 Good afternoon. Welcome to a National Security College event. My name is Nicola Rosenblum and I am the deputy head of the National Security College. The National Security College is a part of the Australian National University in Canberra. As such, before we begin, I would like to acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land on which the ANU is located, the Ngunnawal people, and pay my respects to their elders past, present and emerging. Today's event is entitled A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, a vision for strategic ties between Japan and Australia, and we are honoured that it will feature a keynote speech by Professor Nobukatsu Kanahara of Japan. After his remarks, Professor Kanahara will be joined by Professor Rory Metcalf, Mr Bruce Miller, and Ms HKU for a panel discussion, but there will be an opportunity for you viewers to ask questions using the chat function. This event is brought to you in conjunction with the Embassy of Japan, and I'm now pleased to hand over to the Deputy Head of Mission of the Embassy of Japan, Minister Tadatsu Mori, for some introductory remarks. Thank you, Nicola. Hello everyone. Before beginning my remarks, I do wish to offer our thanks on behalf of the Japanese Embassy to the National Security College for hosting this online seminar concerning the direction of the strategic relationship between Japan and Australia, as the Yamagami is in birth this week. For the information of online viewers, we are very fortunate today to be addressed by Professor Kanahara, who has long been associated with Japan's diplomatic and international legal circles. He serves as Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister Abe from 2012 to 2019. He also served as the inaugural Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, and so his national security credentials are absolutely impeccable. With the signing of the reciprocal access agreement in January of this year, it would be no exaggeration to state that the Japan-Australia security relationship has entered a much broader and more dynamic stage. This in itself serves as a testament to the hard work done by generations of diplomatic and defence staff on both sides, including our panelists today, who have spared no effort in moving our strategic relationship forward. Since the designation in 2014 of this special strategic relationship by former Prime Minister Abe, Japan and Australia have embarked on a range of initiatives to build interoperability and familiarity with one another's security processes and policies. As democracies sharing respect for the rule of law, human rights, and free and transparent trade, we are a natural fit to work together in defence of the regional order that has underpinned our collective prosperity and security. As events in Ukraine have so tragically demonstrated, that order has come under threat from states such as Russia and China, whose own opaque goals and dismissal of international law, coupled with the unilateral use of force, threatens the stability and continuity of our collective well-being. Through the alacrity of these states, democracies around the world have acted swiftly and with determination in response to threats, refusing to go gently into the night, but instead showing that we stand united in defence of the law and national sovereignty. As a combined half of the Quad, Japan and Australia, together with our partners, India and the United States, have already embarked on plans to tackle the various issues of infrastructure development, technological development, climate change, cybersecurity, and vaccine distribution, all of which are of crucial importance to our region. It is our shared awareness of the importance of helping our region to grow, and our dedication on ensuring this occurs in legally transparent, ethical, and sustainable manner, which has drawn us closer together in our planning, consultations, and programmes. It has also backed up our support for one another's initiatives, most recently in the form of the announcement of AUKUS. Japan was the first nation within the Indo-Pacific to welcome this arrangement, as an even more capable RAN will expand the range of activities it can undertake with the JMSDF, thereby bolstering deterrence and safeguarding national sovereignty in our region. Defence arrangements are but one aspect of our strategic relationship, which also encompasses industry, trade, and technology. Our shared interest in developing green hydrogen, coupled with our desire to create alternative supply sources for rare earth, areas worthy of further exploration. With Australia having already established its own space agency, there is also further room under our Defence Technologies Sharing Agreement for cooperation between the ASA and JAXA on satellites and space situational awareness. With all this in mind, I have high expectations that today's discussions will touch on these and many areas besides. I therefore wish the panorists and the National Security College all the very best for us accumulating and engaging seminar this afternoon. Thank you very much for attention. Thank you very much Minister Mori for those remarks. I'm now very pleased to hand over to Professor Kanahara. Thank you very much for having me. It's a great honor to be here. Let me start with Ukraine. February 24th, Russia started to invade Ukraine. Some thought that it would end up with a new frozen conflict of Donbass region and the Uttar had been under Russian influence since the war for annexation of Crimea in 2014. It was not the case. The Ukraine war turned into a full-scale invasion, driving millions of Ukrainian refugees to free and inviting many brave, even ordinary Ukrainians to hold guns and stand up. Kyiv and Kharkiv have not yet formed as of today. President Putin made a fatal mistake. He might end up with a nightmare of stalemates or even lose the war. This is no longer the war of Russia, but of himself and his power in Kremlin. He unexpectedly galvanized the whole West against him. The Western judgment for his atrocities is a black and white matter. His invasion is a flamboyant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. He inscribed his name together with Hitler and Saddam Hussein. NATO is still fearful of escalating Ukrainian war into nuclear World War III and refrains itself from setting a non-fly zone that President Zelensky badly needs. President Putin thinks that he might use tactical nuclear weapons. The Western intelligence officials have started to talk about Russian use of chemical and biological weapons. Time is running against President Putin. At least he would not haste to brutalize the war more, to break the determination of Ukrainians to fight back by attacking more Ukrainian civilians. The Western economic sanctions are effective, but not enough to stop the war immediately. In this moment, one thing is certain, one thing is certain, the credibility of the West is at stake. The West cannot lose this war. The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, must be embarrassed now. He accepted President Putin in Beijing just before the invasion and televised worldwide the message that the two revisionist powers were together. But now, Beijing seems not ready to share the crime and the shame of Russia in Ukraine. The Chinese leaders are carefully watching how united the West is against the Russian adventurism. Prime Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida, is following faithfully the sanctions course set by the West. He knows well that it is not only European security, but the stability of the whole liberal international order itself is at stake. The spurring Western unity is encouraging. It is more so for Japan, Ukrainian war put directly a real question to many Japanese policy makers. If China invades Taiwan, could the whole West be united and resist against PRA like in this Ukrainian war. Taiwan contingency is different from Ukraine war. Ukraine always wanted to join NATO, but NATO did not grant the membership. The result was the war in 2010 in which Georgia, who wanted to join NATO as Ukraine, lost South Ossetia and Abhatia. The West was angry for some moments, but forgotten. The conflict was buried in a graveyard of freedom called Russian frozen conflict. In 2014, when then pro-Russia Ukrainian President Yanukovych fled from Kyiv after strong pro-Western demonstrations in Kyiv, President Putin annexed Crimea by force and put Donbas region under his influence. Again, the West shows their anger, but sanctions upon Russia and later went back to the business as usual, the lesser degree with Russia. The message that President Putin draw from these experiences should be that the West is weak and in disarray, and the West