 It is the evening of 4th December 1957 and a thick fog has descended upon southeast London UK. Commuter trains out of some of London's busiest terminals are severely delayed. The trains are busy tonight with many hopping on the first they can get on. One of these trains is an electric multiple unit bound for Hayes Bromley Kent. The train departs Charing Cross 30 minutes late and heads down the line to Waterloo East, then London Bridge, New Cross and Pass St John's. Owing to the late departure and fog, the Hayes train, much like others, have missed their slot in the carefully arranged timetable. After slowing passing the St John's signal box, the train is brought to a stand at the signal just before the next signal box. The signaler needs to know where the train is going as it is running out of sync. This is not unusual. However, this rather run-of-the-mill hold-up will be the scene for the third worst rail disaster in British history, in which two trains were collided and 90 would die. Welcome to Plainly Difficult, my name is John and today we will dive into the Lewisham St John's rail crash. I'm back at the scene of a disaster in the flesh. I've travelled through here hundreds of times over the years, but it's only been recently that I've discovered it was the location of a terrible crash. I posted some photos and footage up on my Instagram last month when I was down here getting some film. And a good few of you guessed correctly where I was. Oh and whilst I'm here, as always the B-roll footage is up on my second channel. The link is in the description as well as the pinned comment. Our disaster today is a big one involving two trains and a bridge collapse. I'll keep the background light on this one and I won't dive too deep into British railway signalling, as I have covered this before in the Harrow and Wilston and Clapham crashes. Background. St John's has always been a bit of a nowhere stop. There's not much to do around here and as such it's not really a destination station, more just a suburban stop that commuter trains call at. It marks roughly halfway between New Cross and its interchange in the 1950s at least with the London Underground East London Line and its south-eastern railways interchange at Lewisham. Trains bypass St John's on the through lines on their way to either London Bridge or down on the south-eastern mainline. But although not a massively busy station, the area is busy with junctions and can become a bit of a pinch point for trains heading south-east out towards Kent. The St John's signal box is responsible for signalling trains towards Lewisham and the North Kent line or along the south-eastern mainline down towards Park Bridge Junction and eventually Hither Green. Each major junction in this period of British railways signalling is controlled by its own signal box. As such, when a train is bound for Hayes from London avoiding Lewisham, it negotiates the down through across St John's junction and on to the down through south-eastern mainline. From here, the train has to negotiate the Park Bridge Junction, taking the diverging routes down onto the Mid Kent line. St John's is also interesting in that running over the junction is a bridge, which takes trains towards Peckham from Lewisham. But for this video, at least it's irrelevant. The south-eastern mainline through lines also accommodate fast services towards the Kent coast. The 1950s were a rather interesting time. Nowadays, if you sit at St John's, you'll only see electric multiple units, but in 1957, you can see electric, diesel and steam-powered formations. The same could be said for the signalling at the time, both automatic colour lights as well as absolute block signalling practices were in operation. But around St John's, it was colour light signalling and I'll briefly explain what each signal means as it's pretty vital in our story. Right, day one basic signalling for you. There's four types of signal, danger which is red, caution which is one yellow, preliminary caution which is double yellow and green which is clear. Yellow, double yellow and green are all proceed aspects, but they tell the driver the condition of the signals ahead. Green means that the next two signals are showing proceed, double yellow means that the next signal is proceed and yellow means that the next signal is showing red, stop or danger. Remember this for later. The disaster. Right back to that foggy evening in December 1957, at roughly 8 minutes past 6pm, an express train consisting of a Battle of Britain class number 34066 named Spitfire was hauling 11 coaches, carrying around 700 passengers. At around this time, it departed Cannon Street heading for Ramsgate. The train between London Bridge and New Cross was receiving all clear signals. It was travelling slower than usual, mainly due to the fog, taking 10 minutes to reach there from Cannon Street. By this time, the Hayes train had been brought to a stand at the signal just before Parksbridge Junction. This was because the signal protecting the junction ahead was holding a Hastings bound diesel electric train. The signal at Parksbridge Junction had got confused over which train was due to go to Hayes. This was because of issues with