 Question on arms control. Are we going into negotiations in a position of inferiority? That we are not up to the strength level of the Soviet Union militarily? Yes. I don't think there's any question of that. And we have been for quite some time. We have fewer, for example, in nuclear weapons. We have fewer warheads than we had in 1967. But I think, in one way, we're going in a stronger sense than we have in recent years. Because over recent years, we've followed a policy of kind of unilaterally disarming. And the idea that maybe the others would follow suit. This time, with the refurbishing of our military defenses that we've been undergoing for these four years, we're going to the table and they have the knowledge that not only are we stronger than we were, even though we have not caught up with them as yet. But they have the awareness that we're determined to not allow them to have a superiority over us to the extent that our forces wouldn't be a deterrent. And I think in that regard that we sit down at the table with a little more realism than there's been in the past. Isn't there a statement by your software and the campaign, Mr. President, and by Secretary of State George Sultz, the effect that we have been able to reestablish the military balance in the last few years and that otherwise we could not negotiate on an even basis? Well, I was trying to be completely accurate here that obviously we have not completely caught up with the imbalance between us. For example, we have in uniform the military 17 divisions. Well, they've got more than that on the Chinese border. And we have not caught up with the naval buildup. But the fact that we are doing that, the fact that we have 24 more ships, I believe, out there scheduled for addition to the fleet, that is what I think brings us to the table. They know our industrial power. They know what we've been able to achieve when we set our minds to it. So they know that there's been a change of attitude, that we are not cancelling weapons systems without getting anything in return. And from that standpoint, I think this is what they mean, that our whole attitude is different now. And they can look down the road and see that there is a point at which they won't have any margin of superiority. And they don't have enough of a margin today. I tempt them into a first strike. From the subject of arms control treaty violations, you and your administration have said for several years that the Soviets are violating these treaties. A, what do you intend to do about that? And B, would you sign treaties in the future without clearing up those matters? Well, I think all of that is part of what has to be negotiated and probably under the cap of the part of the negotiations that will deal with viability. In other words, it's not enough to have an agreement. It's got to be a verifiable agreement. And some of the violations that they're doing are violations of what had previously been negotiated as the right of each one of us to know about the other. The encrypting of the signals that some of their nuclear tests would, ordinarily that we would be able, simply electronically, to have the facts that it was agreed upon we should have. Both sides should have. But then they have been encrypting so that we don't get that full information from a test. And all of these will be part of the negotiations. Do those violations block the possibility of another agreement until they're cleared up? Now we get into the area of the actual negotiating. And I don't think that I should be discussing those particular facets of what are we going to do, what are we going to offer, what are we going to trade. I don't think that should be voiced in advance. Mr. President, to shift to another subject, there are people in Congress who are talking about the situation in the Philippines with the opposition parties and turmoil there with the communist insurrection. They're saying that the Philippines is our next Iran. Do you see the Philippines that way? Do you agree? I certainly hope not. We're trying to be as helpful as we can in their situation. The Philippines, the United States certainly have a close relationship and alliance over the years. And we've had a good relationship with President Marcos. Now we realize there is an opposition party that we believe is also pledged to democracy. We also are aware that there is another element in the Philippines that has communist support and backing. And what we're hopeful of is that the democratic processes will take place. And even if there is a change of party there, it would be that opposition faction which is still democratic in its principles. I think it would be a disaster for all of us if, out of the friction between those two parties, the third element, the communist element should get in because we know that their result is always totalitarian. Do you feel there are certain steps that should be taken in order to prevent that from happening, either by the government or by the opposition? Well, I hope that both parties are aware of this with Aaron and are going to, neither one of them looked to that third element for any kind of help or alliance. And as I say, we're going to continue to do everything we can as a longtime friend to see that the Philippines remain a democracy. Sir, on South Korea, let me just ask you, given today's news, do you think that some of these Americans who were accompanying the opposition leader there were, in fact, meddling? Well, let's just say that I think there was bad judgment on both sides. You mean the Americans as well as the Korean officials? Yes. And it's tended, certainly here in the treatment of this, it's tended to hide the fact that Korea, has made great strides in democracy. That they have a prosperity that is far above that of a great many of their neighbors in that part of the world. Their democracy is working and this was just, I think, there was some bad judgment there on both sides. Could we