give the committee a little bit of background about where this language came from. You'll note that the bill is a committee bill was put together early in the session. And that was at the request of the Department of Corrections, and much of it stems from a report that was delivered to the agency of human services on December 23 of this of last year. And some of you may remember that the agency of human services engaged on track when Martin to conduct an independent investigation into kind of some of the things that were going on at the Chitenden regional correctional facility which is the states women's facility. In particular with respect to the prevalence of sexual abuse, sexual harassment sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation. The report detailed several areas for the department to work on and the department came forward to the corrections and institutions committee with some requests that would help operationalize some changes within the department. To meet some of the recommendations that were made in the report by Downs Rackland Martin. So one of those recommendations is what we're going to look at this morning as a part of that committee bill. And it's section eight in the house corrections and institutions bill. It sounds like you all have that bill before you so that I don't need to share my screen is that right. Yes, that's correct. Again, it's just section eight. Section eight, which starts at the bottom of page eight. And it has a little reader subheading that should be helpful that says crime and the statute is 13 vs a 30 to 57. What the DRM report noted is that this. So the state does have an existing sexual exploitation statute that prohibits certain types of conduct between employees of the department, or contractors or other people who are providing services to the department and people who are being supervised by the department, but the report noted that the prohibition is really the existing prohibition is really too narrow. And if you look down at the top of page nine, you can see what how how this prohibition is a bit narrow, because it provides that only when a person is being supervised by the department, where that employee or contractor who is providing services for the department has that inmate or other supervisee assigned to them as a part of their case load. So that's, that is the old those are the circumstances under which this kind of conduct is prohibited. The recommendation of DRM was to broaden it so that the prohibition would apply to any supervisee relationship with a department employee or contractor or person who's providing services for the department. So it's prohibited across the board, as opposed to only prohibited. If there is a direct supervisor relationship between the two individuals. So the language here, you can see that the change is just to strike that language that qualifies when the conduct is prohibited where the employee contractor or other service provider is currently engaged in a direct supervisory relationship with the person being supervised. So we strike out that language. So then the criminal prohibition would apply to any relationship between a person who's confined to a correctional facility or being supervised by the department, and a person who's employed by the department, or otherwise providing services for the department. So it's pretty straightforward. And again, this language came from from the Department of Corrections, right. The request came from the department, yes, as a as a direct part of the report from Dr. Martin. Right, right. And do you do you know why. Why was drafted this way when we did it. So I believe that there was a concern raised in this on the Senate side, when this was originally being worked on that it may prohibit existing relationship between supervisors and supervisors or so for example if a person was incarcerated and their spouse was working for the department that it may criminalize that relationship. That's my understanding of the history. I didn't work on this originally but that is my understanding of why we originally put this qualification in statute. Right and that matches my my memory is well and so one might ask well, is that still a concern. You know, I guess we would talk to the prosecutors in terms of how often those those cases might you know is that what's really going on is that what, you know, what we're really looking for. Okay. I'm sorry if I'm mixing up the order but thank you. Yeah. And I think I know the answer to this but so supervisors and supervisors. This, this doesn't apply to a relationship that say to correctional officers may get into because that that could be the same, the same situation I guess as far as being a supervisor super supervisor. No, so the statute only applies when one person is being supervised by the department. So I think the idea behind the sexual exploitation statute is really when there's a power differential between two individuals like abusing a position of vulnerability differential power or trust for sexual purposes. Because it would not the statute would not apply. If it's a relationship between two employees of the department. Great, that's that's what I thought but I just wanted clarification. Thank you. Can just help me out please brand that the commented, our W six on the right hand side what's that mean. So this, let's see the so this draft was really put together