 You should be cancellation of bail part one. Part one, okay. Good evening everyone. Amongst us, we have Justice B. Ramkumar as usual with his insights with people actually look upon every time. And today's session is on the cancellation of bail part one. This is being split into two parts because keeping in view the time exigencies and everybody's affairs regarding day to day changes in the life. We feel that short sessions would be able to capture more knowledge, keeping in view the time span etc. It's not that we have not taken bigger sessions. We took last session previous to this one which was around for two hours 30 minutes. But the questions again this time will be read by Justice B. Ramkumar and it will be answered. We will be playing a dual role today and we keep on receiving messages. And cancellation of bail is an important facet because a lot of us find judgment and law primarily on the bail. But how it has drilled on the cancellation of bail, we are just looking upon to latch that knowledge. Over to you sir. Thank you Mr. Vikas. Good evening friends. The other day, we had seen that in a case where the bail bond executed by the acute and the shorties, if any, for appearance or for production of property, and if the bond is forfeited by committing breach of the condition for appearance or for production of property, the acute and the shorties if any are liable to be proceeded against under section 446 CRPC. Now let us now examine as to what are the circumstances under which the bail granted to an accused can be cancelled. I have divided into a few questions of practical relevance. I will now read question number one. Is there any specific promotion in the CRPC for cancellation of bail? Very often we say we mentioned about bail should be cancelled, bail is liable to be cancelled etc. Which is the specific promotion in the CRPC for cancellation of bail? Actually, there is no provision specifically for cancellation of bail. But section 435 CRPC is the provision understood as the provision enabling a magistrate for cancellation of bail granted by the magistrate in respect of a non-bailable offense. Similarly, section 4392 is the provision understood as locating the power of the session judge and the high court for cancellation of the bail. These are the two provisions. Even though those provisions do not expressly state that the bail granted by this magistrate or granted by the session judge or by the high court may be cancelled. But those provisions say that this magistrate or the high court or the session court may order that the accused be committed to the custody. Accused who has been released on bail be committed to custody means he will be re-arrested and committed to custody. That is the effect of cancellation of bail. These are the two provisions. Now we pass on to question number two. Is there any distinction between cancellation of bail and forfeiture of bond? We have seen the other day what exactly is forfeiture of bond. Yes, there is a distinction. Cancellation of bail means cancellation of the order granted bail. This is ordinarily done for a post bail conduct of the accused or for any violation by the accused of any of the bail conditions imposed by the court. Once the bail is cancelled, there has to be a fresh order for release on bail. Unlike in a case where the bail bond has been forfeited and consequently cancelled by the operation of section 4 fortices capital A CRPC. To put it differently, where the bail bond is cancelled, the court has the discretion to grant bail on fresh bond with freshurities. By virtue of the provision proviso to section 4 fortices capital A CRPC. Since the earlier order granting bail has not been cancelled. The order has not been cancelled, but it is kept intact. But in a case where the bail has been cancelled by recourse to sections 437-5 or section 489-2 CRPC, then there has to be a fresh order granting bail. The earlier order is not kept intact. With that we pass on to question number 3. What are the considerations for cancellation of bail? There also we have only the judgment law because since in the absence of a specific provision for cancellation of bail, the judges have formulated their own grounds to justifying cancellation of bail. Because once a bail is accused is granted bail and if during the currency of the bail he misuses his liberty, then his bail is liable to be cancelled. What are the grounds on which this bail can be cancelled? The judgment law, the grounds are one, the accused has misused his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity. Two, the accused has interfered with the course of investigation. Three, the accused has attempted to tamper with the evidence or has attempted to influence the prosecution witnesses. Four, the accused has threatened any witness or has indulged in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation. The accused is likely to escape into another country. Sixth is the accused attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or being unavailable to the investigating agency. And lastly, the accused attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety because he was granted bail with sureties. Sureties are the jailers of his own choice. Instead of being confined to the four walls of the prison, he chose to be four walls of the prison. He chose to remain within the custody of his surety who are jailers of his own choice. Therefore, if he attempts to go beyond the reach of his sureties, that again is a grounds for canceling the bail. These grounds are not exhaustive. Depending on the facts and situations of the case, there may be further grounds enumerated by courts. Now, the decisions which have held, which have enumerated these grounds are Abdul Basit alias Raju versus Mohammed Abdul Qadir Chaudhary. 