talk about Nicaragua, I guess, Mr. President? There seems to be a real stalemate there. You're not providing aid to the Contras now. There are no negotiations that are going on now. What are you planning to do in a way of policy to try to get something going that might bring about the kind of Nicaragua that you would like? Well, I'm going to continue to ask the Congress to let us in all of Latin America go forward with the kind of program that was born of the Kissinger-led Commission down there, which 75 percent of the help we offer is going to be in social and economic aid to try and make these countries more self-sufficient to eliminate the great poverty in so many of those countries by simply helping them become more viable economically and at the same time giving them help for security so that they're not victims of subversion, particularly from outside their own countries. With regard to Nicaragua, I think that we should continue to offer support to the people of Nicaragua who have been betrayed in the revolution that they themselves supported. That revolution was supposed to be a resultant democracy, and the assurances were given by the people who were fighting the revolution, leading it. Then the Sandinistas did what Castro before them had done in Cuba. Once the revolution was successful, they ousted from the government or any participation in government all the other factions that were dedicated to democracy that have instituted a totalitarian regime. And what the Nicaraguan people want is the revolution they fought for, and I think they're entitled to have it. So support to the people of Nicaragua is support to the Contras or what? Well, they certainly are part of the people and they were part of the revolution in many instances. The thing that so many people that are arguing against this don't seem to be aware of in a difference between, for example, Nicaragua and El Salvador. El Salvador now, after several elections, is a government that is striving for democracy that was chosen by the people, and the people trying to overthrow it. The guerrillas in El Salvador are trying to overthrow a government that the majority of the people elected. In Nicaragua, the so-called Sandinista government is a government that seized power out of the barrel of a gun. It's never been chosen by the people, and it has directly contravened the principles of the revolution that they were fighting, and I think there's every reason for the Contras to be representing those who continue to strive for the democracy that they fought a revolution to get. Well, are you talking about a fundamental change in the Nicaraguan government, or can they do things incrementally? Can they, for example, ease up on press freedom, or can they provide more press freedom, or can they provide certain steps that you might think would be acceptable without making a fundamental change in their government? Well, I don't know when we talk about this, are we talking about the people that are in the government, the form of government? If it's the people, obviously, those who have grabbed power are not going to want to give it up. That's typical of totalitarianism. But as to the other part, all the Sandinistas would have to do is go back to what they themselves participated in promising to the Organization of American States that they wanted democracy, they wanted free voting, they wanted free labor unions, they wanted a free press and all, and subject themselves or submit themselves, I should say, and anyone else who chooses to the will of the people by way of elections and voting. Sir, let me ask you on the Contras question, what form of aid should this take in terms of helping the Contras? I mean, how do we propose to help the Contras? Well, I think what we – I still believe in covert programs where they're necessary and where they're desirable. And so once you say that, then there are some limits as to what you can specify. Mr. President, go back to the issue of arms control and particularly to your Strategic Defense Initiative. If in the Geneva negotiations the Soviets were to agree to go along with the deep reductions in offensive weapons that you've proposed, would you still want to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative or would you be ready to call it off in return for them? No, I would want to proceed with what we're doing, which is research to discover whether there is such a weapon, whether it is practical and feasible. And then I myself have said that my own view would be that if that is determined and there is – we can produce such a weapon, that then before deployment I would be willing to sit down and in a sense internationalize, in other words, to negotiate then before there would be any deployment or anything to make sure that they understood that we weren't trying to create the ability of a first strike ourselves, that our goal was still the elimination of nuclear weapons and that I would see that defensive weapon as another step in attaining that goal. But if we could say that this virtually makes those weapons, if not obsolete, certainly most ineffective, the nuclear weapons then we've got a real reason for saying, now let's all do away with them because we have come up with this defensive weapon. That would eliminate any of the protests that some of the people on the Soviet side have made that we're seeking a first strike capability. I don't think anyone in the world can honestly believe that the United States is interested in such a thing or ever would put itself in that position. So proceeding with the strategic defense is independent of whatever agreement is reached on offensive weapons. That's right because it's not in violation of the ABM Treaty and they have been conducting, you know, who are they kidding? They've been conducting research in this sort of thing for a long time and they already have far beyond anything we have and we believe in violation of the ABM Treaty, that kind of defense