 A conversation with Korea. To start us off, we have some introductory remarks by Ambassador Shin Bong-gil, who is president of IFANS, the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security. So Ambassador Shin, thank you for joining us this morning. Stage is yours. First of all, as the president of IFANS, I'm happy to join a large audience in this public symposium, held under the same a conversation about Korea and the United States. I would like to extend my special thanks to the CSIS and the Korea Chair, Victor Cha, for having organized this symposium. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and it's a special year for the Koreans. As we mark the 70th anniversary of our liberation, as well as the division of the two Koreas. Korea is the only country that remains divided after the Second World War, with the longest armistice in modern history. Division of the peninsula has left Koreans to pay such high price for the past 70 years. The humanitarian costs, including the pains of separate families, the grave human rights situation in North Korea, the growing instability and tension caused by the North's development of nuclear weapons, and long-distance missiles are just a part of the huge cost that we have to pay. The costs of division pose burdens not just for Koreans, but the whole world. After these circumstances, President Park Geun-hae of the Republic of Korea made a speech at Dresden University, Germany, in March last year, where she proposed three agendas for unification as a first step to pave the way for reserving Korea's division, namely the agenda for humanity, agenda for co-prosperity, and agenda for integration. We mentioned that the Korean unification would be a bonanza, not only for Koreans, but for the entire world. In this line, the Korean government has launched the Unification Preparatory Committee in July last year and started drafting the blueprint for the unified Korea and establishing the national consensus. The committee also proposed for holding inter-Korean talks on December 29. We are well aware that the support of the neighboring countries is absolutely essential in realizing the Korean unification, as we have seen from the German experience. An international environment should also be shaped in ways that is favorable to Korean unification. Hence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea has set diplomacy for custom preparation for unification as the core diplomatic agenda for 2015. However, we all know it too well that the surrounding political circumstances are not so supportive. North Korea's isolation is ever-deepening due to the recent cyber-attack against Sony Pictures on top of nuclear weapons and human rights problems. President Obama even said in a recent interview that the North Korean regime will eventually collapse. North Korea is perhaps facing the worst times since the launch of the Kim Jong-un regime. The situations surrounding the Korean Peninsula is not favorable either. The three core countries in Northeast Asia, Korea, China and Japan, were not able to hold the trilateral summit for three years now due to the history and territorial conflicts. Nevertheless, we know that great crises sometimes come with great opportunities. If history is any reminder for us, unification will come in an unexpected manner and moment rather than in a predictable fashion. 2015 can be a year of dialogue and reconciliation that brings about stability on the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding situation, or it can be another unfortunate year of confrontation and division and continuous struggles with the vestiges of the Cold War. This year will indeed stand at the historic crossroad. In this light, we are at times where the U.S., perhaps having the biggest stake in Northeast Asian politics and the Korean unification, has important roles to play. The purpose of today's symposium would be to share frank opinions and enhance mutual understanding of such array of issues. So in closing, it is my sincere hope that the symposium today will provide an opportunity to share insights and wisdom on the Korean Peninsula-related issues. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Shin. And now to offer some congratulatory remarks is Ambassador Ahn Ho-young. Ambassador Ahn, the stage is yours. Thank you. Good afternoon. Your response? Good afternoon. Good afternoon. What is the matter of fact? Well, some of my colleagues coming from Korea, they flew 14 hours, and there is 14-hour time lag between Seoul and Washington. So what time is it? This is 3.30 in the morning. So they need you to cheer them up a little bit. So good afternoon. Good afternoon. Right? So thank you so much. I came to Washington this time as an ambassador in 2013, but the first time when I came to Washington that was back in 1981, second time in 1990, third time in 2005. So this is my fourth time to come and live in Washington, D.C. In other words, I've been coming to Washington every decade for the past four decades. Isn't it amazing, right? When I say that, many of you ask me, well, you must have seen a lot of changes in Washington, D.C. for the past four decades. And you must have seen a lot of changes in the relationship between Korea and United States. And then in fact, I did. I saw a lot of changes, and I have to tell you most of them or all of them were made in a very, very positive direction. So this afternoon, welcoming my friends coming from Korea. Let me try to share with you at least three of them, right? So first positive change I came to notice for the past four decades. That is, the forgotten war has changed itself into a forgotten victory. In the United States, the Korean War, which was fought between 1950 and 1953, it was known, as you know it already, as a forgotten war. That was up until 2013. 2013, I came here as an ambassador, and it just happened to be the 60th anniversary of the end of Korean War hostilities, as well as 60th anniversary of mutual security treaty between Korea and United States. And 2013 was the first year when I heard you, American citizens, referring to the Korean War as a forgotten victory. When I first heard it, I was really, really touched by the fact that Korean War is now being addressed as a forgotten victory in this country because what's the difference between forgotten war and forgotten victory? On the surface, the difference is just one word, war and victory, but at the same time, if you look into the underlying basis between the two, then the difference is huge. So when you say forgotten war, what would be the underlying emotion? The underlying emotion would be frustration. Emotion in the sense we came to Korea, a country we never heard of, we lost tens of thousands of lives, we came back, and nobody even remember that we fought a war in Korea. So when you say forgotten war, the underlying emotion is one of frustration. But what about forgotten victory? What is the underlying emotion when you say forgotten victory? We went to fight in a far-off country. We never even heard of the name Korea. We lost tens of thousands of lives. After six years, what is happening in the country? Economy is booming, democracy is a model democracy, especially in Asia, and Korea has found this place in the international community. I'm so proud. I'm so proud of what is happening in Korea. I'm so proud of what I did for the country six years ago. So when you say forgotten victory, that would be the underlying emotion. So that is the reason why I say, between forgotten war and forgotten victory, it took no less than six years for forgotten war to change itself into forgotten victory. So there is the very positive change I came to notice in this town. The second very positive change would be Korean cuisine. How many of you have Korean food for today? Korean cuisine