quickly and there were many questions that still needed to be answered by the committee. So there are some notes on the side from legal staff that are sort of directing the committee where they need to make decisions, but I would just point out that that is applies to section seven which you're not, which you don't have to deal with. What's our W six mean that's just who did it. Yeah, initials. Yeah. Who made the comment. Okay, thanks. Thanks. And Okay, that's it for now. Thanks. And so do we have anything like this somewhere else sexual exploitation. You know, similar law in terms of this, you know, power imbalance supervisory relationships. That's a good question. And my colleague Michelle child often works on the sexual crime so I wish you were here to answer that. But I believe, but I believe we do yes. And I'm sorry I don't actually exploitation of a minor is also prohibited. If the actor is in a position of power supervision over the minor by virtue of their professional status or voluntary status so for example of volunteer camp counselor or something like that. Also, we have a statute prohibiting sexual sexual exploitation of a person in the custody of law enforcement. So that's a similar. Right. And do those talk about those as narrow as this. I'm putting on the spot. Right. So, I, not quite as narrow so the sexual exploitation of a person in the custody of law enforcement prohibits a law enforcement officer from engaging in any sexual act with a, with a person that the officer is detaining arresting or otherwise holding in custody or who the officer knows is being detained, arrested or held in custody so there doesn't have to be that direct relationship in law enforcement statute. And. And that's the most recent one we did I think. Yes it is. Yeah. It doesn't have to be a direct relationship in the sexual exploitation of a minor set shoot either. It's just provides that no person she'll engage in a sexual act with a minor it's the actor is at least 48 months older than the minor. And the actor is in a position of power authority or supervision over the minor by virtue of their status professional status. So there doesn't it's not the language isn't quite as narrow in that statute either. Okay, great. That's helpful. And also I just want to know we are not doing anything to the fine or it's not proposed to be anything, anything done to the fine that's remaining the same. Right. As well. The fine or imprisonment. Okay, Barbara and then Tom and can I see your hands are up a measure if it's from before new questions certainly you're welcome to mind's up again. Great. Wonderful. Okay. Barbara and then Tom and can. So, I think there's also a statute, if somebody is in the care of the Department of Mental Health. But you, you're, you're probably right about that. I, I don't, I don't know them all. Okay. I think, right, I was my chair grad was just suggesting about comparable I was going to try to find that one because it seems like it's as similar, you know, more than the child one but okay, thank you. Yeah, I think that that's right there are, we have several prohibitions on sexual abuse. Also, which I believe is that one, the Department of Mental Health. Thank you. Tom and then can. Thank you. It's scary Maxine we're starting to think alike a little bit because I was going to ask basically the same question that you just did but, which also brought up another question for me. So with the crime. Are the crime slash penalty the same say between a corrections situation in an arresting officer situation. Is it the same crime. The same penalty. Yeah, same, yeah, same crime penalty. Yes. Okay, same penalty. Yeah, thank you. No, I guess I'm going to assume it's probably, and I know I'm putting you on the spot because it's not here. It's not your thing here, but with a situation with a say a camp counselor and somebody younger that's, that's probably a different crime and penalty isn't it. It's a minor. That is a different penalty. Yes. But there is a, there isn't kind of aggravated provision and the sexual exploitation of a minor statute that provides for an enhanced penalty, which is the same. So there's the original violation is one year or $2,000 fine or both. And the person that the enhanced penalty is five years or $10,000 if the person abuses their position of power authority or supervision in order to engage in a sexual act. So, so there's kind of a baseline and then and then an aggravated penalty. Great, thank you. Ken. So, just to make sure the department of corrections is asking for this change. The department of corrections is asking for the change. Is that what you said? Yes. Okay. Yes, they, yes they are. And, and just one more time the reason. Did we start in section seven is that where we started on this where the, the change in stations. No, or just section eight. Right. It's just section eight. So the bill. The full bill addresses many recommendations that were issued by down to Franklin Martin and their report. As I mentioned at the outset the report really dealt with the allegations of sexual exploitation that the women's facility. So there's the bill addresses a bunch of different recommendations that were made by the report. But the only one you're looking at is the is the crime for now. Thank you. And bring. Did the questions and institutions committee, did they take testimony on this specific section? They. Yes, they