does not have the guts to face Russia. Russia Putin was convinced that mother Russia can retain its fear of influence in the 19th century by force outside the defense responsibility of NATO. Taiwan is different. The island has been under the sphere of influence of the United States for more than 75 years. Before that, the island was Japanese island for half a century. Japan is a direct player there. Japan US alliance treaty has the similar article five of common defense obligations as NATO treaty. In addition, it has another particular important article on the regional security article six. This article separates that US forces can use bases in Japan for the stability of the Far East. This article means that US forces should defend South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines using the US bases in Japan. The article was drafted reflecting the strategic situation in Asia around 1950s. The Korean War and the consecutive Taiwan threat crisis. Sino-US and Sino-Japan's rapprochement in 1970s erased the fear of Taiwan contingency for some moment. But Japan or the United States never accepted Chinese assertion that Beijing can forcibly annex Taiwan against Taiwanese free will. Chinese assertion of history that Taiwan has always been a part of China is a fake news. As is Putin's assertion that Ukraine has been a quarrel of mother Russia. Taiwan was Dutch island like Indonesia. It became a territory of China only in the late 17th century. Taiwan was annexed by Japan in 1895 after some Japanese war and quickly Japanese and industrialized. After the defeat of Imperial Japan 1945, Janji Shi fled from the continent to the islands. Since then, Taiwan has always been in the sphere of influence of the United States. The island has 23 million population on behalf of Ukraine. The surface is as big as Kyushu island of Japan. They achieved a spectacular economic growth in 1980s. Taiwan got free democratized by the leader leader in 1990s. The Taiwanese today have a robust identity clearly distinct from communist China as a free nation. China once tried to absorb Taiwan economically at the turn of the century. And then leader Mainjou tilted toward the continent. The students born after Taiwan democratization rushed into the parliament and pulled back before in policy of Taiwan to make a distance with China in 2014. The incident is known today as sunflower revolution. Taiwan is another symbol of freedom in Asia as the West Berlin was in 1950s in Europe. Taiwan contingency was a matter of draft in 1990s when the China was not very strong. When the leader leader of Taiwan democratized Taiwan, China feared the new identity would be born in Taiwan. So Pierre Shortman missiles in the vicinity of the islands to scare off Taiwanese. Two US Navy aircraft carriers rushed to the western Pacific. China still weak with huge rage against the humiliation backed off immediately. Now China is very different. Three quarters of US size in terms of economy. Its military budget is five times bigger than Japan. That is equal to UK, France or Germany. And this is more than 30% of US defense budgets that is US defense budget is half of the world defense budget. So Chinese defense budget is really huge. It is still increasing the two digits two digits every year. It does not include massive R&D budgets. So Chinese Pierre days now that appear in the region, except the United States. It is a monster that Imperial Japanese Army in 1930s. TGP will not miss an adventure at this juncture. He is concentrating his political energy to extend his leadership into the third term from 2022 to 2027. And even more around 2030 when he should be thinking of his trophy for his history for his leadership history. And that must be comparable to with the Mao Zedong. China must be at this moment China must be far bigger than today and be a fast runga. He might be tempted to invade Taiwan. Dictators have an extraordinary psychology that ordinary men cannot imagine. Putin is the proof. Dictatorship decays over time. After all the wise men will be ousted. And yes, men, the silent dictator tried to please him, the aiding ruler. Suffering from the solitude, suspicion of treason, new leadership challenge, creating the aiding brain and physical strength, worried about his own future and family. And more and more detached from the reality that dictator could make a mistake. As Tarellon said, the French mistake could be worse than a crime. Egypt could make the same fatal mistake as Putin. Egypt is from the red-guard generation of Mao's cultural revolution from 1966 through 1976 when Mao died. There was no education in China. The generation's worldview is very extremely narrow. They are still living in 19th century. The world is a jungle. The strong survives and the weak is destroyed. The social Darwinism, that long time ago in the West, is still very much vividly ingrained in their brain, in their brain. They do not understand the liberal ideals. Westerners proud of China, the Qing dynasty, like pieces of a cake. Because China was weak, now China is strong. Why can't China not expand its territory and sphere of influence in Asia? It was a Western Pacific. It was a Chinese sphere of influence, not only American one, only 200 years ago. This is how they feel. The Chinese Communist Party is now suffering from the lack of legitimacy of power. And this is also a problem. China's traditional political thought is close to European enlightenment thinking. Menchus Benci said 2300 years ago, love is the basis of goods and governance. People's voice is heaven's voice. People are more precious than a king. A good king is given the grace of heaven to rule the world and a bad king can be decapitated. This is what he said. Amazing, isn't it? Chinese leaders know that they are bad kings. Rotten red aristocrats enjoy huge wealth, social gap widens. The whole society is aging rapidly. Ethnic minorities are oppressed. But the Chinese leaders are now determined to stick to power. They saw the miserable collapse of Soviet empire in the Eastern Europe around 1990. This is one reason why they massacred kids in Tiananmen Square. They are free-determined to make their communist regime survive. This is the only existential purpose of CCP today. They started to rewrite history. The legitimacy of the communist dictatorship is based upon the glorious history of founding the strong and prosperous communist China by the Party. The Western invaders Japanese were kicked out by communist war heroes. China even kicked out the American invaders from North Korea. Kuomintang was driven to Taiwan. And China is now the number two economy on the earth. Under HIPAA electronic state Soviet system with strictly controlled information, nationalism is now used to govern. Why is China's intellectuals saying nationalism is a tiger? Once on its back, one can never get off it. And this is exactly what CCP is now doing today. In this political context, Taiwan invasion and its annexation must be a national goal for CCP. It cannot be otherwise. Xi Jinping declares that the annexation of Taiwan is a historic mission of China. It is no longer a matter of to do or not to do. It is a matter of when and how. Can the West be united to defend Taiwan or unlike the Ukrainian case, the US, Japan, Australia could be involved immediately in the contingency. What is the cause of defending Taiwan? This is not only about Taiwan. This is a worry to know whether the emerging liberal order in Asia will survive or not. Many agents support the liberal international order today. The human dignity is absolutely equal. People are born to be free. Freedom means to do what one believes rights and to contribute to the others. People can cooperate to do better for humans share the very basic emotion. It is called love in Christianity, compassion in the Buddhist world. Ren means love by the Confucius and brotherhood by Muslims. This is why the Asians can accept freedom, democracy, rule of law as universal values. The agents came through a very different path to come here. When the Westerners were busy to establish democracies inside their own nations and warring against each other for the mastery of the world politics, the Asians were colonized, racially discriminated. And today's universal values were applied to them in a very limited manner. Their human dignity and sovereignty were denied clearly. But after World War II, they got independence. Gandhi let India to independence with his brief of love and non-violence. Other leaders of Asia took guns to fight back against the returning colonial rulers like in Vietnam and Indonesia. It was only the U.S. who swore that the Philippines to go independence. The British, French and Dutch came back with guns in their hands. Many