 So, we will now move straight on to our first panel, which is a terrific lineup. David Schor is going to moderate. So, if the four panelists could come up and take their seats, they should all be mic'd, and we'll move straight into that. Incidentally, while they're coming up, I'll say that we're going to squeeze the break. In fact, we probably won't take an official break between this panel and the final one, but you're welcome at any time to get up and get a cup of coffee or do whatever you need. Thanks. For you. Good morning, everyone. Thanks for being here. Thanks to Matt for setting things up for inviting us. We indeed, as he said, have an excellent panel, very well informed experts to help orient us for the upcoming summit. We all have our mics on. I just want to start off with a few scene setting points. If the G20's image has faded as a place where big things get done, to a good extent, it's a victim of its own success. If you save the global economy from the brink of cataclysm, what do you do for an encore? That's its main problem. And I would say that it hasn't always been clear what it's doing for an encore. And I don't mean that as a slam, but I mean that as a constructive critique. And that's what I'd like to have you keep in mind as you're listening to all the issues that the G20 is dealing with. The knock against the G20 is that it's trying to do too many things. But I think that misstates the problem. It is true that there are a lot of things washing through and flowing through the G20's inbox. But really, for some of those items, it's fairly passive. For others, it's pretty much hordatory or aspirational. And so really the point, and I'm picking up somewhat on what Caroline Atkinson said before, the point isn't to focus exclusively on the top priorities, but the point really is just to use the process well. And by that, I mean only deal with things where the leaders really can advance things, can push the ball down the field, rather. Whatever the issue, right? Excuse me, so it's really about being clear, if you will, about the theory of change for an issue, right? Where are we trying to get and how? And that's the way that I'd like to hear all of our experts talk about things. So when we G20 wonks talk about streamlined communicates, in a way, what we're saying is that communicates should merely be clear in stating what advancements are being made on a given issue in different ways. So as I say, I'm going to be asking what we're doing for an encore. As someone who has been an advocate for the G20 to do more, to deal with more issues, a wider range, as someone who's spoken up for the G20's ability to deal not just with top tier issues, but with other issues as well. And again, I was delighted to hear Caroline Atkinson pick up on that theme. I do want to be clear, as I turn now to Mark Sobel from the Treasury Department, we are all aware what the top tier is, right? There's not confusion what the core job admission of the G20 is. It has its three main marching orders. And I'd like to hear an update on them. The macroeconomic imbalances between export and consumer demand, financial regulatory reform, the problem of too big to fail, the basal capital requirements, derivatives regulation. And then what people, I think, sometimes forget is also the third pillar of the core of that agenda is international financial institution governance reform. And there was an agreement for changes to IMF quotas in 2010. And so there's some follow-up issues on that. So if you could give us a bit of a snapshot where we are with those. OK, thank you. So you would like me to address all of them in one fell swoop? As efficiently as you can. As efficiently as I can. Nobody's ever accused me of efficiency. So let me address your question against the background of the G20 finance ministers meeting next week that will take place in Moscow. This will be the last finance ministers meeting this year proceeding the Leader's Summit in September. So let me just turn to the issues one by one. So in terms of the global economy, I think the background for the minister's discussion remains largely unchanged. So while tail risks have been avoided over the last year, global growth remains too weak and unemployment is too high. It's quite simple. But in other ways, the current situation has evolved. In the US, recent data show that the recovery is well on track. Private domestic demand is growing around 3%. Labor market conditions are steadily improving. And while headline growth of around 2% is being held back by large fiscal headwinds, the GDP growth should strengthen through the end of 2013 and into 2014. The fiscal deficit in the US, 7% of GDP in 2012 should drop to 4.6%. This year, according to the administration's projections, the administration's forecasts also show a declining debt to GDP path from 2016 through the forecast to rising in 2023. So the US is meeting the fiscal commitments set forth in the 2010 Toronto Summit. But frankly, we are consolidating faster than is desirable to support our economy. The outlook elsewhere is more challenging, however. Europe remains a serious global risk, despite welcome progress in building stronger firewalls. Europe's recovery matters enormously to the United States, but Europe remains mired in recession. Private demand is shrunk for eight consecutive quarters. Welcome agreements have been struck on back-loading consolidation in some countries, and some indicators