has found this place in the mainstream American society. Why do I say that? It's because as an ambassador, I meet a large number of people here in Washington, D.C. I meet senators, I meet congressmen, I meet government officials like Song Kim, Ura Yu, Song Kim, and then I meet academics, I meet journalists. And then many of them, they ask me, well, please recommend to me a good Korean restaurant in town, right? What is the good Korean restaurant in town? When I hear that, what do I say? I say, the best Korean restaurant in town, that is my kitchen in my residence, right? And then I say, I'm sorry I cannot invite you today, right? So the second best restaurant would be, you would have to go to Anandale, right? But at the same time, that's a joke. But when I hear it, I infect my heart is filled with a lot of pride. Why? Because what is food? Clothing you put on the outside of your body, right? Cosmetic you apply on the outside of your face. What about food? This is something you take and put into yourself, into your stomach, right? So if you do not feel comfortable about the country, if you do not feel comfortable about the culture, or if you do not feel comfortable about the people coming from the country, then you wouldn't feel like having the food, right? So there is a reason why in my mind, this is a very positive change. So many American citizens ask me, where can I find a good Korean restaurant? My third very positive change I came to notice in this town is proliferation, quote unquote proliferation of Korea chairs in think tanks in town. It started with the CSIS and just in front of me, I picked a child and when I call him the dean of Korean studies in town, the dean of Korean studies in the United States of America, none of you would object to me. Would you? Victor Chow, he's the dean of Korean studies in the whole United States of America. And what is he doing? He's a chair, Korean chair at the CSIS. And what is CSIS? Well if you go to University of Pennsylvania, they have something called think tanking institute year after year after year, they choose CSIS as the best think tank in the United States and in the whole world in the area of international and foreign studies, security studies. So there's CSIS and Victor Chow is the Korea chair. And then we have Korea chair of the Brookings institution. We have something similar at the Udo Wilson Center and then I know there are many other think tanks, top quality think tanks which want to have Korea chair, right? It means a lot to me why because think about Washington, D.C. I think there are two important groups of people in Washington, D.C. On the one hand, decision makers like Sun Kim or like Ambassador Amitage, right? On the other hand, their opinion makers, everybody else, right? And then I think this is the town where the relationship between decision makers and opinion makers, I think it's a very, very close relationship you have in this town. So having Korea chairs at the CSIS, having Korea chair at the Brookings institution, having Korea chair at the Udo Wilson Center, that in fact means a lot for the relationship between Korea and the United States. So I've already shared with you the three very, very positive changes. I could go on for many hours, but at the same time, I should be stopping by here, but at the same time, what is the meaning of all these positive changes we are observing? And then I've just tried to share with you. Well, in a sense, there are reflections of strengthening relations between Korea and then the United States. But at the same time, they in fact, I mean all those positive changes in fact, they in fact will work to further strengthen the relations between Korea and the United States for the coming 60 years. But at the same time, let me try to wrap up with a word or with a message with which all of you would be able to agree with, which is complacency is the last thing we want. And then we have to continue to ask our service, what worked between our two countries. And then we have to continue to ask our service what we would have to do in the days to come in order to further strengthen relations between Korea and United States. And that I think is the reason why I'm so encouraged about this seminar you are having today. And who do you have on the panel? I should be very careful about it in the sense that I should be behaving myself in a sense, in the sense that we have four panelists, Deputy Prime Minister General Seok and Ambassador Choi Young-jin. They in fact used to be my bosses. They are my former bosses, you see. And then we have Ambassador Amitage and Ambassador Sung Kim, who are my boss today, right? And they are, say, my bosses of yesterday or today, but at the same time, they in fact are the most qualified panelists we could ever get hold of in order to discuss the issue we have at hand today, which is the relations between Korea and United States. So thank you so much. And then let us try to enjoy the panel discussion this afternoon. Thank you. Well, thank you Ambassador Ahn and Ambassador Shin for those remarks. Today is a conversation on Korea and the United States. CSIS is doing this in cooperation with the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security. And we're grateful to our Korean friends and partners for doing our meeting yesterday and then the public symposium today. We also benefit in this symposium from the support of Samsung Electronics America in their support of our Korea platform event. So we're grateful to them as well. There's a lot to talk about. And I thought where we begin is to pick up with some of Ambassador Shin's opening remarks in terms of the question of unification. President Park has been quite vocal on the issue of unification. President Obama, I believe, stated in the last summit that he saw her ideas about sole peace process and other things fitting well with the rebalance or pivot to Asia. So perhaps we should begin by, I would like to ask Deputy Prime Minister Hyun if he could offer some remarks on what you think are the origins. What is the basis of President Park's so-called unification strategy referring to it as a jackpot, if you will, of sorts? Thank you. I think, first of all, I'd like to express my deep appreciation to you and President Shin of Ipons in Korea around the disavailability around your discussion. Just having that there's a saying that if you want to be happy, once you have the office, then you'd better overcome what I was complex. But this time I'm just trying to make my personal view rather than representing the Korean government. So as for the unification issues, as President Shin already mentioned in his opening remarks that this year, I think, we'll mark the 70s anniversary of the division. Actually, I think most Korean people that failed a sense of mission because Korea remains the only countries divided since World War II. So in that sense, I think that unification is quite important issues as far as Korea's government's agenda is concerned. And in addition, over 90% of Korean population were born after the Korean War. So I think most Korean people are aware that the need for unification, but frankly speaking, some of them are wary of the cost of pains in the process of unification. In that sense, I think President Park's unification policies have several implications, at least three implications. So the first implication is I think of how unification policies I think is an attempt at re-engineering over the discourse over unification for the past. I mean, from that something to be dark and then negative to the bright and then point to us. So as you mentioned that already, the unification might be interpreted as bonanza. I'd like to avoid that jackpot. It's a connotation problem. But anyway, so that means that unification might provide huge benefits and