of the newly independent nations turned it back to the West. They chose dictatorship, say communists, populists, or even militarily Funta to achieve a quick development and to be strong and prosperous. But after half a century's experiment of dictatorship in 1990s, they started to join the Club of Democracy one by one. The Philippines were the first new democracy in Asia in 1986. South Korea followed in 1987. In 1990s, many coastal ASEAN nations and Taiwan followed. There are still shaky democracies with many frailties inside, but they are very, very proud democracies today. The Asians also understand that the West changed drastically for much better after World War II. Rev. King's civil rights movement threw down racial discrimination as institution in the United States, the Europeans followed. Freedom of democracy were no longer the local white Christian values, but universal values. The leadership of the U.S. is no longer only for the West itself, but for the world. Now they are following the West and becoming equal partners of the liberal international order. They are watching the Western leadership in Ukraine. NATO intervening in Yugoslavia and Libya. Syrian use of chemical weapons did not invite U.S. punishments. Hong Kong so close to China lost completely its freedom. Georgia has lost Russia. And now the West is standing up for Ukraine. What will happen if China invests Taiwan? This is a question that Asians are asking today. China is far bigger and stronger than Russia. China is a number one trade partner for many nations globally. They have nuclear weapons too. It would be impossible to isolate China as the West's theta gas Russia this time. Exclusion of Russia from swift system and freezing their bank account for foreign reserves show Russian economy. Russia provides 40% of natural gas for Europe. But still, it is a small economy in comparison with the U.S., EU and Japan. The economic size is as big as Korea today. The shock of economic sanctions against Russia is a big but bearable. Could we do the same thing when China invest Taiwan? The answer to this question should be this is not about money. If Taiwan is lost without the help of the West, the whole Asia would be lost to CCP one by one. They would surrender and the credibility of the Western value would erode instantly. The West needs a grand strategy to defend the emerging liberal order in Asia. Either China from reckless adventurism. Ex-Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe launched the strategic concept of free and open in the Pacific for it. It spread worldwide immediately. Now in U.S. and Europe in Asia, many governments talk about their own in the Pacific strategies. There are two points in this strategic concept. The first is importance of incorporating India in the strategic framework. China's economy has already been half size of Japan. It will soon be the number three economy globally. Its population will soon surpass China and their average age is only 29 years old. Ten years younger than the Chinese, 20 years younger than Japanese. Central prosperity is moving from Eastern Asia to Western Asia. As a strategy counterweights with China, India will play a very important role. The U.S. Japan should not forget. The Osiris should not forget that when they kissed Mao's cheek to face the Soviet Union, they pushed away India towards Russia. India never forgets Mao's invasion in their early times. Mao is one of the cruelest dictators of the last century. Beijing, Washington, Tokyo, nonetheless, Axis was born together with Islamabad, Pakistan, and that pushed India, not willingly, towards Russia. The strong strategic picture should be drawn here today. India is the creation of Gandhi and Nehru. It is a born democracy and India should be called upon to join the group of free nations as a main pillar of the future. The second point is that the FOIP realigns democracies. The liberal international order must be expanded successfully into Asia. That would account 60% of human beings and 60% of the world economy in this century. The West cannot be marginalized. On the contrary, it must be expanded. New Asian democracies and those who share the strategic interest to sustain this liberal order at least should be the alliance to form a strategic and global partnership. The liberal order is winning and spreading. This is the mainstream of human history. This is the message of FOIP to the dictators. There's the leading nations in FOIP, and it is quite the US, Japan, Australia, and India. The cooperation before is moving forward to the surprise of China. The British after Brexit is joining US and Australia in Asia, forming AUKUS. It is a great contribution to Asian stability. In the region, Indonesia, the Philippines, who is another of the US and Vietnam and other Asian nations should be invited to the club. They usually do not want to be involved in the big ones fights, but now they understand that the watershed moment is near. They stand up with quite otherwise they'll be compelled by China to be a tributary. The important partner for this is, I mean, among this, among these nations, we have to invite Europeans because Japan, Australia along to face China is a too heavy burden. So we have to invite the Europeans. And as I mentioned, British, but French is interested and Germany changed their strategic direction. They were outside NATO responsibility. The German view was very much focused upon the economy. But now they are seeing some strategic perspective. We have to engage Germany. And we have to engage also small and medium sized, the Eastern European nation who hates dictatorship. Poland. This is Bitcoin, but Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania. And they feel that our values are very much dear to them. We have to engage them. Of course, we have to engage Brussels. When the whole West is united as in this Ukrainian war, the West is far better than China and Russia. Even China cannot reach the size of the West. Before that, they would pick out. So before that, we have to sustain our unity as far as we are united. We could still engage China. And China would pick out in 20 years' time. So coming 20 years is a very, very difficult time for us. And I have to say that Japan and Australia are the only Western Pacific nations who can face this challenge. And we have to enlist the cooperation of other nations in the region, believing that our values are prevailing in Asia. I was with Prime Minister Abe, Shinto Abe, when he visited Darwin. I think it was very important. In the preparation meetings, the IMPEC people and media were saying that this is a great business to enhance our cooperation with Australia for energy. And IMPEC was exploiting the oil under the sea near Darwin. And Prime Minister and his speech writer, Professor Taniguchi said, no, no, no. Don't forget Darwin. Darwin is very important to reshape and to refound our relationship. We have to go to Darwin and we have to make this a starting point of new relationship of Australia and Japan. And they were so right. They were so right. This is a new era for Japan-Australia cooperation. And we are, we are the only two piters to sustain free and open Pacific in the Western Pacific. And we have to engage others here. Then we can be all rights and we can be the winner toward the midst of this century. Thank you very much. I stopped there. And I take any questions. Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor Kanahara, for those fascinating remarks. I'm now going to invite Professor Laurie Metcalf, the head of the National Security College, to chair a panel discussion on Japan-Australia relations and their impact on the Indo-Pacific and on the other issues which Professor Kanahara has raised you today. I would just like to remind you that if participants wish to ask the panel a question, please type it directly into the chat function on your screen. Thank you very much, Professor Metcalf. Thank you very much, Nicola, and it's a real pleasure to be with you all today. Professor Kanahara, that was a really very powerful account, I think, of these strategic challenges and opportunities that Japan faces, that Australia faces, and indeed that like-minded countries face in the Indo-Pacific and globally. What I would like to do in a moment is to invite our two distinguished panelists to join a conversation with you. And I would like perhaps the four of us to explore your speech, explore some of those themes, perhaps ask you some challenging questions, but offer our own perspectives. But also, I want to remind members of our virtual audience, feel free to provide your own questions in the chat function or to my colleagues at the college, and I will try to project some of your questions to