2014 Vol. 10 SCC 754. The judges are H. L. Datu and S. A. Bobade. Yet another decision is Raghuvir Singh versus Tato Pihar. A. R. 1987 Supreme Court 149. The judges just is chin up already. Again Mahbub Gaudh Shake versus Tato Maharashtra. A. R. 2004 Supreme Court 2890. Justice Arijit Pasahit. Then Miyakala Dharmarajam versus Tato Telangana. A. R. 2020 Supreme Court 317 by L. Nageshwar Rao. Justice L. Nageshwar Rao. These are all the decisions which have enumerated the various grounds on which bail granted to an accused can be cancelled. They are not enumerated in the CRPC. They are judge-made grounds. Then there is yet another judge-made ground. That is, if the order granting bail is perverse, for this reason that irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration or relevant materials have been omitted to be taken into consideration. What do you mean by perverse order? A perverse order is an order where no judge who is reasonably instructed in law and facts would have come to such a conclusion. That is a perverse order. So when the bail granted is perverse, then courts have devised a ground whereby the bail granted to the accused can be cancelled because no reasonable judge would have granted bail on such facts. Therefore, there are two three judge rulings of the Supreme Court, mainly. One is Dinesh M. N. versus Tato Gujarat. 2008 Vol. 5 SCC, 66, 3 judges. Dr. Arijit Pasahit, Justice P. Sadashivam, Justice Aftab Alam. Now, this decision, three judge bench decision relies on an earlier decision. Puran versus Ram Bilas, 2001 Vol. 6 SCC, 338. To hold that, there lies a distinction between setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order of order granting bail and the cancellation of the bail already granted on the ground that accused has misconducted himself after the grant of bail. See the distinction? Generally, bail can be cancelled by request to section 437-5 CRPC or 439-2 CRPC for the post bail conduct of the accused. If the accused has misdirected himself or misbehaved himself or misused the liberty granted to him after he was enlarged on bail, then the court concerned can cancel the bail under those provisions. But that is different from the situation where the very bail order itself is a perverse order, bail ought not to have been granted to the accused. In such a case, the superior court, higher court, higher court is justified in cancelling the order granting bail, setting aside the order granting bail. This is another category of cancellation of bail. Yet another decision is conversing, I am sorry. Narendra K. Amin, Narendra K. Amin, Dr. Narendra K. Amin versus state of Gujarat. 2008, volume 13 SCC, again 584, 584, again 3 judges. Dr. Harjeet Prasad, P. Sadashivam of the Balaam. Then we pass on to the next question. What is the standard of proof required for cancellation of bail? In a situation, the accused has misused the liberty granted to him and it calls for cancellation of bail. What is the standard of proof required for cancelling the bail? The grounds for cancellation of bail is not that of the prosecution in a criminal trial. That's not the standard. The standard is preponderance of probabilities, which is the standard of proof available to an accused to substantiate his defense. That is the standard for cancellation of bail. Here the court, the state or the person agreed or even a member of the public can see cancellation. They need not prove the grounds beyond reasonable doubt. They need only prove the ground on the anvil of preponderance of probabilities as is available in a civil court or in a civil case. The citation is state of Delhi administration versus Sanjay Gandhi, AR-19, 78, Supreme Court, 961. Again, three judges. Y. V. Chandrajout, Chief Justice, is the author of the judgment. Murtha Fazaleli and P. N. Shingal. Question number five. Can the default bail granted by the magistrate under section 167-2 CRPC be cancelled? If so, what is the provision for cancellation? See, default bail, as you all know, is the statutory bail. Is the indefensible right of right to bail for an accused who has been in custody for more than the statutory period and grafted by section 167-2 proviso. Depending on the punishment prescribed, if the accused has been in custody for more than 