did. I haven't been there all for every hearing about the bill because I've been in other places, but they did take testimony from the department, I believe. I'm not sure if they've taken testimony from anyone else on this on that particular provision. I think that they wanted to send it to the judiciary committee before taking a bunch of testimony on it. Okay. Thank you. Barbara. And I could not get to the bill earlier so I'm looking at the wording that you were talking about earlier. And have a question which I'm sorry again you may have covered but I was looking for the bill. So, in, in the part that part page nine, the subsection to. I'm understanding that it's because we're trying to eliminate just one narrow situation right of if that person is supervised by like maybe the abuse is happening. Among two colleagues, and there's not a supervised relationship and we're trying to make it broader. Essentially, yes, but I think that what it's really trying to do is to say there's a power differential, regardless of whether the supervisor is in a direct supervisor supervisor relationship with the with the staff person. It applies regardless of whether or not that's like a direct caseload the person is in the doce employees caseload or not, which is great. I'm happy to see that the part that I'm now wondering about is up above where it says a person who is providing. I'm trying to remember the word they use not treatment but drug services maybe. And I'm trying to remember where I saw that but it was. It's actually a part that isn't changed so it's in a I guess. Correctional employee contractor or other person providing services. So I'm wondering and I'm thinking about the case in upper upstate New York, where maybe my facts are wrong, but what if it's somebody who is in a clerical position. I mean, so it, I'm wondering why we're limiting it limiting it to people who are providing services to offenders, as opposed to people that work in the correctional facility. Because in some ways somebody who is in an auxiliary position is still in a power position. And I don't think it does limit it. I think I think because it says no correctional employee contractor. Those words are not qualified by the providing services, providing services only apply only qualifies or other person. Thank you. Thank you very much. Somebody in the waiting room. Okay, great coming in. Alright, wonderful. So let's now switch to age 145. And there is posted new language. Give everybody a minute to to get there. I believe it's under Bryn's name again. There's, I think there's two copies posted under Bryn's name is. I'll just open them and answer for myself. I was wondering if one is a one as highlighting and one doesn't bring in terms of a walkthrough is there. Do you have a preference as to which one we. I'm just looking at the website to it. There should be. Yep, it's it actually says draft age 145 draft 1.1 222 2021. But once you open it, it actually is draft 1.2. And that's the area read something. Apologize. Okay. Yeah. Great. Tom you your hand up. Tom, did you have a look? Okay, it's not. No, I lowered it. Okay. Great. Okay committee members, do you have the draft 1.2 of age 145. Yep. All good. Okay, great. Great. Thank you. Okay. Thank you. Okay. Okay. Okay. So draft 1.2 354 p.m. on the 22nd. I'll just start right in with the changes and which all appear in yellow. And the first one is the definition. We've got a reorganized definition section because the first change the draft makes is to change prohibited restraint. And you'll see that this definition looks different from prohibited restraint as it appeared in the as introduced version. And what with this definition does is it mimics the Massachusetts police reform bill definition of choke hold, except that it does not include that. And then the provision in the Massachusetts version, which requires that the choke hold result in serious bodily injury or death, or be intended to result in serious bodily injury or death. So it's a little bit broader of a definition than Massachusetts for that reason. But you did hear some testimony that from from some of the witnesses that this definition was preferred. So I'm going to drop this in here to replace prohibited restraint, and you will see that the bill has grown quite a bit, and that's because we replace that definition throughout the titles where it appears. And so much of the bill will just be that change. So the next change is on page two. Subdivision five is highlighted just as a let's just an error there's no change to the definition of law enforcement officer. But totality of the circumstances should be highlighted. And that is the definition that you saw the last time you took up each 145 the I believe it was proposed by representative alone. That's the language that is a little bit different from from the version of S1 19 that passed last year. So that's the definition of law enforcement leading up to the use of force, and all facts known to law enforcement officer at the time, including the conduct of the person or persons involved. So you'll notice that this removes the, the bystanders language. I do see a question so should I. Sorry Barbara. Yeah. Okay, I put my hand down but didn't push me before so. So it also removes or should have known. So that did. So you did have or should have known in a previous iteration during your work on S1 19. But that is not the