 לק क्लайज Nik bízla kélل isiej अर्डौय मैंने शॉ marketed ौMarna ौWhen we Guru of beginning of time, during the time of Cultivation, the total main negative of the person is greater than  Cristo in his existence. ॐइ ण� आः औं़ ॉ more ूत् Rah Vajnath ॐश्मुवृ औक ॐ अज आआआँय़ू���ौौौ край ूऊऔौौग़ग़ू आ [?]. ॆ मैर वण क्रु अऊळ रह Shadow Muha the important problem in the philosophy of mind and without proper understanding of personal understand it is very difficult to know what exactly the main problem of mind and today I am going to explain about the concept of persons especially a non materialistic view of person, special relations to stressons concept of persons, how stressons explains the concept of persons is different from Williams, Locke and many other materialistic philosopher, the concept of persons is one of the most important concept in the philosophy of mind, the present thesis M is to outline and explain the non materialistic theory of the mind and persons and here the fundamental question is what is a person and what is its nature, it was a person who has proposed a theory of mind and for him that a person is not just a material body, but also a thinking self therefore according to decades a person is a self, a self conscious mind which thinks, feels, desires and so on, the materialists have however rejected the Cartesian theory of persons and have argued that persons are most material bodies though they are complex material systems with some sort of mental properties, it is wrong to say that mind is the brain or mind has only physical properties, our brain has a particular size, shape and special locations, in virtue of these qualities our brain has a particular look, we can say that our brain can be variously experienced, the qualities of such experience are related in some way to the material object, but if this is so where do we situate the qualitative of experience, there are many neuroscientists they may say that all these are neural activities, now the question is where are they, the answer is that they are located in your mind, this implies that the mind is distinct from the body, the problem of this essay is to question are persons material bodies, the metals they have argued that persons are material bodies although very complex material bodies, the main aim of this section is to show that persons are not merely material entity and we have to show that a person is non-material entities, firstly we have to see now what is person, in this sections that is to say that we have to examine the nature of a person from a non-materialistic point of view, before analyzing this concept of persons, we have to raise a few questions like what is persons, what is the nature of a persons and so on, these questions are fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind, in fact the word persons refer to English word person is alleged to have a derived from the latin persona which was the mask worn by actors in dramatic performance, neither in common sense uses nor in philosophy has there have been a univocal concept of persons, in common sense uses persons refers to a any human beings in a general way, the person is distinct from a thing or a material object, it is general stands for a living conscious human beings, but persons definitions of persons is different from Williams, because as we know a person says that mind is something, it has some kind of personal properties to which both the predicate, p predicate and m predicate is applicable, that I will be explaining in this lectures, but according to Williams, Williams body criteria is the primary criteria to explain the persons. Storson defines that a person as a type of entity such that both predicate ascribing state of consciousness and predicate ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situations etcetera are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type, thus for Storson persons are unique individual who have both mental and physical, thus persons are neither purely physical body, nor are there a pure spiritual substance, however from Storson's view of persons is purely non material, whereas Williams view of persons is purely material, which opposes Storson's Storsonians view, this is because Williams claim is that bodily continuity is a necessary condition for personal identity, because according to Williams it is body which identify the persons, but not the mind and there is no mind at all, therefore bodily criteria identify the persons, thus it is clear that Storson would certainly rejected the contention that mental attributes are reducible to physical attributes, because Storson admit that the concept of persons is non material, but here the question arises does Storson's wish to say that persons are bodies of a certain sort namely bodies which have mental attributes as only, Storson's holds that persons have bodily attributes too, but unlike ordinary bodies persons are things which have mental attributes as well, according to Storson it is essential to persons that they are entities which necessarily have mental and bodily attributes, in addition those mental things are essential different from physical things, they are different types of substance, persons are radical different material bodies, Storson's theory looks like dualistic in holding that there are two different types of substance the physical bodies and the persons, again this physical bodies necessarily have only one dimensions that is a physical dimensions, persons necessarily have two dimensions a physical and a mental dimensions, persons thus have a dual nature, now we may have to look at the relationship between the knowledge a person has of himself and the knowledge of that of others of him, there