 FILE XXXI of Contiguity and Distance in Space and Time There is an easy reason why everything contiguous to us, either in space or time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity and excel every other object in its influence on the imagination. Our self is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality. But where an object is so far removed as to have lost the advantage of this relation, why, as it is farther removed, its idea becomes still fainter and more obscure would, perhaps, require a more particular examination. It is obvious that the imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time in which we are existent, but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses that, however, it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. It is also remarkable that in the conception of those objects which we regard as real and existent, we take them in their proper order and situation, and never leap from one object to another, which is distant from it, without running over, at least in a cursory manner, all those objects which are interposed betwixt them. When we reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves, we are obliged not only to reach it at first by passing through all the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress every moment, being every moment recalled to the consideration of ourselves and our present situation. It is easily conceived that this interruption must weaken the idea by breaking the action of the mind and hindering the conception from being so intense and continued as when we reflect on a nearer object. The fewer steps we make to arrive at the object, and the smoother the road is, this diminution of the vacity is less sensibly felt, but still may be observed more or less in proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty. Here, then, we are to consider two kinds of objects, the contiguous and remote, of which the former, by means of their relation to ourselves, approach an impression in force and vivacity. The latter, by reason of the interruption in our manner of conceiving them, appear in a weaker and more imperfect light. This is their effect on the imagination. If my reasoning be just, they must have a proportionable effect on the will and passions. Contiguous objects must have an influence much superior to the distant and remote. Accordingly, we find in common life that men are principally concerned about those objects, which are not much removed either in space or time, enjoying the present, and leaving what is afar off to the care of chance and fortune. Talk to a man of his condition thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is to happen tomorrow, and he will lend you attention. The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home than the burning of a house when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant. But farther, though distance, both in space and time, has a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions, yet the consequence of a removal in space are much inferior to those of a removal in time. Twenty years are certainly but a small distance of time in comparison of what history and even the memory of some may inform them of, and yet I doubt if a thousand leagues or even the greatest distance of place this globe can admit of will so remarkably weaken our ideas and diminish our passions. A West India merchant will tell you that he is not without concern about what passes in Jamaica, though few extend their views so far into futurity as to dread very remote accidents. The cause of this phenomenon must evidently lie in the different properties of space and time. Without having recourse to metaphysics, anyone may easily observe that space or extension consists of a number of co-existent parts disposed in a certain order and capable of being at once present to the sight or feeling. On the contrary, time or succession, though it consists likewise of parts, never presents to us more than one at once, nor is it possible for any two of them ever to be co-existent. These qualities of the objects have a suitable effect on the imagination. The parts of extension, being susceptible of an union to the senses, acquire an union in the fancy. And as the appearance of one part excludes not another, the transition or passage of the thought through the contiguous parts is by that means rendered more smooth and easy. On the other hand, the incompatibility of the parts of time in their real existence separates them in the imagination and makes it more difficult for that faculty to trace any long succession or series of events. Every part must appear single and alone, nor can regularly have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is supposed to have been immediately precedent. By this means, any distance in time causes a greater interruption in the thought than an equal distance in space, and consequently weakens more considerably the idea and consequently the passions which depend in a great measure on the imagination according to my system. There is another phenomenon of a like nature with the foregoing, that is, the superior effects of the same distance in futurity above that in the past. This difference with respect to the will is easily accounted for. As none of our actions can alter the past, it is not strange it should never determine the will, but with respect to the passions the question is yet entire and well worth the examining. Besides the propensity to a gradual progression through the points of space and time, we have another peculiarity in our method of thinking which concurs in producing this phenomenon. We always follow the succession of time in placing our ideas, and from the consideration of any object pass more easily to that which follows immediately after it than to that which went before it. We may learn this among other instances from the order which is always observed in historical narrations. Nothing but an absolute necessity can oblige an historian to break the order of time, and in his narration give the precedents to an event which was in reality posterior to another. This will easily be applied to the question in hand if we reflect on what I have before observed, that the present situation of the person is always that of the imagination, and that it is from this we proceed to the conception of any distant object. When the object is passed, the progression of the thought in passing to it from the present is contrary to nature, as proceeding from one point of time to that which is preceding and from that to another preceding in