 Hello and welcome. We have with us today Professor Sameer Amin, one of the world's leading Marxist thinkers. He is associated himself with two major forums, the Third World Forum and the World Forum for Alternatives. I'll first like to ask Sameer you to tell us a little bit about these two forums that you have been leading and structuring and after that we'll go on and discuss the situation as it has developed in the Arab world, in this year of uprising and turbulence and reactionary restorations and so on. So tell us a little bit about the two forums that I just mentioned, the Third World Forum and the World Forum for Alternatives. Well good afternoon Asia's and good afternoon and thank you for this interview. Well the Third World Forum was created in the 70s of the past century as an independent association, as an independent network of thinkers from Asia, Africa plus Cuba, from the non-aligned countries. We had felt some of us at that point in time that non-alignment needed also to be supported by an independent organization of thinkers of the left, Lato-Sensu and we established Third World Forum as such. We have been given a diplomatic status within the non-aligned in Senegal within the non-aligned movement and that is an independent, I am stressing, which means independent from the governments of the non-aligned group and from the major parties which were also component of non-alignment. But in order to support and to reinforce the non-alignment vis-à-vis the imperialist coming aggression which we felt was going to come. And then we have survived at such since then, which means three decades and more, four decades now. But then towards the end of the century, exactly in 1997, we felt the need to enlarge and reinforce that network by associating more closely on the one hand Latin America and on the other hand also friends in the North, in Europe and North America and Japan. And that is when we created together with a number of think tanks the World Forum for Alternatives in Cairo in 1997. We were ahead of time since, as you know, the World Social Forum. That's right. Yes. First assembly was met only in 2001 in Porto Alegre in Brazil. But we organized the first, it was a media event. It was not a major event, a first event in Davos in 1999, which was the anti-Davos in Davos. When I first heard of the World Social Forum, the very first thing that came to my mind at that time was in fact the names of the two forums you were already running and even the similarity of the name. And so on. Let me ask you a very broad question about the Arab situation at the moment. One of the tendencies that I think all of us need to work against is the tendency to lapse into one big thing, everything that has happened in the Arab world without enough attention to national specificities. And it is of course true that there is an immense upsurge of democratic demand across the Arab world. That is one thing that is common among all of these movements. But then after that, you have national specificities. It begins in Tunisia, then immediately Egypt erupts. And in the Arab world, the centrality of Egypt being what it is. If it happens in Egypt, it becomes an order of phenomenon. The first thing that we noticed was that these were truly secular democratic movements, anti-authoritarian, with a strong popular current in it. Gradually, the Islamic movement begins to emerge under the pressure of the mass movement. A year later, as the electoral field is opened up, we find the Islamic groups emerging in Tunisia, in Egypt, and so on. So can you give us a broad picture of this whole development? Well, there are two mistakes which should be avoided. The first one is the one that you indicated. One should not speak of the Arab world that is censored and generalized too quickly. Each country has its particular characteristics, of course. But even if there are common characteristics to the whole region, the second mistake that should be avoided is to come to a fast conclusion whether the Arab Spring, as it has been called, has been successful within one year or defeated. It has been neither successful nor defeated. It's only the start of a wider movement. My first point would be to indicate that the upsurge of people in Tunisia and in Egypt particularly was not unexpected. It should have been expected, and it was expected, at least by a number of people on the left. Why is it so? Because the previous regimes during the Bandung period, the Arab countries, or a number of Arab countries, were on the forefront of the struggle for liberation and social change, and I would say progressive social change, even if not socialist. The names of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the name of Boumed Yain, at least, are well known. But these regimes, even if they were not democratic, were perfectly legitimate, because one, they achieved a lot from above, but they achieved land reform, they achieved a move towards industrialization, they achieved a gigantic jump ahead in the fields of public services, basically education, health and so on, and they achieved through all that a kind of full employment, kind of, of course, and with guarantees to the working classes, to the popular classes, and an upward mobility from popular classes to middle classes. That gave them a perfect legitimacy. But once they