are general three views on the personal identity, firstly if the unity of a person is necessarily connected with the continuance of his body through time, then it is impossible for a person to survive the death of his body, secondly if bodily identity is necessarily criteria of personal identity, then it could not be shown that some non physical characteristics of a person continues after his bodily death, on the other hand if bodily identity is not a necessary criteria of the personal identity, persons bodily death is merely one major event in a persons history and not the end of his life, finally if the fundamental criteria of identity were memory, it would follow that a person might be known to have survived death, because he continued to have memories in his disembodied state, the most important fact about the person is the self, the self is sometimes used to mean the whole series of a persons inner mental state and sometimes the spiritual substance to which they belong, the self does not refer to the body, but to the mental history of the persons, this made the unity problem seems intractable, because when the mental images like feelings and the like are contrasted with the temporary persistence, instruction sense a person is a thing which necessary has both mental and physical aspects, the person is primarily the subject of mental experience, in the person theory we cannot say that a person is a body, but we can say that a person is in part a body, if person is a body then it cannot be conscious mind, one of the important question is can we even say that a persons has a body, instruction would say that, but what would it mean about the theory of persons, it means that persons have bodily attributes, another question is does it say anything about the relationship between a person and a body, the body necessarily has bodily attributes and has nothing to do with a persons attributes, but stressions view is that persons have both bodily and mental attributes, we recognize all human beings as persons, this is because we generally do not make a distinction between person and human beings, but we can hardly contemplate the coexistence of biological, very different persons inhabiting other planets who are not human beings like us, the concept of person is in some way an inalienable part of our conceptual scheme, in our conceptual scheme persons and human beings coincide, like joseph merguez in his book on persons and minds, mention that persons are the particulars that have minds and nervous systems, sensations and brain processes, but this will not quite do you know to explain the personal identity, a nervous system is not a persons nor is a psyche a persons, it is at once the subject of both neurological and psychological predicates, in other words it is both nervous systems and a psyche entity, persons are not mereological complex entities nor kind, each of which contains parts a non physical basic subject and a purely corporeal object which this subject is in some way attached, for such a claim would not allow us to ascribe psychological attributes or corporeal attributes to the persons as a whole, it is because persons are more than their bodies and that they are not reducible to any kind of body, gross or subtool, the person substance as described above is not taken to exclude the material properties as such, they only exclude the fact that persons are material bodies and nothing else, persons are autonomous so far as the description in terms of bodies and mind is concerned, but it is not that no reference to body and minds is to be retained at all, thus persons described have the attributes reference to the body and mind, from the above discussion we can reiterate the Cartesian distinction between the mind and the body, they are opposed to the each other because the essence of mind is thinking and the essence of body is extensions, which I have already explained in the some of the lectures, that is to say that the body is something special, which is perishable, the mind of a person is something non-special, after death the body only remains, this concept of the body becomes grossly explicit when we refer to it as the remains, however it is this conception of the body which comes closest to the found in the person's theory, in this theory we find that the body is not a person, nor is a part of the person, it is the person it is in so far as he is thought of as the subject of body attributes, but it becomes a reality at a death, we call it a coughs, therefore one of the paradoxical implication of the person's theory is that the body which a person has cannot be conceived of as a physical object subject to the laws of physical world, as we know from this theory that persons are conscious, finally from the above examinations we came to know that a persons body is not a physical thing, therefore it is very difficult to identify persons with physical body, now you have to see how the persons mind and consciousness goes together, and what is the relationship between person mind and consciousness, as we have argued so far as person is an entity which has both mental and physical attributes, we could say of a person that he is 5 tall and weight 100 kilogram and many other things, but more importantly we could say that he is a thinking about his friends, feels a pang of happiness or is sad or so on, we may therefore say that person has a mind which is different from his body, because the subject of consciousness does not mean a body of a certain sort, but it still might turn out that whatever is a subject of consciousness is identical with a body of certain sort, stresses reject the view that the subject of a state of consciousness is only immaterial, non