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, without any charge sheet having been filed before court, then the accused is entitled to be released on bail, notwithstanding the merits of the case. Court need not look into the merits of the case. Accused is entitled to bail as of rights. It is an indefensible right of the accused. Now, if such a bail, indefensible bail has been granted to an accused due to the efflux of time, passage of time of 60 days or 90 days without a charge sheet having been filed, can it be cancelled? Is a question. Now, every person, the answer is, every person released on default bail granted by magistrate under section 167-2 CRPC is by virtue of the last portion of paragraph A of the proviso to section 167-2 CRPC shall be deemed to have been released under chapter 33. Chapter 33 CRPC is a regular chapter regarding bail. Therefore, such a default bail can be cancelled either under section 437-5 by the magistrate or under section 439-2 CRPC by the session judge or by the high court. So, it can be treated like any other bail order. So, there is nothing special about the default bail. It is deemed to be a bail granted under chapter 33 of the CRPC. The citation is, Bashir v. state of Haryana, A.I.R. 1978, Supreme Court, double five. Yes, Murtaza Ali, Murtaza Fazal Ali and Kailasam, Justice Kailasam is the author of the judgement. Again, Aslam Babalal Deshai v. state of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1993, Supreme Court, page 1, three judges. A.M. Ahmadi, M.M. Pungi and K. Ramesh Swami. We pass on to the next question. Can the default bail granted during the crime stage under the proviso to section 167-2 CRPC be cancelled the consequence on the filing of the charge sheet and the court taking cognizance of the serious offenses revealed by the charge sheet? Now, this is an important question. See, an accused is granted bail during the stage of investigation. The police are conducting the investigation. The investigation is not over, but he was enlarged at the bail. Then, after the conclusion of the investigation, the police may file a charge sheet before the court, which may reveal very serious offenses having been committed by him. Then, the question is, at the time of filing the charge sheet, the court is entitled to take cognizance of the offenses. Now, once the court takes cognizance of the offenses, noticing that very serious offenses are involved, is it not possible, is it not permissible for the court to cancel the bail which was granted during the stage of investigation? No. The answer is an emphatic no. Bail once granted under section 167-2 CRPC is deemed to have been granted under chapter 33 CRPC. And therefore, merely because the charge sheet has subsequently been filed, is no reason to cancel the bail, which will be valid till the conclusion of trial, unless it is specifically cancelled for any post bail conduct of the accused. The citation is Dr. Bipin Shantilal Panchal versus state of Gujarat. AER 1996, Supreme Court 2897. Again, three judges. Justice A. Mohdhi, Chief Justice, B. P. Jeevanrendi and Justice N. P. Singh. Again, Aslam Babbalal Deshai versus state of Maharashtra. AER 1993, Supreme Court, page 3. Once again, Free Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur versus state of Bihar. AER 1982, Supreme Court 1463. Justice P. N. Bhagwati, Amarendra Nath Singh. We now pass on to question number 7. Can the magistrate who granted bail under section 436 CRPC in a bailable offence, cancel the bail and by which provision of law? See, the offence is a bailable offence. Bailable offence means accused is entitled to bail as of right. Now, here is a case where in a bailable offence, accused has been released on bail. No condition can be imposed. The only condition which can be imposed is regarding the time and place of appearance. That is the only condition which can be imposed in a bailable offence. No other condition. Accus cannot be asked to report before the police officer. No other condition can be imposed by the court. Except a condition for appearance before the police officer or the court as the case may be on the appointed date, date and time. Now, if you read the provisions, while there is a specific provision given to the magistrate under section 4375 CRPC for cancelling a bail granted in respect of a non-bailable offence, there is no corresponding provision under section 436 CRPC entitling the magistrate to cancel the bail granted in a bailable offence. Now, since a provision analogous to section 4392 CRPC was absent in the... Now, of course, magistrate cannot cancel. The magistrate has not given the power to cancel the bail granted in a bailable offence under section 436. But, if you read section 4392 CRPC, the section says... See the section 4392 CRPC says, I will read section 4394 for you. Subsection 2 of section 489. A high court or court of session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this chapter be arrested and commit him to custody. Therefore, if bail has been granted under chapter 33 CRPC, which includes 