 Operation Barbarossa, the campaign preceding the fight for Stalingrad, began with the German invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941. After initial successes on several fronts, the German advance was halted outside of Moscow. The following year, the German High Command developed a follow-on operation named Case Blue, a campaign designed to seize the valuable Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus region. On 28 June 1942, the German offensive began with rapid gains. However, the advance toward the Baku oil field soon ground to a halt, and in mid-September, Adolf Hitler ordered the 6th Army to seize the Soviet city of Stalingrad. Stalingrad became the new objective for German forces in southern Russia. In mid-September 1942, the German 6th Army, under the command of General Friedrich Paulus, began its assault on Stalingrad and the defending forces of the Soviet 62nd Army. Paulus' initial plan for capturing the city of 900,000 focused on the center and southern portions of the city. His strategy was to split the Soviet 62nd Army and isolate the battlefield by blocking boat landing areas along the Volga River. Key locations in southern Stalingrad included the village of Kuporosnaya, the suburb of Minina, the Elshanka River, and the Zaritsa River. Between these rivers were the southern landing stage, the food combine, railroad station number two, and the grain elevator. Less than a thousand meters from the Volga, the towering grain elevator could be seen from all directions. The battle for southern Stalingrad would be fought near, along, and inside this iconic structure. It would prove to be key terrain that both the Germans and Soviets would be willing to suffer significant casualties to control. Lieutenant General Vasily Choykov assumed control of the 62nd Army one day before the German assault on Stalingrad began. His army was the primary force standing between the 3rd Reich and the city. After assuming command of the 62nd Army, Choykov immediately attempted to gain situational awareness of his command status and dispositions. With little time to develop an initial commander's assessment of the situation, Choykov went directly to his frontline units. U.S. Army doctrine supports this technique, stating commanders use their presence to gather and communicate information and knowledge. The commander's forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger and hardship. It also allows commanders to appraise for themselves a subordinate unit's condition, including its leaders and soldiers' morale. Having seen the situation for himself, Choykov understood that he had taken command of a demoralized army which was severely reduced in strength. And although he would not have reliable communication with his subordinate commanders, his units all shared a detailed understanding of the terrain. This understanding proved invaluable in enabling rapid decisions to reinforce defensive positions and counterattack in a manner that maximized the use of all available combat power. Unlike Paulus, who spent most of his time outside the city, Choykov's presence at the front had a profound impact. ADP 6-0 recommends such action. Commanders use their presence to lead their forces effectively. They recognize that military operations take a toll on the moral, physical, and mental stamina of soldiers. They seek to maintain a constant understanding of the status of their forces and adjust their leadership appropriately. They gather and communicate information and knowledge about the command's purpose, goals, and status. By the time Choykov took command, the 62nd Army had been reduced to less than 54,000 soldiers, 100 tanks, and 700 mortars. Troop levels would wax and wane in the following months. Most of the Soviet heavy artillery pieces remained on the east side of the Volga. Although the 62nd Army consisted of two tank corps, eight rifle divisions, and several brigades on paper, the 62nd Army was in actuality an ad hoc organization built out of the remnants of units ground down by extended combat. At full strength, a Soviet rifle division in 1942 consisted of approximately 10,000 soldiers, making it only two-thirds the size of a German division whose typical composition was 15,000. Choykov's divisions were composed of three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment, and other assorted division troops. By mid-September, the troop strength of the divisions in the 62nd Army varied from as many as 4,000 to as few as 200, but the average strength of a division in the vicinity of Stalingrad was approximately 2,000 troops. Under the command of Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, Germany's Army Group B planned for the capture of Stalingrad by clearing the south and central portions of the city simultaneously. Once those areas were under German control, Polis' 6th Army planned to seize the northern industrial sectors, a move he hoped would lead to the fall of the city. This urban offensive would require a significant number of troops. Armies that enter cities must be prepared for unique challenges that include complex man-made physical terrain, populations of significant size and density, and supporting infrastructure. As the fight for Stalingrad demonstrates, history suggests urban offensive missions require 3 to 5 times greater troop density than for similar missions in open terrain. If commanders lack sufficient force to conduct effective operations, they may postpone or consider not initiating those operations until they have the necessary strength. But the Germans entered Stalingrad uncertain of the Soviet's defensive troop strength in the city, and with no accurate calculation of the civilian resistance that remained in a city of 900,000 people. The fight for southern Stalingrad was initially assigned to elements of Colonel