physical, a thing to which nothing but a state of consciousness can be ascribed, according to him consciousness is not applicable to physical things, not purely immaterial substance is applicable to persons, but a fundamental question is what is consciousness, generally consciousness is described as something which distinguishes man from a good deal of the world around, only a person possesses this consciousness which is not by other material objects, again the question arises that what is this consciousness which a person certainly has, but rocks and other animates beings do not have, as G. Moore writes the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what distinctly it is, it seems to vanish, it seems as if we had before us as mere emptiness when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue, the other elements is as if it were diaphanos, we know perfectly well that we are conscious of things around us including other people, but we do not grasp conscious of the mind, it is this common feature consciousness which may be said to be the central element in the concept of mind, if we are asked to give a general characterization of the branch of philosophy called philosophy of mind, we might say that it is that branch particular concern with the nature of consciousness, we will call them mental phenomena to which only beings capable of consciousness are subject, mental phenomena are such as ways of beings conscious that is hearing, imagining and many other mental capacities, person is a minded being and have the capacity of doing the mental activities, such activities include thinking, willing, feeling, understanding, speaking, communicating and above all remembering the past mental activities are such that they presupposes that there is a thinking who is capable of these activities, the thinking is here a subject or I who is or has the capacity of consciousness, wherever we will find the concept of I, we will find the existence of consciousness because it is persons who stand for the concept of I and have consciousness, one of the most general view is that the philosophy of mind is concerned with all mental phenomena which they themselves are concerned with consciousness, philosophy of mind which they themselves from Decathlon words have accepted consciousness as a fundamental metaphysical reality, I remain the same person if I am conscious of being so even though my body should change drastically and be diminished through imputations, logically it is possible that I should remain the same persons although I am all together distributed persons, therefore persons are indivisible non-corporal simple entities, it is because it becomes difficult here to distribute this persons so constitute from metaphysical self that is transcendental ego, spirit, mental substance, soul and other similar immaterial substances, however the concept of persons does not fit into these entities because persons are if anything concrete beings in the world, one can ascribe consciousness others only if one can identify other subject of experience, in addition one cannot identify other subject if one can identify them only as subject of experience, position of state of consciousness the latter must have concrete existence in the world, if we are too obsessed with the inner criteria we shall be tempted to treat persons as essentially as minds, however admitting outer criteria does not mean that there are no state of consciousness, we should claim that some pre predicates refer to the occurrence of state of consciousness, the persons are uncertainly identical beings having the life of their one, they are not definitely Cartesian egos rather they possess mixed bag of m predicates and p predicates, persons are in any case conscious individual who can be ascribed a larger number of predicates such as thinking, feeling, willing, deciding etcetera, these conscious states according to soul are intentional that is are of something and it transfer something and those intentionality which we have explained already that is they are directed to something outside them, those persons have these conscious states are intentional and mental beings, again only being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentionality at all and so every unconscious state is at least potentially consciousness, potentially conscious, these thesis has enormous consequence for the study of the mind, but there is a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality that are the consequences that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness and our consciousness is of consciousness of something, thus persons have the essential features of consciousness, there is an interconnections between persons mind and consciousness, empirically there is a distinction among them, but transcendently they point in the same directions, it is right to say that a persons is a mental being and the essence of mind is consciousness, therefore the concept of mind and the consciousness goes together, thus consciousness is related to mind which also belongs to a persons, therefore in this way consciousness mind and person goes together, now we have to see the dual nature of persons, why there is a dual nature, because as we have seen from the even in Cartesian view and then in the stresson view also there is also dualism also is there, the problem person has traditionally been raised in a dualistic context, it has been greatly influenced those who have discussed by the picture of a person as composed of two entities body and mind which are continuously related to each other, the persons substance are not merely a set of properties physical or mental, because they are not fully exhausted in their