opportunities not only for Korea, but also in the world. Just a couple of things. I mean, the unified Korea will be a herald of peace and booster of growth and land of freedom and democracy and the defect of human rights. And also, there are several security issues also might be counted as benefit. So definitely, some division of Korea will be geopolitical cause. But unified Korea will be the geopolitical source of prosperity. So that's the first implication. The second implication is that I think we need to prepare for the unification through a more practical approach rather than ideological ones. So to make today's vision tomorrow's the realities, I think we must begin. It's a very meticulous of the preparation from now. So that's why I think that the Korean government already established the preparatory unification. I mean, the committee is under President Park's. So and the way to reach the unification is not just one time. It's a very pace and a gradual and a functional approach in this sense. So I think, as already President Shin mentioned, President Park proposed at the three-point agenda in a speech in Dresden of Germany, such as the agenda for humanity, agenda for co-prosperity, and agenda for the integration. That's the second implication. The final, the third implication is that I think in relation to unification, I think we have to create a right international environment conducive to that unification. This might be the core of President Park's unification policies. So that means that Korea's North Asia policies cannot be decoupled from the unification. So that means that such as that Korea's North East Asia peace and then cooperation initiatives and Eurasian initiatives might contribute to bringing about those Korea's changes. So those kinds of implications might be included in my interpretation of President Park's unification policies. Well, thank you, Prime Minister Hyun. Ambassador Choi Young-jin, you were ambassador here during the early part of President Park's term in office. I'd like to ask you the same question, but going a little bit further, I mean, you've had lots of experience in the ROK government serving in different posts, serving many presidents. Do you find that her unification policy or strategy as Deputy Prime Minister Hyun laid out is different from things you've seen in the past? Are the things about it that you feel are different or unique in the way she thinks about unification? The approach towards North Korea has been central theme for all the currencies in Korea and its evolving process. And we have tested all sorts of possible formulas. Sunshine policy, confrontation, brinkmanship, and some meetings, everything. But it didn't really produce tangible results. So what Madame Park is trying to do is without confidence, really we cannot make meaningful progress. So that's what she's aiming at. Having said this, unlike the German case, a lot depends, unfortunately, on North Korea, not us, neither South Korea nor the United States. Because North Korea is a completely isolated country with otaku economy. That means we do not have much leverage. And on top of this, North Korea, the best description is North Korea is in mortal dilemma. On the one hand, what North Korea is doing is pursuing what the Soviet Union did exactly by words, word by word, sacrificed the life of the population, starting them, and shift all the resources to military capabilities increase. And Pyongyang knows that it cannot possibly work. So it did increase the internal contradictions, which will lead the regime to collapse. So what North Korea has, the other option is what I call Chinese option, which is to make a strategic decision and embark on the road of opening and reform. In other words, introduction of the market economy, accept trade and investment, and engage with foreign countries, not in military negotiations or in economic exchange. But that is fraught with dangers for the regime, because it is completely controlled economy. If you let the population taste the liberty, then regime is not sure that they might survive. So one way or the other, there is a great danger for the regime. So what North Korea is now pursuing, it is called a two-track approach or simultaneous advancement that is nuclear weapons and trade, which is only the expression of this dilemma. It cannot possibly work. So sooner or later, North Korea must make a choice. Whether it can, even though there is a danger, it can experiment Chinese option. Otherwise, a lot of agitations, ambiguities, North Korea will go down to the path of Soviet Union. So whatever happens, the unification will be on South Korea's term, because North Korea is a burden, not a prey anymore. So only South Korea can take up enormous burden of raising the livelihood of North Korean population. In that case, what it means to Korea is we will have market economy, democratic country on the entire Korean peninsula, nuclear weapons free. And that means South Korea, an additional 25 million highly skilled workers, labor forces. That is what they call jackpot or balanza. And they are highly qualified. And remember, only 20, some years ago, China and North Korea were on a par, they were saying, economically. And only 30-something years ago, South and North Korea were not quite different. So that means given opportunity, North Korean people can make enormous, miraculous economic development, like South Korea, like China. So I see the chances of the road to that opportunity, the balanza, will be unpredictable because a lot depend on North Korea, not on us. Thank you. Rich Armadage, Ambassador An said that he had all his bosses up here. I really do have my boss up here. He's the CSIS trustee. So Rich Armadage, former deputy secretary of state, not to be impolite in this room, but there's always this discourse in parts of Korea or parts of Asia that somehow the United States is not in favor of Korean unification. And I'd like to get your response to that. The other nations in Asia? The other nations in Asia, including the United States, their views on unification. Well, thank you, Professor Chao. I think as Director answered your question, as a general matter, reunification of the peninsula under Seoul's leadership is a good outcome and a desirable outcome with some caveats. The caveats, I think, are quite obvious. First of all, for the United States, and I think for Japan, if a United Peninsula of Korea is in the main directed in their economic interest and their political interest toward the People's Republic of China, this may be a source of some concern for the United States and others. If, on the other hand, the United Peninsula of Korea is very Western oriented and looking outward, this would be, I think, something that we view most favorably and positively. Likewise, the future Peninsula of Korea, if US forces were still invited by the people of Korea to participate in some manner, that might be of a concern to China. All of those are manageable. But as I say, after having said, it's generally a favorable situation. The manner in which reunification is accomplished and the direction of the politics from Seoul after that will dictate a lot of the response. But as a general matter, people who are not in favor of reunification are greatly in the minority, from my point of view. Great, thanks. Sung Kim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Special Envoy for North Korea, former US Ambassador Korea, thanks for joining us today. So we've heard from Rich generally about how different countries in the region feel. I mean, from the perspective of the Obama administration, I think President Obama was on the first to say that he supports Korea whole and free. Could you tell us something about what the administration's views are on Pakennae's unification of Bonanza, the Seoul peace