General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, specifically General Werner Kemp's 48th Panzer Corps. Besides various additional support troops, the Corps' combat strength consisted primarily of the 24th Panzer Division, the 94th Infantry Division, and the 29th Motorized Division. Kemp's plan to seize the southern regions of Stalingrad included a coordinated advance by all three of these divisions. In order to successfully accomplish a complex mission of this nature, effective commanders understand that their leadership guides the development of teams and helps to establish mutual trust and shared understanding throughout the force. Commanders allocate resources and provide a clear intent that guides subordinates' actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander's intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. The 24th Panzer Division, the Corps' main effort, was tasked with seizing southern Stalingrad between the El Shanka and Zaritsa rivers. In the center, the 94th Infantry Division's objective was to clear the suburb of Minina, just south of the El Shanka River. In the south, the 29th Motorized Division's objective was to clear the suburb of Kuperosnia. Additionally, the 71st Division was assigned to protect the 48th Corps' left flank. The 24th Panzer Division, known as the Leaping Horsemen, consisted of three maneuver regiments. The 24th Panzer Regiment comprised of three tank battalions with a total strength of 183 tanks, the 21st Panzer Grenadier Regiment with two motorized infantry battalions, and the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment with one half-track battalion and one motorized infantry battalion. The division also possessed a self-propelled artillery regiment and elements of reconnaissance, engineer, anti-armor, anti-aircraft, motorcycle, and signal battalions, as well as division support troops. The Division's Organization for Combat was based on the Kampfgruppe, or battle group, that was task-organized for a specific mission or operation. As the 24th Panzer Division prepared to advance into southern Stalingrad, it was organized into two Kampfgruppes. Named after their commanding officers, Colonel Edelsheim and Lieutenant Colonel Hellermann, each Kampfgruppe was organized with attached special troops and weapons systems. At full strength, the 24th Panzer Division was authorized 12,560 soldiers. On the eve of the advance, the organic division strength, excluding corps attachments, was only 7,059 soldiers, which meant the division was going to attack at 56% of its authorized strength. Further compounding its problems, the division possessed only 23 operational tanks and limited ammunition as it prepared to begin its offensive into southern Stalingrad. On 13 September 1942, at 0645, the Third Reich opened its assault on Stalingrad with a massive air and artillery bombardment across the city. Casualties were high among Soviet military and civilians. Fortunately for the defenders of Stalingrad, the Luftwaffe paid little attention to the Soviet resupply boats darting back and forth across the Volga. Failing to isolate the battlefield would prove a critical mistake. The Germans lacked pertinent and reliable intelligence on Soviet unit dispositions and strength. Therefore, much of the destruction caused by the German aerial and artillery barrage was distributed throughout the city instead of massed against known enemy defensive positions in strong points. This error in judgment contradicts US doctrine, which requires that leaders conducting urban operations must understand the urban environment to determine decisive points. Shape the operation to establish the conditions for success. Precisely mass the effects of combat power to engage the decisive points that lead to centers of gravity. The Wehrmacht's inability to accurately determine Soviet unit locations and decisive points significantly diminished the effects of the artillery and aerial bombardment on the Soviet defenses. The Soviets conducted counter-battery fire with artillery and katusha rockets located on the east side of the Volga. The ill-equipped Red Army Air Force was unable to oppose the Luftwaffe with counter-air operations during the day, but conducted aerial bombardment of the German lines at night. This harassing fire was designed as a psychological move to deprive German soldiers of rest. On the evening of 13 September, the 24th Panzer Division received its orders to attack the following day. The German division was directed to advance and link up with the 71st Division along the Serista River. The link-up was essential to ensure Soviet forces could not exploit the boundaries between German units and to facilitate unity of effort. A link-up is a meeting of friendly ground forces which occurs in a variety of circumstances. Both forces may be moving toward each other or one may be stationary. Whenever possible joining forces exchanges much information as possible before starting an operation, as they are inherently high risk due to their complexity and the close proximity of units under different commanders. The link-up between German forces did not work as planned. The 71st Infantry Division's eight infantry battalions had been diminished from previous combat, each possessing less than 200 of their 1,000 authorized troops. The weakened state of the 71st Division delayed the link-up with the 24th Panzer Division for several days. Although there are inherent benefits to commanders who operate near front lines, danger follows a commander at the front. After Major General von Hauenschild, the commander of the 24th Panzer Division, was wounded, Major General Arno von Lenski took command on 14 September. Despite the limited gains in the previous two days, the German 48th Corps planned for a major breakthrough in the south on 15 September. The 29th