 Wider always does a good conference and I'm thinking that this year maybe you even, Wider even exceeded previous conferences, the sessions I've attended seem great and full of ideas and so it's quite exciting. I need to say also I've worked for the US government but these are my own views and not the views of the US government or USAID or all of this disclaimer. Okay, done. I'm going to talk about two points hopefully if I have time. One is about the changes in finance for development which was raised by the first two speakers and Daniel as well and the second which wasn't raised by anybody but I think is worthy perhaps of a discussion is whether results-based aid is leading to more aid effectiveness. So I want to be a little provocative on that point and see what you all think. Okay, so on the finance for development, you know, as Richard noted many of us expected that the impact of the global economic crisis which after dealing with failed banks, et cetera, et cetera, ended up leaving a lot less fiscal space in many rich countries' budgets combined with significant economic uncertainty flowing out of that crisis would lead to a reduction in concessional aid from rich countries and that really didn't happen. So I think this trend, this crisis in aid can be overstated and I have seen in my time, my short time working for the US government that in our Congress, which in the US is the one that decides on where the money goes, the technical term is appropriations Congress by constitutional right appropriates the money and the executive then spends it. There is quite a bit of appetite still for concessional aid. Now obviously part of that is because as the defense secretary, Matt, said, you know, I'd really rather have foreign aid than bullets, meaning, you know, that there is a security component to much of the concessional aid that US is giving, US economic security, US other kinds of political security, other kinds of security. And of course, there is no question that no government is giving bilateral aid without having some agenda. I think some of the issues around aid effectiveness were in the that Richard highlighted and has been, you know, is considered an important figure in this area have been an attempt to try to discipline some of those agendas around the needs of countries and around coordination. So what's interesting is that the, both through the financial engineering Richard referred to, but also the World Bank recently got a capital increase. And, you know, against all odds, you might say, in this time of fiscal space, etc., etc. So there I think the appetite is still strong. But there are other players in the US, we're focused a lot on the rise of private foundations. I think in Europe, it's more of a rise of NGOs, and so people are giving donations to NGOs. In the US, it's private foundations who may or may not give their money to NGOs or may develop their own projects directly. Now, what's interesting about that kind of financial flow, I think the jury is out on what this is doing in development space. And I think, you know, it wasn't really discussed. But I think what I would highlight, I mean, on the one hand, some of us are optimistic about it because it brings scope for innovation, new ideas, ideas that the US government wouldn't consider a major foundation could consider. And of course, the US has had major foundations involved in concessional foreign aid projects for decades. You know, if you think back to things like the Rockefeller Foundation and then in the post world or to Arab places like the Hewlett Foundation. But nonetheless, it's really grown. Now, I think it's important to say that these private foundations really kind of have a different approach, a different utility function, economists would say, than either the multilateral or the bilateral development agencies. And in particular, what's striking to me is they usually don't want to deal with governments. Now, I think that has a certain anti development aspect to it, because development is nothing if it's not a collective action problem. And so, and what's interesting to me is how a foundation like the Gates Foundation has evolved. And they are now dealing with governments much more as is say the Mastercard Foundation has also understood those are two foundations that I'm more familiar with. Now, having said that they then kind of try to set up their parallel structure, something that many older aid agencies know better than to do, although they do anyways. You know, but it so I think that's an evolving space in terms of aid effectiveness that we need to keep our eyes on in terms of the changing structure. And then of course, there's private finance that everybody's talked to. And, you know, this was all kinds of private private finance have been raised in the last three, four years as, you know, sort of the answer to the funding needs of achieving the SDGs. Now, whether those funding estimates are right or not, you know, whatever, but it's being raised as the answer. And I think we really need to think about when we look at that the issues of incentive compatibility. Now, for example, FDI is absolutely key. And it brings in innovation and, you know, it helps with productivity, etc., etc. And so it's key for certain things. But is it incentive compatible with development? Well, it depends on its relationship to the private financial sector, which needs to develop locally, which is incredibly important for development. And