process, Northeast Asian peace and security forum? Sure, thanks very much. But before I answer your question, can I make three points? See, I always follow Ambassador Ahn's lead. And you notice that he always has three points, no matter what this is. Three points. First, I apologize for being a little late. But Chris Nelson, it's not because I was conducting some secret diplomacy. There's something much more ominous than that, Washington traffic. Secondly, I want to echo what Ambassador Ahn said about my fellow panelists. This is, I'm deeply honored to be on the stage with Deputy Secretary Amitage, Deputy Prime Minister Hyun and Ambassador Choi. Deputy Prime Minister Hyun was enormously helpful in our efforts to implement the historic free trade agreement. It was a very, very strong partner, so thank you. And Rich is, of course, bossed to many, many people, including me. I still remember I was a very junior political officer in Tokyo when Secretary Ahn visited. I was so scared I wouldn't even sit down in his suite. And he said, just sit down. This belongs to the American people. And Ambassador Choi represents the finest of the Korean diplomatic corps at everything. Korea has some of the most talented diplomats, and he's one of them. So I'm thrilled to be with all of you here. And finally, point three is thanks to Victor and CSIs for organizing this forum. Initially, I think Victor told me that this would be a very safe forum about US-Korea alliance. So I thought, great. Sure, I'd be happy to participate. But then somehow over the past few days, it's evolved into something that's focused on reunification. But still I'm happy to be here. I think our answer on the question of unification is quite straightforward and simple. The president has made this very clear. We very strongly support President Park's vision for unification. We strongly support the Korean government's efforts to engage the North Koreans in some meaningful and constructive dialogue to talk about not just issues between the two Koreas, but to talk about how we can all work together towards the common goal of denuclearization. So actually, no qualification. We very strongly support President Park's efforts and vision. Great, that's very straightforward. Let me ask you about another question. It is related to the alliance. I promise we'll talk about the alliance, but it's related to the alliance. And there's some perceptions in this town and among the chattering classes out there, the so-called opinion makers that Ambassador Han referred to that the growing engagement between President Park and Xi Jinping on the economic side, in terms of the security side, is somehow reflecting Korea drifting in the direction of China and away from the sort of conventional US-Japan relationship. How would you respond to that? Prime Minister Han. Well, maybe. In my view, I think that some violations, some bilateral relations cannot be the jettison game. In other words, I mean, Korea, I think, I mean, should pursue in both. I mean, that relation with the US, and also some kind of a very close relation with China. But the reason I think that some kind of access to China is not shifted from the US. I want to interpret it. In some sense, try to find out some kind of the activities in the Korea-China relations, and more than more activities compared to the previous years. So this is my interpretive. In other words, I mean, this is not something like away from US, just about to cross the China. This is a kind of a strategy, from Korea's point of view. And another thing is that actually, that China is very much close in the general unification or some denuclearization policies, so it's concern. But I think that North Korea has continuously proclaimed the so-called Byung-jin policies, and in other words, something like they argued that, I mean, simultaneously very much the nuclearization and then economy issues. But you cannot have a cake and eat too, so it doesn't work. So I think in this sense, I think North Korea, I think, should take more seriously where's the economy's going on. In other words, they should take some kind of reforms, not so much satisfactorily, but they should start. I'm just following the Chinese case or the Vietnamese case. But they start anyway, unless it's really hard, I mean, to deal with that international context. Rich, what about this question of Korea drifting from the conversations of the people in the region? Professor Chao, on this issue, there are always some of the chattering classes who are going to look for trouble when it doesn't exist and make allegations that Mrs. Park wants to trade one relationship for another. I, for one, don't buy it. Don't buy it for a minute. I mean, obviously, there are economic dimensions of a Republican-Korean-China relationship. It's undeniable. I read yesterday in the newspaper one in three tourists to a Republican career from China. So you can't deny an economic interest. But I think her activities with President Xi Jinping in the main are devoted to trying to resolve the North Korean puzzle, the North Korean question, and trying to get China finally to stand up and use what influence China does have in a very positive way. And I think the reason she can do this is because she has confidence that the United States is going to be there for, that we do believe in this relationship. But Ambassador Ahn and his opening remarks made some comments about needing to guard against complacency. And if the relationship between the Republican career and People's Republic of China keeps us from being complacent, that's a good thing. But I don't buy the argument of some of the Chattery classes. But Rich, what about in Japan? What's the view in Japan? What would you say the view in Japan? What is the view in Japan? Yeah. As I talk to Japanese friends, they are somewhat more skeptical about the motives of the government of Korea. Not totally skeptical, but somewhat more skeptical. And I've noticed in recent months as the relationship between China and Japan has slightly bettered that that sort of criticism has dropped down a bit. Right. And so we're very fortunate to have two former ambassadors on stage here, Song Ambassador for the United States to Korea, Ambassador Choi, Ambassador Korea to the United States. So let me ask you on the alliance, one question is with regard to TPP. And there seems to be a new momentum to TPP now. The president in the State of the Union speech explicitly talked about TPA and TPP. How should the US ROK alliance be thinking about TPP and its future? So Ambassador Choi. We have chorus. In other words, Korea, US free trade agreement, which is by far the most highly and the highest level of liberalization between two countries in terms of trade. So TPP is an additional instrument in our hands to reinforce the relationship. And I don't think why Korea should not join TPP. It's only a matter of timing. And on the other hand, your previous question was very important, Korea leading towards China. We have the other issue, counterpart of TPP, that is AIIB, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, proposed by China. So in the end, I think Korea should join both of them. And in this sense, I did not see any problem TPP possibly may cause to Korea. Having said this, let me briefly respond to your important question. Sure, Korea leading towards China. It is not correct. It's factually correct. But also, it doesn't make any sense for all the three countries involved. The misgivings, I think, arise from the trade volume, really too much, too rapidly increasing between two countries, Korea and China. 