 Section 46 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Operations in Mississippi, Longstreet in East Tennessee, Commissioned Lieutenant General, Commanding the Armies of the United States, First Interview with President Lincoln. Soon after his return from Knoxville, I ordered Sherman to distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville. Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained for the purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected also to have the cooperation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. Of course, I approved heartily. About the 10th of January, Sherman was back in Memphis where Hurlbut commanded and got together his Memphis men or ordered him collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. Sherman knew that General, Bishop Polk, was occupying Meridian with his headquarters and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined therefore to move directly upon Meridian. I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Suey Smith to Sherman's department and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against Forrest who was then known to be southeast from Memphis. Smith was ordered to move about the 1st of February. While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. When these scouts returned, it was through them that he got the information of General Polk's being at Meridian and of the strength and disposition of his command. Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men who under so able a leader were very effective. Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest but not equal man to man for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest men had had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won and followed up their victories improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officer and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on, neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. Sherman got off on the 3rd of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition, whatever, until he crossed the Big Black and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of Confederate infantry and he was obliged to keep his army close together. He had no serious engagement, but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came nearer being picked up. He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian and thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south and also for the purpose of hearing from Suey Smith, who, he supposed, had met Forrest before this time, and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the first as expected, had not left until the 11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's favor. Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a cooperative movement with him against Shreeport subject to my approval. I disapproved of Sherman's going himself because I had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. He must have them for the spring campaign. The Trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive. My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign in Siege, had, while there, contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that, on the 24th of January, I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to anyone else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me, and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had remained at Nashville. When I obtained this leave, I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee cooperate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I directed Thomas and Logan, who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at least 10,000 men, besides Stanley's division, which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department, and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. About this time, General Foster, who had been in command of the department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him, advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was, that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could affect the most for their cause. I thought the advice was good, and adopting that view countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet. On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible, and I directed him to move without delay, finding that he had not moved on the 17th, I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to cooperate with Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again on the 21st, he, not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start the next day. He finally got off on the 22nd or 23rd, the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go any farther because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon fell back. Phil Field also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces following would be receding from theirs. On the 2nd of March, however, I learned of Sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the third, I was ordered to Washington. The bill, restoring the grade of Lieutenant General of the Army, had passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. My nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March, and confirmed the next day, the 2nd. I was ordered to Washington on the 3rd to receive my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion, by President Lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me, and, and, a few other visitors. The President, in presenting my commission, read from a paper, stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The President said, General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission constituting you, Lieutenant General in the Army of the United States, with this high honor, devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with what I hear speak for the nation, goes my own hardy personal concurrence. To this I replied, Mr. President, I accept the commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men. On the tenth I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station, then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there, and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the Spring Campaign. It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I was made Lieutenant General. But when I got to Washington and saw the situation it was playing, that here was the point for the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back, to have Sherman advance to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My commission, as Lieutenant General, was given to me on the 9th of March 1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Mead, commanding the Army of the Potomac at his headquarters at Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan. I had no general Mead slightly in the Mexican War, but had not met him since until this visit. I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac. I might say to all except the officers of the regular Army who had served in the Mexican War. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that Army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Mead evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to Mead that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting anyone for him as to Sherman he could not be spared from the West. This incident gave Mead even a more favorable opinion of Mead than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. Mead's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all of the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the Potomac, except from the authorities at Washington. All other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as anyone present with them was concerned. I tried to make General Mead's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the Potomac to Mead to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct I established my headquarters near his unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the 11th I returned to Washington and on the day after orders were published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies. I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in the West and to meet Sherman, whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville. Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first point which I wish to discuss was particularly about the cooperation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by Sanguinary War, the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Bewell, McCook, Negley, and Crittenden in the West. Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the General-in-Chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me, now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleveland with the one Chattanooga to Atlanta. There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective and that important railroad center Atlanta the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign and at the time I met General Sherman it was expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies and would be ready to cooperate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the program being to move upon Mobile by land while the Navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible to capture Atlanta and hold it and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two again as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made. The success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again I left Sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while I looked out for the rest. I directed however that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the assignment of General Beall to duty. I received the assurance that duty would be offered to him and afterwards the Secretary told me that he had offered Beall an assignment and that the latter had declined it saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in the Old Army. Sherman ranked him as a Brigadier General. All of them ranked me in the Old Army and Sherman and Beall did as Brigadiers. The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the Commander Commander he is ordered to report to. On the 23rd of March I was back in Washington and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Colpairpore Courthouse a few miles south of the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as Lieutenant General. I knew him however very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before when they were rival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident of Missouri and by no means a Lincoln man in that contest but I recognized in his great ability. In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted and never wanted to interfere in them but that procrastination on the part of commanders and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress which was always with him forced him into issuing his series of military orders one, two, three, etc. He did not know but they were all wrong and did know that some of them were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was someone who would take the responsibility and act and call on him for all the assistance needed pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended. The Secretary of War I had met once before only but felt that I knew him better. While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires at night when they were not being otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything ask of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. I did not communicate my plans to the President nor did I to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck. March the 26th my headquarters were as stated at Culpeper and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. End of Section 46. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at joclev.com. Section 47 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant Chapter 47. The Military Situation. Plans for the campaign. Sheridan assigned to command of the military. Flank movements. Forest at Fort Pillow. General Banks's expedition. Colonel Mosby. An incident of the wilderness campaign. When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this. The Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its north. The line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the northwest north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga. Thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston Rivers taking in nearly all of the state of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands and that part of Old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia, Plymouth Washington and New Bern in North Carolina, Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia, Ferdinandia, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the southern territory and empire in extent was still in the hands of the Army. Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the Alleghenies and north of Natchez with a large movable force about Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported Sherman and were subject to his orders. This arrangement, however, ensured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. In the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before or when the war began. They were both between the federal and Confederate capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea coast in Virginia and North Carolina, but beyond that no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war overground from the James River and Czechohomaniac near Richmond to Gettysburg and Chambersburg in Pennsylvania with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National Army, sometimes to the Confederate Army, but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern Press if not by the Southern Generals. The Northern Press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims. A portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled hours, while another portion most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal Armies would, nevertheless, generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. That portion of the Army of the Potomac, not engaged in guarding lines of communication, was on the Northern Bank of the Rapidan. The Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river was strongly entrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ableist general in the Confederate Army. The country, back to the James River, is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross, except where bridged. The region is heavily timbered and the roads narrow and narrow. After the least rain, such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. To provision an Army campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. The Union Armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another, more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the center, and all west to Memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing, the Army of the James under General Butler as the left wing, and all the troops south as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners. Where they could not do this, their positions were abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army of the James from South Carolina alone with General Gilmore in command. It was not contemplated that General Gilmore should leave his department, but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands. Concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of it, the Ninth Army Corps, over twenty thousand strong under General Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. The Corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea coast, south of Norfolk in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact Burnside and the War Department both thought the Ninth Corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee Commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac. The second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chattanooga. Besides these main armies, the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force, making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west and the Army of the James guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours and with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly, I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's Army and Atlanta being his objective points. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Golly River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications or see them destroyed and a large amount of storage and provision which they so much needed fallen to our hands. Siegel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective. Before the advance commenced, I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I'd ever met him. Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign, I invited his views. They were very much such as I intended to direct and as I did direct in writing before leaving. General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of Major General shortly after the Battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the Coors under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith's promotion were well founded. In one of my early interviews with the President, I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man in the Army for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up saying, how would Sheridan do? I replied, the very man I want. The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the Cavalry Corps with the Army of the Potomac. Disrelieved General Alfred Pleasanton. It was not a reflection on that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the General Move, mobile to be his objective. At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy or by his left. Each plan presented advantages. If by his right, my left, the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay, and tributaries would furnish us an easy holding distance of every position the Army could occupy from the rapid down to the James River, but Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole Army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following. A movement by his left, our right, would obviate this but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. While these preparations were going on, the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West, Forest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city, he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forest's raid I telegraph Sherman to send all his cavalry against him and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. Forest, however, fell back rapidly and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and attachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops fought bravely but were overpowered. I will leave Forest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. The river was died, he said, with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that Negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners. Subsequently, Forest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. At the east also the rebels were busy. I had said to Halick that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's command. If success attended our arms, both places and others too would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by federal troops before I took command of the armies and I knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them and therefore explained my views. But before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington but directed the holding of New Bern at all hazards. This was essential because New Bern was a port into which blockade runners could enter. General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to General Command. I had opposed the movement strenuously but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By direction of Halick I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River and turn over the line of that river to Steele who commanded in Arkansas to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were given accordingly and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A.J. Smith's command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part of the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back in time to take part in the program as laid down. Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May 1864 had been begun. The services of forty thousand veteran troops over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks however to say that his expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He opposed the expedition. By the 27th of April Spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the Great Move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up to James River as possible by daylight and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in Washington City which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Siegel was in Winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rappahannock to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and entrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. If the army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to Richmond called Beauregard from the south to reinforce it and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then too I ordered to move simultaneous with that of the army at the Potomac up the James River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. While my headquarters were at Culpeper from the 26th of March to the 4th of May I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with the Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion a few days before moving a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps or regiment which operated in the rear of the army at the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion as the train approached Warrenton Junction a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I was on a special train if I remember correctly without any guard. Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army and so near the border of hostilities as long as he did without losing his entire command. On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the president before reaching the James River. He had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line and seemed to think he had a new feature in war. I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured and to prevent incursions into the northern states. These troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still and by advancing they would confel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was, oh yes, I see that. As we say out west if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does. There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness Campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak. And to avoid a digression further on I will mention it here. A few days before my departure from Culpeper the honorable E. B. Washburn visited me there and remained with my headquarters for some distance south through the battle of the Wilderness and I think to Spotsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me and I have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to have him, Swinton, accompany the army and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted however in the character of the information he could give. We received Richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was desirable therefore that correspondence should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events he was not invited and soon I found that he was corresponding with some paper, I have now forgotten which one, thus violating his word either expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburn had given as to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us however for a time at least. The second night after crossing the rapidan, the night of the 5th of May, Colonel W. R. Rowley of my staff was acting as night officer at my headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal instructions for the night, three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. A few nights still later, after the first and possibly after the second days fighting in the wilderness, General Mead came to my tent for consultation bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both his staff and mine retired to the campfire some yards in front of the tent thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump a little to one side and between the front of the tent and the campfire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump listening to the conversation between Mead and myself. He called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the historian, and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eavesdropping. The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Mead came to my headquarter saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. End of Section 47, recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at joclev.com. Section 48 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 48 Commencement of the Grand Campaign General Butler's Position Sheridan's First Raid The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was, therefore, almost an independent objective. It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee, and his army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was the plan, and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but cooperative columns. As stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River and eliminated the use of 40,000 veterans whose cooperation in the Grand Campaign had been expected, 10,000 with Sherman and 30,000 against Mobile. Siegel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, according to program, but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the Valley, I received instead the following announcement from Halleck. Siegel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run, never did anything else. The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns and some 900 men out of his 6,000. The plan had been for an advance of Siegel's forces in two columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously, the other proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell, his western column advanced from the golly in West Virginia at the appointed time and with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having accomplished this, they recrossed the alligaties to metal bluffs and there awaited further orders. Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's Army. At midnight they turned back and Butler, by daylight, was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day without loss and no doubt very much to the surprise of the enemy. This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand but should Lee fall back into Richmond. I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun entrenching and on the 70th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond but no great success attended these latter efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack Petersburg which was almost defenseless. About the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff about halfway between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the meantime Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attacked Butler with great vigor and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital. The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly enclosed by means of a single entrenched line and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by the James River, his left by the Appomattox and his rear by their junction, the two streams uniting nearby. The bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for entrenchments while it increased the area which the line enclosed. Previous to ordering any troops from Butler, I sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the army of the Potomac to that of the James to inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement in cooperation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond, or if I could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to Whitehouse to join me and reinforce the army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes and that I could do the latter with great security, but that General Butler could not move from where he was in cooperation to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers, which was of great strength and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior, but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across to Richmond and Pittsburgh Railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butler's line of entrenchments across the neck represented the cork that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack, but as Barnard expressed it the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his expression particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn, and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention, as this did very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and I know very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned in the Notes of General Bottow's book, which when they were shown to me I asked to have stricken out, yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history, and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war, and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac. The two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's Great Atlanta Campaign, which must conclude my description of the various cooperative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the Center, I will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. By thus anticipating, in point of time, I would be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapid end. On the 8th of May, just after the Battle of the Wilderness and when we were moving on to Spotsylvania, I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry, to cut the two roads, one running west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and, when compelled to do so for one of four age generations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade. The object of this move was threefold. First, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications and destroy, or forget for his own use, supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him and thus better protect our flanks, rear, and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning and accomplished more than was expected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the Potomac. The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night, Stewart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command, but the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road, and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. Stewart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the tenth and by a detour and an exhausting march interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at Ashland and on the eleventh arrived in Stewart's Front, a severe engagement ensued, in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. Sheridan passed through the outer defenses of Richmond and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones, but having no supports near, he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for the James River below the city to communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the morning, the twelfth, he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge. He found disbarred and the defeated Confederate cavalry reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided, troops were sent out to attack his rear. He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. The defenses of Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining, and the opposite bank guarded to the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge-building. On the thirteenth Sheridan was at Bottoms Bridge over the Chickahominy. On the fourteenth he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the James River at Hocksell's Landing. He at once put himself into communication with General Butler who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. Sheridan had left the army of the Potomac at Spotsylvania but did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution, therefore, had to be exercised in getting back. On the seventeenth after resting his command for three days he started on his return. He moved by the way of White House. The bridge over the Pomunkey had been burned by the enemy but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the twenty-second he was at Stets on the Metapony where he learned the position of the two armies. On the twenty-fourth he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor in the vicinity of Chesterfield. Sheridan, in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army, encountered his cavalry and four engagements and defeated them in all. Recaptured, four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy. Destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war, destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. End of Section 48. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Lillaroth, Arkansas. Jim at jocclev.com Section 49 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant. Chapter 49 Sherman's Campaign in Georgia Siege of Atlanta Death of General McPherson Attempt to Capture Andersonville Capture of Atlanta After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati, I went on to Washington as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of his new command. His military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the Allegheny Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the state of Arkansas in the Trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the Department of the Ohio General Schofield Commanding, the next was the Department of the Cumberland General Thomas Commanding, the third, the Department of the Tennessee General McPherson Commanding, and General Steele still commanded the Trans-Mississippi or Department of Arkansas. The last named department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was, therefore, soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in command. The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. General Sherman at once set himself to work, preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at Huntsville with about 24,000 men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding. Thomas with over 60,000 men of the Army of the Cumberland was at Chattanooga, and Schofield with about 14,000 men was at Knoxville. With these three armies numbering about 100,000 men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance with a view of destroying Johnston's Army and capturing Atlanta. He visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to Chattanooga sufficiently large to warrant a movement. He found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move the fourth of May. As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly one fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams some of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising northeast from there and flowing southwest, this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take with smaller tributaries entering into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for defense had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta and very strongly entrenched so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position he would have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very strongly entrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With a less skillful general and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded. Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville having him move on the direct road to Dalton, Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying. But when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired and they were not back. Then again Sherman had lent banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to cooperate with the Trans-Mississippi forces and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified so as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas, the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up in the mountain between the national and Confederate armies through which a stream, a wagon-road, and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been damned so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have to pass. McPherson was, therefore, sent around by the right to come out by the way of Snake Creek gap into the rear of the enemy. This was a surprise to Johnston and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at Dalton. On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Rosaca. But our cavalry, having been sent around to the right, got near the road in the enemy's rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's army and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back. It had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed forward night and day and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting, some of it very hard fighting rising to the dignity of very important battles. Neither were single positions gained in a day. On the contrary, weeks were spent at some and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed. It was the 23rd of May before the road was finished up to the rear of Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of Aleutuna. This place was very strongly entrenched and naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought of but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This was done by sending a large force around our right by the way of Dallas to reach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troops also were fortified and as close up to the enemy as they could get. They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th of June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and Aleutuna was left in our possession. Aleutuna, being an important place, was strongly entrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther and made a secondary base of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point. The entrenchments completed. Storehouses provided for food and the army got in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new position. While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kennesaw Mountain where strong entrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during the progress of the battle Scofield was gaining ground to the left and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. These operations were completed by the third of July when it was found that Johnston had evacuated the place he was pursued at once. Sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his entrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the Chattahoochee. About the fifth of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. The enemy was again flanked out of his position or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the ninth he fell back across the river. Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th when Sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston was now relieved of the command and hood superseded him. Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. The very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy and that now they would become the aggressors, the very thing our troops wanted. For my own part I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything that could have prolonged a war a year beyond the time that it did finally close would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. Atlanta was very strongly entrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this there were advanced entrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. Sure enough as indicated by the change of commanders the enemy was about to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's Corps and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest which lasted more than an hour, but the Confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both sides. On this day General Greciam since our postmaster general was very badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again passing by our left flank which was then in motion to get a position further in rear of him and a desperate battle ensued which lasted most of the day of the 22nd. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancing they were struck in flank and their flank was enveloped. But they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. Finally however and before night the enemy was driven back into the city. It was during this battle that McPherson while passing from one column to another was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest, and best generals. Gerard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful in this and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry having crossed the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally when hard pressed he had come in striking the railroad in rear of Sherman and reported to him about this time. The battle of the 22nd is usually known as the battle of Atlanta although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2nd of September. Preparations went on as before to flank the enemy out of his position. The work was tedious and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. Our troops were gradually embarked around to the east until they struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly fortified as were those to the north and west of the city all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of Atlanta. On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great vigor. Logan entrenched himself hastily and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town. This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully 10 miles. The whole of this line being entrenched and made stronger every day they remained there. In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south about making. He was then to go east and if possible release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment in the way in which they were housed and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathy was felt for them and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But the prisoners moved to failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured but he got back having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his small command. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of Stoneman and had sent Sherman word which he received. The rumor was confirmed there also from other sources. A few days after Colonel Adams' return, Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than a thousand men. It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. He covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men and at length surrendered himself and his detachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories, or military supplies, etc. On the 4th and 5th, Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure to a great extent by both General Sherman and General Schofield. But I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to command him. If he did raise this question, while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. About the same time Wheeler got upon our road north of Rosaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton, this cut Sherman off from communication with the North for several days. Sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon Road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22nd. These little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics, that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of August and on the 1st of September was well up towards the railroad 20 miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardy entrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardy away before night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardy left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up his military works such as he thought would be valuable in our hands and decant. The next morning at daylight, General H. W. Slokum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta and notified Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the center, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. The campaign had lasted about four months and was one of the most memorable in history. There was but little, if anything, in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticize it all and nothing to criticize severely. It was creditable, alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was turned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of supplers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously and set the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for the Republicans in their canvas of 1864. It was followed later by Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North. End of Section 49, recording by Jim Clevenger, Lillarock, Arkansas, Jim at JOCCLEV.COM