436 bailable offence also, the high court and the court of session are given the power to cancel the bail, but not the magistrate. Though section 436 is not specifically mentioned, any bail granted under this chapter may be cancelled is the wording. The accused may be ordered to be committed to custody. That is the wording of 4392. Whereas under 4375 CRPC, the magistrate given the power to... Similar power, but only in respect of a non-bailable offence. Regarding bailable offence, section 436 does not give him any such power. Now, in the absence... In fact, this is corresponding to section... In the corresponding provision under the 1898 court also, there was no provision entitling the magistrate to cancel the bail granted in a bailable offence. Then noticing this omission, Salah Bhaji Hussain v. Madhukar Purushottam Monday, a.a. 1958 Supreme Court 376. Again, three judges. Justice P. B. Gajendra Gadkar speaking for the bench. Held that, the high court can cancel the bail granted in respect of the bailable offence under the inherent power of the high court, if that is necessary to ensure fair trial. That is the case where the accused was granted bail in a bailable offence. Fail to appear before the court on the appointed date and time. There was no provision for enabling the magistrate to cancel the bail. Supreme Court's three-judge bench held that the high court can cancel the bail in exercise of inherent power. This decision of the three-judge bench was subsequently approved by a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in Radhilal Banji Mitani versus Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay. A.R. 1967 Supreme Court 1639, five judges. The author of the judgment is Justice R.S. Bachawat. Now, in Talab, Haji Hussain, A.R. 1958 Supreme Court 376, which I refer to just now, the three-judge bench. Justice P. B. Gajendra Gadkar observed that it was really an omission by the legislature. Either due to oversight or inadvertence. As in the case of Section 476 of the 1973 Court also. But then, according to me, it did not be oversight or omission because one reason for not giving a power to the magistrate to cancel the bail in respect of a bailable offence may be that the only condition which can be imposed in a bailable offence is the condition for appearance, for appearance on the date and time. Now, that condition is violated. The magistrate has got the power to, the power of forfeiture of bond. The bond can be forfeited by on the accused, not appearing before court as directed on the appointed day. The other day we saw that the forfeiture is automatic. The Form 47, second schedule CRPC. Now, once he commits breach of the conditions for appearance by remaining absent in court, by remaining absent in the dock, that is visible for the court. The magistrate can see that the accused is absent. There is no petition filed for accusing the absent. No representation also. Then, the bond is automatically forfeited. And the accused and the surety, if any, can be penalized by recovering the penalty, the bond amount as the penalty. Therefore, when that power is there for the magistrate, which is almost similar to the, the consequence is similar. If the bond is cancelled and consequently the, if the bond is forfeited and consequently the bond is cancelled by the operation of section 446, capital ACRPC, then it is as good as cancellation of bail order. Therefore, that may be the reason why there is no specific provision provided by the legislature. Then we come to the last question for today. Is it permissible for the magistrate to cancel the bail granted by a superior court, such as the court of session or the high court, either during the crime stage or during inquiry or trial before the lower court? Now, the answer is yes. Of course, it may be, it may look startling where the bail was granted by the high court. Can the sessions court cancel the bail or can the magistrate cancel the bail granted by the high court? It may, or if the bail has been granted by the sessions court, can the magistrate cancel the bail? It may look startling. But you may kindly bear with me. There can be three situations. One, as per section 436, one CRPC, if any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offense, a bailable offense is arrested or detained without a warrant by an officer in charge of the police station or appears or is brought before any court, such as such a court is bound to release him on bail. That is the wording of 436-1. The wording of section 436-1 needs to reflect that if the offense, a bailable offense, then the person accused of such offense shall be released on bail, shall be released on bail by the police officer or the magistrate as the case may be. So, the police officer or the magistrate himself is releasing him on bail. Now, after passing an order granting bail with or without conditions and with or without sureties, the actual, now take the case of the actual release. The actual release is made from custody will also be made by the stationers officer or the