Motorized Division and the 94th Infantry Division would continue to reduce Soviet resistance in Kuporosnia and Minina. The 24th Panzer Division also received orders to maneuver into the southern district. The Division's objectives were three-fold. Penetrate the enemy front line, seize Railroad Station No. 2, and link up with the 71st Division at the Cerista River Railroad Bridge. As the Germans advanced through the city, their units faced risks unique to urban operations. The risk considerations included inadequate force strength, information operations, increased military casualties, unavoidable collateral damage, lack of time and loss of momentum, increased vulnerabilities, potentially destabilizing escalation. At 0-3-30, Kampfgruppe Edelscheim attacked east through the dark along the railroad line. Concurrently, Kampfgruppe Hellermann began clearing bypass Soviet forces to the flank and rear of Edelscheim's command. As Edelscheim advanced, German troops reduced strong points through the use of artillery and direct fire support. As dawn broke, the grain elevator stood in the distance. By mid-morning, Kampfgruppe Edelscheim reached the railroad junction roughly two kilometers west of the Volga River and turned to the north. At the railroad junction, Soviet resistance stiffened, halting the German advance, from their foxholes on both sides of the tracks, defending infantrymen fought bitterly against the Wehrmacht. As the Panzer units approached these positions, the direct fire from the heavily armored tanks or the threat of being crushed in their foxholes by the treads of the tanks dislodged many of the Soviet soldiers. Advancing approximately two kilometers farther north, the lead elements of Kampfgruppe Edelscheim reached the area west of railroad station number two. As they advanced, heavy Soviet flanking fires from various positions in the workers' village and the food combine slowed their progress and caused heavy casualties. During this time, the advancing soldiers of Kampfgruppe Edelscheim bypassed the grain elevator. Having failed to identify the marked advantage the seizure of the grain elevator afford future operations in southern Stalingrad. The grain elevator provided observation of the German avenues of approach into the city, which afforded the Soviet defenders advanced warning of German movements and provided clear fields of fire for its defenders. Because of the multi-dimensional urban terrain of buildings and subterraining spaces, map reconnaissance rarely revealed key terrain in the urban environment. Only when seeing firsthand the dominant position of the grain elevator could leaders fully appreciate its importance. Looking to eliminate this Soviet advantage, a squad of German soldiers seized and held the abandoned structure, but German commanders failed to plan for the retention of this key terrain. Kampfgruppe Edelscheim's advance had caught the local Soviet commanders by surprise, but the German units failed to consolidate gains after successfully seizing the grain elevator. Lieutenant Anatoly Mureshko, a member of Troikov's staff, described the situation. The speed of the German advance in this sector shocked us. We could see what they were trying to do. Isolate us from the rest of the front and disrupt the supplies being set to our army across the river. Their panzers had broken through so fast that we almost lost the grain elevator straight away. Refusing to abandon key terrain, senior Lieutenant Polyakov and a group of 27 soldiers from the Soviet 10th Rifle Brigade counterattacked to recapture the grain elevator. Under pressure from the Soviet counterattack, the Germans hastily abandoned the ground floor, leaving their counterparts trapped on the second floor. Polyakov's troops killed the isolated German defenders on the upper floor, thus returning the grain elevator to Soviet control. The Soviet counterattack forced the Germans to withdraw from the grain elevator and allowed Colonel Vasiliy P. Dubiansky, commander of the 35th Guards Rifle Division to reinforce the defense of this key terrain. As Edelsheim's soldiers approached the railroad station, he paused the attack to allow Stukas and supporting artillery to degrade the Soviet defenses along the Kampfgruppe's projected line of advance. Based on his battle damage assessment, Edelsheim concluded that conditions for the attack were set. This led the Kampfgruppe to capture Railway Station No. 2. Once Edelsheim established contact with the 94th Infantry Division near the Elshanka River, he left a small force behind to defend the railroad station while the main body of the Kampfgruppe resumed its northward advance. Later that day, Lensky moved the 24th Panzer Division headquarters into the railroad station. The lead elements of Kampfgruppe Edelsheim reached the southern bank of the River Reveen by 1615, but the 71st Infantry Division was nowhere in sight. The weakened forces of the 71st had been unable to meet the timeline for the planned link-up. Having reached the Zaretsa River, Colonel Edelsheim redirected part of his forces to move west to assist Kampfgruppe Hellermann as it cleared enemy forces from the workers' villages and the Barracks Complex. After battling Kampfgruppe Hellermann all day, the cutoff Soviet troops began to withdraw to areas near the Zaretsa River. Following a retreat from their forward positions, remnants of the Soviet 244th Rifle Division and the 10th Rifle Brigade continued to hold positions around the Barracks Complex as well as parts of the northern workers' villages. At dusk, General Lensky ordered Kampfgruppe Edelsheim to withdraw from the Zaretsa River bridge toward the railroad station in order to strengthen the German lines. Despite the failure of the German 21st Division to link up, the 24th Panzer Division's attack yielded significant gains on 15 September. Most of