opposition to the natural course of the succession. On the other hand, when we turn our thought to a future object, our fancy flows along the stream of time and arrives at the object by an order which seems most natural, passing always from one point of time to that which is immediately posterior to it. This easy progression of ideas favors the imagination and makes it conceive its object in a stronger and fuller light than when we are continually opposed in our passage and are obliged to overcome the difficulties arising from the natural propensity of the fancy. A small degree of distance in the past has, therefore, a greater effect in interrupting and weakening the conception than a much greater in the future. From this effect of it on the imagination is derived its influence on the will and passions. There is another cause which both contributes to the same effect and proceeds from the same quality of the fancy by which we are determined to trace the succession of time by a similar succession of ideas. When from the present instant we consider two points of time equally distant in the future and in the past, it is evident that abstractedly considered their relation to the present is almost equal, for as the future will sometime be present, so the past was once present. If we could, therefore, remove this quality of the imagination and equal distance in the past and in the future would have a similar influence. Nor is this only true when the fancy remains fixed and from the present instant surveys the future and the past, but also when it changes its situation and places us in different periods of time. For as on the one hand in supposing ourselves existent in a point of time interposed betwixt the present instant and the future object, we find the future object approach to us and the past retire and become more distant. So on the other hand, in supposing ourselves existent in a point of time interposed betwixt the present and the past, the past approaches to us and the future becomes more distant. But from the property of the fancy above mentioned, we rather choose to fix our thought on the point of time interposed betwixt the present and the future than on that betwixt the present and the past. We advance rather than retard our existence and following what seems the natural succession of time proceed from past to present and from present to the future, by which means we conceive the future as flowing every moment nearer us and the past as retiring. An equal distance therefore in the past and in the future has not the same effect on the imagination and that because we consider the one as continually increasing and the other as continually diminishing. The fancy anticipates the course of things and surveys the object in that condition to which it tends as well as in that which is regarded as the present. And a file 31. File 32 of a treatise of human nature by David Hume, volume two. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager. Book two of the passions. Part three of the will and direct passions. Section eight. The same subject continued. Thus we have accounted for three phenomena which seem pretty remarkable. Why distance weakens the conception and passion. Why distance in time has a greater effect than that in space. And why distance in past time has still a greater effect than that in future. We must now consider three phenomena which seem to be in a manner the reverse of these. Why a very great distance increases our esteem and admiration for an object. Why such a distance in time increases it more than that in space. And a distance in past time more than that in future. The curiousness of the subject will, I hope, excuse my dwelling on it for some time. To begin with the first phenomenon. Why a great distance increases our esteem and admiration for an object. It is evident that the mere view and contemplation of any greatness. Whether successive or extended enlarges the soul and give it a sensible delight and pleasure. A wide plane, the ocean, eternity, a succession of several ages. All these are entertaining objects and excel everything however beautiful which accompanies not its beauty with a suitable greatness. Now when any very distant object is presented to the imagination, we naturally reflect on the interposed distance. And by that means, conceiving something great and magnificent, receive the usual satisfaction. But as the fancy passes easily from one idea to another related to it, and transports to the second all the passions excited by the first, the admiration which is directed to the distance naturally diffuses itself over the distant object. Accordingly we find that it is not necessary the object should be actually distant from us in order to cause our admiration. But that it is sufficient if, by the natural association of ideas, it conveys our view to any considerable distance. A great traveller, though in the same chamber, will pass for a very extraordinary person, as a Greek medal even in our cabinet, is always esteemed of valuable curiosity. Here the object by a natural transition conveys our view to the distance, and the admiration which arises from that distance by another natural transition returns back to the object. But though every great distance produces an admiration for the distant object, a distance in time has a more considerable effect than that in space. Ancient busts and inscriptions are more valued than Japan tables, and not to mention the Greeks and Romans, it is certain we regard with more veneration the old Chaldeans and Egyptians than the modern Chinese and Persians, and bestow more fruitless pains to clear up the history and chronology of the former, than it would cost us to make a voyage and be certainly informed of the character, learning and government of the latter. I shall be obliged to make a digression in order to explain this phenomenon. It is a quality very observable in human nature that any opposition which does not entirely discourage and intimidate us has rather a contrary effect, and inspires us with a more than ordinary grandeur and magnanimity. In collecting our force to overcome the opposition, we invigorate the soul, and give it an elevation with which otherwise it would never have been acquainted. Compliance by rendering our strength useless makes us insensible of it, but opposition awakens and employs it. This is also true in the inverse. Opposition not only enlarges the soul, but the soul, when full of courage and magnanimity in a manner seeks opposition. Readers note the Latin quotation is not read here, but rather the English