20 years ago, when we established relations between the countries, it was almost zero. Last year, it was increased to $250 billion. On the other hand, Korea-US remained at the level of $100 billion, so two and a half times more. And this may give you, as Korea leading towards China is a natural course for the future, that is only trade. Don't forget that Korea-US is a military alliance. It cannot be compared to simple commercial relations with China. And more than that, just to remember, imagine what will happen to this important area for the entire world. What happens if there is no presence of the United States, America? And it will be very chaotic, very even dangerous. And from America's interest as the policy pivot to Asia proves America's every interest to be engaged in this important area, in the future, and in the global economy. And Korea-US alliance is one of the people most important. So it makes sense for Korea and America to maintain this alliance. Secondly, for China, I really don't think if Korea aligns completely China, that would please China and serve to the interest of China. It's better for us, Korea, to maintain relations with America and serve as a link between East and West and for the benefit of everybody. So leaning towards China is not only correct, but does not make any sense. Korea will maintain alliance with the United States as long as Washington wants it. Korea will increase its global relations with China naturally, if it happens. And we don't see any contradiction. As long as we say China is not on the collision course, and I don't believe it. There will be competition, but I don't think confrontation is in the car. So as long as that is discredited, Korea's maintaining alliance with the US and Korea's increasing cooperation with China is not contradiction is totally, absolutely feasible and to the interest of everybody involved. Thanks. Sung, you are, you wear two hats now. And in your hat as Deputy Assistant Secretary, you have both Japan and Korea under your AOR, if you will. So could I ask you, what is sort of the state of the trilateral relationship right now? I know that you've just come back from trilateral talks. You could say, in this role that you have now, keeping all of our allies on the same page, how's that going, basically? First of all, as you know, the trilateral cooperation and coordination among the US, Korea, and Japan is critical to not only US's interest, but for regional peace and stability. And this is why we take it so seriously. And this is why we work hard with both Korean friends and Japanese friends to try to strengthen that trilateral cooperation. I'm just, in terms of my recent dealings, as you mentioned, I was in Tokyo last week for North Korea policy coordination among the three countries. And I can report confidently that our coordination could not be better, I think, on every major aspect. There's very strong agreement among the three countries, both in sort of assessing the current situation, reviewing recent developments, including the cyber attack against Sony, but more importantly, looking forward on the next steps and what we can do together to try to resume credible negotiations on de-inquisition, I think we're on the same page. And if you look at, if you go back a little bit further, we signed a MOU on information sharing among the three countries, which again, I think is an important positive development on the three countries that will help strengthen trilateral cooperation. Obviously, Japan and Korea have some difficult issues between them. I think both countries are committed to making a real effort to resolve some of those issues, including the painful comfort women issue. I think as a strong friend and an ally to both countries, we encourage both Seoul and Tokyo to work harder to try to address some of the issues between them. But I think overall, there's very strong recognition that trilateral cooperation is important and that three of us need to continue to work at it. Victor, can I just go back to your couple? Yes, please. On China-Korea, I agree with everything Rich and Ambassador Ches said, and I think that is the administration's perspective as well. I would, in fact, go one step further and say, not only are we not worried about Korea-China relations, but in fact, we think it's a good thing that Korea and China are improving relations. It's a good thing that China is having constructive and robust relations with democratic countries that believes in human rights, free market principles, et cetera. I think that type of influence will be good for all of us. But let me ask you then, but Rich said there is a little bit of concern in Japan among some. I mean, how is that addressed? But I think my sense is that part of that concern may be because Japan and Korea relations probably are not as smooth as it could be. But I'm confident that these two great countries will be able to find a way back to a much more constructive, fuller relationship. That happens, I think. Concerns about Korea-China relations will probably diminish quite a bit. And do you want to say anything on TPP? Sure. As you know, we welcome Korea's interest in joining TPP. We think it would make a lot of sense. And as Ambassador Choi pointed out, we have in US-Korea free trade agreement called the Gold Standard Free Trade Agreement. It's a wonderful agreement. So it really would not be much of an effort for Korea to meet the additional standards that would come with TPP. Mm-hmm, OK. Just like the TPP. I think TPP is very, very important in the tool respect for the United States. Number one is that I think that TPP is some kind of reflection of a so-called rebalance in Asia policy of the United States. Now, another one is that once the TPP is not concluded smoothly, I think the US leadership might be seriously affected. I mean, if you consider that the Chinese are in that emergency in the Northeast Asia, including RCEP, so on, some kind of. So TPP should be concluded as a schedule. As far as Korea is concerned, I think Korea should join TPP in Sonowarita, I mean, depending upon the schedule of the TPPs for the original members. But in the case of Korea, I mean, among the three countries of our TPPs, only two countries of Korea did not have free trade agreements. One is Mexico, another is Japan. So that means most of the members of the TPP original have been the schemes Korea had already fixed. So that might have some time for the joint TPP in a practical sense. Thank you. Rich, do you have a view on TPP? Other than it should be done, right? I'm bored. OK, then let's turn to, we talked a little bit about it during the unification question, but let's turn to North Korea if we could. So since the start of the new year, we've seen lots of different things by the North Koreans, dropping the hint of a possible summit, accepting this invitation to go to Moscow in May, talking at least to the press about their interest in inviting US officials to North Korea. I mean, what do you think all this means? What are the, is this a strategic decision by the North Koreans, or is it tactical? Prime Minister Hyun, what do you think is going on here? Well, it is quite well known that North Korea's behavior is like roller coaster ride, right? It's very unpredictable, but especially that, I mean, it's very unpredictable since the third nuclear test, that might trigger the very top-stable international sanctions. But let me call your attention to the North Korean economies when we interpret their proposal as well. So as I mentioned already, some kind of biogen might not work. Even though North Korea, I mean, mentioned that they adopted a couple of market-oriented policies, like they designated some economic zone and then provided some kind of favorable terms to foreign investors and tourists. And also, they allowed some agricultural people to own some 30% of production, some stuff like that. But, I mean, Kim Jong-un's behavior is really unpredictable, so those kind of policies cannot rule any foreign investors or