magistrate as the case may be, the bailable offense. The police officer or the magistrate himself is granting bail. He is released on bail by the police officer or the magistrate himself and the actual release also, the bond is executed by the before the magistrate or the police officer and it is the same magistrate or police officer who is actually releasing him on bail. Now, such a release on custody will be after complying with the requirements of section 441 CRPC by executing a bail bond for such amount as the SHO stationers officer or the magistrate may deem fit. Now, we have seen the other day form 45 of the second schedule CRPC is the form for executing the bail bond both by the accused as well as the sureties. We also noticed two decisions of Supreme Court wherein it was held that the bond executed by the accused and the government and the bond executed by the sureties and the government are independent contracts. The accused is undertaking to forfeit the government in the event of he remaining absent. The sureties are also undertaking to forfeit the government the amount, the bond amount in the event the accused remains absent. Now, in the case, second situation is in the case of a high court or court of session, the power to grant bail is to be found in section 439 plus 1 plus A CRPC. Here the phraseology of the section is different from that of section 436 or 437 CRPC. Section 4391 CRPC says that the high court or a court of session may direct that the accused person in custody be released on bail. Unlike section 436 and 437 where the accused may be released on bail. The magistrate may release the accused, the SHO may release the accused. Here the session court or the high court may direct the release of the accused on bail. See the difference in phraseology. So it is the when the high court or the court of session directs the release of an accused person on bail. The actual release from custody will have to be done by the lower court, namely the magistrate. Suppose it is the high court and if the offense is to be tribaled by the session court, it is the session court. Opposing the bail is granted by the session court and if the case is tribaled by the magistrate, the bail order granted by the high court or the session court is to be complied with by the lower court. And very often the high court or the session court will say the accused is directed to be released on bail on his executing a bond for rupees say 10,000 with two solvent sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the court below or to the satisfaction of the session judge or to the satisfaction of the magistrate. It is the magistrate or the session judge who ultimately gets satisfied about the surety etc. And actually releases the magistrate or the session judge who actually releases the accused from custody in compliance of the order passed by the session court or the high court. Now we'll examine a few case law on the point. There's one decision by the Kerala High Court speaking through judges S. Patmanaban, Ali Ahmed versus state of Kerala. There is an observation in paragraph 11 in that decision as follows. Being courts of superior jurisdiction, bail granted by the session judge or by the high court cannot be cancelled by the magistrate. I will demonstrate that it is only a passing observation. The facts, the above observation was only a passing remark. That was it. That was not a case where bail granted by superior court was being cancelled by the high court or by the superior court by the inferior court. In that case, although most of the accused persons were granted anticipatory bail by the court of session, all of them were subsequently granted regular bail by the magistrate himself. It was apprehending that at the time of committal, the magistrate would cancel their bail and commit them to custody by resort to section, clauses the ANBO section 209 CRPC. Because there is a misconception that while committing the case to the court of session, the magistrate has to cancel the bail and commit him to custody. If he is already on bail, that will continue. But it was because of that misapprehension that the accused approached the high court saying that we were granted initially by the session judge. Subsequently, after the case became right for trial, the magistrate himself granted bail. But now the magistrate is going to commit the case before the committal, the magistrate had granted bail. Now the accused are apprehended, arrested or remanded to custody by clauses ANBO section 209 at the time of committal of the case. So apprehending their custody or remanded to custody, the accused approve the high court. The high court said, nothing doing, you are already on bail. So section 209 clauses ANBO is subject to the condition that already if a person is already on bail, there is no question of the magistrate cancelling their bail and remanding them to custody. So it was not a case where a bail granted by a superior court was being cancelled by an inferior court. So even though there is such an observation in the judgment. Then this position was again reiterated by Justice Katie Thomas from the Kerala High Court in Vikraman v. State of Kerala 1986 KLT 1372. Subsequently, in Raghuvir Singh v. State of Bihar a year 1987 superior court 149 interpreting similar provision in section 309. 