and we're seeking a non-nuclear weapon that could render these weapons obsolete. Sir, just back on Latin America, Fidel Castro said recently that he saw a possibility for improving relations with the U.S. Do you see any possibility of U.S., of you or the government improving relations with Castro? Well, I'm not greatly optimistic because we've heard this before. Early in my administration there were signal sent of this kind and we took them up on it and we tried to have some meetings with them and nothing came of it. Their words, they're never backed by deeds. They're very simple things that they could do that would indicate that they were ready for change. I'm in the Middle East, Mr. President. Do you expect the current review of the arms sale policy to result in some kind of change in U.S. policy in the region? Well, now, you're asking about the Middle East in arms policy. Yeah, you're conducting a review of arms policy. Well, what we feel, I'm still dedicated to that September 1st, 1982 provision of a negotiated peace. I don't believe it can be achieved without King Hussein of Jordan and with or at least with the permission of the Palestinians representing them in direct negotiations with the Israelis. And what we are prepared to be of whatever help we can be, we're not seeking to impose a settlement on anyone. We haven't got some plan of how it must be worked out. But I feel that we have to make the moderate Arab states recognize that we can be their friend as well as the friend of Israel. And this could be helpful in our trying to be of help in peace negotiations. And part of this would be because they're under threat. There's a war going on just minutes away from them by air. The Soviet Union, with its invasion of Afghanistan, has made it evident that the Middle East can't rule out the possibility of expansionism in the part of the Soviets there. And therefore, we think that they're entitled to some defensive weapons also. At the same time, we have ensured Israel that we will never see them lose their qualitative edge to the point that they're endangered by anything we do. Do you see an opportunity at this point to push that peace initiative of yours once again with the FAAD visit and other developments? Is this the time to make another move? I'm going to talk, we have another meeting coming tomorrow morning. I'm going to talk to him definitely so that he knows that we haven't retreated. The fact that the events in Lebanon and so forth kind of put the plan on ice, it was not only that. If you'll remember, there was a very definite breaking off of relations between the PLO and King Hussein. Hussein was going forward, trying to work with them, and then suddenly they parted company. Now there have been talks resumed because anyone who talks for the Arab side is going to have to be able to represent the Palestinian problem in those negotiations. You can't write them off or ignore their right to some claims. So what we're trying to talk about is hoping that this can now come to the point that there can be direct negotiations. Do you put any limit on who can represent the Palestinians? Well, it more or less has to be worked out between them and King Hussein. Whether they will permit him or whether they will want direct representation and then I think with the Israelis the issue comes up then. Will whoever represents the Palestinians be willing to say that they recognize the right of Israel to exist as a nation? This is a great sticking point. It's why we cannot enter into any discussions with the Palestinians, the PLO. As long as they say that, how do you talk to a country you should negotiate with these people when these people say we don't recognize that country's right to exist? As part of the comprehensive review that you're doing on the Middle East, are you thinking of connecting arm sales to the peace process? Well, we have made some arm sales, a number of instances. Actually what I feel is necessary is this is a part of convincing the Arabs that we do sincerely intend to be their friends also. That we're not in any way an opponent. President, on the question of black leaders, you've criticized black leaders recently as representing a special interest and concerned about their own jobs and positions. Assuming that that might be true, how do you then plan to keep in touch with the black community in general if you're not doing it through these black leaders? Very willing to do it through those and tried. And there were meetings here and they came to note. What I said there is a general thing that I was saying, not about all because there are leaders of quite prominent black groups like Roy Unis of CORE who agrees completely with what I said. But I think it's something that happens even in government bureaucracies that are set up to solve a certain problem. But once the bureaucracy is set up, it never quite wants to admit that the problem has been solved because there's no longer any need for the bureaucracy. And I think that there is some element of this. See, I've just lived longer than the rest of you. I remember when things were very much different, not from reading about them, from seeing them. And I think that there is an unwillingness in the part of some leaders to bring to the attention or remind the people they represent how much progress has been made. And again, as I say, because if you do, they might then say, well, then what are we still organized for? Now, granted, we have not totally eliminated all the problems. There are a lot of us that are still heart and soul for continuing. But the progress that we've made is such that there is no reason anymore to try to keep a group in existence on the basis of animus, anger, and others. How do you really get that message through to the black community if you don't deal with black leaders? Well, I think that now, what constitutes black leaders? I've been meeting with a lot of people that have, I think, achieved quite some