 to do conferences with people affiliated with the military. Everything always ticks along so perfectly smoothly. So first, I just want to reiterate the thanks to James for organizing this entire program. It's been absolutely stimulating so far and I've really enjoyed all of the presentations. So thank you all for your time this afternoon. I'm Dr. Hilary Brufa. I'm a lecturer in National Security Studies in the Department of War Studies here at King's. And I was previously in the Department of Defense Studies. So over where Dr. Jordan is right now. So it's very much we consider these kinds of projects a full school initiative. So I have the absolute pleasure of chairing the panel on new research and perspectives on the Falklands War. Dr. James has already said that I've revealed the title of our school conference in June about Back to the Future. And I think there is a little bit of that in this panel as well because even though we're celebrating 40 years from the conflict, we're still thinking about new directions to take research on this subject. And we've already heard from quite a few speakers about their experience of being there and thinking about this topic. But now we're also going to look ahead at what people are working on right now we're hoping to work on in the future. So I've got a very rich panel. We've got quite a few presenters. So what we're going to do is we'll hear from each of them for about 10 minutes. I'll try to be as stringent as possible with the time so that hopefully we'll have an opportunity to ask some questions afterwards. I think everybody is on the call. So that's absolutely brilliant. And so I won't take up much more time because I know there's a lot to get through on this panel. And so I'll move straight to introducing our first speaker. So we're going to be hearing first from Captain Christopher Skinner from the Royal Australian Navy. And he's going to be thinking about lessons for 1982 for Australia. And I think if I'm not mistaken, he's also calling in from Australia. So thank you so much for being up with us live as well. I think that's a real treat for us over here in Europe. So can you hear us? Yes, I'm just organizing my slide. And I have two main slides to show. So I should stick within your time limit quite happily. Brilliant. So let's see. OK, so this is actually the second slide. The first one is just the titles. But anyway, this is what I really want to talk about. It's still loading for us just so that if you just give it just a moment because I don't know if people can see it yet. So now it's loaded the PowerPoint. It's just not in presentation mode yet. If you wanted to put it in presentation mode. But we can see it and we can see the numbers. So if you also want to just progress like this, that works too. So can you see it now? We can see them. We can see the map. Yes, over to you. OK, can you hear me OK? I'm stuck good. OK, look, the primary lesson for Australia. Is to take note of the very important comments that have been made this afternoon and the several authoritative books and papers that have been published. But to put it in the context that I'm showing on this map and none of the islands for which Australia has an interest are at 8000 miles away. But for Australia, they represent a similar sort of challenge in some respects. And I've just labeled the ones here that sort of set the boundary on that. And I'd note the fact that Christmas Island has a population somewhat similar to the Falklands. Herd Island is the furthest away. It's unpopulated, but it's Australian territory and exclusive economic zone. It's basically volcanic. Macquarie Island is halfway to Antarctica, where we operate three Antarctic bases, which is already they're outnumbered by Chinese Antarctic bases in much the same territorial areas. But what Australia does not have, of course, is the long history of maritime power exercise and political influence. And so we've got a struggle to sort of adapt. And that's where I these main points here, which I'll run through fairly quickly. Some of them have already been covered by other speakers, so I won't dwell on them. But in particular, the role of the exorcets, and there weren't very many of them in the Falklands War, should have been and is only just now starting to be a wake-up call to the role of missiles in general. And I don't think I need to dwell on that point with drones and uncrewed vehicles of all kinds. This is becoming more and more an important topic. And frankly, in Australia, we're only just waking up to this and starting to think about the implications. The second point of ships taken up from trade, we don't have a lot of ships to take up. So that's a major challenge. And I was interested to hear one of the earlier speakers talking about charters and using merchant ships that were on ordinary trade missions. So we need to do a lot more work on that. Logistics has been covered at great length. And I just think it's quite extraordinary how the logistics for the Falklands War were handled over such a long distance and with very little preparation and also not a great deal of facilities en route. The usage of missiles and other weapons, and particularly decoys, is a big issue. And in Australia, we have woken up to that. And we've just initiated a major effort to build a domestic production and to some extent to reinvent some of the earlier work that was done in Australia on missile design and development. I'll leave the bottom one on that side for the moment. Intelligence surveillance reconnaissance very well discussed earlier. Now we've got satellites and all sorts of other surveillance. So it's a whole new ballgame, as they say. Anti-submarine warfare has been well discussed. I won't dwell on that. The role of the submarines operated by the Royal Navy were very significant. And the recent agreement of the UK and the US to the AUKUS agreement to support Australia acquiring various technologies, but most importantly, nuclear submarine technology is really important and gets us caught up to some extent. The bottom bullet on that side of making it more difficult for the other side, I think, more needs to be said about that. How the Argentine understanding of what the UK was doing was manipulated and or influenced. I think there's a real story in that that I'd be interested to hear more on another occasion. The information warfare, somebody already made the point that in the modern day and age, everything would be hauled through the social media and formal media and all sorts of disinformation going on, as we're seeing with Ukraine and Russia. But the fourth bullet on the right is the one that I think