Professor Kanahara as the conversation goes along. We've got a little under an hour ahead of us, so let's get into it. I'm going to begin by introducing, in a little more depth now to co-panelists, Ambassador Bruce Miller, former Australian Ambassador to Tokyo, and of course, very senior official in the Australian government throughout his career in Foreign Service and Intelligence as well. Bruce, I will be very interested in a moment to hear your questions and views, and also HKU, who's the deputy head of mission at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. HK, I appreciate you represent the Australian government in your role at the embassy, but I'm sure that your perspective on Japan's and Australia's strategic challenges is particularly insightful. So anything that you can share with us is really welcome today. I'm going to begin with one question, and then I'm going to invite my panelists into the conversation, if I may. So Kanahara-san, my question is to you to begin with, and you gave a very powerful account of the history of democracy in Asia, in the Indo-Pacific. And it's quite persuasive at one level to say that there seems to be this trend towards democratization and liberal values, and you interestingly referred not only to the independence movements, the anti-colonial movements. You mentioned Gandhi, India, for example, but you even reached back into ancient cultures in this region, including Chinese cultures and talked about, I guess, what sounded to me like democratic principles or impulses as well. So I'm interested to hear your view on what's gone wrong. Why don't we have, if you like, this flowering of democracy right across Asia, right across the Indo-Pacific, and where do you see this story going? Is the Communist Party the end of the story for the Chinese civilization, for example? Thank you very much. The Asian civilization is like this. Each nation has its own indigenous civilization, Japanese, right, Indonesian, right? And the Indian civilization covers the Southeast Asia and India, right? And to continue somehow to Afghanistan, Central Asia, with Persia. A Chinese one comes down from Japan, Korea, and the Vietnam is the southernmost. So the Chinese, Indian, and then Europeans, and then the American. This is a sort of a milfy cake. I have to say that when Japanese met the European Enlightenment thinking, some said, oh, this is exactly like Confucius, they said. People is more precious than the king. King must be benevolent, and they have to keep the people. Otherwise, the king can be ousted. This is exactly Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But Japanese thought, now we don't have parliament, we don't have independent judiciary. So they rushed to Europe and they import everything from the, you know, the parliament and the constitution. They did it in a very hasty way. And it took it to Groot somehow. And many nations just followed us. China tried to, and the Qing dynasty, they tried to open parliament. It has an advisory body, not a real parliament, but they tried to do that. And they almost wrote the constitution as we did, but they failed. And in the turn of the new century, 20th century, this is not a very good century. The totalitarianism started to spread. This was communism in the 80s. In Japan's case, it's the port city militarily. They wanted to change the world, change the country, not one stroke. A big revolution. And the key issue was social gap, the wealth gap. There was no pension, there was no Medicare, there was no social welfare. So they wanted to do that. But we did it, the Western nation did that through parliament. But some went to dictatorship. The worst case was communism. It spread very, very rapidly. When China, the Qing dynasty, failed, it's 50 years after Japan's major restoration. And when they opened up their door to the West, the West was totalitarian dying. And they imported, say, half nationalism and half communism. They had to, they had to create, they created the world. They created their own nation very rapidly. This was a big mistake. A big mistake was Japan's invasion because it invited communism to take the power. Communism is very different from enlightenment. Very different from Chinese original thinking. It's a very heresy thinking in Russia. They didn't know liberalism at all. They opened, they opened the parliament only 1906. Constitution was written under Nicolaus II to 1906. It's 16 years later than Japan. Soon after that, they moved to communism. So they didn't understand what the freedom is. Our system is based upon not only institutions. Our system is based upon more deeper political philosophy. Everybody is equal. Everybody is equal because everybody sees something important through his conscience inside, right? And this is... Tolstoy said it's God. And he said it's love. But the many nations share the same thing. Chinese say Ren, we say Jin. That's love. And the Buddhist teaches compassion. And if you are against teaching of Buddha, the king must be destroyed. That's in the Buddhist sutra. So we do share the philosophy. But we did not have institutions, restaurants in the industrial age. So Japan was one of the success stories after big mistakes. What do we did? Big mistake I put in today. Big mistake. But the world is now changed. And with these liberal institutions, we are far better. We should keep that. But this is based upon the very basic Asian political thinking of several thousand years. Institutions are necessary because the industrial age is very fast-moving society. We need it. But we can't implant European institutions in Asian political civilization. This is what we can do. And we proved it. And we think that we should do it. Japan's big mistake was... Social Darwinism. This is very much against Asian thinking. It's a beast world, right? The strong one can eat up the weak. And I have to say, still, still, the Chinese are somehow there. We abandoned that. But Chinese are somehow there. I read the... Ganyo Wei. He's an intellectual Qing dynasty. The very famous one. He wrote a book, famous book. The world is one. He said, we should cooperate. But he was influenced by the social Darwinism. He said, black people disappear. He wrote in his book. Only yellow and white people remain. So we have to make a new civilization and a new world, right? This kind of the 19th century social Darwinism, the world is jungle. This kind of thinking is still somehow there in the communist world. And that is our fear. Putin's there. He doesn't understand. What's the matter, Russia? That never existed. Ukrainians fought against Meiji. They were invaded by Russia. Ukraine has some identity and freedom there. They want to join you. It's their desire. It's a free will there. Putin doesn't understand that. He never understands the meaning of freedom. And I think this is the case of Xi Jinping, too. So this is the race of ideas. The competition of ideas, not only money and guns. So we have to win and we can win. And I infer from your remarks that this is not over. Maybe we'll come back to that later. But I'll now go a little bit away from that grand sweep of history to perhaps look a little bit more at the present challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific, particularly for Japan and Australia and the Japan-Australia partnership for this special strategic partnership. So I may now invite our panelists to join the discussion. Bruce, if I might start with you, it would be interesting to hear any reflections that you have from your professional experience and your personal insight on Professor Kanahara's speech and perhaps any question that you may have for him. Thank you, Rory. And it's a pleasure to be here and to be talking with old friends in this way. So look, I should emphasize, unlike HK, I'm a former bureaucrat, like Kanahara-san is too. So we have more license to say what we think personally, which we'll do. So I'm not saying anything that should be taken as representing what the government thinks. I'll leave that to HK. But look, I said a couple of observations and a couple of questions, if I may. And the observations are that we have, of course, Australia and Japan done a huge amount of work over the last 15 years, really, to strengthen our strategic and more broadly our bilateral alignment, whether it be intelligence sharing agreements, defence logistics agreements in the AXA. The most recently concluded reciprocal access agreement, which sends a very powerful message about our willingness to engage in practical cooperation and defence. Even the free trade agreement of eight years ago, that has a strategic element to it as well in a big way. So I've done it all for a lot, but the geopolitical situation so eloquently described