I think in some sectors, it's more incentive compatible than others. It may be more incentive compatible, for example, in light manufacturing than mining. Mining is a huge and foreign direct investment in mining is a huge governance problem. I don't know how the minerals are going to come out of the earth without foreign direct investment, but the government governance challenge remains. And then we come to sovereign bonds and sovereign lending. Now, I think about this as responding in part to a massive need for infrastructure finance. And a lot of people are criticizing sovereign bonds for infrastructure finance, including in my own country and in my own government. And I just thought it worth mentioning that, you know, in the 1800s, that is how the U.S. got the railroads built, as well as the ports built and a lot of other infrastructure built. Now, of course, there were some defaults. Maybe the original junk bond was the Confederate government bond that financed the wrong side, shall we say, of the U.S. Civil War. But there were other bonds in the U.S. and municipal bonds, especially, that weren't paid or discounted or whatever rescheduled. It's gone on for a long time, sovereign bonds for infrastructure finance. And of course, the real question is a project finance question. Are the projects well-designed and appropriate? Does the country have the capability to manage them? There are now these days quite a few discussions about how multilateral institutions can help countries manage some of that project financing better. Some of those discussions take a bit of a, let's look down our nose tone. You know, we'll help you kids. But I think the, and that turned people off initially. I remember I was at the World Bank when the, in their infinite wisdom, they decided they needed to help all the African governments with Chinese financing because they have, you know, they could make big mistakes. And the African government said, thank you very much. I think that the approach, perhaps with working with the African Development Bank on this front, on infrastructure finance development and on debt management is significantly less, shall we say, you know, arrogant. So, and I think it shows promise. But at the same time, what if there are no projects? It's just budget financing and where's that going? And that has caused some problems. And I think the really important point to remember for low income countries is in this situation, there is no HIPAA process because it's private finance. And so it's going to look much more like Argentina and much less like HIPAA in Africa or in Bolivia or Haiti or whatever. And that's messy. And, you know, Greece is going to look really simple compared to Angola or Chad. I mean, Gambia is so small. Gambia is not paying, but, you know, whatever, Gambia is so small, whatever. But, you know, some of these bigger countries, when they stop paying and they still need commercial credit. So that's a big problem. Just because you don't want to pay on your sovereign bonds doesn't mean you don't still need commercial credit, including short term commercial credit for trade flows. And so restoring credit worthiness will be a challenge. Now, just, I have two minutes left so at most, right? So I just want to say maybe two things about results based aid. Everybody knows what results based aid when I'm talking about. Pay for performance, socially impact bonds for you do this, we pay you, et cetera. So is this an improvement in aid effectiveness somehow and concessional flow effectiveness? Well, yes, potentially. It's really important that aid agencies and governments and whoever they finance, governments, NGOs, stop doing stuff that doesn't work. That's really important. And I think 3IE and others have been so great if it gets people stopped doing stuff that doesn't work because they are only paying for performance. And so if they do stuff that doesn't work, there won't be a performance. That's great. But then I would say there are some problems. First of all, impact, if they're based on impact evaluation evidence that often ignores the fallacy of composition, right? The general equilibrium. So just because this program can get two people a job doesn't mean if we scale that program up, we'll get five million people a job. I mean, highly unlikely, right? And, you know, you have that in spades on a lot of this stuff. And then what I see in general on results is there's an obsession with measuring something, you know, and measuring something every six months or every year. My agency has to produce 270 reports every year to Congress, right? That's one every working day on something. And, you know, the problem is this ignores what really is important for development, which is capacity development in the private and the public sector. And capacity development is not something you can report on every six months. It just doesn't change that often. And it's difficult to report on any way and you can have some backsliding. And so, for example, we discussed, you know, the US government has given a lot in PEPFAR. It's a great success. A lot of people are on treatment. Treatment is helping stop the spread of the epidemic. But when Ebola came, we discovered health systems just couldn't cope. So I'll just stop there. And I'll just say one thing I think that needs to be discussed is to what extent are all these flows achieving the institutional development, which is needed for development. Thank you very much.