something like that. So I think we might interpret that some kind of proposal for the cemetery might be a sign that those policies is failing. So that means that due to that some kind of difficulties of economies, they might try to find out new ways, like a proposal to a cemetery or some kind of thing. But, and also, I read in the newspaper, President Park, that mentioned that she would like to meet without precondition. But we have to be very careful that does meet without precondition does not mean that some kind of unconditional engagement. So the meeting without precondition is one thing to test the real condition of North Korea. But as we talked already, President Park's unification of policies is very concisant. In other words, it's bottom line, it's a deep neutralization, et cetera. Thanks. Rich, so what do you think is going on here? And then also, if you could say something about where you think the discussion between Japan and North Korea is and what, which be, first, what do you think is behind all of these North Korean overtures? And then secondly, if you could say something about Japan and North Korea and their relationship. Japan and North Korea. First of all, I would have said in answer to the question of strategic versus tactical, that during the time of Kim Il-sung, it was somewhat more strategic. But since the mid-90s, somewhat after the framework agreement, I think it's been increasingly tactical. And now, I would say it's totally tactical, cynical, oozing in sincerity from North Korea. Even the recent published or at least reported upon memoirs of former President Lee Min-bak makes it quite clear that North Koreans were of course interested in the summit for a certain amount of money. So I don't think we can overstate their cynicism. On the question of Japan and North Korea, this is for the second time Japan has been intent on having discussions with the North Koreans on the question of abductees during Prime Minister Kozumi's time in office, he had these discussions as well. It appears that the North Koreans have lost interest for the most part in this. From my point of view, I may be misinformed, but the Japanese wanted some deliberations. They wanted information. And the North Koreans, they just wanted something, money or aid or something of that nature without having to come up with any admission of guilt or anything of that nature. So I find those things are completely stalled. There were some here in the United States that were worried for a while that Japan might be playing a game with North Korea that was really directed against the Republic of Korea. I don't find that to be the case in discussions with Japanese officials. I've never heard anybody indicate that, but I've seen it written about the pressure. That's hung. I mean, where do you think we are on this? I mean, what is behind these North Korean overtures? You know, are they, is there meaning to them? Do you see anything useful in them? Our sense is that North Koreans, wherever they go, whether they're over-churched in Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, they're hearing a very consistent message from all of these countries. And that is that unless they make progress on the nuclear issue, and unless they start to live up to their obligations and commitments, and follow UN Security Council resolution requirements, that they will not be able to improve relations with anybody. And I think that's a fairly consistent and important message that they're hearing in their diplomatic outreach effort. And I think that is going to continue. I don't see any of our friends in Europe, Southeast Asia, anywhere, compromising on that very important principle. Because we all share a very serious concern about North Korea's pursuit of dangerous weapons programs, both nuclear and missiles. And so they, unless they may start to work with us on some meaningful progress in that regard, I don't think they will see much success in their diplomatic outreach. On Japan, North Korea, as Rich points out, I think there may have been some concern initially. But basically, we support Japan's efforts to deal with this very important humanitarian issue of that tease. So we are very comfortable with Japan, North Korea dialogue, focused on how they can make progress on that important issue. Then how do we explain Russia? If the message that they're getting, the North Koreans are getting all over is you can't approve with anybody, tell you denuclearize what, maybe the Russians didn't get the message or something. Russia and North Korea, we have to put it into perspective. And I agree that, Mr. Sun Kim, that I don't see much diplomacy on the part of North Korea. I can see only expressions of their dilemma, expressions of their ambiguities. In other words, what North Korea can really do is show outside world, South Korea, Japan, China, United States, that I made up my mind. In other words, I want to join you. Then everything will be so easy, corporations, investment, but as long as North Korea does not make such a strategic decision, it will be always in dilemma and overtures will be half-hearted. And all the corporation initiatives will be presenting to them will be seen as Trojan horse of poisoned carrot. So that's not because we really poisoned it, but from under a part, however, good intention we propose corporation exchanges, they will be seen as Trojan horse because of the characteristics of the regime. And how do we see whether they made a strategic decision? There is only one criteria, that is China case again. Only the North Korea regime is just like North Koreans. They want to control everything, even for investment. And the workforces was provided by the state. And what made the decision important to us, he realized it would lead nowhere, China's economy. As long as we do not allow economic freedom to individuals, there will be no market, there will be no economic development. So what we should do in the mid-80s, I will allow the Chinese citizens living in the special economic zone to employ the freely, individually, and receive salaries individually and spend them as they fit. That made what China is today. So as long as North Korea, I don't think nobody's seen it. The Pyongyang regime allowed another single decision to be employed freely by foreign company or by foreign embassy. So as long as we do not see such a move, I don't see any meaningful gesture in North Korea which can be of interest to us. So as long as North Korea does not make strategic decision, I don't see any gesture in their part, including North Korea, Russia, theatrics, I don't see any meaningful significance for the future. And remember last comment, Russia, North Korea, they always made a point when they were in difficulty and all the other things did not work. So now everything is frozen for North Korea and Russia is in difficulty. So they may come up with some interesting diplomatic moves, but will it have meaningful bearings for the future? As long as North Korea does not make strategic decision, I don't see any really meaningful prospect for the future progress. Okay, can I add? Yes, please. I think it's worth noting that Russians, even though they are having some senior level contact with the North Koreans, at every opportunity senior Russian government officials have made clear that they remain committed to the joint statement of the Six-Party process, that they wanna work with the Six-Party process towards complete denuclearization of North Korea and that in fact they would strongly oppose a nuclear test by North Korea. So I think I agree with Ambassador Choi that there would be a limit to what the two countries can do unless North Korea has actually started to address our common concerns, right? On Russia, obviously historically, well, Russia is a Eurasian land mass, but its