for us by Kanahara-san means we really have to do quite a lot more in the way of developing our strategic partnership to step up to the challenges and the threats that we face. And I suppose we do need to think of some practical things we can do beyond agreeing fervently that our interests are aligned and we should do more. And I suppose to me, I'd suggest that we need to look more at our declaratory policy and what we say about what our relationship means to us. Declaring policy really matters in building deterrence. I'd suggest we need to update what we already have, a joint declaration of 2007 on defence and security cooperation, updated in a big way, and to talk about a formal agreement as we have under ANSIS, Articles 2 and 3, to consult on threats or security challenges and also both undertaking to engage in self-help and to maintain our defence capabilities. Those are two key obligations in our ANSIS alliance and I think the formal obligations that Strangepan could well think about, formally pronouncing upon and which would in turn send a big strategic message about our cohesion and our willingness to step up to deal with challenges. Of course, after that, we could always agree to take action to meet the common danger posed by an arm to tack on either, which is a standard part of ANSIS and of NATO. But that's perhaps a further step down the track, but that's not beyond the realm of possibility. So I just put that on the table with the potential discussion. But I'd also say, I think I'd suggest we also need a no holds bar discussion of how we can improve further our defence capabilities in a complementary way and with no area out of scope. And here is my first question, I suppose. I saw recently that former Prime Minister Abe had proposed, I think, a sharing or a basing of US nuclear weapons in Japan as something to talk about, something that really hasn't been talked about publicly before. And I'd be interested to know what Kanihara-San's reaction to that is. Of course, that's a response to the world as it evolves and is changing what we've seen in Ukraine. And, you know, one of the things that countries like Japan or indeed Australia might think of doing. So that's my question. And one other question, quite a different question, I have is Kanihara-San, you spoke about the importance of getting Europeans interested in facing China as well in dealing with China and sending a collective message on what the liberal democracies believe on the rules-based order, on opposing coercion, economic and otherwise. I think there's certainly a much greater interest from European countries, UK, France, Germany, the EU as a whole in this part of the world. But I question whether they will maintain their focus on East Asia. I'm not confident that they'll stay the course, they'll go to the UK. If only because they've once again become preoccupied with Russia and what's happened there. The strategic focus could well shift back to their part of the world, understandably. So it's quite the diplomatic task, I think we have ahead of us, countries like Japan, Australia, the US to persuade Europeans to stay interested. So that's my second question. The first question about the former Prime Minister, there's comments about potential sharing of basing of US nukes. And secondly about how realistic is it for us to expect Europeans to remain consistently focused on Indo-Pacific for the next few decades. Thank you, Bruce. Professor, over to you. Thank you, Bruce. I can't... In general, I can't agree more. We should enhance our strategic communications with each other agents. We should make our framework, the quads, the robust, the inside quads, Japan, Australia, the US, this triangle is very, must be a quarry. We have to have to do this in many levels. We have to enhance our corporations. Well, nuclear thing, I was invited last year by Ivo Dardar of the Chicago Global Affairs Council together with Chuck Hegel, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the UK. They hosted a meeting with some intellectual... I was invited there. And we are talking about the... They were talking about many European things, the UK, French, nuclear umbrella towards Germany. And these things were the hot topic there. And they shoot us to Asia. So I said the nuclear situation in Asia, what to do, recommendations. And nuclear sharing there. Australia was not very happy there. But after that, well, this is important. This is important issue, I said to myself. And I wrote a book. And this is... I said, you know, we should consider the nuclear sharing with the United States. This is, again, new book on nuclear sharing. This appeared one week ago. Then I wrote this book. Nobody was interested. Amazingly, nobody creases me. Suddenly, two weeks ago, Prime Minister said, we should think about it. And then, boom, it started. It's a big debate inside Japan. About 60% of Japanese said, yes, we have to discuss about nuclear weapons. This is not the yes interaction, but they say taboo of nuclear issues is no longer effective. We have to talk about it. And I have said the Cold War, the Soviet Union collapsed 30 years ago, right? So pro-Soviet people are gone. They are very senior to Japan. The answers are not interested in knowing what's going on in reality. This is basic atmosphere. Up to the end of the Cold War, we are not very much worried about Russian invasion because Russia is a big bear. And the head is in Europe. And NATO grabs the head, right? The Americans have the huge number of nuclear weapons over the Arctic Sea. So the situation was quite stable. We feared because of Russians, but it was not our idea that Russia would invade us one day, suddenly, unilaterally against us. We were not ever happy. We did not happen. After a sign of Japan's relationship, normalization, we thought it's much easier to face Russians. So up to 1990, we are not very much worried. We are discussing about the American sub-Sah. They have no X and they come to Japan or not. This was a scandal sort of. The leftists are very much angry against that. But the government said, we don't ask Americans whether they have it or not. This is a stupid debate. But now, the situation is very different, very different. China has 1,600 missiles pointed at Japan. 600 are the intermediate range. That could reach anywhere, Hokkaido, Tokyo. And they have MOOCs, of course. Small size ones too. And Americans don't have that. They were bound by INF Treaty. They have nothing there. So escalation ladder is not asymmetrical. And now China says they are going to invade Taiwan. And as I said, in Article 6 of the Security Treaty, revised 1960, we asked Americans to defend the surrounding area of Japan. That's Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Japan's empire and American colony. And this is a crust of Japan. And we can't defend them. We ask them to defend that. They said they won't do that using Japanese bases. So this is the regional framework for Japan-US alliance. And Americans are supposed to defend Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. After Kishinja went to Beijing, Taiwan's status a bit blurred. But still, Congress said the U.S. should defend Taiwan. And I'm sure that with high probability, Americans will intervene in a warfare against China. China's annexation of Taiwan. So we'll be directly involved. And there are three reasons to be involved in Taiwan contingency for the Japanese one. Article 6 allows U.S. to use Japanese bases to defend Taiwan. It's one, two. The Senkaku Islands, they say it is a part of Taiwan. So they would come to Senkaku Islands, too. Three, this is most important. Iwanaguni Islands, the southernmost the islands of Japan is only 100 km from Taiwan. It is impossible to avoid these Sakishima islands to make a war in Taiwan. So it would be directly involved. So Putin said he might use nooks against NATO if they intervene in Ukraine. Xi Jinping might say the same thing after 10 years later. He might say if Japan's forces intervene in Taiwan contingency, China might use nuclear weapons. Or if Japan lets American forces use Japanese bases, bases in Japan, China might use nuclear weapons. They will have to face it. Now this is the situation of Germany in the 1950s. This is now real. We've never asked this question before. When Americans said you have American numbers, this is comfortable. Nobody asked questions. Now we have to ask, is this real? Is this real, sir? This is the first time that we ask this question ourselves. I have to say when China shoots missile against Americans, I was in Omaha one day in the strategic command immediately. This is what they do. They are training this every day. But the Americans have 30 minutes before the first bomb attacks in