 Well, look at people's reaction to those communities that have a very special kind of environment. People love and enjoy, appreciate that kind of closeness, that kind of village atmosphere, that kind of historic restoration and care and sensitivity. So from an economic standpoint it makes all kinds of sense, but the reason it makes sense is because most people much prefer that to a suburban wall. It's the world we live in, you know, all of its various manifestations. You know, it's a beach on Cape Cod, it's downtown Boston, it's Paris, it's a little village someplace, it's a village green in Vermont. I mean, all of these things are part of a built environment. How we view them and, more importantly, how we treat them is very important. Their decisions are central to this process. It's not just helping a little bit. And Boston is a case in point. Following World War II, we, like every other major metropolitan area, were told that in order to save the city, we had to build a so-called master highway plant, which involves six eight-lane highways right into the heart of the city. And then because, of course, if that's all you did, you'd have a massive traffic jam, an eight-lane elevated distributor, so-called, which was the so-called inner belt highway. It was going to come down Ruggle Street, eight lanes elevated, three feet from the Museum of Fine Arts, right through Frederick Law Olmsted's Emerald Necklace in front of Simmons and Emanuel, right through Beach Park and Brookline, across the Charles River, marching through Cambridge around to Somerville, then hooking up with the other end of the then elevated central artery. And that was the planning orthodoxy of the time. I mean, you had to do this. And by the way, we were not alone. Every metropolitan area in the country, including, by the way, the Bay Area, was told it had to do the same thing. And construction on these things began with those very tempting 90-cent federal dollars, because this was interstate highway money. Well, it was a small bunch of us politicians, in that case, legislators, five of us, to be perfectly frank, out of 280 at the time, who said there's something wrong with this picture. We're going to destroy this city. We're going to tear apart historic neighborhoods. We're going to do terrible damage to a city, which was hurting at the time. Don't get me wrong. I mean, Boston was not wonderful in those days. And in the meantime, our transit system was going to hell in a handbasket. It was a disaster, breaking down terrible equipment, no investment, while billions were going to be poured into this highway system. Well, it took us 10 years. It was a huge battle. But we finally won it and stopped the master highway plan. And then thanks to a sainted man named Thomas P. O. Neal Jr., who at that time was, I think, the majority leader, we were the first state in the country to be able to use our interstate highway money as transit. It never been used, never been done before. You couldn't bust the highway trust fund. It was gasoline tax money, had to be used for highways. We were the first city in metropolitan area in state to be permitted to do that. So we stopped the highways. We invested heavily in the T. We acquired the entire commuter rail system in eastern Massachusetts for a total of 35 million bucks. You know, I tell people this and they don't believe it. Tracks, stations, parking lots, such as they were, they needed work. But the whole thing gives you some sense of how it was valued back in the mid-70s. And today, I think it's fair to say that we've got probably the best public transportation system in the country and we not only saved the city, we then made it possible for people to get serious about restoring the city, restoring its neighborhoods, because that transit access was so important. It's now one of the most walkable cities in the country. It's one of the most beautiful cities in the country. And it was the direct result of political decisions made by not just those of us in an elective office, though a lot of us had a good deal to do with it, including, by the way, Frank Sarge, and my predecessor and the guy that I beat in 1974, who made one of the gutsiest decisions any governor has ever made in the state, having been an original architect of the master highway plan, he learned, he listened, he studied, and he said, it's a mistake. We're going to stop it. That was a tough thing for him to do. And he did it. So it was political leaders really, elected politicians along with neighborhood groups and others, who finally came to the conclusion that this would be very destructive. And I shudder to think of what Boston would look like today if they had master highway plans. So these were political decisions. Development follows your infrastructure. If you invest the majority of your transportation dollars in highways, then you're going to get sprawled. Highways and airports, which is what we did after World War II. If you invest in fixed rail transit, you're going to get density. It's as simple as that. Now, I'm not obsessive on the subject of density. It just doesn't make any sense, particularly in a world where climate change and what we're doing with energy and all of those kinds of things is so important. Europe uses half the energy per capita we do with a standard of living, which certainly is equal to ours. How is that possible? Well, they've invested heavily in transit and high speed rail. They have highways. But in the vast majority of major European cities, those highways stop at a ring road around the city, eight or nine miles outside the city. Inside, there are no super highways. Inside that ring road, it's all about transit. Now, if you want to drive into the city, on the city streets, you can do so. But billions of dollars haven't been spent to carve up those cities into what a really highway rock warrants and