we've got the greatest lesson for us is to be ready to respond to situations however unlikely they may appear at the time. You've got to be prepared as best possible for those to occur. So that's the end of my 10 minutes. Thank you so much. And thank you for keeping straight to the time. It sets us off very well for the rest of the session. So and there were a lot of practical tips in there that I think people will want to pick up on in the discussion. So thank you so much, especially at such a late hour over there or early hour, how you think about it. OK, so we'll move on to our next speaker who I can already see is preparing slides, which is excellent. And so I can see the screen share taking place. So we'll go to Group Captain John Alexander from the Royal Air Force, who's going to talk about the Falklands War and UK Future Operational Doctrine. So would you like to do a sound check just before beginning? You hear me, Hilary? I can hear you now, yes. So we can hear you at the screen. It says you've started screen sharing, but sometimes it takes a minute, I think, with so many people on the call to load. So I'll let you know as soon as we can see it. OK, well, I'll start anyway and catch up with my slides later. So my 10 minutes is a 21st century perspective on the Falklands campaign as operational art. I'll explain what I mean by operational art in a moment. And I'm doing this partly as a researcher. So I published on Airland Integration as a part-time reserve with the Royal Air Force recently writing joint operational doctrine at Shrevenham and now observing joint exercises. And also I'm almost a veteran. So the Ray Prisquad and I was serving on deploy to the Falklands after the Argentine surrender in August 1982. So my screen is frozen. Can I just check if people can hear me? Can you hear me, Hilary? We can hear you. Your slides haven't come up. We can hear you. Loud and clear. Thank you. So what I mean by operational art to paraphrase the Soviet military theorists, Svetchen. My computer is doing something. Just bear with me. There we go. We can see the slides now. OK, good. OK. Operational art, I'm sure General Thompson would call this common sense. It's the planning and conduct of military operations to achieve strategic objectives by directing the effort of tactical forces. So it's general ship or adminship or marshal ship. And it's also associated with the idea of the operational level, which is the level at which operational art is conducted, so at which campaigns and major operations are planned. So applying it to the Falklands, I mean, we've already heard today examples of how the Falklands campaign might be seen as anachronism. There's no urban. There's no people, all those things that Professor Freeman said earlier, the law of armed conflict was complied with. Obviously, the technology is quite different now as well. But one of the things from a doctrine point of view is the Falklands campaign predated the British, the belated British discovery of doctrine at the operational level and the idea, again, in doctrine of joytury. That's not to say that those things didn't exist beforehand. They just weren't written down in the same way that they are now and have been since the late 80s. Hugh Strawn and his chapter on operational art in Britain up until 2009 doesn't actually mention the Falklands, which I think is quite interesting. And if you look at current UK doctrine, the only mention is for the moral component, but the Falklands is a fantastic example of the moral component of fighting power for the British forces. There's also an argument that operational art itself is an anachronism. We've touched on this a bit today. The operational level now, the joint task force and courses are likely to be US or NATO led. It's difficult to conceive of operations that would be British led. There's an argument that the operational level artificially separates the tactical from the strategic. There's an argument that things like multi-domain integration, the idea of a gray zone, which is below the threshold of warfare and ideas like information advantage. Countless other buzzwords mean that operational art is outdated because many of these things need to be coordinated, integrated at the political, military, strategic level. And the idea of a purely military sphere of operation is no longer apt. But if we look at the Falklands, and I make two very broad points in a few minutes I've got left. One is, I think we can see the Falklands as a great, as a very successful campaign. And one of the reasons is because it was joined up from the strategic to the tactical. And arguably that started with Admiral Leitch famously crashing a cabinet meeting and convincing the Prime Minister that the Falklands campaign was very much in her interest. It was an existential threat to her government and arguably Britain's place in the world. And in response to that, she took advice and formed a war cabinet. John Major did that for the first Gulf campaign, but it's not been done since. Notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. And arguably what that meant was the strategic to operational to the tactical was very joined up. And we've covered some of these points already today. David Jordan mentioned the Vulcan raids and how they were instigated by the chiefs. General Thompson has written about Goose Green and the government's forcing the tempo of the land campaign. So without getting into the detail, keeping this simple, I think we can see the Falklands as a great example of the vertical integration of operational art from the strategic to the operational through the tactical. What's missing, if we look at the command structure, and this is from Professor Friedman's official history, but what's missing and what students at Staff College struggle with now is there's no, there's no in theater joint operational commander. Many people think that Aber Woodward is the task force commander, of course he's not in Saddlefield House, in Northwood, Aber Woodfield House keeps control because he thinks he's best placed with comms and whatever to exercise. And therefore he has a number of task groups and task units working for him. We've already heard today about the difficulty of coordinating with Bluff Cove being an example of that. I would argue as well, that the use of the REF Harrier GR3 force with 2020 hindsight is another example of how the lack of a joint task force commander, which we now have an operational doctrine, how that lack was felt. And so just reinforcing David Jordan's point on that as well, just reinforcing David Jordan's point on the Harrier GR3, the air defense, the fleet air defense