the Soviet 244th Rifle Division and the 10th Rifle Brigade had become trapped west of the rail line. This presented a dangerous situation to the Soviet forces as the units could be divided, isolated and destroyed in detail. However, the German 24th Panzer Division's position was also tenuous. As planned, the Germans had split and isolated the Red Army units. Lensky focused next on destroying the Soviet troops west of the railroad. The shortage of infantry in the German Division, however, made this a difficult task. Both the 24th Panzer and the 94th Infantry Divisions had suffered significant casualties from protracted combat prior to arriving at Stalingrad. Their reduced strength made it difficult for the divisions to neutralize many of the Soviet positions bypassed over the previous two days. Thus, while the Germans focused on maintaining their defensive positions overnight, Soviet forces in southern Stalingrad exploited the opportunity to counterattack seizing important buildings in other key terrain. The orders for the 24th Panzer Division's attack on 16 September directed that Kampfgruppe Edelschein would attack to the north to secure a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Zaritsa River and link up with the 71st Infantry Division. Kampfgruppe Hellermann would continue to clear the areas west of the rail line to the Zaritsa River. The 94th Infantry Division was ordered to clear the remaining Soviet forces in Minina in coordination with the 29th Motorized Division, conduct a crossing of the Elshanka River and the railroad spur running from the main line east to the Volga River and from there, advance northeastward on the right flank between the 24th Panzer Division and the Volga River to the south bank of the Zaritsa River. The grain elevator was now in the 94th Division's sector of advance. Unlike the 24th Panzer Division at this point, the Infantry battalions for the 94th Division were rated as medium strong, indicating that they each possessed about 500 to 700 soldiers or approximately 50 to 70% of their authorized strength. By 16 September, most of the Soviet units in Stalingrad were severely depleted by casualties and scheduled to be reinforced by the 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade. However, due to the Luftwaffe's new attacks on the Soviet fairy operations, the brigade was unable to cross the Volga until later that night. The Soviet forces defending the southern region of the city had been divided into two parts. The 244th Rifle Division and elements of the 10th Rifle Brigade were defending in the vicinity of the Berks Complex in the villages. The remaining units of the 35th Guards Rifle Division were dispersed among the 131st Rifle Division, the 271st NKVD Regiment and the 133rd Tank Brigade which was fighting as infantry. Additionally, the Soviet 42nd Rifle Brigade had moved into the area north of the Zaretsa River to prevent the link-up between the German 71st and 24th Panzer Divisions. Despite the ad hoc array of Soviet forces, unity of command and unity of effort remained imperative to their defensive effort. U.S. doctrine stipulates although severely challenged, the principle of unity of command remains essential to urban operations. The nature of the operation, the number of tasks, and the size of the urban area may require that forces operate non-contiguously. Non-contiguous operations challenge a commander's ability to unify the actions of subordinates, apply the full force of combat power, and achieve success. The 24th Panzer Division began maneuvering to achieve its objectives on the morning of 16 September. Shortly after dawn, Kampfgruppe Edelschein once again attacked north along the railroad and soon crossed the Zaretsa seizing a foothold on the north side of the river despite the strong resistance of the Soviet 42nd Rifle Brigade. Because of the counter attacks by the 42nd Brigade and Kampfgruppe Hellermann's inability to assist Edelschein, the German forces south of the bridge had to withdraw once again that evening without linking up with the 71st Division. To the west, Kampfgruppe Hellermann attacked north against the isolated forces of the Soviet 244th Rifle Division and 10th Rifle Brigade on Barracks Hill. Hellermann seized the Barracks complex in most of the surrounding high ground but the day was not a complete success as the German attacks toward the Edelschein were repulsed by the remnants of the Soviet 244th Division. To the south, the German 29th motorized divisions push into Mininath, failed to clear the Soviet defenders from the area. The 276th Infantry Regiment of the German 94th Infantry Division assisted that effort while the remainder of General Georg Pfeiffer's division shifted to the left and crossed the Alshanka River by noon. From there, the 274th Infantry Regiment attacked north gaining a foothold in the food combine near Railroad Station No. 2. Elements of the German 267th Infantry Regiment advanced toward the grain elevator and prepared to attack the Soviet forces defending the massive structure. To secure this key terrain, the Soviets reinforced just north of the elevator with dug-in artillery and tanks. Around noon, the German 267th engaged in fierce combat with the Soviet 133rd Tank Brigade and other defending troops in the middle of the rail line west of the grain elevator. During this struggle, the Second Battalion of German 267th conducted several failed assaults against the fortified and now burning grain elevator, sustaining heavy casualties in the process. The German attacks in the south on 16 September forced Choykov to reorganize the forces in his area defenses. Due to heavy casualties, he ordered Dubiansky to assume overall command of the remnants of the 131st Rifle Division, 10th Rifle Brigade, and 271st NKVD Regiment. In response to Choykov's requests for reinforcements in