Washington. They can shoot back. This is the strategic deterrence rate. When China shoots a missile against Tokyo, it comes to Tokyo only in five minutes time. When the commander in Omaha calls the president, he says, sir, Tokyo disappeared. He goes back. The American president might say, let me think. Let me think. This is the reality. How to make understand for a certain CGP, that's the Americans who should back. Putting American looks in Japan is the most most precious way. It can be on soil, but as dolphins might be under the sea. If it is under the sea, this is a perfect deterrence against China. We know that Americans don't like nuclear sharing at all. They don't want to do that. They adhere to non-proliferation and they believe that the tactical New York select ocean ones destabilize the nuclear deterrence so they don't like it. But we have to ask the Germans, is it perfect? Americans say we can win a war. Japanese say you should not start a war. If the war is started, Taiwan and Japan can be destroyed. We don't like a peace without Taiwan and Japan in Asia. We want peace without a war. For that purpose, we have to make deterrence perfect. This is my argument. The Prime Minister says we should discuss that. I think it is very good because North Korea does stupid things developing nuclear weapons. As far as we did not react, China and Russia were never serious to destroy North Korea. Now we are sending the message that we can go in the same way. This is a natural thing to do. I am sure the public opinion is for discussion, but it is not yet for introduction of nooks. Americans are not easily engaging in this. In 1990s Bill Perry wrote about these things. They are just a fear. Japan is going nuclear. As far as we are not serious about nuclear things, Americans can never be serious. Serious discussion must go on now. That is my message. I am going to interrupt at this point. It is an incredibly confronting topic. It is an important topic we should come back to throughout the conversation, the nuclear question in the Indo-Pacific. This fascinating question of American basing in the region. Can I park that one there and move to a broader topic? I don't want to let it go. Certainly, if I was a journalist watching this live event, I would have a lot of questions about that myself. I don't think we can let that go. Nor should we. I do think it is important to talk about the broader strategic landscape and the broader strategic partnership between Australia and Japan. We could not have had this conversation 10 years ago or 20 years ago in my opinion. A lot has happened since then. I might invite HKU from the Australian Embassy in Tokyo into the conversation. HK, although you don't have perhaps the license or the freedom that Ambassador Miller has to talk about some of these issues in a public forum, you do know things that he does not. That is right. Working in the diplomatic relationship at a very high level. I wonder if you have any observations about how the strategic partnership with Japan has evolved from an Australian interests perspective and perhaps if you have a question that you would like to put to Professor Kanahara. Thank you, Rory. Thank you, Professor, for your excellent remarks. Lucky for me, because Australia-Japan relationship is so strong, there is actually a lot of things I can say publicly. And while still towing the government line, and that's what's so exciting about this relationship, I think it's fair to say that since Japan's introduction of thought work and Australia's foreign policy white paper in 2017, those two things are really identical. They're the same. Our objectives and our direction ever since has been basically the same. And to that extent the relationship that Rory talks about, it is so deep and so wide that it is not only just being discussed at the highest level as strategic conversation, and just on that by the way, Bruce mentioned wouldn't it be great to have an update and joint declaration on security cooperation? It so happens our leaders have already agreed that we do that when they sign the RAA so watch that space but not only is it happening at that level it's happening at all levels of government. So no matter what the issue there is deep cooperation and consultation happening both ways. And often pre sort of pre-announcement so that it's a real genuine consultation. And to that extent I wanted to even highlight Ukraine. What's happening there it's amazing how well Australia and Japan are working consulting each other right down to sanctions bans, you know, how will it affect each other, what would actually have the biggest impact to change the calculation by Russia. So it goes right down to that kind of level. But of course all of this is important because of our focus on Indo-Pacific and in that space what we have seen is a much deeper cooperation in the Pacific Island country region where there is real things happening and in Southeast Asia region that is where Japan have really encouraged Australia to be more engaged and we are trying to step up to that. So therefore we're working out how we can complement each other in those areas for a positive agenda for an inclusive agenda and to this extent I wanted to bring in one idea that now we live in a world where it's not national security economic relationships it's all in one and as we know growth and economic security have become much more important issues that are actually strategic in nature. So to this extent Australia and Japan have another amazing pillar of cooperation that can change the calculation in our region and that is to do with decarbonisation and clean energy. Minister Mori touched on it in his introduction about green hydrogen. There is enormous effort made by the Japanese government and corporates to really go for those investments that will help us decarbonise. Australia is actually providing that platform Australia has huge potential for clean energy production. In partnership I really believe this is another important strategic tool that's available to both of us so that not only are we talking about security issues in our region but actually giving them practical tools real solutions to help them achieve growth in a clean way. I mean this is the key right without actual sustainable growth the region will be looking for cheap investment, easy money so how do we help our neighbours to stand up tall for FOIP for liberal order by actually equipping them with clean energy that is affordable. So I just wanted to plant that idea which is actually merging as a major strategic tool for our partnership. Then my question to Professor was comment about Europe I think you spot on and Bruce frankly you could be still paid by the Australian Government given your line of questions in comments because it was exactly all the things I wanted to address but there so far I talked about the cooperation in those other regions but is there something Professor that you think Australia and Japan can do to engage European countries more what does that actually look like in practice so I'll leave it there. Thank you Rory. Thank you, fantastic question. Thank you very much and Europe I have say during the Cold War we are facing the same enemy the Soviet Union but the cooperation was between Washington Tokyo and the Washington Brassels Brassels Tokyo did not talk to each other very much after Prime Minister Abe opens the Japanese delegation to NATO in his second term but we are exchanging the female officers for gender equality these things in the army and the cyber to new dimension because in cyber space there is no distance there is no time it's one very small space where everybody is connected and in cyber Japan is not very strong Australia is far stronger than us we can cooperate on cyber and Russia is a big headache for everybody now and we thought we are in competition with China for great power competition for coming decades we are preparing for that Japanese defence budget is now finally slowly increasing and the SDF is now made more effective but when Russia started the war everybody's focus is upon Russia, upon Putin now but I have say that war will not last long Putin made a big mistake he was he was cheated by FSB that the Eastern Ukraine can be taken very easily they will recommend the Russian soldiers it was not the case, they are fighting back against Russians and he has to finish this war because the West is not squeezing them by economic sanctions economic sanctions cannot stop the war but it can weaken the nation over time so this time is not on Putin time is on us but as far as the Ukrainians are fighting effectively against Russians we can help Ukrainians and this will be sometimes this will be over Putin knows that he is superior