have improved. Still, the outlook is highly clouded. Fiscal policy remains pro-cyclical, and the economic outlook continues to depend on net exports. And within Europe, as you know, there is a continuing strong pressure on the periphery to adjust via contraction rather than increasing domestic demand in large surplus nations. The short-term Japanese outlook has been bolstered by abenomics. Like others, we are keenly interested in the third era of structural reform, which is critical for a lasting return to growth. It is important that abenomics operate through domestic demand. Chinese financial markets were recently impacted by interbank market tightness that many analysts believe will lower credit expansion and growth. Asia's chronic external surpluses and ongoing impediment to global rebalancing. Emerging market growth looks weaker. Volatility in global financial markets has picked up lately. Overall, we remain concerned that prospects for global rebalancing outside the US are discouraging. The US cannot be the world's importer of first and last resort. On the international regulatory agenda, we see this as successfully moving forward. Sorry, the international financial regulatory agenda. We see this agenda as successfully moving forward with the United States leading the way. Progress is unmistakable, and today's regulatory regime is far more robust than before the crisis. The US banking agencies have issued their final Basel three rules. Basel 2.5 and 3 have clearly strengthened the quality and quantity of capital around the world. Further to that end, the surcharge on globally systemically important banks has done so. US banks already meet Basel 3 capital standards, and the largest 18 US bank holding companies, which represent more than 70% of the total assets of the system, have a common equity tier one ratio above 11%. We're also working in the US on proposed rules to establish a leverage ratio for large firms. Above the Basel 3 required minimum and the combined amount of equity and long-term debt these firms should maintain to facilitate orderly resolution. Europe has just put in place its directive to implement Basel 3. It's important to adhere to the underlying Basel text and treat risk-weighted assets consistently across borders. Progress has been made also on cross-border resolution frameworks with the aim of helping ensure taxpayers never again have to bear the cost of a crisis of the magnitude we saw. The FSB has put forward key attributes for effective resolution regimes, which the United States has already implemented. The FDIC's single point of entry approach will allow subsidiaries of a failed globally systemically important bank to continue operating worldwide without interruption. Europe is making progress through its bank recovery and resolution directive, which sets forth the proposed deposit or preference and creditor hierarchy regime, plus associated financing. And Brussels just proposed a single resolution mechanism for the euro area. So another key aspect of the agenda that we've been discussing very heavily since the crisis is OTC derivatives. The CFTC has already designated credit default and interest weight swaps for mandatory clearing. They've registered some 75 swap dealers and launched significant trade reporting. We see others as behind. The crisis showed how destructive the risk from cross-border OTC derivatives can be. And that close alignment globally is critical to avoid regulatory gaps. Yesterday, the European Commission and the CFTC reached a significant agreement on a common path forward on derivatives to bring transparency and lower risk to the global swaps market. It's a key event. And progress has also been made recently in developing final international standards for margin requirements for unclear derivatives. The US is also tackling the risks of shadow banking. The FSOC issued recommendations for public comment to reduce the risk posed by money market funds. And the SEC has recently proposed regulations intended to do so. So the international regulatory reform agenda is extensive, it's nitty gritty. But the key areas I've described above, I think they show that robust progress is being made through the FSB standard setting bodies and bilateral dialogues in building a more resilient global financial system. So turning to architecture, there's an issue, I guess, with congressional approval of the 2010 agreement. Familiar with it. You can enlighten us further. So I think Caroline outlined a lot of the issues that are on the table. There are quite a few issues in the international architecture space. There's issues about sustainable lending, regional financing arrangements, public debt management, guidelines, and the like. So I want to make sure that the audience understands that there is a comprehensive agenda. And I know that our Russian friends are pursuing the agenda and that our Australian colleagues will be taking up many of these issues next year. Now, on quota, the quota issue, this is a top priority for us. We are very focused on securing legislation. All of us are working very hard to do so. And well, we should. The IMF is, in our view, a great triumph of international cooperation. It's an invaluable organization. If anybody's read Ben Stiles' recently book, it just shows how integral and seminal we were in creating this august institution. It's really served the world's interests, but our interests extraordinarily well. It