the describer system and the thick fog, not allowing the signaler to see the actual train in the flesh. With two trains now backed up at Parksbridge Junction's signals, the Hayes train was protected in the rear by signal Lima 18. This was around 18 minutes past 6 in the evening and the Ramsgate train was approaching St John's. The train was travelling around 35 miles an hour. It went past the double yellow and single yellow with Driver True making no reduction in speed. It was quickly approaching Lima 18 at danger. The fireman aboard the steam locomotive was the first to see the signal at danger. There was roughly 138 yards between the signal and the rear of the Hayes train, nowhere near enough to stop the train in time. At 18.20 the Ramsgate train hit the rear of the Hayes train. The Hayes train was formed of two four-car units and a two-car unit at the rear. The impact pushed the rear two cars forward into the eighth carriage, completely destroying it. The tender and leading coach at Ramsgate train were thrown off the track. This dislodged a pier of the bridge just beyond St John's signal box, causing it to fall and crush two coaches. A third train approaching the bridge heading towards Lewisham luckily stopped just short of the now disappeared main span. 89 were killed instantly with another dying in hospital of their injuries. Around 60% of the fatalities were aboard the Ramsgate train's two front carriages which were now crushed under the bridge. Two households adjacent to the line called the London Ambulance and Met Police Services emergency lines roughly at around 22 minutes past 6pm. The fog hindered emergency services hiding the true scale of the disaster. All services that required movement towards Lewisham were cancelled, causing havoc for pretty much anyone needing to get home in South East London. Traction current was isolated all evening and into the early morning to help rescue efforts. The last injured survivor was removed four hours after the collision. It would take just over a week for the line to be cleared. The bridge removed and replaced with a temporary structure. The aftermath. Now why did the accident happen? The Ramsgate train was found to have working breaks. It had been tested before the journey. However, the guard when interviewed after the accident stated that he didn't feel any break application prior to the impact. The fireman and driver although shaken up were actually alive and were interviewed. In fireman hairs interview he stated that my driver did not ask me to see the signals between New Cross and St John's starter. Nor did he cross the foot plate to view the signals. We were running normally. I estimate speed at St John's at about 40 miles an hour. This is telling because you see on UK trains drivers are placed on the left side of the cab but the signals around the accident area were actually on the right hand side of the running line meaning you would have to look across the front of the engine severely reducing the distance that you can see which when coupled to the reduced visibility of the fog meant seeing and reacting to the signals was severely hindered. Sadly the answer to the disaster was plain and simple. Driver through the Ramsgate train just didn't react to the signals which could have been helped by asking the fireman who usually occupied the right hand side of the cab to observe the right hand sighted signals. In the 1958 report into the crash it was state in its conclusion. I am therefore convinced that Driver True did not see signals Lima 16, Lima 17 or Lima 18 and accordingly he did not make a brake application until after his fireman had called out that Lima 18 was at red. Criminal proceedings would be launched upon Driver True for manslaughter but the jury could not reach a verdict and he was acquitted at a second trial but the real issue although caused by the driver was the lack of train protection systems. I mean a very similar disaster unfolded at the start of the decade at Harrow and Wilson in 1952. AWS or automatic warning system was gradually being rolled out at the time mainly for semaphore controlled areas but Lewisham showed it was really required everywhere. The system would be rolled out across the British rail network and even still forms the backbone of British train protection systems and warning systems today albeit augmented with train protection and warning system so this disaster I am going to rate it as a bad day at the office and a number six on the legacy scale. This is a plain difficult production all videos on the channel were creative commons attribution share a light licensed. Plain difficult videos are produced by me John in the currently very windy corner of southern London UK. I'd like to thank my patrons and YouTube members for your financial support and also the rest of you who tune in every week to see your dose of me talking. I have an Instagram so go and check that out for random pictures and odds and sods of things I get up to when not working on videos and I've also got Twitter. If you're enjoying this outro song then please check it out on my second channel made by John and all that's left to say is thank you for watching and Mr Music, play us out please.