should have known was not in 119 as it passed. Okay, I guess I didn't realize that. The bystander part was taken out because it was confusing of who was a bystander. So I believe you did hear from witnesses. You heard from quite a few witnesses on on this issue. There was some dispute about who would be a bystander and also some concerns that bystanders conduct would not should not would not should not impact officers decision to use force. Great. And I remember asking, because my original thought was that it was police officers, or other law enforcement that come on the scene and was told well then they're not a bystander. But we have seen situations where law enforcement has been a bystander and not called 911 or try to get the person's knee off somebody's neck. And would cover any law enforcement officer on the scene, the way it's written, the, the. I see another hand I don't know. Yeah, can I jump in for just one second on this on on the totality of circumstances. All that about the bystander would be subsumed in all facts known to the law enforcement officer. The change on the totality of circumstances is making clear that we're talking about the conduct and decisions of the law enforcement officer leading up to the use of force that's kind of a separate component of this, which is different than then that that's really one of the major advances I think of this is actually that. And then the second part is pretty standard and that's all facts known to the law enforcement officer, which would include what the bystanders are doing. And really could also include the conduct of the person or persons involved that would be subsumed in that the reason why we have that phrase in there is is because we wanted just because we're saying the conduct of the law enforcement officer. We wanted to also make very clear that we're talking to conduct of the subject, you know, as well. But all that other stuff is caught in the facts known to the officer, including whatever bystanders are there whatever was the relevant for why the force was used that that would be subsumed in that. Okay, so if force is being used. And let's say it was questionable how much force was needed and another law enforcement officer was there and did nothing. Would they, what would, how would this bill hold that person accountable. But that is already, there's a couple places there's in the use of lethal force if somebody sees a chokehold being used. But if you recall in S2 19 that we passed. We put into the disciplinary proceedings and such intervention if there is excessive use of force. So if by you know that that a law enforcement officer is supposed to intervene. So that is covered but just not necessarily directly in this bill am I remembering that right, Bryn. You are and it does now appear in the bill in section four because we're amending the definition of prohibited restraint throughout, but it is entitled 20 and the misconduct section, a requirement that law and that a law enforcement officer intervene if they witness another law enforcement officer using excessive force. Pardon, or call 911 or something. They have to, they're required to either intervene or report to a supervisor. Okay, and can I follow up and ask Martin a question Maxine or should I wait. Okay, so Martin, if a law enforcement officer. I didn't read the vlog that day or something and was somehow negligent in knowing facts that were known to law to law enforcement but not to that officer. How is that the way it's worded now. I sort of feel like you could put your blinders on and not know a whole lot. I'm going to let Bryn take the first shot at that because she and I have talked about that but. Okay, thanks. So if I, if I represent a very, do I understand your question correctly that you're asking if there if the standards impose any duty on another law enforcement officer to Yeah, so, so basically what how it's changed of all the facts known in the law to the law enforcement officer. The one I'm saying if that law enforcement officer decided not to read the log that day that went out that said a person with Alzheimer's is on the loose and we're trying to find him and didn't know that because they they didn't follow through on information that is available but not to that officer. So, I think that where you need to look is section subsection before, and that is the analysis that the court will do in a, in a case that evaluates whether or not the officers use the force was reasonable. This is based on the totality of the circumstances, but it is the, it's the reasonable officer standard so it's going to be that that officers actions are going to be judged on that reasonableness standard so would a reasonable officer have to behave the same way in these circumstances. I understand what you're asking low is that because totality of the circumstances only includes the facts known to the officer. With that impact, the outcome and I mean I think that's a legitimate question. Thank you. Okay, go ahead and thank you and see any other hands. Okay. Maybe there is. So, trying to ask this question eloquently. When cops are called out to deal with the situation. It's not like they have a whole booklet that they have time to go and read or even a sheet of paper or anything like this to go and try to save the person that might be in trouble whether it's mentally or whatever. They're just going and trying to assess the