 Alexander asks, what do you think of delegated proof-of-stake, DPOS, and what do you think of EOS? I am not that familiar with EOS, because I do not have the time to study every blockchain that's out there, to a level of depth, to have an in-depth opinion. I do have some superficial knowledge about EOS, as well as its delegated proof-of-stake mechanism. I think the fundamental problem with delegated proof-of-stake is the same problem we have in political democracy and traditional systems that we use for elections, and that is voter apathy. We've seen this happen a number of times, both in proof-of-stake and delegated proof-of-stake systems, where people delegate their vote to others to use proof-of-stake, but then they don't pay attention to how these delegates are voting on their behalf. The same problem you have when you elect a member of Congress, and then you don't really pay attention to how they're voting in Congress, or even you don't vote for Congress at all, and this exists in every democracy. Voter apathy is the problem. It takes a lot of work to pay close attention to all of the political machinations and gains that may occur in a proof-of-stake system where, for example, in EOS, block producers are jockeying for a position, and there have been a number of cases where block producers have been voted out of the network and have been quite bitter about it, and there's a lot of lobbying and politics and coalitions and jockeying for a position, as I said before. So I think EOS is a very, very interesting experiment, because what it's doing is it's exploring the areas of governance through delegated proof-of-stake systems that other blockchains are not exploring, and it's doing so at significant scale with significant money at stake, and that's the kind of testing you need to do to a governance system. A governance system can work perfectly well on paper, and then when you put millions of dollars behind it, and there's something actually at stake, no pun intended, then things get interesting. Then you start exploring the edge cases in a game theory. Then you have an adversarial system where people are trying to profit, which is how game theory works and is a good thing, of course, but if there are weaknesses in the mechanisms of governance, that can lead to failures of the delegated proof-of-stake or proof-of-stake system. What do I think of EOS? I think it is a very interesting experiment in governance, and experiments don't have to be successful to give us great data. In fact, we get enormous amounts of data from the things that blow up by studying very carefully how they blow up. Whether EOS succeeds or not, we're going to learn a lot because we're able to see this experiment play out at very large scale compared to previous delegated proof-of-stake systems. I would say the same thing about Dash as well as a number of other prominent proof-of-stake and delegated proof-of-stake, Byzantine fault-torns, and various variations on these consensus algorithms. Consensus algorithms are a brand new science. Beyond the science, they're also a mechanism for applied economics and game theory that gets very seriously tested when operated at scale with real money. All of these systems that are experimenting with different consensus algorithms are teaching us a lot, and I think that's great.