interests have been directed more to the former historically than the latter. I think because of the difficulties right now in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and the difficulties between Russia and the European Union that Russia is looking to be relevant somewhere. That's part of it and they had a very bad one-sided energy deal with China recently and now you indicated earlier, Professor Choi, an invitation apparently to Kim Jong-un to go to Moscow. I think what the Russians are doing are sending a signal that they can cause difficulties in other parts of the world if they choose in order to try to get Europe and the West to lighten up on sanctions regime, but I did not put it that fast, the Russian Federation. Okay, so we have some time left and I promise that we'd have some questions from the audience, so if you could just raise your hand and identify yourself, that would be great. So we have Glenn. I'm Glenn Fukushima at the Center for American Progress. Want to thank the panelists for a very stimulating discussion. I'd like to ask about the three-country cooperation. Although Ambassador Kim tried to emphasize the cooperation among the three, I think all of us will agree that, especially between Japan and South Korea, the cooperation could be increased and enhanced. I have the impression in Japan that some people believe that it's not exactly clear what it is that South Korea needs in order for the relation to get back on track, that the goalpost seems to be moving. And so I'd like to ask the two Korean panelists, so what exactly is it that Japan needs to do in order to get back on track with regard to the heads of states having meeting and getting back to the ability to cooperate to the full potential of the United States, Japan, and Korea? And to the American panelists, I'd like to ask, what advice, concrete specific advice are you providing to the two parties in order to get back on track in cooperation? Thank you. Okay Ambassador Chet, would you like to respond to the Glenn question? What do the South Koreans want to see? First of all, the trilateral cooperation between Japan, the US, and Korea, crazy in favor of increasing the cooperation, even in a security field. And because the three countries in a way serve as an anchor to the entire East Asian stability and development, we are spreading the market economy, spreading democracy, and to the extent that China accept the values with three countries share, will make us more secure and more prosperous. So we are in favor of the trilateral cooperation except, except on the security front, if three countries want to take action, even in China, Korea cannot be part of that cooperation, that element of cooperation. Why? Because we share frontier with China. We have millions of Korean expatriots living in China. We have a North Korean problem. So we have our interest is not totally same as yours, Japan and the United States. So even though we share the large part for the trilateral cooperation, there are small portion in case the three countries wants to something against aiming at China in terms of security, Korea cannot be part of it. And regarding bilateral cooperation, I don't see any other means than muddling through because wave of fundamental differences. If you ignore it, it will be illusory. So let's just see what we are, each others. And there are some basic elements on you, she did not agree. So it's better to, to see the things as they are and muddle through and give time the chance. So 50th anniversary of Korea, Japan normalization. What can the US do? Yeah, I, another variation of that question is, will the US mediate between Japan and Korea? And the answer, as you know, is no. But as a good friend and as a close ally, I mean, we obviously encourage both countries to try to deal with some of the outstanding issues. But I think the basic advice is what the president indicated in some of his recent public comments, which is that it's important for the US, it's important for the two countries to look forward and to find areas of cooperation and to strengthen child-adult cooperation, even as they work to address some of the issues from the past. So I don't think anybody's suggesting that you should dismiss this very important painful issues from the past, but it's obviously we should look forward as well. And I think that's what all three countries want to do. That's why we do, even as they deal with the difficult issue of comfort women. We're finding opportunities for child-adult cooperation, the information sharing agreement, and child-adult defense talks, policy coordination of North Korea, et cetera. So I think I'm not, model two may be a bit too strong. I think we'll be fine. Glenn, nice to see you. Just a reminder, I'm all for the tripartite cooperation. It is important for all the reasons that my distinguished colleagues have mentioned, and we need it. But let's be clear. The relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan, well, the United States and the Republic of Korea, for that matter, the United States and Japan has not always been clear sailing. We had normalization between Republic of Korea and Japan in 1965, but you've had plenty of small explosions since then, while it was a kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from Tokyo in the early 70s, or attempted assassinations and so on, et cetera. I think we've got to be clear. Let's not hyperventilate. We've got a problem, got a problem primarily between Korea and Japan that has historical significance. It can be resolved, and generally, we have been able to resolve rocky times in our relationship. And I mentioned the United States has had difficulty with Japan, and the famous Nixon shock of China, and for that matter, the United States has turned our back from time to time on the Republic of Korea with very bad consequences, most notably, I think, Dean Atchison and Mr. Truman's comments about Korea being outside our defense perimeter. So these relationships take work, and that's what Ambassador Sung Kim and his colleagues are doing. They're working it hard, and they're working in the best possible way they can. And let's not take caution of our fears here. Thanks. Chris Nelson. Thanks so much. Great discussion. Just a quick follow-up on Glenn. They're closing the Accura. What the hell are we going to do? That's a terrible situation. But anyway, I did have a serious question. In looking at what we're saying and doing, it's a bit like the common power distinction between changing regime and the regime changing itself. A lot of what we're talking about with North Korea in terms of what we're doing about North Korea, it looks like we are pushing to change the regime literally. Is there maybe a better way we could talk about what we're doing with sanctions and with human rights and with all the pressure we're bringing for obviously legitimate reasons that doesn't look in Pyongyang as though it just confirms the whole hostile policy, a rubric that we hear all the time, including KCNAs today, rather chilling threats of nuclear war, very charming. And then specifically on the Japan-Korea problem. A year or so ago, President Obama stood next to President Park and made very strong, very heartfelt, very public remarks about the comfort women and in a sense advising Prime Minister Abe to stop this agitation. But in the last few weeks, it seems to have gotten stronger and now involves American textbook publishers. Is it time for the president to speak out, as he did a year and a half ago, is do we need to hear more of the kind of friendly concerned remarks that he did from Richard Armitage and Joe Nye last December when you guys were there. Talking very frankly about Yasukuni and the comfort women, giving friendly advice as a friend on how to talk about these things. If we