309 clause to CRPC, Justice O. Jinnapuraddy also held that section 309 to CRPC does not empower the court to remand and accuse to custody if he is already on bail. So similar interpretation was given by Justice Jinnapuraddy from the Supreme Court. Therefore, there is no binding verdict by these decisions to the effect that bail granted by a superior court cannot be cancelled by an inferior court. In fact, the difference in the phraseology may kindly be noted. While the magistrate and the session officer while granting bail, they are entitled to they are given the power to release him on bail. Whereas in the case of the session's court or the High Court, they can only direct the release of the accused on bail. That direction is to be complied with by the lower court, namely the session judge or the magistrate. If it is a session judge by the magistrate, if it is the High Court by the session judge. Yet another decision is V.K. Shaji that is Thamanam Shaji versus Shate of Kerala, A.I.R. 2006 Supreme Court, page 100, rendered by Justice K.G. Balakrishan, who was subsequently became the Chief Justice of India. That is a case where the court of session while granting bail with conditions had empowered the magistrate below to take action for violation of violation in the event of the accused committing any violation of the bail condition. It was noticing the above empowerment in the bail order itself that the Supreme Court rejected the contents of the accused that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to take steps for cancelling the bail granted by the High Court. That is of course an observation in paragraph 6 as follows. The plea of the appellant's counsel is that the session judge, the session court had granted bail. The order of cancellation of such bail should also have been passed by the session court or by any superior court and not by the learned magistrate who is not empowered to cancel it. As a general proposition, the plea raised by the appellant is correct. It's only a passing observation, but there the bail granted by the High Court itself had empowered or itself had authorized the lower court to take action in the event of violation. The inferior court cancelling the bail granted by a superior court without any authorization was not an issue in that case having regard to the view taken by the appellant court. Then we come to Mahesh versus state of Kerala that's a decision by Justice K. Hema of the Kela High Court. After referring to the difference in the phraseology of sections 437 and 439 which we have just now referred to, it was held that if any condition in the bail order issued by a superior court is violated by the accused, it is not necessary for the magistrate to address such superior court to cancel the bail and that the magistrate himself can independently proceed against the accused even if there is no request to cancel the bail. Mahesh state has got the so amount of power to cancel the bail by this according to me lays down the correct law. Then fourth decision is Naushad versus state of Kerala by Justice Abraham Matthew of the Kela High Court. Disagreeing with the view taken in James George versus state of Kerala 2015-4KHC-943, it was held that section 437-5 and section 439-2 they are busy, empower the magistrates and courts of session respectively to cancel the bail granted to an accused in the light of his post bail conduct. Since the bail order granted in that case by the High Court had empowered the session court to cancel the bail in the event of any violation of the bail condition, the High Court permitted the first informant to move the first informant victim to move the session court for cancer treatment. Therefore the question as to whether the bail granted by a superior court, whether it can be cancelled by an inferior court without any authorization did not arise for discussion or decision in that case. Then we come to Guru Charan Singh versus state of Delhi, state Delhi administration. A year 1978 Supreme Court 179 is a very important decision, throwing profound light on this question. The decision is by Justice P.K. Goswami and V.D. Tulsa Purukar, the author of the edginess is Justice P.K. Goswami. In Para 16 the apex court compared the power of the High Court and that of the court of session to cancel bail under section 4982 of the 1898 court and section 489-2 of the present court 1973 court and observed that the restriction under the old court that the same court either the High Court or the court of session which granted bail alone could cancel the bail has been lifted under the new court under the 1973 court under section 489-2 CRPC. The following observation in Para 16 is very relevant. In other words, section 4982 of the old court under section 498 