prominence in their work in that field. And as I say, Roy Innes is a core. He sees this exactly the same way. I'm perfectly willing to try and say these same things to the people that are in the organizations where a few of the leaders have seemed to be, well, very frankly, more interested in some political differences than they are in resolving the problem. Mr. President, shift to a totally different area. Poland, does the trial and the conviction of those four police officers and the murder of that Catholic priest constitute any kind of a step on the part of the Polish government that justifies in your mind relaxing any of our sanctions or making any moves towards Poland to ease the situation and improve it? I honestly don't think that it reflects any change. I think it reflects something that went wrong. And the government doesn't mind throwing somebody to the wolves in order to keep the sleigh going ahead of the wolf pack. No fundamental change internally. Therefore, no reason for us to change our policy. No. Mr. President, taking you back to the question of your Strategic Defense Initiative. Throughout history, there's always been a question of offense being able to overcome defense. And it always has in the past. Here, we're about to embark on the expenditure of a lot of money to test this proposition again. Why do you think this time the defense might be able to prevail over the offense? Well, all right, let me give you a parallel. Matthew was here among our own people. World War I, Poison Gas, came into being for the first time. And it was horrible. 1925, all the nations of the world met in Geneva and ruled out poison gas in the future for war. But by that time, a gas mask had been developed. And gas mask has been standard soldier equipment in just about every army in the world ever since 1925. We haven't thrown the mask away. Now, we're talking about a weapon that has been developed for which there is no defense whatsoever. The only program we have is MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction. And why don't we have MAS instead, Mutual Assured Security? Now, we all know how to make that weapon. Suppose that we were so successful at the arms talks that we all agreed to do away with them, just as we agreed to do away with poison gas. And the years go by, but we all know how to make them. You can't take out of your mind the knowledge that we now have. And sometime in a time of stress, whether it's the two great countries or some other countries, somebody is going to say, just as they have in recent years, maybe it would be handy for us to produce a few of these things. And you wouldn't be able to tell if they had or not. But at least your security would be your own kind of gas mask that if somebody does cheat after you've tried to eliminate them and comes up with those, you'd have a weapon in which you could knock them down. Just as today, you could put on the gas mask if somebody cheats and decides to use poison gas. So I think it'd be well worth having. And then, of course, there's the possibility that you can't get everybody to eliminate those weapons as we're seeking to do. And therefore, you have made it through defense. You've changed the whole ratio. The opponent that might want to be expansionist and resort to war has to say in the face of that defensive weapon, how many of these things do I have to have before I can be sure that enough get through that they won't be able to blow me out of the water? Mr. President, you've talked at times of two different kinds of a defense. One, defending cities, the whole population. Somebody referred to it as an astrodome defense, so to speak. And you seem now to be talking about a defense that would be around our missiles. Which is it you want, a limited defense or a total defense? I want a defense that simply says everybody starts pushing the button on those weapons. We've got a good chance of keeping all or at least the bulk of them from getting to the target. Because even if it's around missile sites, that's the type of weapon anymore in which there's no way to restrain that from killing any number of people. Or now, as a great many reputable scientists are telling us, that such a war could just end up in no victory for anyone because we would wipe out the Earth as we know it. And if you think back to a couple of natural calamities back in the last century, in the 1800s, just natural phenomena from earthquakes. I mean, volcanoes. We saw the weather so changed that there was snow in July in many temperate countries. And they called it the year in which there was no summer. Well, if one volcano can do that, what are we talking about with a whole nuclear exchange? The nuclear winter that scientists have been talking about. It's titular head of the party. And as such, you've kind of got a responsibility to let the party function and make its decisions. Now, it's not an easy thing for me to think about, but I have to keep that in mind. So you won't support him under any circumstances? You won't endorse him under any circumstances? Let me just say it's a decision I have said. I know it must be made, and I'm just not going to think about it. I'll be like Scarlet here. I'll think about it tomorrow. Don't your comments almost make him a logical successor to you? I mean, your praise of him and the performance of the office doesn't that make him a logical successor? Well, I have to say that if anyone was a voter and considering they would have to recognize who's had the most contact with what's going on. Thank you very much. Thank you. All right. How do you feel? You've got a cold? I've got an allergy. I was... You're not... I found out years ago when I was ranching, there was a season of the year in which I called a hay fever, or a minority randomize, tear it up and swell it up and everything. And it wasn't until I got the sacramental, finally Nancy prevailed on me, because I'd never taken allergies seriously. And sacramentalists...