 Good afternoon. It is a great pleasure to be part of this wonderful and somewhat experimental encounter. Many thanks to the conveners for giving me this opportunity. Many thanks for Natalie for the introduction and thank you to everyone watching right now. So this is work in progress and I'm eagerly looking forward to your comments. Now my paper investigates how scientific methods used to evaluate states risk management vis-à-vis climate change can be operationalized in legal terms and potentially applies in the context of climate litigation. There's a legal argument that has been emerging according to which states' acts and omissions that contribute to climate change can amount to a violation of states' human rights obligations. However, there's no clarity or consensus as to the specific content of state obligations relating to climate change. For example, insurance and litigation levels. To explore ways of how the nature of these obligations can be specified, I draw on the work by a scientific NGO called Climate Action Checker and this research organization assesses government climate action against the 2 to 1.5 degree target of the Paris Agreement and it rates countries into six different categories. In terms of structure, I'll start with a brief doctrinal analysis of the legal argument. Then I focus on cat's rating methodology and the third part integrates the legal considerations with cat's scientific findings. Now the risks humanity is facing due to anthropogenic climate change are well known. The IPCC has among others identified a risk such as risk of death, injury, severe ill health and disrupted or loss of livelihoods. Several international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council have recognized a link between climate change and human rights. But so far none of these international bodies has unspoken of the violation of human rights in this context. However, international instruments have been used on the domestic domestic level by the Dutch Supreme Court and its recent landmark agenda judgment to identify a threatened violation of human rights due to climate change. The court found among others that the rights to life and respect for private and family life in the European Convention on Human Rights give rights to state positive obligations in the context of climate change and the court ordered the Dutch government to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. The Dutch court based its interpretation of the relevant ECHR articles on case law by the European Court of Human Rights, more specifically on the ECHR's real and immediate risk doctrine. Likewise, a legal argument has been emerging in international legal scholarship according to which state responsibility for adverse effects of climate change on human rights can be established on the basis of existing norms of international human rights law. Human rights in question are among others the rights to life, the rights to the highest attainable standard of health, the rights to self determination, just to name a few. Now, in this context, a number of questions arise. What is the specific content of state obligations relating to climate change? What exactly constitutes an omission or internationally wrongful act? What levels of omission and reductions are required of states to live up to their human rights obligations? To tackle these questions, it is essential to integrate legal considerations with findings from climate sciences. To explore ways to do so, the rest of my paper draws on the scientific assessment of state climate action by the Climate Action Trekkam. CUTs is made up of climate scientists and policy analysis from two research organisations, Climate Analytics and the New Climate Institute. CUT is working closely with the PIC, the POPSTEM Institute for Climate Empowering Research, which is also a format CUT consortium member and obviously a CLEOS collaborator of the International Penal Climate Change. CUT rates government climate action against a 2 to 1.5 degree target of the payers agreement and it ranks countries into six different categories, critically insufficient, highly insufficient, insufficient, two degrees compatible, 1.5 degrees compatible and role model. CUTs analyses are based on 40 studies used by the IPCC and traditional calculations run by the CUT. As of now, out of 33 countries analysed by CUT, covering approximately 80% of global emissions, 10 are rated as insufficient and 15 is highly or critically insufficient. The CUT specifically specifies that states risk management, these are the climate change, needs to reflect the highest possible emission and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. These obviously are highly general variations. What CUTs offers is an assessment of what exactly is needed of states to achieve the goal of limiting the level of warming to 2 or 1.5 degrees. CUT also offers possible interpretations of what each country's fair share should be. Instead of deciding itself, what is fair CUT constructs a range of options that different scholars consider to be fair. CUT shows what temperature rise these different options would lead to. Each rating category reflects the temperature increase they would come about if all other states were to undertake risk management with the same relative emission level. Negatively, CUT rates the least stringent part of this fair share range as insufficient as according to its analyses, it would lead to a warming of 2 to 3 degrees. Now for these scientific findings to be used in the legal context, they need to be operationalised so to speak. The reason why this is necessary can maybe be best expressed in statistical terminology. CUT findings are presented in the six categories for use in the legal context. However, we somehow need to recalibrate this scale, this continuum into binary terms. Which level of risk management, which rating category translates into compliance with states obligations in the context of fair change and which into a violation of these obligations. Now how did the Dutch court in its groundbreaking judgment that I mentioned earlier go about the complex task of deciding what level of emission reductions is needed for the Dutch state to comply with its obligations. The court found that the Dutch state's obligation to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% compared to 1990. The main factor the court seems to evade its decision on is the extent to which their support within the international community for such a target. The court is of the opinion that specifying state's positive obligations and each state's share in reducing greenhouse gas emissions belongs in print support to the political domain and that states will have to agree on this amongst themselves. By among others referring to statements made by the UNFCCC cup conferences up to 2015, the court finds that there's a high degree of international consensus on the urgent need for annex one countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25 to 40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. This figure is taken from a scenario contained in an IPCC assessment report of 2007 which said that such a reduction is needed so that global warming is reasonably expected to be limited to a maximum of two degrees. As the court uses as well as ensuring that the state is complying at least with its minimum obligation, it settles on the figure of 25%. Now how does this compare to Katz assessment? Katz evaluation is based on scenarios contained in the latest IPCC report and it is continuously updated with the latest figures on global and national emissions which obviously have changed quite a bit since 2007 when the assessment report by the SEC was published from which the 25 to 40% target was taken. The court finds that for the EU, the Netherlands is not rated individually but for the EU a 25% reduction falls at the least stringent end of Katz fair share range. According to Katz if all other countries were to adopt the same relative ambition level that that would lead to global warming higher than two degrees at almost three degrees. Now the Dutch court itself notes that it has been recognised for some years that global warming should not be limited to a maximum of two degrees to prevent dangerous climate change but to a maximum of 1.5 degrees and that it is possible that dangerous climate change will occur even with less global warming and a lower concentration of greenhouse gases. This brings me to argue that the question of what the positive obligation of states should mean in complete terms belongs not only to the political or judicial domain but the scientific one as well. Of course a judicial reasoning based on Katz approach would not be immune to criticism. Katz is an NGO one might point for example to possible legitimacy issues however I argue that there is great value in Katz analysis for the way forward in specifying states obligations in terms of climate mitigation. Katz offers a transparent and objective way of tackling this complex task among others with assessments based on the latest emission fees. Facing decisions on this approach could arguably enhance the legitimacy of lawmaking and judicial bodies and these fields. Thank you very much.