the south, Colonel General A.I. Yurimenko approved the release of the 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade, a unit composed of sailors from the northern Turk fleets, to be employed in southern Stalingrad. The brigade crossed the river to the southern landing stage on the night of 16-17 September. Choykov focused his area defense on denying German forces access to key terrain for as long as possible, rather than on the destruction of the German attackers. Choykov assigned the Naval Brigade to defend a sector that ran from the Tsaritsa River south to the railroad junction east of the Elshanka River. He ordered the sailors to reinforce the defenses of the 35th Guards Rifle Division, the 10th Rifle Brigade, and the 133rd Tank Brigade. Once across the Volga, the Naval Brigade commander deployed three of his battalions in defensive positions from the food combine to the south bank of the Tsaritsa River, while his fourth battalion established reserve positions in a central location on the western bank of the Volga. The commander sent one platoon to the grain elevator to reinforce the approximately 30 soldiers holding the structure. The fighting resumed early in the morning of 17 September near the Tsaritsa River railroad bridge. Though the 24th Panzer Division had withdrawn its troops south of the river, a company from the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment held the bridge, still waiting for the arrival of the 71st Infantry Division. The German troops at the bridge tracked the 71st's advance by the sounds of small arms fire and the Stuka attacks as friendly forces made their way toward their location. By 11.20 that morning, the rest of Kampfgruppe Edelschein had cleared almost all defensive forces from the workers villages and had closed in on the Tsaritsa River's south bank. This action increased its ability to retain the bridgehead. Hellerman's forces continued to advance north and shortly after noon seized a hilly area south of the Tsaritsa ravine where General Lensky ordered him to halt. At 17.55 hours, the 24th Panzer Division had finally cleared and secured the workers villages south of the Tsaritsa River and west of the main railroad line. By evening, the two Panzer Kampfgruppes driving to the north and the 71st Division's 211st Infantry Regiment maneuvers in the south had squeezed the Soviets 244th Rifle Division and part of the 42nd Rifle Brigade into a small pocket on the Tsaritsa ravine. All Soviet escape routes were effectively blocked. The 94th Infantry Division continued its effort to destroy the Soviet forces defending east of the main railroad line and south of the Tsaritsa River. During the early morning hours, the German 276th Regiment slipped across the Elshanka River, leaving the fight for Minina to the 29th Motorized Division. The regiment then attacked to destroy the remaining Soviet defenders in the food field. This action freed the 267th Infantry Regiment to attack Red Army forces east of the main railroad line. Facing stubborn resistance from elements of the 35th Guards Rifle Division, a battalion of German 267th Regiment maneuvered north along the railroad and linked up with elements of Kampfgruppe Edelsheim at its bridgehead on the Tsaritsa River. With this push, the 24th Panzer Division and the 94th Infantry Division formed a line of contact from the Tsaritsa River extending southward along the railroad to the vicinity of Railroad Station Number 2 and the Food Combine. The German link-up was achieved, but the success was short-lived. Elements of the partially reinforced Soviet 35th Guards Rifle Division halted the 94th's advance toward the Volga. The grain elevators stood in the way of any further advance. The 94th Division lost the ability to continue the attack and culminated. The Wehrmacht would have to redouble their efforts to seize the grain elevator. On the morning of 17 September, elements of the 267th Regiment conducted at least one failed attack to destroy or dislodge the defenders in and around the grain elevator. Once the 267th continued farther north, the German 274th Infantry assumed the mission attempting at least four additional attacks on the grain elevator. All were defeated inflicting heavy German losses. Between each assault, German commanders paused to reassess the optimal mix of infantry, sappers and heavy weapons that could be deployed against the Soviet strong points. As the casualties mounted, Kempf, and no doubt the soldiers of the 94th Infantry Division came to regret the 24th Panzer Division's failure to secure and maintain control of the grain elevator during its initial advance. Defending the grain elevator were troops of the Soviet 35th Guards Rifle and 10th NKVD divisions along with reinforcements from the 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade. Despite the devastating aerial, indirect and direct German fires unleashed against them, the Soviet defenders stubbornly held their positions. South of the Elshanka River, the German 29th Motorized Division continued its advance. Its troops, now supported by several tanks from the 14th Panzer Division, forced elements of the Soviet 35th Guards and 131st Rifle Divisions out of their positions at Lumber Factory No. 2, the Electrals Power Plant and other buildings south of the Elshanka River. The survivors were able to withdraw north across the river or east toward the Volga's Western Bank to establish new defensive positions. By day's end, the German 29th Division continued to face several Soviet strong points. By nightfall on 17 September, General Paulus, head of the 6th Army, believed that he was about to complete the seizure of key objectives in South Stalingrad. Therefore, he ordered Kempf to transfer the 24th Panzer Division to 51st Corps in order to support the main effort in the next phase of the Battle of Stalingrad, the