best possible job at that time. To make sure nothing worse happens to that individual or anybody else around correct. Is it that the job of law enforcement. So I, I'm not sure that's a question for, for Bryn, in terms of the language right now we're looking at that at the language of this proposed amendment that's that's very much appreciate your question we do have a few witnesses from law enforcement testifying who I'm sure will answer be able to answer your question and. Okay, thank you. Sure. Tom. Thank you. No, I just what Barbara was saying, I just wondering if she's referring to something that happened in Vermont or, or out of Vermont, as far as the knee on the neck thing. Not in Vermont. Okay. Thank you. So I'm going to keep going then. If you, if you turn, if you scroll the page three, you'll see there's some language that has been struck through. And I just want to point out to the committee that this without the benefit of hindsight was language that h 145 as introduced included, but it was not a part of s 119 as a past last year. It was a proposal to include and we've, and we've struck it out here. So you would remove that qualification without the benefit of hindsight. So I'll get to a second and again committee, this is a proposed amendment. Just want to, you know, make that clear that we're putting this out here for discussion. Still looking at the bill as as introduced because we have not taken any, any votes on this yet. Tom. I learned to put my hand down. Sorry. No worries. Okay. Martin, go ahead. Yeah, yeah, just on that particular change. I mean, would you would you agree, Bren, I think that we, you know, that we've heard from a number of witnesses, as far as whether that's a redundancy whether that really is is captured in the language on based on the totality of the circumstances or not. I wonder if you can let us know from your perspective. Yep. So it was when you were working on s 119 last year, the, the committee gave a lot of thought to this provision about whether or not you should include that language because as you probably remember it comes that comes pretty closely from federal court jurisprudence and these types of claims. But it was you made the decision last year not to include it because of your work on the totality of the circumstances definition. So I would agree that including it here is unnecessary given that the totality of the circumstances includes that language about all facts known to the officer at the time. I believe you heard some testimony that including that qualification here as well may signal to the courts that you want to further limit their inquiry. And I would agree with the fact that courts will read will interpret every word that's included in these standards. So if you limit the if you put that limit on the totality of the circumstances and then you limit it again in the analysis section. So we'll give that meaning and it and they may further limit their inquiry based on including it in two places. Thank you. Okay. Thanks. Okay, so the next change is on page five. I'm sorry I apologize before you go ahead there was a change that was proposed that we have not made in this I mean it's it's not in the amendment it was not in the introduce but it was something certainly we've talked about. And that was the adding the to the extent feasible at the beginning of B five. If you could just explain from your perspective that language. Sure. So, B five for everybody is on page three. And just as a reminder to the committee this is that language that directs law enforcement that know that a subject's conduct is the result of some type of impairment, or disability or other factor sort of outside of the subject's control that the officer take that information into account when determining whether or not to use force and the amount of force that is is necessary. So this is another part of the standards that the committee really you took a long, you took a long time working on this language. And the focus was really whether an officer with this information who knew who had this knowledge should use it or should or not should it should that knowledge be a factor in their decision about use of force. If. So I think that some of the testimony about adding if feasible to this particular provision may have misunderstood the purpose of this provision which is, it's not this is not where the assessment is made this is not about law enforcement assessment of a person, the directive is pretty straightforward that if the officer knows has knowledge of an impairment, then they have to use that knowledge in their, in their decision making about the use of force. So, so in before directly of it, this is the provision that talks about what is feasible or not. And again before, if you remember this is kind of the. A little bit of the beating heart of this use of force section because this is where the court, this is what directs the court in their analysis of law enforcement use of force. So force has to be objectively reasonable, and their failure to use feasible and reasonable alternatives to force will factor into whether that use of force was objectively reasonable. So, this is where you have the feasible qualification is in before. And I can't, you know, before is a very important provision because it talks about that reasonableness analysis. B five is a simple sort of straightforward directive if the officer