in the military in the domain of military he will have some battle tactical victory there that's the reason why he is hinting using nukes and chemical weapons but there must be some ceasefire Russian army is 900,000 and Ukrainians 200,000 but their true army is only 360,000 and they cannot move all from Chechnya so this is quite a good match Jabrin and Stinger the British are against tanks, they are effective and the Ukrainians are Cossack people they know how to fight and when there are some stalemate is realized Russia will negotiate some ceasefire with them Donbas region will be taken by Russia illegally and at Crimea and Mariupol as of C can be taken by Russia but Russia will withdraw Putin has election in 2024 he can postpone it he is a dictator but his power base is very badly damaged here we know that Russians are half Asian half European sometimes pro-European leader comes up like Khrushchev like Gorbachev like Yeltsin like Slavic nationalists very narrow leaders but sometimes they have pro-Western leader Russia can be weakened they are going to lose the power status in Europe they have to be habited from there for that purpose a new leader might come up then we can engage Russians Russia in terms of economy they are now quarter of us in terms of maybe twice as big as Australia they are exactly the size of Korea today and that means they are now 12th of China today in 10 years time they can be less than 5% of China they can never be tributary of China they don't accept that they were under Mongolian empire they are tributary to Mongolian empire for 250 years they cannot accept that any longer so Russia might change their course Russia may not share Putin's dream senior people do share Putin's dream Russian empire in the Russian Russian world but they dream of studying Oxford, Cambridge and going to United States and Russia might change and then we might engage Russians in 10 years 15 years time China is bigger and bigger and they don't change the dooder could be the same CGP then we could have some chance to engage Europeans they released from Russian pressure so we have to continue that for that purpose we should talk about same values we should talk about the green technology the global problems and we have to engage them and this is very important because the four quads is not enough to face Chinese they are far bigger than us Americans are sometimes today is okay but President Trump was very much divided and we need Europeans but with Europeans Americans, Japanese Australians, possibly with Indians we are far bigger, far, far bigger than China China would never catch up with us they would pick out before that so we have to engage Europeans anyway thank you there is so much there and we could take that further I am conscious there are some very good questions from members of the audience that I would like to go to so with the permission of the panel I might do that now and introduce a few of those questions to keep this conversation going though Professor I might go back to firstly the theme of Japanese defence policy and Japan's defence posture several of the members of the audience are asking us what is the future for Japanese defence policy and an interesting question about the scale of the Japanese defence budget the amount that you need to invest to be a really significant power Germany of course has announced quite a historic increase in the percentage of its GDP that it will spend on defence following the Russia shock of this year I always speculate that if Japan would spend a significantly larger proportion of its GDP on defence that would have a real impact on the region so do you see Japan moving far beyond 1% of GDP on defence what could be the drivers of that will there be particular shocks to do with China or North Korea what do you see in that path well the Japan surpassed the size of the UK France and Germany in 1960s already in 1970s the pacifist prime minister Miki said we can't spend money for the military he said Japan is becoming bigger and bigger he said 1% of GDP stop there beyond that some Americans would take care of us the prime minister Miki's very irresponsible policy it was effective until Nakasone Nakasone said I'm no longer bound by Miki but the Japanese economy still grows so it's 1% it's 5 trillion yen it's 500 trillion yen it's 5 trillion dollars 1% is very big and when Japanese economy grows we have to catch up so sadly the defence budget is going up but it's always below 1% and the demographs cut off the defence budget when prime minister took back the office in 2012 the defence budget was 4 trillion and 7 700 billion yen and Abe-san pushed that up to after 8 years with supplementary budgets 5 trillion 5 trillion 560 billion yen so he just increased budget because I increased budget military but the economy grows so it can never go beyond 1% Kishida-san we know that China China was our size 10 years ago amazing isn't it three times bigger than us and they started to bully us and took power they started to send cost-cut buses in Senkaku Islands we saw that in Vietnam in the Philippines and in Indonesia we never dreamed that they would bully us but China started dance and that's wake up call for us now China is far bigger than us and the Americans are of course far bigger than China still the military budget but we can no longer depend upon the United States like a baby to do something there Kishida-san just passed through the supplementary defense budget of 600 billion yen it's a big one in combination with regular budgets with this Kishida supplementary budget for the first time our defense budget reached 6 trillion that is we have to continue that we should continue this we have many things left behind so we are cyber is very weak drones are very weak science technology our science technology is very much miserable our defense ministry has only 200 billion yen for R&D it's a sesame it's one quarter of Korean military defense R&D budget and we have to change a lot of things and it requires huge amount of money and the finance ministry is saying no we have pension we have Medicare we have no more money but with pandemic they just threw out 10 trillion dollars you have money you still have money everybody is saying military budget must be increased I think this trend will continue not as drastic as Germany but this trend must continue but you see steady continuity I think rather than a sudden a sudden burst you make a case that there is growth I would go to some of the other questions that we have a lot of the questions I'm receiving from the audience about relationships with third or fourth countries so we have the Australia-Japan relationship we have that really quite far-seeing and maybe somewhat provocative idea of making it a more formal treaty relationship we have the Quad we have the alliance between Japan and the United States we have India and of course we have perhaps relations with European powers as well a question to you professor goes to how do we work more closely with these other countries for example with India whether it's in the Quad there are questions of course about India's position with regard to Russia and Ukraine and whether that makes things more difficult for the Quad whether that makes things more difficult for our efforts to work with India as a democracy a democratic partner in the Indo-Pacific there's also the question of how strategic can Europe's ambitions be as a partner in the Indo-Pacific and finally there's the question of other partners for example with the change of leadership in South Korea an interesting question about how much more closely we can work with the Koreans as a democratic partner in the Indo-Pacific so I'm going to give you those India, Korea and others what can you say about the opportunities and the challenges ahead India is the only one nation that can be a counterweight of China in the future not today, it's a small elephant, not yet a big elephant so India is calculating their own interest, national interest we should not forget that we are enemies of India because we are, we normalize the relationship with Mao Zedong, right we don't know but India feels that they were pushed away because India was facing China and China is a strong communist invader for the Indians in 1862, 1858 they don't forget that when we embrace China we are democracy but we are kissing the cheeks of Mao Zedong so Indians must have gone to Russia to buy advanced weapons but they didn't like communism at all but they went to Russia they see us, the Axis nations Washington, Tokyo, Seoul Beijing, Islamabad and Riyadh that's how they saw and they are coming towards us slowly because they are bound by non-alignment principle but Bajibai the Bajibai party and Modi