contributed to the post-war development and reconstruction of Europe and Asia. It has helped us deal with debt crises in the 80s. It helped us deal with the transition economies, bringing them into the system in the 90s. David Lipton will be here. It's something he and I worked very closely on, and a great moment in history. The fund was instrumental in tackling the emerging market crises of the 90s and early 2000s. And the governance reforms are basically just to catch up the governance system with changes in the world economically. Exactly. Now, the fund is also the first responder in crises. It always has been. And as such, it's very supportive of the US interests. When there are problems overseas, it hits our economy. It reduces our exports, reduces jobs, good jobs in the US economy. It reduces foreign direct investment flows in the United States. We've seen that financial instability abroad can create financial market impacts, which impact Americans 401k. If we didn't have the IMF, we'd have to invent it. So you're absolutely right. The United States has been at the forefront in supporting modernization of the IMF and the governance reforms to reflect the growing realities of the growth in the emerging markets. That remains something we support at Pittsburgh. We were very instrumental. We drafted and brokered the agreement about increasing the share of dynamic emerging markets by at least 5%, which was reflected in the 2010 deal. So currently, as has been the case, the US is the largest shareholder in the IMF. We have tremendous influence in this institution. And I think we need to preserve that leadership position. And the budget proposal that we'll submit, that we've submitted, provides for doubling in quota, but it also provides for a corresponding reduction in the NAB. So we're not putting one new dollar into the fund, but it's important to move forward with the 2010 reforms. We are seeking to do so. And it's important for the world. It's also important, I think, to promote and protect US leadership in the fund and its capacity to support an open, growing and resilient economy. So my last sentence, the ministers will have plenty to talk about next week in Moscow. Never a problem that they have. The reforms in governance, they do affect more reducing European voice and increasing Asian voices and also emerging economy voices just to be clear on that. As I was listening to you, Mark, and thank you for that excellent presentation, I was thinking about the juncture between the longer term economic challenges and the immediate term, because those issues of imbalances sort of sit right there at the juncture of the two, that some of the things that are needed to have strong, sustainable and balanced growth over time, which is the walk towards the G20, are also things that are needed for a stronger recovery. Turning now to Gary Littman of the US Chamber, we heard in both of the earlier presentations discussion of trade. And I'd like you to pick up there. I do remember at the Khan summit that the leaders were bold in a strange way to say, we finally acknowledge that Doha really is going poorly and we're not sure it's going to work out. So what they did was some truth-telling, as Caroline alluded to. And now we have this interesting dynamic with the Pacific and Atlantic, the TPP and TTIP, if I can keep this straight. What's your read on global trade talks and these regional trade talks and how they relate to one another? Thank you, David. I think it's important to discuss these issues in the context of where the private sector was at the moment of the crisis. Frankly, we was done after Lehman Brothers collapsed the corporate community who was in the state of shock. And we were astounded to see the government use the administration and others being able to respond so quickly and stemmed up G20 as indeed the premier forum to address the economic crisis. Companies that we represent, they trade all over the world. But each market is seen as a particular market to try to adjust there, you try to develop your business. They grow that market. For corporate leadership to seek governments being able to respond so quickly, much faster than we were able to understand what were the roots of the crisis and how the global economy would evolve was a humbling experience. And I think G20 deserves a huge amount of credit for getting together and sending us a signal that we should do two things. We should try and regain the confidence of the regulators or policymakers that we know what we're doing, that we understand global risk, we understand our responsibility and capacity to generate regenerative growth, and that we will play by the new rules. Second step in that was for us to, in the private sector, also call each other. What we did instantly, the business leaders of the largest business federations, we all got on the phone amongst ourselves, which we didn't do before that for competitive reasons, for lack of understanding of each other's capacities. We annulated, in a way, G20. We didn't have all 20, but we had enough 15 CEOs and presidents of the largest business federations, employer groups, got together and we discussed how we can restore the confidence in the markets, and what do we think about the government's policy. And we started doing that on a regular basis. We're still doing that. So by the time of the con, I wanted to say festival, summit, we were at a point where we were trying to be