has the knowledge, then they have to use it. But that is qualified by before, because before requires that that it be feasible for an officer to use the information. And does that get at what at your question representative. Thank you. Many members is that clear, because that's, that's an important point to make sure folks understand that. Thank you. Okay, thanks. Okay, so the next. Before we go on, Brent, can you just go through an explanation on number four again. Just to make sure I've. I do understand it. Sure. So before you mean. Yes. So before this is, this provides some context for what a reasonable, what reasonableness means under these circumstances. And it says that decision by law enforcement has to whether the decision of a law enforcement officer to use force is objectively reasonable is evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation based on those two totality of the circumstances which we went through before. And that analysis is going to turn on whether there were any other feasible alternatives to the use of force. And that is where you have the feasible qualification failure to use feasible and reasonable alternatives are consideration for whether the law enforcement's conduct was objectively reasonable. Okay, we probably discussed it a hundred times but where does the perspective of a reasonable officer come from. Do you mean in the in the courts analysis. No, in number four here, shall be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation. Who, who or where does the perspective come from a colleague or So courts use this sort of reasonable person standard quite regularly and their decision making about about tort cases that come before them. So the reasonable officer standard is, is, is quite well understood by by by the courts and they, and they do use different markers to determine what is reasonable conduct. Am I am I getting to what you're asking or are you asking about whether or not there are particular witnesses that would testify as to yeah well yeah well what you what you touched on certainly. I think is part of it but is there witnesses and that type of thing also in these situations. So, my understanding is that there does not need to be expert witness testimony about what constitutes reasonable officer conduct, but rather that it's a, the inquiry is what what a reasonable officer do in that situation with an understanding that officers received certain types of training and have certain experience. But I don't I don't think expert testimony is is a part of that reasonable inquiry. And I'm a little surprised, but because as time goes on reasonable certainly changes in 1920 reasonable was probably a bit more brutal than it is today. And so is that all in the training that you mentioned. So yeah so course will often look to the law enforcement policies and determining whether or not their, their actions were reasonable. I think quite a few of the cases that you looked at when you were when you were working on 119 specifically pointed to the law enforcement's policies and training to confirm whether or not their their actions for conduct was reasonable. Great. Thanks for the refresher. Okay, thanks brain. Okay. So, I'm going to move down to page five. This is a new you've added a new subdivision to subsection C, which you remember is the is the standards for use of deadly force. So you've added a subdivision six which provides that law enforcement shall not use a chokehold on a person unless lethal forces justified pursuant to subdivision one of subsection C. If you scroll up to the previous page you remember this is that standard for when law enforcement are justified in using deadly force. And that is only when based on the totality of the circumstances such force is objectively necessary reasonable and necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person, or to the fleeing person, if the officer reasonably believes that that person will cause death or bodily injury to another serious bodily injury to another person. So only under those circumstances may a law enforcement officer use a chokehold. Martin. Yeah, I, is it appropriate at this time just for me to give a quick rationale for why I suggest, you know suggest this in this proposed amendment. Sure. So, I say, I mean, I think overall what we've done in this amendment is make much make it much clearer as far as how to address or treat chokeholds. I mean, we have the definition now where it describes what a chokehold is the previous definition was a little in my view a little bit odd, because it was a definition that also put restrictions on on a chokehold in other words it was. The move and also it's, it's prohibited be if it leads to death or serious bodily injury and it just didn't make that much sense there so. So the chokehold definition just talks about the move. And by having this language in here. It's very clear that chokeholds are not to be used in a situation where law enforcement officer wants to restrain an individual where law enforcement officer wants to use that chokehold to help effectuate an arrest. None of those things are allowed it's very clear that those things are not allowed. But what this does is it addresses I think the very legitimate concern that we heard from various law enforcement officers. What about the situation where where the law enforcement officers grappling with an individual where the