existence, the description of the persons as having such and such properties are complete, still presupposes that there are persons as having those properties, according to stresson the properties like being at such and such time and place having such and such weight color and so on are impredicate, the other properties are psychological properties like being in the state of happiness, being in the state of pain and so on are the state of prepredicates, in his way stresson has rightly said the concept of persons is to be understood as the concept of type of entities, such that both predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics a physical situation and consciousness are equally applicable to an individual entities of that type, stresson has pointed out that the co-applicability to the same persons substance, the impredicates cannot be ascribable independently because of that prohibits them from being ascribable to the conscious beings like impredicates, the prepredicates cannot be ascribed to the material bodies, this is because combination of distinct kind of substance that has both physical and mental properties without being reducible to each other, the above argument shows that stresson consider persons as non material and non dual without rejecting Cartesian dualism, this is because decades held that when we are on the concept of persons we are really referring to one or both of the two distinct substances of different types, each of which has its one appropriate type of states and properties and none of the states belongs to both, that is to say that state of consciousness belong to one of the substance and to the other, Dekar has given a sharp focus on this dualistic concept of persons, it is not easy to get away from dualism because persons have both sort of attributes such as mental and physical, according to dualistic conceptions a person is something altogether distinct from body, that is a person is not identical with his body, some dualists however believe that person is a composite entity, one part of which is its body and another part of which is something immaterial spirit or soul, the dualism essentially adheres to the mind body distinctions and persons as mental beings are distinct from material bodies, according to Dekar's the self of a person is something altogether distinct from its body, so the self is altogether non physical lacking in all physical characteristics whatever, in this interpretations we can say that person is an immaterial substance a spirit or a soul which stands in special relation to certain physical body which is its body, Dekar think that a person is some sort of combination of an immaterial soul and a physical body, which stand to one another in a rather mysterious relation of substantial, there is one kind of substantial union in both body and mind, but Cartesian dualism does not maintain that a person is immaterial stuff on the contrary it maintains that a person is a combination of body and mind, in fact our bodies and we are utterly unlike one another in respect to the sort of properties that we possess, our bodies have special extensions and location in physical space whereas, we have no such qualities, on the other hand we have thought and feelings, states of consciousness whereas, our bodies are known to have qualities other than these, but the question arises should a person not simply be identified with a certain physical body as Williams has argued. Strussens gives an answer to the above questions, he says that mental state such as thoughts, feelings seems to not to be properly attribute to something like a body, but only to a person, one is inclined to or that it is I who thinks and feels not my body even if I need to have a body to be able to think and feel. However, if a person is composed of body, but not identical with it, then it seems that every part of the body most be a part of the persons, but not every part of the person can be the part of the body. So, one of the plausible assumption is that a person has a parts which are not identical with the body and so it is not identical with the body. By saying this we are denying that a person is composed of body, all that is meant is that persons have both bodily and mental existence, persons are not purely or distributed spirit, but if you see one of the most important thing course in the philosophy of mind is AJ IR and he says that the relationship between consciousness and the subject to which is attributed is a contingent relations. According to him a person is not a purely immaterial stuff or immaterial subject, it is rather an embodied person to which mental attributes are a casual ascribable. He accept a casual relation between the person and his body, therefore according to him there is no contradiction in holding that a persons body would have been inhabited by another persons. A stresson says that it rejects the idea of casual relation to other, according to him persons are more primitive than their mind and body, that is persons are primary than where the mind and body are secondary, because for him the considered person is a primitive concept and this primitiveness of the person gives one kind of distinctness in stresson and concept of mind or persons. In the case of persons both mind and body is ascribable, but not in the case of mind and body. Now, you have to see persons as individual, John Locke says that the considered person is something like forensic question, but the stresson says that the considered person is something primitive concept. Locke uses of the persons while it raises philosophical problems of its own, perhaps it is less, it is because of that there is a one kind of dispute in both the explanations, especially