responsible, responsible voice for business and looking for ways where we could contribute the most to the restoration of the growth patterns. That's why we pushed each of us individually, national governments and collectively, international institutions and G20, to pay attention to trade, but not trade in the classical way of having more negotiations. Our main concern was demand, where will it go? What will structural reforms propose by G20 mean to the demand distribution around the world and how will trade be financed? The treasurers of companies, the financial experts of the industrial conglomerates looked at their financial sources and learned, sure, you're gonna go to the bank, are you gonna hedge your risk, who's gonna finance the major infrastructure project, where will the money go and how much will it cost and what would be the way to reduce the risk? So at that point, our main request to policy makers was give us a signal, give us a signal of how trade will be financed in the future, where might be the next sources of demand and where we shouldn't expect much and trade negotiations, good, let's not jettison that. Trade was not the problem. Trade was, and trade organizations and trade negotiations should be the culprit. Eventually, as the acute face of the crisis receded, we in the business community thought that, okay, protectionism was contained, let's put it that way, or did not take the most egregious forms. Now, how can we contribute to economic growth? And while WTO is important and we'll support the negotiations there, we needed a quicker response, a quicker and not very costly stimulus to the global economy. That's one of the reasons we all started supporting regional trade agreements. I'm trying to put pressure on the governments to do it faster, be more ambitious. It's an important way to stimulate our own interest in taking risk if we see that markets will be available. In St. Petersburg in June, we had another round of debates with corporate leaders and business federations about the dynamic between regional agreements, regional negotiations and WTO. You know, you can debate philosophy, companies are thinking, where am I gonna sell? And we cannot wait forever for Geneva. So what we did, we collectively agreed to put pressure on regulators to focus on trade facilitation. Trade facilitation meaning making the movement of goods more frictionless, remove the bottlenecks of the customs, make sure that we don't create, you don't throw sand into the system, make sure that customs offices show up in process, make sure that nuisance regulations don't emerge at the borders. And WTO has done enough in that area. So we hope by the time of the bottom meeting, there could be some progress there. But it's not kind of an either or situation. WTO is essential. And with Russian accession to WTO, we very much are interested in seeing how is this large economy, huge economy, sixth largest in the world if you combine EU, will shape WTO process, will bring new agenda there, new energy and help it move forward. But we cannot wait, particularly in times of economic doldrums I would say. I think that point about trade protectionist measures can't be stressed strongly enough. It is one of the unsung successes of the G20, I think, because if you do compare today to the Great Depression of the 1930s, this is clearly the dog that didn't bark at me. So there's a lot of critique made about the fact that there have been some protectionist measures in spite of the pledge to refrain from them. But there could have been a lot more to be sure. So thanks for that. And I now want to turn to Amanda Sy from the Australian Embassy. And for those who don't know the reason we're glad to have someone from the Australian Embassy is that Australia is next up as host of the 2014 summit. And so we'd like to hear from you, Amanda, about the plans, about some of the basics in terms of when the summit, where and when the summit will be. But it would also be interesting to hear from you about how the Troika has worked, the G20 now has a Troika system for handing off between the past host, current host and next host. And also, many of us are aware, and you all, the more so, that there is an election coming up in Australia. And that has to in some ways complicate things at least in the immediate term. And I can only imagine, I guess, that career professionals and career officers like yourself, of course, are the ones kind of making sure that the continuity is there and everything goes well. Okay, well, let me start with, I guess, the logistical arrangements and things like that. We're well advanced, I guess, in preparations for our host year on that front. The government's already announced the location and timing for the leader's summit. And that's going to take place in Brisbane in November, which is a great place to be. It's announced that there'll be two meetings of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. They'll take place in Sydney in February, so quite early, and in Cairns in September in the lead up to the summit. And of course, there's always the prospect that Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors will meet in the margins of the IMF Spring and Annual meetings, which take place in September, October, if that's required. We're very conscious that Australia's a very long way for all of the officials and ministers to travel. So we do bear that in mind in part of the organization. We