fairly strict definition of when lethal or deadly force can be used does apply that there's an imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death. And there's no other option. You know that why should that law enforcement officer not use what would make a lot of sense as opposed particularly if if you say well instead use your firearm. So this makes it very clear in a very restricted manner that a chokehold in very limited circumstances can be used. And also there's some protection in the use of deadly force standards, particularly in C3 where they must cease the use of deadly force once that subject is under the officers control or it doesn't you know, doesn't pose the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury so this was really you know this is something just I think clarifies what we actually kind of we're doing but not in a very clear way with s1 19 in conjunction with the prohibited offense. The situation without this amendment is that yes a law enforcement officer in that situation that I just described could use a chokehold and then would look to the justifiable homicide defense under the new offense that we have for prohibited restraint that so they would have that ability but it's just not as clear this clarifies that you know we recognize that there are limited circumstances where a chokehold may be an appropriate action for law enforcement officer to take so I just, I think this just clarifies what what we're trying to do relative to what we passed last fall. So thanks. Thank you. Okay, so the next change you see right below it is just that we've replaced prohibited restraint with chokehold, which we're going to do several other places in the bill. So moving on to section two. This is the, the prohibition on law enforcement use of chokeholds in title 13. Replacing prohibited restraint with chokeholds replacing the definition. This is exactly as it appears in the standard section. So it's made on section six. I'm sorry, on page six subdivision to and then also just replacing replacing the language throughout that that crime section three. This is the, this is new. I think the remaining sections of the bill are new. So is the provision that the criminal justice council shall not offer or approve of any training on the use of prohibited restraints, except to identify and prevent their use. So the changes here just for just swap out prohibited restraint for chokehold. And then the following section section four is the definitions section of law which applies to the council. And on page seven, we've replaced prohibited restraint with chokeholds. And on page eight is where we replace the definition. Section five. This is the language in title 20 that passed as a part of s 219 last year. And regarding administrative penalties that the council can impose for the use of excessive force or the use of a prohibited restraint. And again, the changes here are just to swap out prohibited restraint for chokeholds. And then that is the remainder of the bill on page nine is as it appeared in the as introduced version. So no other changes there. Thank you. We'll have a question. So, now, going back to page five section sub six. So a law enforcement officer shall not use a chokehold on a person unless lethal force is justified pursuant to subdivision one of the subsection. So, you know, in short, if the officer believed their life was in danger or the life of someone else that they would still be possible to use a chokehold is that correct. Correct. As long as as it's found to be objectively reasonable and necessary. Yes. But then a section later, then on page six, it says under subsection. So, F, the council should not approve offer approve any training on the use of a chokehold is defined in section. In this chapter, except for training designated to identify and prevent the use of chokeholds. So, is the bill is currently written are we saying in a life or death situation. A law enforcement officer could employ a chokehold, but in their actual training they're not going to be taught how to use one. Yes. That seems a little odd to me it's like if we're going to allow them to, if we're going to allow them to employ chokeholds and life or death situations. I am not certain I'm comfortable with the idea that they're not going to be trained on how to employ one. If they are in a life or death situation where it needs to be used, you know, one I certainly want a law enforcement officer to be able to defend themselves and save their life necessary. But also I would think that if it is allowed under some circumstances I would want a law enforcement officer to be properly trained on how to use one because they might do less damage with training than if they were sort of improvising on the fly. So I feel like there's a bit of a disconnect between between page five and page six here. Thank you. Thank you, I'm not sure if you're able to address that but certainly again we will have members from the law enforcement community testifying to to address questions like that. Yeah, I mean I think that you represent have not as identified one of the major points of that the committee both in the house and in the Senate. We're dealing with during S 118. Any other questions for Bryn in terms of the proposed language committee okay I'm not seeing any any hands up. So let's let's take a 15 minute break, and then we will start with disability rights.