don't do this, so the president doesn't speak out, if you guys don't speak out, what evidence do we have that Abe is not gonna continue to push this revised view on comfort women and managing infants, if that matter, and things will not muddle through, they'll get worse. So that's a really serious issue that seems to be bubbling up as long as it keeps going the way it's going. So we're not talking about mediating here in a sense we're talking about here. Friendly adult supervision of mutual friends. Thank you. Okay, so I guess there are two questions there. One is with the human rights and with the sanctions, the executive order. I mean, is this a hostile policy from the perspective of Pyongyang that the United States and its allies are pursuing? And then the second question I think really is to song should the president speak out on the historical issues as he had done with President Park last year? So Rich, do you wanna take the question about whether we have a hostile policy towards North Korea? Where's the question? Whether we have the United States has a hostile policy towards North Korea with the sanctions and the human rights? Well, if our support for our colleagues and soul and for their right to exist free from threat from North Korea is hostile, to North Korea then it's hostile. From my point of view, it's not hostile enough. We ought to put unremitting, unrelenting pressure on that regime and use things that really get their attention like the United Nations report on human rights recently and the rather stunning vote when you look at the number who voted for the resolution against those stalwarts such as China, Cuba, Russia, Zimbabwe which voted against it. Remember when we were doing negotiations in back in 2005 we used to, North Koreans used to say you have a hostile policy towards us and we'd say we only have a hostile policy towards your nuclear weapons. With regard to the rest of your people and everything we don't have a hostile policy. Sung, what about this Chris's question about this history issue? Yeah, you know, not sure I have much more to add than what we've said already. I mean, this is something that we care very deeply about and we of course engage both Japanese senior officials and Korean senior officials about this issue and encourage both sides to find a way forward. You know, I can't answer whether the president would should make a public statement about it but I think in general, you know, probably quite diplomacy could be more effective in the situation. As Vector pointed out, I mean, this is an important anniversary year for Korea and Japan and we hope that both sides will make a stronger effort to get relations back on track as they lead up to the anniversary milestone in June. She mentioned that General Sharp is with us as well, former USFK commander, so he's probably seen a lot of North Korea's hostile policy towards us. I agree with Chris. Yeah. On that, Victor, I mean, I can't remember any time in which the North Koreans did not think we had a hostile policy. So, I mean, I think it's a fairly consistent theme and that should not be dictating our policies. Yes, next question. Yes, right here. Hi, my name is Sung Woo Choi. I'm a Korean student from the George Washington University and I would like to ask both US and Korean ambassadors that recently two Japanese hostages were killed by ISIS and seems like Prime Minister Abe wants to reinterpret their pacifist constitution. And I wonder what is the, both US and Korean stance on this? So the US and Korean stance on reinterpretation of the constitution, okay. So US, Korean stance on reinterpretation of the constitution, we'd like to go first. That's Sung Woo Choi. The collective security is acknowledged by the United Nations. So, per se, it shouldn't make any problem even to South Korea. But the problem may arise when this question is linked with large issues of revision of the history. So because of this, we are concerned. But as a principle, we can oppose it. But we would be less concerned if Japan has a desirable attitude to interpret visual regards in its own past. First of all, on the hostage situation, as you know, we have expressed our deepest condolences to the families of the victims as well as the people of Japan. I think this is the brutal, tragic murders. I agree with Ambassador Choi that this collective self-defense principle is something that's enshrined in the UN Charter. So there's no reason to challenge it. And if you look into what US and Japan have been doing to strengthen US-Japan alliance, I think that's very much consistent with what Japan and Prime Minister Abe wants to do in terms of collective self-defense and Japan being able to contribute more constructively to not just regional efforts, but global efforts as well. So, you know, Prime Minister Abe's statements after the brutal killings, I think are completely understandable. And I think it's very consistent with what US and Japan are trying to do together. Okay, I think we have time for just a couple more. So, yes, it's coming here. Hello, my name is In Sung Shim, the Yonamnus Correspondent to Washington. It was great discussion. So thanks for the great discussion and it was very useful. My question is to Ambassador Kim about the talks about talks within North Korea. There was a report that you suggested talks about talks with North Korea. The Washington Post reported at first, but while North Korea is acting your proposal, they in return, they invite you to come to North Korea, but US government declined that because it might give some wrong signal to the world. And I wanna hear you. I wanna hear it from you directly. What has happened? And then is there any, another question, is there any possibility for you to suggest again that kind of talks about talks or any possibility for you to visit North Korea for that kind of meeting? Talks about talks? Talks about, it's not a good English song to talk about. But I thought you were gonna invite questions from the audience, not from the press. Well, I didn't know you was press. Look, I mean, I'm not gonna get into some details about diplomatic communication, but I think our position is well known that if the North Koreans are willing to talk seriously about the issue of denuclearization, we're willing to look for an opportunity to do so. I think that's been our consistent position approach for a long time. In fact, that's an approach taken by other members of the six-party process as well. I mean, when you look at Seoul's efforts to resume inter-Korean dialogue, of course there are inter-Korean issues, but I fully expect that that effort will also support our common effort on denuclearization. Same thing for Japan-North Korea dialogue. Of course it's focused on the abductee issue, but I would expect that the Japanese government would take the opportunity to emphasize the importance of returning to credible and meaningful negotiations on the nuclear issue. So there's been a lot of wild speculation about what's happening, but let me assure you that there's been no change in our position and approach on this issue. We will continue to work with the international community to strengthen sanctions enforcement, and I think the recent disturbing development with the cyber attack on Sony is a reminder that we need to maintain that strong effort. But at the same time, we will coordinate with our five-party partners to look for an opportunity to resume credible, meaningful, serious negotiations on the nuclear issue. Ladies and gentlemen, that's about all the time we have this afternoon. I wanna thank you all for coming. I wanna thank our partner, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Samsung Electronics America for their help. And to our panelists, please thank them for their efforts and all of their analysis. Thank you.