will have a very strong focus on consultation, and I think that's evident by the fact that the government's already announced the domestic engagement groups for business, so the B20 and Civil Society, and who will lead them up. And I know Richard Goida, who's the West Farmers CEO, has been part of that leadership team on the B20 for Australia's host years, already being active and engaging with the Russian B20 and other counterparts around the place to gear up and be in a position to ensure that they can feed into the wider G20 process. So we'll have a very strong focus on consultation, both with the non-government sector, of course, G20 members and non-G20 members. And we are very mindful of promoting continuity across host years. That's critical for ensuring we maintain the group's effectiveness, particularly as a lot of the issues that are being talked about, as Caroline mentioned earlier, you're in this phase of looking more to the chronic issues that are maybe obstacles to growth and things like that. These can be multi-year objectives, they may not be able to be solved in a single year. So that continuity is very important. And the Troika process is critical to that. We've been working very closely with Russia, the current host, and with Mexico, obviously the previous chair as part of that process. And my counterparts are involved in that directly. I'm very happy with how that process is working. They feel it's a very strong process. And of course, we'll be engaging with Turkey, who'll come into the Troika for our host year as well. So we put a lot of emphasis on that. I guess on issues and topics, it's probably too premature at this stage with Russia's presence in full swing to get too much into the detail about how Australia will approach its responsibilities in the G20 in 2014. Our immediate focus, of course, is working closely with the Russian Sherpa, with the finance teams, and others to deliver a strong positive outcome in St. Petersburg. That's what we can do to hope set up a sound basis for 2014. So that's the focus of what my colleagues are actively engaged in. And the final set of objectives that's ultimately adopted will very much depend on where some of the current work streams end up at the end of this year. But the present government has made it clear that the focus on creating jobs and lifting growth at Russia, of course, has made a priority for its summit will be a key theme into 2014 as well. You see from the IMF's forecasts for global growth, I think the projection for 2013 is 3.1%. So the types of things that Mark was speaking about earlier of looking at addressing weak global growth and too high unemployment, these things are likely to be relevant and persistent themes as we move forward. So the government has signalled that that's likely to be a strong theme for 2014. And parts of the work streams that Russia has made a priority this year around financing investment is critical to that. So the enabling of stronger growth in the private sector in particular and ways to address that will be part of that. The former treasurer who, of course, has been heavily engaged in the G20 process was a very strong supporter of that work stream and the engagement Russia had put into it. The other area that the government has signalled, it's likely to continue and pick up is the work that Russia, the UK, the OECD and others have been engaged in on base erosion and profit shifting. But they've already been progress this year. The OECD will report to G20 Finance Ministers. They've indicated in April that they're keen to have a substantive discussion on that next weekend. So we'll see where this evolves to and in the interests of continuity where Australia might go with that in 2014. But you touched on the elections. There is an election due in Australia sometime between now and the end of November. The timing of that is not clear. It's up to the present Prime Minister to announce that. So we're not sure when that will be, whether it will occur before, around or after the summit and we'll have to wait and see. I guess the point I would make, it'd make two points, one, we do have a new minister representing at us at the Finance Ministers meeting next week. He's a very capable minister, a very experienced cabinet minister in the government and very familiar with the Treasury portfolio having been assistant treasurer in the past. And so you'd expect a bit of continuity with the change of Finance Ministers there having worked closely with the government in its thinking around G20 for many years now. On the election as a career public servant, I should generally avoid speculating on any of these outcomes. The only point I would make is that it has tended to be the case in Australia across both sides of the political parties that there's been a strong interest in the fundamental macro settings and structural basis for economy of what's needed to support conditions for strong growth. Neither side would have strong qualms with an agenda focused on lifting growth and creating jobs, which is beneficial. And so I'd expect that irrespective of the election, Australia's commitment to the G20, the focus we'll put on it in our host year and the like will still be there. Thank you. What I should have made clear in turning to Amanda in the first place is that she is the Finance Ministries detailing to the embassy here. And picking up on your point about consultations, just to note quickly