translation. And among the tamer beasts, he longs to be granted in answer to his prayers a slavering boar, or to have a tawny lion come down from the mountain. End of translation Whatever supports and fills the passions is agreeable to us, as on the contrary what weakens and enfeebles them is uneasy. As opposition has the first effect and facility the second, no wonder the mind in certain dispositions desires the former and is Everest to the latter. These principles have an effect on the imagination as well as on the passions. To be convinced of this, we need only consider the influence of heights and depths on that faculty. Any great elevation of place communicates a kind of pride or sublimity of imagination and gives a fancied superiority over those that lie below. And vice versa, a sublime and strong imagination conveys the idea of ascent and elevation. Hence it proceeds that we associate in a manner the idea of whatever is good with that of height and evil with lowness. Heaven is supposed to be above and hell below. A noble genius is called an elevate and sublime one. Readers note the Latin quotation is not read here, but rather the English translation. Spurns the dank soil in winged flight. End of translation On the contrary, a vulgar and trivial conception is styled indifferently low or mean. Prosperity is denominated ascent and adversity descent. Kings and princes are supposed to be placed at the top of human affairs as peasants and day laborers are said to be in the lowest stations. These methods of thinking and of expressing ourselves are not of so little consequence as they may appear at first sight. It is evident to common sense as well as philosophy that there is no natural or essential difference betwixt high and low, and that this distinction arises only from the gravitation of matter, which produces emotion from the one to the other. The very same direction which in this part of the globe is called ascent, is denominated descent in our antipodes, which can proceed from nothing but the contrary tendency of bodies. Now it is certain that the tendency of bodies continually operating upon our senses must produce from custom a light tendency in the fancy, and that when we consider any object situated in an ascent, the idea of its weight gives us a propensity to transport it from the place in which it is situated to the place immediately below it, and so on till we come to the ground, which equally stops the body and our imagination. For a like reason, we feel a difficulty in mounting and pass not without a kind of reluctance from the inferior to that which is situated above it, as if our ideas acquired a kind of gravity from their objects. As a proof of this, do we not find that the facility which is so much studied in music and poetry is called the fall or cadency of the harmony or period, the idea of facility communicating to us that of descent in the same manner as descent produces a facility? Since the imagination, therefore, in running from low to high finds an opposition in its internal qualities and principles, and since the soul, when elevated with joy and courage in a manner seeks opposition and throws itself with alacrity into any scene of thought or action where its courage meets with matter to nourish and employ it, it follows that everything which invigorates and enlivens the soul, whether by touching the passions or imagination, naturally conveys to the fancy this inclination for ascent and determines it to run against the natural stream of its thoughts and conceptions. This aspiring progress of the imagination suits the present disposition of the mind, and the difficulty, instead of extinguishing its vigor and alacrity, has the contrary effect of sustaining and increasing it. Virtue, genius, power, and riches are for this reason associated with height and sublimity, as poverty, slavery, and folly are conjoined with descent and lowness. Were the case the same with us as Milton represents it to be with the angels, to whom descent is adverse and who cannot sink without labor and compulsion, this order of things would be entirely inverted, as appears hence that the very nature of ascent and descent is derived from the difficulty and propensity, and consequently every one of their effects proceeds from that origin. All this is easily applied to the present question, why a considerable distance in time produces a greater veneration for the distant objects than a like removal in space. The imagination moves with more difficulty in passing from one portion of time to another than in a transition through the parts of space, and that because space or extension appears united to our senses while time or succession is always broken and divided. This difficulty, when joined with a small distance, interrupts and weakens the fancy, but has a contrary effect in a great removal. The mind elevated by the vastness of its object is still further elevated by the difficulty of the conception, and being obliged every moment to renew its efforts in the transition from one part of time to another feels a more vigorous and sublime disposition than in a transition through the parts of space where the ideas flow along with easiness and facility. In this disposition the imagination passing as is usual from the consideration of the distance to the view of the distant objects gives us a proportionable veneration for it, and this is the reason why all the relics of antiquity are so precious in our eyes and appear more valuable than what is brought even from the remotest parts of the world. The third phenomenon I have remarked will be a full confirmation of this. It is not every removal in time which has the effect of producing veneration and esteem. We are not apt to imagine our posterity will excel us or equal our ancestors. This phenomenon is the more remarkable because any distance in futurity weakens not our ideas so much as an equal removal in the past, though a removal in the past when very great increases our passions beyond a like removal in the future, yet a small removal has a greater influence in diminishing them. In our common way of thinking we are placed in a kind of middle station betwixt the past and future, and as our imagination finds a kind of difficulty in running along the former and the facility in following the course of the latter, the difficulty conveys the notion of ascent and the facility of the contrary. Hence we imagine our ancestors to be in a manner mounted above us and our posterity to lie below us. Our fancy arrives not at the one without effort, but easily reaches the other, which