got out of steam because of their internal limitations, and that was within 10, 15 or 20 years of achievements, of real achievements, and that coincided with also the coming out of steam of historical really existing socialism, as one would say, and when capital moved on the offensive under the umbrella of so-called neoliberalism and market economy, et cetera, et cetera, the ruling classes, in order to remain in office in power, abandoned the national popular program and aligned on the demands of neoliberalism through privatization, through dismantling of public services, through opening the economy, et cetera, et cetera. Now this neoliberal recipe led to a social disaster within a few years. All which has been achieved throughout 20 years of national popular regimes were lost within a few years coming back to growing and fast growing inequality, mass unemployment, precarity, destruction of the public services, particularly educational health, et cetera, et cetera. And then those regimes lost their legitimacy and became more and more responsive to the popular resistance by police, by repression, without anything else. They were fully supported by the US, by the Western imperialist power, in spite of there being more and more police regimes with no legitimacy. So we were expecting the explosion at some point in time. And it came. It started in Tunisia. It moved quickly in Egypt. And we ought to see that at that point in time, the Western powers, particularly the US, as well as the regimes themselves, surprised by the amplitude of this upsurge of the people. And now we have to go perhaps a little more into some details. I mean, the movement, at least I will speak of Egypt in some details, the movement brought together a variety of components, the repoliticized youth, which is a new branch of the new proletariat with precarity, et cetera, et cetera. The new trade unions, which have emerged through the enormous strikes which preceded the upsurge, because they happened in Egypt in 2007 and 2008. The movement of resistance, of small peasants to the accelerated expropriation produced by neoliberal policies, et cetera, et cetera. All these movements are potentially, but I'm stressing potentially left-oriented, in the sense that they were expressing a double protest. A protest against the social disaster, but also a protest against the police regime, the ugliest form of police regimes for democratic demands. And at that point in time, also organizations and movements within the middle classes, democratic-oriented, moved in. Now, but in the case of Egypt, at least, this alliance, it's not yet an alliance, but this coming together of movements potentially left-oriented. Why do I say potentially? Because while they were clear on their demands, they were not conscious of the link between the social disaster and the police regime, the objective link between that and so-called neoliberalism, which means really existing capitalism and imperialism, as it is for us today. That link is not yet well established. It does exist among a minority of the radical left. It penetrates within the youth and within the new trade unions, but it is still at the very beginning. And therefore, facing that potential alliance of progressive democratic forces, progressive, socially-oriented, progressive, and potentially even I would say a potentially socialist in the longer run, there is a block organized of the reactionary forces, which brings together a number also of components, but basically the high command of the army, because the support of the U.S. to one billion and a half dollars a year was given to an Egyptian army, not in order to reinforce its military capacity, but in order to destroy it by corrupting the high command and having the high command moving into and associating with the compredor bourgeoisie on the one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood, because while it is being repeated in the medias that the Muslim Brotherhood were in the opposition to the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak, this is a lie. The Muslim Brotherhood were opposing Nasser's regime, Nasser's regime, but it is Sadat who brought them back immediately when he turned to right at the international level by aligning on the U.S. and at the internal level by aligning on neoliberalism through the structural adjustment programs, etc., etc. They were allies. The proof of it is that Sadat and then Mubarak gave them, sold out to their benefit, three major institutions of the society, education, and it was through education that the veil was reintroduced in the society, justice, and it is through justice that the Sharia was reintroduced, and the TV. Do you see a government giving to the opposition such major institutions? No, they were part. But there was a balance of power. The high command remained at the top of the commanding positions and the Muslim Brotherhood were allies supporting them. Now, at the beginning of the movement, as you know and as everybody knows, the Muslim Brotherhood took position against the movement. They were expecting, as the U.S. establishment, as the government himself of Mubarak, the defeat of the protest by May repression. But first day, one million people on the streets, 300 people killed, nobody called the Western NATO to the rescue. Second day, two