that Gary's been quite involved in the B20, the Business 20. He was talking about the sort of parallel process among private sector leaders to the G20, which what you were describing at the outset was probably just loose and self-driven, but then has taken shape as the B20. There's the Civil 20, there's the L20, Labor 20. I myself am part of the Think 20, which is where we pointy heads hang out. And so there's a lot to the G20 that is not always visible to the naked eye. So I'd like to, since we have enough time to the session, we did really wanna preserve enough for some Q&A and to bring you into the conversation. So I'll open the floor. Please, and as before, wait for the microphone to come to you and be sure to identify yourself. Hi, my name is Noah Feidt. I'm representing Pat and Boggs. I guess probably this would be best for Treasury, but in terms of T-Tip, there are obviously some discrepancies between the European and the American positions. How do you see that playing out in the course of negotiations? I am not a trade person and this is a G20 discussion. I think Caroline's addressed some of your issues this morning. You wanna add? Just we've had this conversation with our European partners in the private sector. It's very difficult to imagine trade negotiations that would not touch on financial services. This is the lifeblood of trade. Now with the exception of prudential issues and issues that are now addressed at FSB, IOSCO, and other bodies, business community has learned a lesson from the crisis. The IPO financial service provider is very close to you. So we want negotiations to be as comprehensive as possible. There was another question here. Hello, I'm Don Lee with the Los Angeles Times. This is a question for Mr. Sobel. You described the global rebalancing effort as discouraging. And I think it's been, it was the Pittsburgh summit when that effort or commitment was made. Where has some progress been made? Where is it really falling short and what is the US strategy to advance that? And further, do you think that can be done without some sort of specific enforcement mechanism? Thank you. You're quite correct at the Pittsburgh summit. We, and the G20, advance the framework for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. At the heart of the framework was the concept that the world needed to rebalance growth-friendly manner. To that end, it was agreed that deficit countries needed to raise national saving and large surplus nations needed to boost domestic demand as well as pursue greater exchange rate flexibility. There has been a good degree of progress on rebalancing. You see this in current account positions around the world. There also has been progress in moving towards more market determination of exchange rates. You see this in particular in our discussions with the Chinese. I think there's a stronger consensus. There's a consensus around the need for greater exchange rate reforms in the G20 and we've been able to reiterate the language and build a consensus around more greater market determination of exchange rates, enhanced flexibility, refraining from competitive devaluation, and the like. What, obviously, the global economy has evolved and faced some difficulties since Pittsburgh. And one of the key themes that we've tried to emphasize is that we pursue the path of raising national saving, that countries around the rest of the world boost domestic demand so that, as I mentioned, the US would not be the importer of first and last resort. And so I think as we're looking forward and we see the US recovery moving forward, we are keenly interested in how the rest of the world will boost domestic demand. I was saying before that there's a close positive relationship in some ways between longer-term concerns and short-term concerns. That's not quite always the case, though, right? There has also been, I think, very much in the G20 and what it's dealing with trade-offs between longer-term concerns and immediate concerns so that when Caroline was describing how absorbed the G20 has been with the threats to the recovery from Europe, that kind of does suck up a lot of oxygen that could be going towards some of these other issues with the longer-time horizon. I'm looking for a next question I can always raise. Always raise. Thank you. Thank you. Kasia Klimashinska from Bloomberg News. I have a question for Mark Sable as well about Japan. If you could please elaborate on your comments about the impact of current Japanese policies domestically and globally. You know, I think everybody wants to see a strong Japanese economy. As you know, Mr. Abe has put forward a program that rests on three arrows, monetary, fiscal, and structural reforms. I think there's widespread consensus that strong structural reforms are really crucial to boosting productivity in Japan and providing a strong foundation for durable growth and complement the macroeconomic policy adjustments. We're very supportive of that. And what we have said is that it's very important that avianomics operate through domestic demand that it boosts the internal resilience and strength of the economy. So that is our focus. And I think there's widespread consensus inside Japan and outside on that. Sure, right there. It's coming, there it is. This is Anna Yukina from Reuters. You mentioned a bit about global volatility and I was wondering if you see in what's going on in markets now a need for greater coordination