effort weakens the conception where the distance is small, but enlarges and elevates the imagination when attended with a suitable object. As on the other hand, the facility assists the fancy in a small removal, but takes off from its force when it contemplates any considerable distance. It may not be improper before we leave this subject of the will to resume in a few words all that has been said concerning it in order to set the whole more distinctly before the eyes of the reader. What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of the mind when any good or evil is presented or any object which by the original formation of our faculties is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former but such as operate more calmly and cause no disorder in the temper which tranquility leads us into a mistake concerning them and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties. Both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable and depend in a great measure on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual. Generally speaking the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will though it is often found that the calm ones when corroborated by reflection and seconded by resolution are able to control them in their most furious movements. What makes this whole affair more uncertain is that a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one either by a change of temper or of the circumstances and situation of the object as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion by custom or by exciting the imagination. Upon the whole this struggle of passion and of reason as it is called diversifies human life and makes men so different not only from each other but also from themselves in different times. Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension. End of File 32. File 33 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Jaeger. Book 2 of The Passions. Part 3 of The Will and Direct Passions. Section 9 of The Direct Passions. It is easy to observe that the passions both direct and indirect are founded on pain and pleasure and that in order to produce an affection of any kind it is only requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion and of most of our reflective or secondary impressions. The impressions which arise from good and evil most naturally and with the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear along with volition. The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good and to avoid the evil, though they be conceived merely in idea and be considered as to exist in any future period of time. But supposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure and that arising from an object related to ourselves or others, this does not prevent the propensity or aversion with the consequent emotions but by concurring with certain dormant principles of the human mind excites the new impressions of pride or humility, love or hatred. That propensity which unites us to the object or separates us from it still continues to operate but in conjunction with the indirect passions which arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas. These indirect passions being always agreeable or uneasy give in their turn additional force to the direct passions and increase our desire and aversion to the object. Thus a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty, and this pleasure produces the direct passions or the impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these clothes are considered as belonging to ourselves the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion, and the pleasure which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope. When good is certain or probable it produces joy. When evil is in the same situation there arises grief or sorrow. When either good or evil is uncertain it gives rise to fear or hope according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other. Desire arises from good considered simply, and aversion is derived from evil. The will exerts itself when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body. Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies and of happiness to our friends, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil and proceed not from them like the other affections. None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention except hope and fear, which we shall hear endeavour to account for. It is evident that the very same event which by its certainty would produce grief or joy gives always rise to fear or hope when only probable and uncertain. In order therefore to understand the reason why this circumstance makes such a considerable difference, we must reflect on what I have already advanced in the preceding book concerning the nature of probability. Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either side, but is incessantly tossed from one to another, and at one moment is determined to consider an object as existent, and at another moment as the contrary. The imagination or understanding, call it which you please, fluctuates betwixt the opposite views, and though perhaps it may be oftener turned to the one side than the other, it is impossible for it by reason of the opposition of causes or chances to rest on either. The pro and con of the question alternately prevail, and the mind surveying the object in its opposite principles finds such a contrarity as utterly destroys all certainty and established opinion. Suppose then that the object concerning whose reality we are doubtful is an object either of desire or aversion. It is evident that, according as the mind turns itself either to the one side or the other, it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow. An object whose existence we desire gives satisfaction when we reflect on those causes which produce it, and for the same reason excites grief or uneasiness from the opposite consideration, so that as the understanding in all probable questions is divided betwixt the contrary points of view, the affections must in the same manner be divided betwixt opposite emotions. Now if we consider the human mind, we shall find that with regard to the passions, it is not of the nature of a wind instrument of music which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases, but rather resembles a string instrument where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound which gradually and insensibly decays. The imagination is extreme quick and agile, but the passions are slow and restive, for which reason when any object is presented that affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other, though the fancy may change its views with great celerity, each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of joy or sorrow predominates in the composition. Because the nature of probability is to cast a superior number of views or chances on one side, or which is the same thing, a superior number of returns of one passion, or since the dispersed passions are collected into one, a superior degree of that passion. That is, in other words, the grief and joy being intermingled with each other by means of the contrary views of the imagination produced by their union the passions of hope and fear. Upon this head there may be started a very curious question concerning that contrarity of passions which is our present subject. It is observable that where the objects of contrary passions are presented at once, beside the increase of the predominant passion, which has been already explained and commonly arises at their first shock or encounter, it sometimes happens that both the passions exist successively and by short intervals. Sometimes that they destroy each other and neither of them takes place. And sometimes that both of them remain united in the mind. It may therefore be asked by what theory we can explain these variations and to what general principle we can reduce them. When the contrary passions arise from objects entirely different, they take place alternately, the want of relation and the ideas separating the impressions from each other and preventing their opposition. Thus when a man is afflicted for the loss of a lawsuit and joyful for the birth of a son, the mind running from the agreeable to the calamitous object with whatever hilarity it may perform this motion can scarcely temper the one affection with the other and remain betwixt them in a state of indifference. It more easily attains that calm situation when the same event is of a mixed nature and contains something adverse and something prosperous in its different circumstances. For in that case both the passions mingling with each other by means of the relation become mutually destructive and leave the mind in perfect tranquility. But suppose in the third place that the object is not a compound of good or evil, but is considered as probable or improbable in any degree. In that case I assert that the contrary passions will both of them be present at once in the soul and instead of destroying and tempering each other will subsist together and produce a third impression or affection by their union. Contrary passions are not capable of destroying each other except when their contrary movements exactly rencounter and are opposite in their direction as well as in the sensation they produce. This exact rencounter depends upon the relations of those ideas from which they are derived and is more or less perfect according to the degrees of the relation. In the case of probability the contrary chances are so far related that they determine concerning the existence or non-existence of the same object. But this relation is far from being perfect since some of the chances lie on the side of existence and others on that of non-existence which are objects altogether incompatible. It is impossible by one steady view to survey the opposite chances and the events dependent on them but it is necessary that the imagination should run alternately from the one to the other. Each view of the imagination produces its peculiar passion which decays away by degrees and is followed by a sensible vibration after the stroke. The incompatibility of the views keeps the passions from shocking in a direct line if that expression may be allowed and yet their relation is sufficient to mingle their fainter emotions. It is after this manner that hope and fear arise from the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy and from their imperfect union and conjunction. Upon the whole contrary passions succeed each other alternately when they arise from different objects. They mutually destroy each other when they proceed from different parts of the same and they subsist both of them and mingle together when they are derived from the contrary and incompatible chances or possibilities on which any one object depends. The influence of the relations of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair. If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected the passions are like an alkali and an acid which being mingled destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect and consists in the contradictory views of the same object the passions are like oil and vinegar which however mingled never perfectly unite and incorporate. As the hypothesis concerning hope and fear carries its own evidence along with it we shall be the more concise in our proofs. A few strong arguments are better than many weak ones. The passions of fear and hope may arise when the chances are equal on both sides and no superiority can be discovered in the one above the other. Nay in this situation the passions are rather the strongest as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon and is tossed with the greatest uncertainty. Throw in a superior degree of probability to the side of grief you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the composition and tincture it into fear. Increase the probability and by that means the grief the fear prevails still more and more till at last it runs insensibly as the joy continually diminishes into pure grief. After you have brought it to this situation diminish the grief after the same manner that you increased it by diminishing the probability on that side and you'll see the passion clear every moment until it changes insensibly into hope which again runs after the same manner by slow degrees into joy as you increase that part of the composition by the increase of the probability. Are not these as plain proofs that the passions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy as in optics it is a proof that a colored ray of the sun passing through a prism is a composition of two others when as you diminish or increase the quantity of either you find it prevail proportionably more or less in the composition. I am sure neither natural nor moral philosophy admits of stronger proofs. Probability is of two kinds either when the object is really in itself uncertain and to be determined by chance or when though the object be already certain yet it is uncertain to our judgment which finds a number of proofs on each side of the question. Both these kinds of