in the Locke's explanations says that considered person is forensic concept, but stresson's person is metaphysical concept like the concept of the self and therefore, it is not merely social or forensic concept. Radhan points out that it is a metaphysical concept of persons, because it shows that how it can be used to describe the minded being as a unique substance, which is not identical with the body, though it is necessary linked with the body, that is to say that persons have material bodies and yet they are not on same level as the physical bodies or organism. Persons therefore, are not physical things at all, that is because persons are transcendental their physical existence, therefore persons are transcendental being. The transcendental qualities however show that persons are explainable from the first person perspective, the first person perspective are unique individual, that is an I who experience as Woodman's sense point out that even it is the name which can substituent I, therefore the first person is not the description of any human beings, because it refers to the third person perspective, but it refers to the person himself or herself. This does not mean that persons is distinct from this world, but person is a part of this world. As Strussian persons to begin with is to be understood as distinct from a mere material body, which retains the contrast customarily observed between person and things. According to Strussians each of us distinguishes between himself and the state of himself on the other hand and what is not himself or state of himself on the other hand. Then the question is what are the conditions of our making this distinction? Why do we make it in the way we do? Strussians argues that in your conceptual scheme material bodies are basic properties. This means that material bodies could be identified without referring to another individual in particular, whereas the identification and re-identification of particulars of other categories rest ultimately on the identification of material bodies. Then Strussian enquires whether we could make intelligible to our self a conceptual scheme in which material bodies are not basic. This leads him to the construction of the model no space world in which all the sensory items are but in which it did seem possible to find a place for idea of re-identifiable particulars by exploiting certain auditory analogous of the idea of special substance. The requirements was for a scheme in which a distinction was made between oneself and not on self oneself. Let us now think of some ways in which we ordinarily talk of ourselves certain things which we do and which are ordinarily ascribed to ourselves. We ascribe ourselves as intentions, sensations and feeling, perceptions and memories also. We ascribe ourselves locations and attitudes. Of course, not only we ascribe ourselves temporarily conditions like state situations but also enduring characters including physical characters like height, shape, weight that is to say that those among the things that we ascribe to ourselves are those that we ascribe to material bodies but there are things and attributes that we ascribe to ourselves but cannot dream of ascribing to material bodies. Let us take a visual experience. First there is a group of empirical facts of which the most familiar of that is the eyes of that body are closed. The person sees nothing. To this group belong all the facts known to the aphthalerotic surgeons. Secondly, there is the fact that falls within the field of vision at any moment of depending part of the orientation of this eyes that is the direction his head is turned in and on the orientation of his eyeball in the sockets. Thirdly, there is the fact that where he sees from what is possible field of vision at any moment it depends on the body. But Sturgeon divides these facts into the group to emphasize in the following the fact that visual experience in all these three ways depends on the fact about the body or bodies. It is a contingent fact that it is same body. Each person's body occupies a special position in relation to that person's perceptual experience. For each person's there is one body occupies certain causal position in relation to the that person's perceptual experiences. For Sturgeon's a person's body occupies an important position in a person's experience. So, that he could answer to the following questions satisfactorily. Firstly, why are one state of consciousness ascribed to anything at all and why are they are ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics. For the Cartesian this question does not arises. It is only a linguistic illusion that both kind of predicates are properly ascribed to one and the same that there is a common owner or subject. They have said that when we speak of a person we refer to two distinct substances. The state of consciousness belong to one those of the substance and not to other. Sturgeon says that he escapes one of our questions but he does not escape the other. Why is that because state of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? In order to overcome above problems Sturgeon's used the concept of persons as a primitive concept. Then he said what I mean by the concept of person is the concept of type of entities such that both predicates ascribing state of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal character physical situation and C and R equal applicable to type. Why he is saying that it is because the concept of person is a one kind of primitive concept. Now we can get answer to the above questions which Descartes raised but Sturgeon said that the answer to these two questions are connected in this manner. That is a necessary condition of