are coming towards us we have to encourage this with the ambassador in Delhi he started to open up the nuclear talks nuclear energy talks with India and we followed they developed nuclear weapons but we believed that they are staunch non-proliferator and we should engage them this is the breaking point since then we are now trying to put India hands of course they don't jump to our size immediately they calculate always they have relationships with Russia but they want to come towards us Russia is very angry to see this void by there because they see for them, for Russians India is much more beloved sister than China now we are ripping off India and they have to bow to Chinese they are very angry but we have to do that and India is coming towards us and this is a strategic shift we have to encourage but we cannot forget that India is still a medium-sized nation it's not comparison with say US and Europe and Japan they are coming towards us by adjusting their interests one by one so we have to be patient for India but we have to engage them in future superpower and democracy Korea Korea is now when we wrote under other administration for the first time National Security Strategy I was saying among allies friends put Australia as number one nation but I was defeated the Korean school they put Korea as number one you would regret that I said we have a very difficult time with Moon Jae-in I have to say but Korea is now their economy is as big as Russia so 10th or 9th, 10th, 11th as big as Canada today and their army is heavily ground force oriented but it's now 600,000 army it's half size it's almost half size of US army they don't have nuclear energy like us they wish they had nuclear weapons and they would introduce nuclear weapons they are now expanding the military budget very rapidly it's interesting the Korean leftists they hate say American imperialism it's very ideological but because they hate American imperialism they expand massively the military budget they want to be independent amazing isn't it this year or next year South Korea might surpass us amazing isn't it the economy is one quarter of hours but the military budget is not huge and they spend money for R&D not like us now they are the second biggest arms exporter in Asia they started this 10 years ago they are very successful and they are expanding their navy today and our navy is nervous because North Korea has no navy against whom are you preparing this navy South Korea smile don't answer but the now I have to say Korea is a power from the American perspective it was only Japan before and they use Japanese bases to defend Korea Taiwan and the Philippines that's American perspective and Japan started to engage forces one by one in Korea 1990s of which said we have to help Americans in non-combat operations and now we see Taiwan contingency now we can engage forces in combat operations near Japan we can do this but we never expected that the surrounding nations would help us fight with us and now Korea has absolutely no intention to do so but they have capabilities to do so it's a power now from American perspective Japan and Korea is two sisters and the same the almost same size same capabilities it is a big nation if Korea joins strategic picture of ours the west that changes hugely the picture 600,000 military forces the military budget is because Japanese one the huge navy may be introducing American nuclear weapons this can change the big picture unfortunately Koreans are still framed in the Korean war mentality the North Korea is their enemy and never dreamt of fighting against China and don't involve in Taiwan contingency and that's still them so it is important to put them out of the box put them out of the peninsula box put them in the broader international strategic context if they join their forces they are their power forces with us we are far stronger than today as I have stated it's very difficult but we have to do that thank you and I think we're running short of time so I'm going to hit you with one or two more very quick questions professor and ask you for very summary brief answers on them I want to clarify your thinking on the nuclear question if I may because I think that is very important and obviously a key message in your thinking you're an advocate for Japanese nuclear basing of US forces and potentially for capability sharing is that how you would summarise it or something else that's what they say I think now it's only me in Japan but when you say there's a shift of public opinion towards having the debate having the debate is supported I saw the opinion yesterday 63% Japanese they welcome the debates not the weapons but the debate it was taboo for a long time that's a big shift on India you have a strong view about India as a partner but it sounds to me that you think that India's position on Ukraine and Russia is not a deal breaker for the Quad it's not a deal breaker for these partnerships having said that do you think that India's reliance on Russia is a good idea isn't it something we need to help India move away from we are putting the Indian hands towards us but we do have to understand that we are enemies of this because we embrace China and they have the principle of non-alignment too and they can't move in this way this is a democracy so numerous the parties are there it's not easy to run that government so they come only it's a baby elephant and very timid and very intellectual and they know how to have their own interests and they are doing this and we have to encourage them to do so and to come towards us even slowly and they are now half size of Japan but in 10 years time they'll be bigger than us in 20 years time they can be bigger than maybe China so we have to invest in India today and I have to say with the Westerners invested in starting to defeat Hitler and Tojo to defeat Russians now we have to invest in India and their democracy we invest in dictators but now for the first time we are investing in democracy to defeat the dictators I like the way you put that it's putting that grand sweep of history into some very very clear categories my last question professor and then I'm going to thank you and hand back to my colleague Nicola to conclude our proceedings my last question for you is about China and it's about how China is reading the present situation and perhaps how you anticipate China will behave one of the big questions and you raised Taiwan I think in your talk you spoke very much about the lessons of the Ukraine conflict for the security of Taiwan and the security of the Indo-Pacific what lessons do you think China is learning or the current Chinese leadership Xi Jinping is learning from Putin's in my view catastrophic decision to invade Ukraine what lessons is China learning and are you seeing are you anticipating any adjustment in China's strategy diplomacy behavior in the years ahead maybe 3.1 is China was shocked to see Putin's full skill invasion so their first reaction is don't take me I don't think with Putin I'm different this is one two nonetheless China is in competition in great power competition with the United States so they can never accept junior status with the US in the west they don't do that three they don't understand the freedom democracy these things this is very akin to the original thinking of Chinese traditional thinking but Marxism is very much different from this our ideals and China China just swallowed it they forgot what the freedom was what the democracy was and to bring back China to this sort of our ideals it takes decades and China will stay still there and their purpose of party is only the survival not democratizing China can I say a word last for the Japanese audience Japanese audience okay this is Professor Medcalf's book this is about Australian strategy about Indo-Pacific Japanese must read this this is a great introduction of not only Australian but all the liberal nations in Asia must read this thank you very much thank you Professor I couldn't disagree and I think it's important that we have a Japanese translation on that note I'm going to hand back to my colleague Nicola Rosenblum to conclude our proceedings thank you very much Wuri and thank you so much to Professor Kanahara and to our panelists for the very interesting discussion of the sharing of views and experiences with us I think we've all enjoyed the stimulating and provocative discussion that we've had today can I also just thank all of our participants I hope you've enjoyed this National Security College event brought to you in collaboration with the Japanese Embassy in Australia a recording of today's event will shortly be available from the ANU YouTube channel thank you again to everyone and goodbye thank you