probabilities cause fear and hope which can only proceed from that property in which they agree that is the uncertainty and fluctuation they bestow on the imagination by that contrarity of views which is common to both. It is a probable good or evil that commonly produces hope or fear because probability being a wavering and unconstant method of surveying an object causes naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of passion but we may observe that wherever from other causes this mixture can be produced the passions of fear and hope will arise even though there be no probability which must be allowed to be a convincing proof of the present hypothesis. We find that an evil barely conceived as possible does sometimes produce fear especially if the evil be very great. A man cannot think of excessive pains and tortures without trembling if he be in the least danger of suffering them. The smallness of the probability is compensated by the greatness of the evil and the sensation is equally lively as if the evil were more probable. One view or glimpse of the former has the same effect as several of the latter but they are not only possible evils that cause fear but even some allowed to be impossible as when we tremble on the brink of a precipice though we know ourselves to be in perfect security and have it in our choice whether we will advance a step farther. This proceeds from the immediate presence of the evil which influences the imagination in the same manner as the certainty of it would do but being encountered by the reflection on our security is immediately retracted and causes the same kind of passion as when from a contrarity of chances contrary passions are produced. Evils that are certain have sometimes the same effect in producing fear as the possible or impossible. Thus a man in a strong prison well guarded without the least means of escape trembles at the thought of the rack to which he is sentenced. This happens only when the certain evil is terrible and confounding in which case the mind continually rejects it with horror while it continually presses in upon the thought. The evil is there fixed and established but the mind cannot endure to fix upon it from which fluctuation and uncertainty there arises a passion of much the same appearance with fear. But it is not only where good or evil is uncertain as to its existence but also as to its kind that fear or hope arises. Let one be told by a person whose veracity he cannot doubt of that one of his sons is suddenly killed. It is evident the passion this event would occasion would not settle into pure grief till he got certain information which of his sons he had lost. Here there is an evil certain but the kind of it uncertain. Consequently the fear we feel on this occasion is without the least mixture of joy and arises merely from the fluctuation of the fancy betwixt its objects. And though each side of the question produces here the same passion yet that passion cannot settle but receives from the imagination a tremulous and unsteady motion resembling in its cause as well as in its sensation the mixture and contention of grief and joy. From these principles we may account for a phenomenon in the passions which at first sight seems very extraordinary that is that surprise is apt to change into fear and everything that is unexpected affrights us. The most obvious conclusion from this is that human nature is in general pusillanimous since upon the sudden appearance of any object we immediately conclude it to be an evil and without waiting till we can examine its nature whether it be good or bad are at first affected with fear. This I say is the most obvious conclusion but upon further examination we shall find that the phenomenon is otherwise to be accounted for. The suddenness and strangeness of an appearance naturally excite a commotion in the mind like everything for which we are not prepared and to which we are not accustomed. This commotion again naturally produces a curiosity or inquisitiveness which being very violent from the strong and sudden impulse of the object becomes uneasy and resembles in its fluctuation and uncertainty the sensation of fear or the mixed passions of grief and joy. This image of fear naturally converts into the thing itself and gives us a real apprehension of evil as the mind always forms its judgments more from its present disposition than from the nature of its objects. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a strong connection with fear even though they do not cause any opposition of passions by the opposite views and considerations they present to us. A person who has left his friend in any malady will feel more anxiety upon his account than if he were present, though perhaps he is not only incapable of giving him assistance but likewise of judging of the event of his sickness. In this case though the principal object of the passion that is the life or death of his friend be to him equally uncertain when present as when absent yet there are a thousand little circumstances of his friend's situation and condition the knowledge of which fixes the idea and prevents that fluctuation and uncertainty so near allied to fear. Uncertainty is indeed in one respect as near allied to hope as to fear since it makes an essential part in the composition of the former passion but the reason why it inclines not to that side is that uncertainty alone is uneasy and has a relation of impressions to the uneasy passions. It is thus our uncertainty concerning any minute circumstance relating to a person increases our apprehensions of his death or misfortune. Horace has remarked this phenomenon. As a bird watching over her fledglings is more afraid of their being attacked by snakes if she were to leave them even though were she to stay she would not be any more capable of helping them when they were with her but this principle of the connection of fear with uncertainty I carry farther and observe that any doubt produces that passion even though it presents nothing to us on any side but what is good and desirable a virgin on her bridal night goes to bed full of fears and apprehensions though she expects nothing but pleasure of the highest kind and what she has long wished for the newness and greatness of the event the confusion of wishes and joys so embarrassed the mind that it knows not on what passion to fix itself from whence arises a fluttering or unsettledness of the spirits which being in some degree uneasy very naturally degenerates into fear thus we still find that whatever causes any fluctuation or mixture of