fight for the Northern Factory districts. Kempf did not share confidence that the fight was nearly over. After all, the 94th Infantry Division was still focused on reducing the Soviet forces between the railroad and the Volga, while the 24th Panzer was still struggling to defeat the Soviet 244th Rifle Division trapped in a pocket along the Zaretsa River west of the city. Kempf acknowledged the order, but indicated that he would not be able to withdraw the 24th Panzer for two days until 19 September. By the evening of 17 September, only 50 exhausted soldiers, mostly from the 35th Guards Rifle Division, remained in the grain elevator. Morale had improved with the arrival of a platoon of naval infantrymen sent earlier that day by the 92nd Brigade Commander. The sailors arrived wearing naval uniforms armed with two antiquated Maxim machine guns and two early model Russian anti-tank rifles, which resulted in the Soviet Guardsmen's mocking of the naval contingent. However, the jokes turned to adulation the following day when the sailors proved their medal during the next round of German assaults. Kempf distributed orders to his subordinate divisions for 18 September. The 24th Panzer Division was to retain its defense on the Zaretsa River bridgehead and the main rail line between the bridge and railway station number two. The 94th Infantry Division was to eliminate all remaining Soviet resistance in the sector between the rail line and the Zaretsa River. The 29th Motorized Division would continue operations to clear Minina to the south bank of the Elshanka and move into South Stalingrad to support the 94th's efforts. On the morning of 18 September, the German 94th Division consisted of the 267th, 274th, and 276th Regiments deployed from north to south. The 267th had elements in contact with Kampfgruppe Edelschein on the left and held the sector north of the grain elevator. The center was held by the 274th, which faced the grain elevator. Meanwhile, the 276th was positioned in the food combine, but part of the sizable facility remained under Soviet control. As the Division maneuvered eastward, the fighting deteriorated into a series of unsynchronized small unit attacks. The Soviets had deployed several strong points in the streets, buildings, and other structures east of Railroad Station Number 2, including at the grain elevator and the warehouses scattered throughout the food combine. To address the Soviet strong points, German officers employed combined arms teams at the lowest level, integrating units with anti-tank weapons and field artillery pieces. These weapons were employed in direct fire mode to reduce enemy fortifications. Even when compared with the carnage of an already brutal urban campaign, the 94th Division's fight near the grain elevator was particularly desperate. At 1315, the 24th Panzer Division was ordered to target the grain elevator with its 88mm anti-aircraft guns. Within a short time, the guns of the 602nd anti-aircraft battalion fired 50 rounds into the structure, causing 44 2-foot-wide holes. Switching tactics, German flamethrower units were used against the grain elevator with similarly futile results. Finally, a battery of 105mm guns from the 24th Panzer Division's 89th artillery regiment were deployed to fire directly at the grain elevator. This bombardment resulted in the collapse of a section of the lower floors, but did not coerce a Soviet retreat or surrender. The Soviet employment of concentrated commander from prepared and protected positions served to hold the grain elevator. Current US Army doctrine advises that, in an area defense, a unit concentrates combat power effects against attempted enemy breakthroughs and flanking movements from prepared and protected positions. The commander uses his or her reserve to cover gaps between defensive positions to reinforce those positions as necessary and to counterattack to seal penetrations or block enemy attempts at flanking movements. Inside the grain elevator, the mixed Soviet defenders were suffering from the prolonged siege. Despite shortages of ammunition, food and water, the depleted troops continued their determined resistance. Lieutenant Andrei Hasanov, a naval infantryman who survived the battle, summarized the defensive effort. Enemy tanks and infantry, approximately 10 times our numbers, soon launched an attack from south and west. After the first attack was beaten back, a second began, then a third. In all, 10 attacks were beaten off on September 18th. In the elevator, the grain was on fire. The water in the machine guns evaporated, the wounded were thirsty, but there was no water nearby. That was how we defended ourselves 24 hours a day for 3 days. Heat, smoke, thirst, all our lips were cracked. During the day, many of us climbed up to the highest points in the elevator and from there fired on the Germans. At night, we came down and made a defensive rink around the building. At the end of the day, the German troops of the 274th infantry were no closer to seizing the grain elevator than they had been that morning. Farther north, the 24th Panzer Division's efforts in coordination with the 71st Infantry Division remain largely focused on reducing the Soviet battle positions along the Zaretsa River. The job was made somewhat easier when remnants of the Soviet 42nd Rifle Brigade and 244th Rifle Division escaped the German trap by successfully exfiltrating eastward along the banks of the Zaretsa River toward the Soviet lines near the Volga. At 1815, the 94th Infantry Division was notified that it was also to be transferred to the 51st Corps for operations in North Stalingrad. Even so, it had become clear to Paulus that the fighting in the south was not conclusive. Although the 24th Panzer Division would be pulled out of the line the following morning, Pfeiffer's 94th Division would remain