destroy the very fabric of those cities. That's one of the reasons why they're so popular. It's one of the reasons why the most expensive places to live in most European cities is in the inner city, not in the suburbs. And, of course, that's true of places like Boston and San Francisco these days, Portland, Oregon, which made a decision to emphasize light rail and is a gorgeous city and an extremely attractive city. And here again, the decision as to where you spend your infrastructure dollars and on what is a political decision. And I use that term in the best sense of the word. It's a public policy decision, and it has consequences. What happened, for example, in Southern California is the direct result of decisions made by some well-intentioned people. Don't get me wrong. Earl Warren was an interesting governor and a great chief justice. But California, coming out of World War II, kind of led the way in building the famous California freeway system. And at first everybody said, this is fabulous. But I'll tell you, I remember going out to watch my hero, John Kennedy, get nominated for the presidency in 1960 in Los Angeles. This was in 1960. And even then, it was clear that the freeway system wasn't working. It was not only encouraging sprawl. It wasn't working as a transportation system. Cars were backed up at five o'clock in the afternoon, moving parking lots and all that kind of stuff. And a city which had the best street railway system in America prior to World War II, that was Los Angeles. You could go anywhere in those big red street cars. Basically, ripped up its tracks, threw the street cars away, and decided to put buses on the street. Well, the result was sprawl, I mean, with a capital S. Now, years later, Los Angeles, to its credit, is investing hundreds of millions of dollars to try to recreate, at least to some extent, that transit system. And if they do, then over time, it won't happen overnight, you're going to begin to get a Los Angeles that's filled in, that's attractive, that's walkable, and so on. But those were decisions that most major metropolitan areas in America made back coming out of World War II for a lot of reasons. Hey, the car was wonderful. They were cheap. We hadn't seen any for five or six years. I remember as a kid seeing the first cars coming back into the neighborhood. The Hudson's, the Studebakers, the Ramblers, the Nash's, the Kaisers and Phrases. Nobody knows what I'm talking about these days. And it was incredible. I mean, we'd had seen a new car in five or six years. And people really kind of got excited about this. But the end result was that we ended up destroying neighborhoods, carving up our cities, and encouraging kind of a mindless sprawl which eventually even made the highways unworkable. And now we're desperately trying to reverse the impact of at least some of those things. I think we understand now, unfortunately, we made a lot of mistakes just how damaging all of this was. And look, don't get me wrong. I mean, there are, or at least initially, worsen things were very attractive about suburban living. If you lived in a cold water flat in a slum in Boston and you would come back from World War II as a GI and manage things as a GI bill to get a college degree and to begin to earn a few bucks, and you married, settled down with kids, going back to that cold water flat wasn't exactly the greatest quality of life, however historic the neighborhood. And moving out to Framingham and buying a seven-room house for 20,000 bucks, which is what they cost in those days, was a very attractive prospect. And why not? And having your little barbecue in the back and so on and so forth. The problem is that thousands of people began doing that. And personally, I know these folks who were trying to get from home to work and back again in a few other places, all trying to use the same roads. And it just didn't work. So it's perfectly understandable why and fueled by the way by 4% mortgages, guaranteed by the United States government. And understandably, these guys had served us, they put their lives on the line, they came back. We wanted to do right by them. But it's perfectly understandable now why they did what they did and why the economics of the thing at the time seemed to work well. Unfortunately, 20 years later, we discovered that we had a massive problem in our hands. I mean, in a sense, we've all been late on this. We've all been late on this. I mean, this state, for example, this state has 14 community colleges, 12 of which were located in what are essentially suburban locations. If every one of those community colleges had been designed as an attractive urban campus and located in the heart of our older urban industrial communities, today those downtowns would be sparkling. And the community colleges would be the centerpiece of downtown revitalization. Why do we put them out in the burps? Well, because there was this notion that if it was a college, you had to have a campus with a creek or something where you could serenade your girl with a ukulele or something. I don't know. There was this kind of romantic view of campuses. But in point of fact, these were older industrial communities that downtowns were being decimated by all this highway construction and the disinvestment out. And what we should have done with our public buildings and public investments was to focus them there. Well, belatedly, starting at Lowell, we woke up. And Lowell today is one of the great examples of urban revitalization, historic restoration, and so forth in the National Heritage Park. But, you know, in those days, we didn't know what the Hela Heritage Park was. And so we made... It wasn't just investing in highways. We made decisions about where to locate important public activities and public structures. Why do we do that? Well, we were part of the whole suburban myth ourselves, I guess.