 Pete, join us please on stage and explain a little bit more about locking and carbon locking. What does it really mean and why should we be concerned about that? Thanks, Kala. And I think I'd like to pick right up on Gori on your theme of infrastructure. And is this green growth? Is it brown growth? What determines that? And energy infrastructure, it lasts a long time. Even efficient coal power plants are still coal power plants. As Gori said, they last 40 years. Road infrastructure enables petrol based cars to travel for decades. Buildings also last for decades and continue to consume energy. So these decisions take us down pathways that make it harder to change later. If we choose high carbon infrastructure now, it makes it harder in the future to meet those lower carbon pathways that we've agreed to in the international community, those two degree pathway. Makes it more costly, harder to reach those paths. So I'm going to start with this picture of this offshore oil rig. It's currently parked in Seattle with an interview of SCI's offices there. That's where I work. It's on its way to the Arctic to drill for oil. Now high cost, high risk, fossil fuel, and energy infrastructure only make sense in a high carbon pathway. It doesn't make sense in a two degree pathway. Now those that are exploring for oil using this kind of infrastructure are counting on that high carbon pathway. They've said as much. This rig is being commissioned by Shell and just last week we heard from Nick Stern, for example, said Shell is asking us to bet against the world. If you tweet that, quote Nick Stern, not me. Shell is counting on the fact that we won't live up to our collective pledges to be within a two degree pathway. That's a pretty big bet. So at SCI in Seattle, in the US center, we are working on developing an approach, an analytical approach to help policymakers analyze and assess what kinds of energy infrastructure, including both on the demand side and on the supply side, like this oil rig, lead to carbon lock-in and take us further away, make it ever harder for us to meet the two degree pathway. So on the demand side, lock-in arises from things that are pretty well known, coal power plants and such. On the supply side, it's harder to point a particular finger at what leads to lock-in. This chart is of future oil supply in 2030. I just picked a year. That's the year that much of the negotiations around Paris are focusing on. Now, if we're going to have 110 million barrels of oil, the x-axis is annual oil production, then we need all of this oil that is currently being explored. Much of this high-cost oil, the y-axis, is the cost of procuring oil per barrel. We would need that. It's capital-intensive, like it's offshore oil, but what if we take the low-carbon path and we only need 70, 80 million barrels of oil a day? That high-cost oil infrastructure is bringing us oil, and once that capital is sunk, it's bringing us oil that is at a cost that would make it very hard to stay within those limits, stay within a two-degree pathway. So that raises a question for policymakers. Does it make sense to pursue policies on fossil fuel supply as well as on fossil fuel demand, the kinds of policies that are more commonly pursued? So I invite you all to follow our fossil fuel initiative at SCI, the fossil fuels and climate change mitigation, which is exploring this question of what role is there for supply side policy in climate change. I'm seeing both Kazakhstan and Russia here, and if there was a figure of natural gas, a lot of additional Central Asian countries, mostly Turkmenistan would be here, and looking at it from the supply side, what will happen with those proven deposits of these countries if you limit that two-degree target? What will happen with those deposits that we know only will exceed us above the two-degree target? Will they become obsolete? Yeah. You're asking about stranded assets, potentially, which has become a popular concept that to meet two degrees, we need to leave two-thirds of fossil fuels in the ground. Now, it's important to note that we have so many fossil fuels, even under business as usual, we're going to leave some in the ground. So it's not as quite as radical as a departure as you might think. Some high-carbon coal deposits in particular, that may lead to stranding. Now, oil deposits, as in this chart, are more capital-intensive and can still be produced for low cost. So in that case, lock-in may be a greater risk. Once you invest that capital, it's harder to strand. It's going to be more likely to be produced, and that may be the case for some of the natural gas, which is, of course, more complicated because it also can substitute for coal and therefore reduce emissions in some cases. But if the price stays low as it is today, then a lot of this can't be dug up because the prices will have to go up because the production price is higher. Good point. And in terms of coal infrastructure, that's a fascinating trend. As Goyi said, coal may have peaked in China. That's led to some of the investments. We showed three or four terminals on the Mongolian border that would potentially carry coal. Are those going to go forward or not? There are proposals to export coal from the U.S. that have continually been pushed off because of that drop of coal prices. So one might say that's a good development. On the other hand, if this other infrastructure along that China builds out along this road... Yeah. Then that coal demand might very well pick up again. Yeah. Thanks a lot, Pete.