in the south for several more days to attempt to complete the mission there. During the night of 18 and 19 September, the 94th Infantry Division assumed full control of the sector north of the Shonka River. The German 267th Infantry Regiment gradually assumed control of the 24th Panzer Division sector in the north as that division departed for its new mission with the 51st Corps. By the morning of 19 September, a battalion of the 267th, supported by the 71st Division's 211th Infantry on the north side of the Zaretsa River, slowly fought its way east down the ravine toward the Volga River. Throughout the day, the German Grenadiers pursued the survivors of the 42nd Brigade and the 244th Rifle Division eastward toward May 1st Square. Despite overwhelming German combat power, the Soviets fought hard to retain several crossings on the Zaretsa River, which they needed in order to maintain contact with the 13 Guards Rifle Division located on the north side of the river. To the south, the German 29th Motorized Division was finally able to advance to the Shonka River, forcing the remaining Russian forces in Minina to retrograde to the north bank of the river. Other elements of the 29th also crossed over the river and moved to the vicinity of the food combine. Having been defeated by the 29th Motorized Division in Minina and withdrawn back to the north side of the Elshanka, the Soviet 35th Guards Rifle Division struggled to maintain unity of effort. Dubiansky's division, which numbered only several hundred soldiers, was attempting to defend along a 1.5 kilometer-wide front. During the afternoon, the situation for the Soviet 35th Guards became nearly untenable. After crossing north of the Elshanka River, the 274th Infantry and a Kampfgruppe from the 29th Motorized Division threatened to encircle the Russian 101st Guard Rifle Regiment, now comprised of roughly 80 soldiers near the railroad at the food combine. Dubiansky ordered the remainder of his division to withdraw to a new line extending from the factory building south to several houses along the north bank of the Elshanka River. Dubiansky's planned withdrawal under contact required integration of combat multipliers, obscuration, and deception. Soon after, the German 276th Regiment, supported by 20 tanks from the 29th Motorized Division, broke through Soviet defense's southeast of railroad station number two. This event allowed the 274th Infantry to surround most of the grain elevator. Dubiansky was forced to order a general withdrawal of Soviet forces toward the Volga River, abandoning the entire food combine. The Soviet situation had become desperate. It was apparent that if the 35th Division was to survive, it would have to attempt to break out through German lines. The Division's best chance for survival was to maneuver toward the crossing near the mouth of the Tsaritsa before German forces could further isolate them. The German 276th Regiment quickly secured the food combine and was ordered to shift north. From that location, it supported the 267th attack toward the mouth of the Tsaritsa river to seize key sections of southern Stalingrad. If the German troops succeeded in this effort, all Soviet forces south of the Tsaritsa, including Dubiansky's guards would be isolated and encircled. By the morning of 20 September, the Soviet hold in southern Stalingrad was rapidly deteriorating. The 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade was attempting to retain several crossings over the river to keep the south connected with central Stalingrad. As part of the general retreat the day before, the 10th Rifle Brigade had been ordered to withdraw from its position near the grain elevator and establish new defensive positions protecting the southern landing stage. The 35th Guards under increasing pressure from attacks by the German 274th Infantry from the west and the 29th Motorized Division from the south was driven back to positions east of the grain elevator. General Choykov realized that he was about to lose what remained of the 35th Guard Division. He ordered Dubiansky to transfer control of his sector to the 92nd Brigade and to withdraw his division to the mouth of the Tsaritsa river. From this position he planned to withdraw. Dubiansky ordered the men encircled near the grain elevator to attempt a breakout but the defenders refused to withdraw. As Dubiansky led his 35th Guard Division north toward the mouth of the Tsaritsa, he encountered the advancing German forces of the 267th and 276th Infantry Regiments pushing east toward the Volga. The maneuver became a breakout as the 35th Guard Division fought to prevent encirclement. Late in the day as Dubiansky's command approached a highway bridge across the Tsaritsa, he discovered to his dismay that elements of the German 276th Regiment had already captured the crossing. The Germans had been pushing east toward the mouth of the river, effectively blocking Dubiansky's retreat. After nightfall, Dubiansky led a desperate attack on the bridge which succeeded despite poor odds. However, only a handful of his men remained to be evacuated to the east bank of the Volga the following night. The battle had been costly. During its 11 days of urban fighting in Stalingrad, the 35th Guards Rifle Division had suffered a devastating 9,000 casualties. As the Soviet 35th Guards Rifle Division and its attachments withdrew north, the defenders of the grain elevator became completely surrounded by the German troops of the 274th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Motorized Division. Looking to end the in-pass, the Germans made repeated requests for the Soviet soldiers to lay down their weapons and surrender. Unrelenting, the Soviet defenders dismissed the surrender demands and continued their staunch defense. In preparation for another ground assault, the German command ordered