of the old court a person who had been admitted to bail by the High Court could be committed to custody only by the High Court. Similarly, if a person was admitted to bail by a court of session, it was only the court of session that could commit him to custody. This restriction upon the power of entertainment of an application for committing a person already admitted to bail to custody is lifted in the new court under section 439-2 CRPC. Under section 439-2 the new of the new court the High Court may commit a person released on bail under chapter 33 by any court including the court of session to custody. If it thinks appropriate to do so, it must however be made clear that a court of session cannot cancel a bail which has already been granted by the High Court. Unless new circumstances arise during the progress of the trial after an accused person has been admitted to bail by the High Court. So in a case where High Court had admitted a person to bail with conditions and if ordinarily the lower court cannot cancel the bail, session court cannot cancel the bail. But if any of the conditions have been violated during the progress of the trial, it means that if there are supermeaning circumstances during trial like the accused violating the bail conditions imposed by the High Court, then the session court will be entitled to cancel the bail. Very, very pertinent observation made by the Supreme Court. Then we come to Talab Haji Hussain. This is an earlier decision. 1958 Supreme Court 3763 judges. Justice N. H. Bhagwati, J. L. Kapoor, P. B. Gajendra Ghatkar. This I am adverting to only for the purpose of same consequence mentioned by the Supreme Court by Justice Bhagwati. In Gurucharan Singh, you will find similar observation in this very early decision of the Supreme Court. 1958 Supreme Court 376, rendered by Justice P. B. Gajendra Ghatkar. That is the case where the condition for appearance in the bail granted to the accused, who had allegedly committed a bailable offence, was violated. Violated in the sense that he did not appear before the court in compliance of the condition. Now, as we have already seen, in the old court also there was no condition for cancelling the bail granted in the bailable offence, as in the present court also. Thereupon the complainant moved the magistrate for cancelling the bail granted to the accused. The magistrate dismissed the application on the ground that there was no power to cancel the bail granted in the bailable offence, unlike in the case of a non-bailable offence. The matter was taken up before the High Court of Bombay, where Chief Judge is M. C. Chagla and Justice Dathar took the view that even if the magistrate is helpless for want of the power to cancel the bail, granted under section 1898, under the 1898 court, the inherent power of the High Court under section 561A of the old court could be pressed into service by the High Court for cancelling the bail and the High Court cancelled the bail. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the order of the High Court was confirmed, observing internally at that omission, it is an omission of the legislature to make a specific provision in that behalf and maybe clearly due to oversight or inadult and cannot be regarded as deliberate. These are the observations of the Supreme Court. Now, as I mentioned earlier, it may not need not necessarily be an omission. The only condition which can be imposed in a bailable offence is a condition for appearance on the date and time mentioned in the bail order. Now, when that condition is violated, the bond is, there can be four features of the bond, which will have the effect of virtually cancellation of the bail. Therefore, no right for cancellation of bail need be given according, that is my view. Then in this decision of the Supreme Court, that is in Tala Bhaji Hussain v. Madhugar, year 1958, Supreme Court 376, there is a very important observation. Now, it is obvious that the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of the accused person. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused and provisions of the court are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption. But a fair trial has naturally two objects in view. It must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is therefore of the utmost importance that in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat either from the prosecution or from the defense. A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as would lead to the conviction of an innocent person. Similarly, the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial and so there can be no possible doubt that if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the high court to secure the ends of justice. This observation became relevant because there was no provision for the mind state to cancel the bail in a bailable offense. That is why the Supreme Court said that will be a relevant occasion for the high court to intervene and exercise its inherent power to cancel the bail. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of fair trial. And it is for the contingents of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the high court are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons either by subverting or intimidating witnesses are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, this is the most important observation. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself. And if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case the inherent power of the high court can legitimately be invoked. As I mentioned, that is a case where there was no power to cancel bail in the case of a bailable offender. So the high court had to cancel the bail by exercising its inherent power. This is the most important observation in that decision. Now, according to me, therefore, my humble opinion is that the difference in the phraseology in section 437 and 4891 AACR-PC as noted above and the coupled with the view taken by Justice Heva in Mahesh versus state of Kerala, 2010, 4 KLT-921, which lays down which has clearly analyzed the mechanics of these two sections and the observation by Supreme Court in Guru Charan Singh, a year 1978, Supreme Court 179, etc. speak volumes to the effect that a bail granted by a superior court even without any authorization by the superior court can be canceled by the inferior court because the superior court is directing release of the accused on bail. And that is to be executed or complied with by the lower court by getting the requirements, the satisfaction is to be arrived at by the lower court. Therefore, if the lower court is satisfied that the bail conditions so imposed and which has to be incorporated in the bail bond also by virtue of section 441 CRP. Therefore, when that is violated, the that court can in my humble view can cancel the bail granted by a superior court not to standing or even without even in the absence of a specific empowerment by that court. With that, we complete today's lecture and we will discuss the rest of the questions on the next location. Thank you. So, we have a few questions on the YouTube. So, we didn't get rid of the zoom link. We have not is only going live with your sessions on YouTube. So, can bail be granted? This is by Anil Kumar Garg. We cancelled under section 439 sub clause 2 or 437 sub clause 5 even after the dismissal of the application under section 156-3 seeking registration of FIR under section 195A of IPC for extending threats to prosecution witnessed by accused. I didn't get the question. So, he says that after the dismissal of the application under section 156-3, you have sought registration of FIR under section 195A for threatening the accused. Can you seek cancellation of bail on these grounds? Mere allegation is not enough. Just be proved. Just be proved. At least by the preponderance of properties. The artistic is preponderance of property. But unless it is proved, the accused cannot be put to any such a disadvantage. I court granted anticipatory bail with the condition to surrender the passport with the trial court and a five years elapsed with the set passport being in the custody of the trial court. What is the best remedy for the accused? That is not a subject matter of our discussion today. He will have to move the I court itself. He will have to move the I court itself if the condition. What is his problem after this passport? The passport period has elapsed. He can make a request to the I court that my passport is expiring on such and such date. And if ultimately I am found not guilty, I may have to resume my job abroad. So please allow me to get my passport renewed. I court can on appropriate condition allow him. I have done that. I have allowed the passport to be renewed and asking him to again produce the renewed passport before the court. In case the police does not file an application for cancellation of bail, can a prosecution witness himself file an application in section 437 subclass 5 or 439 subclass 2 for getting the bail cancelled on account of the fact that the accused is threatening threats to the witness? We are dealing with that question in the coming section. Any member of the public, not only the prosecution witness, not only the first informant, not only the state public prosecutor, any member of the public who is concerned about the post bail contact that you can move the court for cancellation of bail. Because he is misusing the liberty granted to him. We will discuss this in the coming session. So we can only say they can stay tuned with Beyond Law CLC and they can watch those webinars. And those who have missed the previous webinars of Justice Ram Kumar, the way we are moving on, I feel that we will be touching the 50 marks with the webinars of Justice Ram Kumar. So stay connected and they can always watch previous ones. And Justice Ram Kumar's YouTube sessions are also available in large number of important topics on live blog. And he has also started sharing knowledge on the live blog. So everyone stay safe, stay blessed and share...