passions with any degree of uneasiness always produces fear or at least a passion so like it that they are scarcely to be distinguished I have here confined myself to the examination of hope and fear in their most simple and natural situation without considering all the variations they may receive from the mixture of different views and reflections terror consternation astonishment anxiety and other passions of that kind are nothing but different species and degrees of fear it is easy to imagine how a different situation of the object or a different turn of thought may change even the sensation of a passion and this may in general account for all the particular subdivisions of the other affections as well as of fear love may shoe itself in the shape of tenderness friendship intimacy esteem goodwill and and many other appearances which at the bottom are the same affections and arise from the same causes though with a small variation which it is not necessary to give any particular account of it is for this reason I have all along confined myself to the principal passion the same care of avoiding prolixity is the reason why I waive the examination of the will and direct passions as they appear in animals since nothing is more evident than that they are the same nature and excited by the same causes as in human creatures I leave this to the reader's own observation desiring him at the same time to consider the additional force this bestows on the present system and of file 33 file 34 of a treatise of human nature by David Hume volume 2 this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by George Yeager book 2 of the passions part 3 of the will and direct passions section 10 of curiosity or the love of truth but me thinks we have been not a little inattentive to run over so many different parts of the human mind and examine so many passions without taking once into the consideration that love of truth which was the first source of all our inquiries tool therefore be proper before we leave this subject to bestow a few reflections on that passion and shoe its origin in human nature it is an affection of so peculiar a kind that it would have been impossible to have treated of it under any of those heads which we have examined without danger of obscurity and confusion truth is of two kinds consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas considered as such or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence it is certain that the former species of truth is not desired merely as truth and that it is not the justness of our conclusions which alone gives the pleasure for these conclusions are equally just when we discover the equality of two bodies by a pair of compasses as when we learn it by a mathematical demonstration and though in the one case the proofs be demonstrative and in the other only sensible yet generally speaking the mind acquiesces with equal assurance in the one as in the other and in an arithmetical operation where both the truth and the assurance are of the same nature as in the most profound algebraical problem the pleasure is very inconsiderable if rather it does not degenerate into pain which is an evident proof that the satisfaction which we sometimes receive from the discovery of truth proceeds not from it merely as such but only as in doubt with certain qualities the first and most considerable circumstance requisite to render truth agreeable is the genius and capacity which is employed in its invention and discovery what is easy and obvious is never valued and even what is in itself difficult if we come to the knowledge of it without difficulty and without any stretch of thought or judgment is but little regarded we love to trace the demonstrations of mathematicians but should receive small entertainment from a person who should barely inform us of the proportions of lines and angles though we repose the most confidence both in his judgment and veracity in this case it is sufficient to have ears to learn the truth we never are obliged to fix our attention or exert our genius which of all other exercises of the mind is the most pleasant and agreeable but though the exercise of genius be the principle source of that satisfaction we receive from the sciences yet I doubt if it be alone sufficient to give us any considerable enjoyment the truth we discover must also be of some importance it is easy to multiply algebraical problems to infinity nor is there any end in the discovery of the proportions of conic sections though few mathematicians take any pleasure in these researches but turn their thoughts to what is more useful and important now the question is after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us the difficulty on this head arises from hence that many philosophers have consumed their time have destroyed their health and neglected their fortune in the search of such truths as they esteemed important and useful to the world though it appeared from their whole conduct and behavior that they were not endowed with any share of public spirit nor had any concern for the interests of mankind were they convinced that their discoveries were of no consequence they would entirely lose all relish for their studies and that though the consequences be entirely indifferent to them which seems to be a contradiction to remove this contradiction we must consider that there are certain desires and inclinations which go no farther than the imagination and are rather the faint shadows and images of passions than any real affections thus suppose a man who takes a survey of the fortifications of any city considers their strength and advantages natural or acquired observes the disposition and contrivance of the bastions ramparts mines and other military works it is plain that in proportion as all these are fitted to attain their ends he will receive a suitable pleasure and satisfaction this pleasure as it arises from the utility not the form of the objects can be no other than a sympathy with the inhabitants for whose security all this art is employed though it is possible that this person as a stranger or an enemy may in his heart have no kindness for them or may even entertain a hatred against them it may indeed be objected that such a remote sympathy is a very slight foundation for a passion and that so much industry and application as we frequently observe in philosophers can never be derived from so inconsiderable and original but here I return to what I have already remarked that the pleasure of study consists chiefly in the action of the mind and the exercise of the