two days of bombardment by artillery and aerial units. Just prior to the Wehrmacht's assault, the grain elevator was again pounded by dive bombers artillery and mortars. The intense barrage caused large pieces of concrete to rain down in all directions. Additionally, the grain and other flammable materials were once again ignited, filling the structure with dust, fire and smoke, making it difficult to breathe and obscuring visibility inside the grain elevator. The base of the elevator was decimated under the intense and continuous gunfire. Finally, the German commander ordered 16 tanks forward accompanied by assault troops. The Soviet defenders held their positions throughout the intense bombardment. They attempted to disable the approaching panzers with anti-tank rifles, hand grenades and Molotov cocktails. These weapons succeeded in damaging or destroying several German tanks and Soviet machine gun fire repelled the German infantry as they attempted to enter the grain elevator. Incredibly, the Soviet defenders defeated seven German attacks by integrating all available weapon systems, fields of fire, engagement areas and position development into a tenacious defense. The Germans were forced to withdraw once again, but conditions in the grain elevator continued to deteriorate. Lieutenant Andrei Khazanov, who survived the fighting in the elevator, later wrote At noon, 12 enemy tanks came up. We had already run out of ammunition for our anti-tank rifles and we had no grenades left. The tanks approached the elevator and began to fire at our horizon from point blank range. But no one flinched. One Russian machine gun was blown up by a German shell. Another bent out of shape by a piece of shrapnel. Explosions were shattering the concrete. The grain was in flames. We could not see each other for distant smoke, but we cheered each other with shouts. Fighting flared up inside the building. We sensed and heard the enemy soldiers' breath and footsteps, but we could not see them in the smoke. We fired at sounds. With ammunition and food at critical levels, the defenders suffered on. Between firefights, the Soviets had to address the issue of those killed in action. Survivors recounted how they had disposed of their Red's dead bodies by sliding open the metal hatches on the silos and dropping the soldiers' remains into the wheat below. Realizing they could no longer maintain their defensive positions, the surviving Soviet troops attempted a night breakout to the south. The breakout failed, resulting in the capture of 20 soldiers. The following day, the commander of the German 274th Infantry Regiment prepared his men for yet another attack. Using intelligence gathered from their failed assaults, the Germans knew that a 2 meter wide trench encircled much of the base of the elevator. If an assault force could successfully negotiate the Soviet machine gunfire, it could gain entry into the structure through the trench. Without informing higher command or the regiment's adjacent units, the commander of the 274th planned a surprise attack at nightfall. As darkness fell, men of the 274th Infantry conducted a faint attack from the southeast of the railway station. The German faint hoped to deceive the Soviets as to the location and time of the main offensive action. The deception operation succeeded in distracting the Soviet defenders while another assault group attacked the grain elevator from the northwest. The Germans successfully reached the trench line and then sprinted under fire to entryways. By 200 hours, the Germans had gained a foothold in the western section of the grain elevator. The Germans transitioned to room clearing throughout the tangle of steel and concrete. As the fighting intensified inside the grain elevator, the remaining Russian defenders attempted to execute another breakout to the south, but the German troops of the 29th Motorized Infantry Division had established a tight cordon about 100 meters from the southern half of the elevator. As groups of Soviet soldiers ran into the open, they quickly came under fire. The German positions were too strong and the 29th Motorized captured another 84 Soviet prisoners, only allowing a few Soviets to escape back to friendly lines. By 0 to 20 on the 22nd of September, the entire grain elevator was finally in German hands. While the darkness still lingered that morning, a corporal of the 274th Infantry climbed to the top floor and raised the German flag over the mammoth complex. As the sun rose that day, the Nazi swastika could be seen from great distances waving atop the grain elevator. Four days later, General Troikov determined that any further resistance in southern Stalingrad was pointless and he ordered the withdrawal of the remaining Soviet soldiers. On the night of 26, 27, September, the surviving soldiers and sailors boarded a ferry and moved to an island in the Volga. The departure of the 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade signaled the end of the fight for southern Stalingrad. However, the struggle for the northern factory district had just begun. The Germans depleted 94th Infantry Division transitioned control of southern Stalingrad to the 29th Motorized Division and maneuvered north to join the 24th Panzer Division in the fight for northern Stalingrad. On 26, September, 1942, General Paulus reported, the battle flag of the Reich flies over the Stalingrad party building. The battle of Stalingrad culminated in November with Axis control of roughly 90% of the city. Yet, the German command failed to identify a massive Soviet buildup on their flanks. This failure led to the eventual destruction of the 6th Army during the 1942-1943 Soviet counterattacks, Operation Uranus and Operation Little Saturn. The momentum of the war on the eastern front had turned and the Red Army began the long march to Berlin.