and where that could come from? Whether that's something you're worried about or will it sort itself out? Thank you. So let me be very clear on not commenting on monetary policy. That's exclusively within the Fed's domain. You know, volatility has picked up. And I think we are in the United States, we're doing what we can to strengthen our economy, to improve our foundations, to raise growth and lower unemployment. And I think that others around the world have their agendas as well. Europe is trying to build on its firewalls and put in place foundations for growth. And we see efforts towards rebouncing in Asia. So I think that what we need to do is for people to come together, put in place frameworks that will achieve strong growth to rebounce their economies. That's a strategy and I think that is the a best way to boost confidence in the global economy. Financing an investment has come up a couple of few times in our discussion so far. I wanted to highlight a couple more that we haven't focused as much on and wonder whether any of my colleagues can shed further light. And that's twofold. It seems as if on the development agenda of the G20 that financing of infrastructure and infrastructure investment has been a major topic. And we're seeing a lot of potential to pay off in growth from investing in infrastructure. The other is climate change financing which has a relatively new working group in the G20 I believe set up just last year. Trying to figure out the right relationship between public investment that will draw private investment behind and of course has a cross linkage to the UN FCCC negotiations where climate financing was a big piece of the deal in Copenhagen between emerging economies and established economies. So as I say, those are both coming up in the G20 context and I wonder if anyone can add to what I've already described. If I may, David, the issue of long-term financing was one of the prime subjects of the discussions among private sector participants in the G20 under the Russian presidency. We had a separate task force organized chaired by the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and co-chaired by the US Chamber of Commerce. Most of the participants were long-term investors, someone wealth funds, pension funds who were describing the fact that there's sufficient savings around the world. Australia's superannuation fund alone is what $1.2 trillion at least and growing. On the other hand, there is a need to generate growth and jobs in return. So it's not like there's no need for infrastructure investment, but there's a huge gap. And in the time of the crisis and when the markets don't really function that well, that gap needs to be somehow covered. The people with the savings who manage the savings are saying that there are not enough investable projects while people who promote development, promote projects say that they cannot figure out the access to the money that's out there in the insurance firms and asset managers, et cetera. So we spend a lot of time on discussing what could be done in that respect, what could be the private sector solution or at least the indication of directions. The paper will be presented to Mr. Daivar I think next week, which will say that there needs to be a separate reflection stream that would include the World Bank, EBRD, long-term investment funds and project promotions. One of the biggest disappointments, frankly from the private sector point of view was when many countries introduced the stimulus. But looking back, we cannot point to any major modernization of our infrastructure that would be associated with that money. The governments need to spend something quickly. We supported that. But what was on the shelf at that time was prisons and potholes. So we need to figure out what are the right projects to finance, what are the new maybe asset classes, what should be changes in the accounting rules that would allow pension funds to underwrite projects. The Russians suggested that we create an informal knowledge network. I think we will all want to stay engaged in that and that network will develop some suggestions for policy makers, including on how to do two things, three things actually. One, to measure the actual effectiveness of infrastructure investment. So you don't create the white elephants and airports that nobody flies to. And then that creates a cost of maintenance that becomes a major problem. So how do you measure the effectiveness of the return on investment? What changes need to be suggested in the accounting rules that would allow long-term investors to assume more of a risk? And third, how do you make sure that infrastructure that has been built connects countries rather than just creates insulated markets? Infrastructure that would actually help trade. So we want to think about that. We have a lot of help from some of the major consulting firms and we want to rely heavily on World Bank, EBRD and the experience of others. On the climate finance, let's say when the sub-prime market, sub-prime mortgage market collapsed, nobody thought that, that would mean also the collapse of alternative energy support in Spain three years later. We need time to figure out what climate finance means today. And is it different from generating growth? Does it have to be a separate conversation with business? But it has to be a conversation with business. That's probably one lesson that we want to communicate to policy