genius and understanding in the discovery or comprehension of any truth if the importance of the truth be requisite to complete the pleasure it is not on account of any considerable addition which of itself it brings to our enjoyment but only because it is in some measure requisite to fix our attention when we are careless and inattentive the same action of the understanding has no effect upon us nor is able to convey any of that satisfaction which arises from it when we are in another disposition but beside the action of the mind which is the principle foundation of the pleasure there is likewise required a degree of success in the attainment of the end or the discovery of that truth we examine upon this head I shall make a general remark which may be useful on many occasions that is that where the mind pursues any end with passion though that passion be not derived originally from the end but merely from the action and pursuit yet by the natural course of the affections we acquire a concern for the end itself and are uneasy under any disappointment we meet with in the pursuit of it this proceeds from the relation and parallel direction of the passions above mentioned to illustrate all this by a similar instance I shall observe that there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than those of hunting and philosophy whatever disproportion may at first sight appear betwixt them it is evident that the pleasure of hunting consists in the action of the mind and body the motion the attention the difficulty and the uncertainty it is evident likewise that these actions must be attended with an idea of utility in order to their having any effect upon us a man of the greatest fortune and the farthest removed from avarice though he takes a pleasure in hunting after partridges and pheasants feels no satisfaction in shooting crows and magpies and that because he considers the first as fit for the table and the other as entirely useless here it is certain that the utility or importance of itself causes no real passion but is only requisite to support the imagination and the same person who overlooks a ten times greater profit in any other subject is pleased to bring home half a dozen woodcocks or plovers after having employed several hours in hunting after them to make the parallel betwixt hunting and philosophy more complete we may observe that though in both cases the end of our action may in itself be despised yet in the heat of the action we acquire such an attention to this end that we are very uneasy under any disappointments and are sorry when we either miss our game or fall into any error in our reasoning if we want another parallel to these affections we may consider the passion of gaming which affords a pleasure from the same principles as hunting and philosophy it has been remarked that the pleasure of gaming arises not from interest alone since many leave a sure gain for this entertainment neither is it derived from the game alone since the same persons have no satisfaction when they play for nothing but proceeds from both these causes united though separately they have no effect it is here as in certain chemical preparations where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third which is opaque and colored the interest which we have in any game engages our attention without which we can have no enjoyment either in that or in any other action our attention being once engaged the difficulty variety and sudden reverses of fortune still farther interest us and it is from that concern our satisfaction arises human life is so tiresome a scene and men generally are of such indolent dispositions that whatever amuses them though by a passion mixed with pain does in the main give them a sensible pleasure and this pleasure is here increased by the nature of the objects which being sensible and of a narrow compass are entered into with facility and are agreeable to the imagination the same theory that accounts for the love of truth in mathematics and algebra may be extended to morals politics natural philosophy and other studies where we consider not the abstract relations of ideas but their real connections and existence but beside the love of knowledge which displays itself in the sciences there is a certain curiosity implanted in human nature which is a passion derived from a quite different principle some people have an insatiable desire of knowing the actions and circumstances of their neighbors though their interests be no way concerned in them and they must entirely depend on others for their information in which case there is no room for study or application let us search for the reason of this phenomenon it has been proved at large that the influence of belief is that wants to enliven and infix any idea in the imagination and prevent all kind of hesitation and uncertainty about it both these circumstances are advantageous by the vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy and produce though in a lesser degree the same pleasure which arises from a moderate passion as the vivacity of the idea gives pleasure so it certainly prevents uneasiness by fixing one particular idea in the mind and keeping it from wavering in the choice of its objects it is a quality of human nature which is conspicuous on many occasions and is common both to the mind and body that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us and that however any objects may in themselves be indifferent yet their alteration gives uneasiness as it is the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought and transport us suddenly from one idea to another it must of consequence be the occasion of pain this pain chiefly takes place where interest relation or the greatness and novelty of any event interests us in it it is not every matter of fact of which we have a curiosity to be informed neither are they such only as we have an interest to know it is sufficient if the idea strikes on us with such force and concerns us so nearly as to give us an uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy a stranger when he arrives first at any town may be entirely indifferent about knowing the history and adventures of the inhabitants but as he becomes farther acquainted with them and has lived any considerable time among them he acquires the same curiosity as the natives when we are reading the history of a nation we may have an ardent desire of clearing up any doubt or difficulty that occurs in it but become careless in such researches when the ideas of these events are in a great measure obliterated end of file 34