million people in the streets, 300 people killed. Third day, three million people, 300 people killed, and perhaps fifth or sixth day, 15 billion people, which meant the change in the balance of force. And it is only at that point in time that the Muslim Brotherhood, the leadership, without even supporting still the movement, say, well, we don't mind our people joining the movement. They had already joined the movement as everybody in the nation. Then the strategy which was developed by the reactionary bloc under the leadership of Obama himself, a short transition, quiet, with fast elections, so-called free pluripartist elections, and that's finished. It will establish a new legitimacy, the elected parliament. The movement did not consider that that that should be the target. The movement asked for a longer transition in order to allow to the popular classes and the movement to organize itself, to conquer positions in society, and then perhaps we could have meaningful elections. Anyway, we have had the elections. And as you mentioned, as well in Tunisia and in the conditions in Tunisia are quite similar with differences, but quite close to the case of Egypt, we had a victory of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, 40% in Tunisia and 60% or more in Egypt. Now, this victory of the Islamist of the Muslim Brotherhood was not unexpected and is not curious. It was expected. Why? Because the neoliberal recipe had led to what I'm calling a lumpen development in Egypt. That is a spiral going down with survival activities in the so-called informal sector, developing fast, fast, fast, and with the significant productive activities being more and more reduced. This was the recipe of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has nothing to offer but such a pattern of development. This pattern of so-called development, lumpen development, which in fact is properization, which means growing poverty, unemployment, precarity, etc., etc., for the majorities, the vast majorities, while a small minority becoming billionaires is benefiting from that pattern of so-called development, that led to the explosion. But the Muslim Brotherhood was developing. This pattern of spiral down is very favorable to them. Why? Because with the billion of dollars offered given to them by the Gulf with the benediction of Obama and of the US establishment, of course, were used precisely to finance the spiral down, to finance the poverty. That is when a chap needs some money to buy a taxi in order to survive, while the Muslim Brotherhood could come and give him the money to buy the taxi. And when the public services and health are completely destroyed, well, the Muslim Brotherhood, thanks to the money of the Gulf, offer free care in centers of them. So, that this chap would vote for those who support his survival would be a normal thing, which does not mean that simultaneously he will not belong to a movement claiming for re-establishing public services, re-establishing education, re-establishing normal rules for labor conditions, etc., etc. There is this duplication. And therefore, in the case of Egypt, you can see very clearly that as a result of the elections, there are two legitimacy. One I would call a minor legitimacy. Yes, the elected parliament has some legitimacy, but limited one, because the continuation of the struggle for social justice, for democratization of the society, etc., etc., has also its own legitimacy, and there is a conflict between the two. Additionally, the victory, the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood have introduced a secondary contradiction, but still a contradiction, in the reactionary alliance between the high command of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, because now the Muslim Brotherhood are in a position to ask for a higher position within the alliance, not anymore being subordinated to the dictatorship of the high command. This, we don't know where it will lead. It can lead to clashes. There are continuous negotiations between them for compromises. We don't know where it will lead. So what I conclude on Egypt. By saying that, in fact, we cannot say that the movement has been successful, because nothing has been changed, either at the level of the power system, which remains in the hands of the high command of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, nor at the level of changes in the social organization. But also we cannot say that it has been defeated, because the movement is still going on. And I read this history as the beginning of a long wave. I don't know how many years it will continue with ups and downs, with possibly victories, but also possibly defeats, but it will continue as a movement. Because the main thing positive, which has changed, is that the people are no more afraid. Fear has disappeared by getting some results, even if tiny results, by moving into the streets in millions and not being afraid of repression of the police. With guns and tanks against them, now the fear has disappeared. And this is a change which will have effects in the longer run. Sameer, thank you very, very much for this very enlightening commentary, condensed version of what has happened over the last one year. I'll be asking you some more questions for the second part of her interview. Thank you very much.