state of consciousness ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics a certain physical situation and C. That is to say stand up a consciousness could not be ascribed at all where as they were ascribed to persons in that sense I have claimed for this world. Above Sturgeon's view says that a necessary condition of a state of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to persons. The concept of person is prior to that of a an individual consciousness. A person is not an embodied ego but an ego might be a disembodied persons. Again Sturgeon's points out that one can ascribe state of consciousness to others only if one can identify other subject of experience. In addition one cannot identify others if one can identify then only as subject of experience that this way will lead to Cartesianism. We cannot but refer to the bodies of others. So, state of consciousness could not be ascribed at all unless they are ascribed to an individual persons who has a body. So, the pure individual persons or consciousness in the sense of pure ego is a concept that cannot exist. It can exist only as a secondary non-primity concept but can be analysed in terms of concept of persons. The pure individual consciousness cannot exist as a primary concept to be used in the explanation of the concept of persons but it might have logically secondary existence. From within our conceptual scheme each of us concepts of his or her individual survival of bodily death one has to think of oneself as having thought memories in a disembodied state but this disembodied state is only a secondary concept because cannot but think a person as embodied beings. According to Sturgeon's a person is not an embodied ego but an ego might be a disembodied persons retaining the logical benefits of individual from having been a persons. As we have seen there are two kinds of predicates properly applied to individuals of this type. The first kind of predicate consists of those that are also properly applied to material bodies to which we do not ascribe state of consciousness which he calls impredicate. The second type consists of those predicates such as thinking hard, believing in God which he calls prepredicates. Therefore Sturgeon says that the concept of person is to be understood as the concept of type of entity such that both predicate ascribing state of consciousness and those ascribing state of corporeal characteristics that is impredicates are equally applicable to an individual entity. Then he said that the concept of persons is to be understood as the concept of type of entity such that both predicate ascribing state of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics physical situation and see are equally applicable to an individual of that entity of that type. Sturgeon is not taking the concept of person as a secondary concept in the relation to two primary kinds that all particular consciousness and a human body. Sturgeon says that though not all prepredicates are what we should call predicates ascribing state of consciousness that is going for a work and many other things they may be said to have this in common that they are imply the position of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed. From the above stand point what Sturgeon want to say is that one ascribe prepredicates to others on the strength of observation of their behavior and that behavior criteria one goes on a on are not just science of the presence of what is meant by the prepredicates. What are criteria one goes and are not just science of presence of that that is meant by preprede but are criteria of a logical adequate that kind of ascriptions of the prepredicate this claim shows that persons is immaterial because of state of consciousness is applicable to persons this is because there are predicates which could not be self ascribable and other ascribable to the same individual. But there are remains many cases in which one has an entirely adequate basis for ascribing prepredicates to oneself and yet this basis is distinction from those one which one ascribe the predicates to another. In other words these predicates have the same meaning and both ways of ascription is in perfect individual that is why prepredicates have certain characteristics such as I am in pain I am depressed and etcetera and one should not ascribe to some body from these observation because this is less to third person perspective of the consider persons. Moreover the above explanation begs an important questions that is how can one ascribe oneself not on the basis of observations the very same thing that others may have on the basis of observations reasons of a logically adequate kind of ascribing one which might be phrased. Sturgeon says that the above questions may be observed in a wider one which might be phrased the questions are how are prepredicates possible and how is the consider persons is possible. Sturgeon says that these two questions are replacing those two earlier questions that are why are one state of consciousness ascribe to anything at all and why are they ascribe to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics. The answer to these two questions are inherited in the primitiveness of the consider person this is because the uniqueness characters of prepredicates because he or she who is an individual have the prepredicates the attributes of prepredicates that make a person is an individual the persons are metaphysical beings claims an ontological reality in the sense they could not be what they are without metaphysical essence. Therefore this is the essence about the concept of persons according to stresson and stresson has been explaining the metaphysical point of view on persons. Thank you.