makers. Looking for anyone else who wants to come in? A couple of climate topics have come up in our discussion and I, we've just been talking about climate change finance. Caroline talked earlier about the fossil fuel subsidy phase-out. It's a little bit of a tongue twister. But I wanted to add another idea in sort of the, you heard it here, first category of something that might be good for the G20 or somewhere else to get into it. And that is fuel efficiency in transportation, vehicles, light duty, heavy duty. And because that is a sector that generates so much of the greenhouse gas problem where technology adoption already has some momentum where regulations have an important role to play. And it sort of just struck me that in a process like the G20 as John Henry was describing earlier that fuel economy and fuel efficiency standards could be something very helpful and could make a big difference with greenhouse gases. So I sort of thought I'd just throw that one out there. I know that we are supposed to be wrapping up shortly. I was given very strict marching orders from Matt, but we do have a few minutes left. Well, I just wanted to just come back to financing for investments since it's on the minister's agenda and just say very briefly that we absolutely agree that long-term financing is crucial for allocating sufficient resources to investments and particularly infrastructure. The financing for investment agenda, I think also dovetails very nicely with the president's proposed Rebuild American partnership to encourage greater private investment in America's infrastructure. We think that one of the keys to mobilizing financing for investment is of course to focus on domestic enabling environments. That's a very important thing. There's also issues that are being discussed about facilitating greater supply of facilitating intermediation of global savings and improving processes for planning and prioritization and funding of investment projects. And the last point I wanted to make on financing for investment and the reason I spoke is the financing for investment agenda dovetails very nicely with I think what Caroline said, and I said, and Amanda said, which is our top priority is growth and jobs. And this is an important aspect of that discussion. Thanks. Did either of you want to make some final words? Please. You know, I want to make just one statement that just went to has been an amazing source of political signals for the private sector. And in a way we've learned a lot by trying to replicate it among companies and business federations and we've learned how difficult it is to find consensus, how difficult it is to think globally all the time. So for us G20, it's something that we need to support, we need to support very earnestly and bring our best ideas forward. We see its role frankly not in addressing collectively the chronic problems of individual markets. They're chronic for a reason. And each of us works on them in our own economy and has been working forever. But as a source of assessment of where are the next risks, systemic risks, global risks, what can the governments do together to mitigate them and to manage them? And where can we as the private sectors, people who are supposedly generating the growths, right? The growth and jobs. Where do we come in fairly early on? Just like, you know, we see the example of G20 setting up different working groups on long-term infrastructure finance, I believe Germany and Indonesia took the lead. We wanna be early on in that process. And not in a competitive sense, us against Chinese, Germans against Brazil. No, but really we've learned over the last four years the need to stick together and set aside competitive issues. We wanna be part of that in terms of risk assessment and solutions. You can rely on Australians, we'll see the benefit of that. And we also think that we're at a very vulnerable point still. There's a lot that needs to be done and we appreciate what's been done. And we also wanna make sure that you understand the business community, at least the larger companies, are fully aware of the importance of IMF and other international institutions and very supportive of continued use leadership there. Many of the conversations I've been involved with around the G20 talk in terms of maybe we shouldn't be talking as if we are past the crisis. Maybe we should be talking as if we are still in a later phase of the original crisis. Amanda, did you wanna? Look very quickly, you mentioned the development agenda before and I guess the point I'd make in that sense is the types of things we've been talking about, financing of investment, trade facilitation, strengthening the integrity of tax bases. These are all issues that obviously developing countries have a strong interest in. So why we often think about the G20 is having different work streams. There is a lot of, I think, potential for integration here around the G20 core issues and the development agenda. And I think it comes back really to where the Russian ambassador started and Caroline started, which is when you're looking at a global forum, the G20 bringing together developing and developed countries for these types of discussions really is the appropriate forum for considering, discussing and sharing views on these issues. Well, those are all, I think, very good benedictions for us to conclude on. Please join me in thanking our panelists for an excellent discussion.