was well set up based on the sea harriers. The GR3s were sent to sea harrier reinforcements. There was no idea when they left that they would be used for offensive air support. They ended up being used for offensive air support because casualties to the sea harriers are much less than expected, but there was no, there's a very limited command structure for the use of offensive air support. And I think looking at the archives, looking at the historical branches narrative for REF operations, June operation corporate, which has been published online, you can see those lessons being learned. And I think that applies, therefore there are lessons there that apply to today for what are called multi-domain operations. And as Admiral Perry has already explained, that's basically joint plus space and cyber, but in any contemporary operation, then we need to think about where command for those multi-domain operations is best placed. And in our doctrine, that's the joint task for set quarters between the four-star, three-star joint commander and between the tactical forces. So that's it, that's my 10 minutes perspectives of the Falklands campaign from a 21st century British joint doctrine perspective. Brilliant, thank you very much. And another well-timed presentation and a big question to the group there on whether or not operational art is an anachronism or not that we can pick up on. Certainly you've presented a case of the importance of joining up our approach. So we'll move swiftly forward to our next presenter. I can see on the program, we've got Dr. Louise Claire from the University of Manchester and the title of her talk is, War Does Not Begin With Its Outbreak It Begins With the Use of Words. And so she's going to talk to us about media and cultural influences in the prelude to the 1982 Falklands Malvinas War. I also just wanted to flag and promote for her that she's got a book coming out very, very soon in July with Routledge. It's called Politics Propaganda and the Press International Reactions to the Falklands Malvinas Conflict. So you're going to get a taster of the research now, and then you can all head straight over to pre-order the book afterwards. So thank you so much for joining us for your presentation, Dr. Claire, and I'll hand over to you. Thanks Hilary for the introduction. If I just able to share my screen with everyone, hopefully it'll work reasonably smoothly. Can you see it? Can see it? It's not yet in presentation mode, but we can see this slide. Yeah, just wanted to make sure. Yes, we can hear you very well. So all good to go. So over to you. OK, yeah, good stuff. I just want to say also thanks to James as well for inviting me to talk and thanks for organizing the conference in this event. So without further ado, I'll begin. I'm going to begin with a quotation. It's primarily based this particular talk on the United States focus and hate shutter diplomacy, as you may have already guessed. I have found the perfect symbol for this country, the putrid toilet on the ground floor. There were looked into helpers. The security creeps leaders around a pretty palm shade interior courtyard off the edges of which there is a corner. Some corner, it's unendated with pee pee, huge puddles of it, thoroughly soaking the pile of shredded newspaper, a facade of elegance and sophistication on the outside, behind which the Calaco reality lies in all its stinky poo squalor. If I can just get back to the next screen. These are the words written in the diary, a senior National Security Council staff member, James Rentschler, soon after the US delegation had arrived in Buenos Aires, hoping to mediate a peaceful solution to the Falcon Slash Malvinus crisis. Like other members of his party, Rentschler was somewhat shocked about the conditions with which he and his colleagues were presented with. What was more surprising though, is the fact that the Argentine military junta expected to curry support from the United States for the Argentine recuperation of what they called as the Malvinus Islands that had taken place several days beforehand. Additionally, this early on in the crisis, adding hope to Argentina's cause was the fact that public support from the United States, from Margaret Thatcher's UK government is by no means a given. Argentina, despite lukewarm relations during Carter years, was beginning to enjoy a closer rapport with Reagan's America. Key support was being provided for the Reagan doctrine in Latin America and Argentines considered themselves increasingly important piece of the Cold War jigsaw in US foreign policy in the region. As a result, the government hoped, even expected, the US to have sympathy for the nation's long held Macauza Malvinus and to help them secure sovereignty over the islands. US decisions mattered therefore, as the crisis unfolded and the diplomatic impressions were set to make a big difference to the course and eventual outcome of the war. Yet James Rentschler and his State Department colleagues once they arrived as part of the team that was to conduct what famously became known as Alexander Haig's shuttle diplomacy. When met with squalid conditions and likely to impress, cultural faux pas or diplomatic mind games, this paper argues more for the former than for the latter. For Rentschler's description, lay a metaphorical show of desperation as it perceived injustices in times rather than a calculated claim the sovereign territory the country had been due for a century or more. I argue therefore that during the initial phase of the Falklands crisis on the 2nd of April to the 30th of April, 1982, cultural perceptions comprising of language, cultural norms, which is values and beliefs and a nation's history, a diplomatic level as well as those imbued in the media coverage of the unfolding crisis were instrumental in not only marginalizing the Argentine cause but bolstered US support for and consolidated help towards the British campaign to retake the islands. Now, this is not to say that US global Cold War commitments as well as real politic are factors to be ignored in the United States support of Britain, but cultural perceptions played a vitally important and until now largely neglected role in influencing US decision makers and in projecting the form and content of media output in the United States. So while many of us are familiar with the British side of the war in Argentina, the recovery of what they used to call as the Malvinus was firmly etched onto national consciousness. The Calza Malvinus, however, was a cause which was never really fully understood by British or US commentators. And this blind spot to an issue rooted within Argentine life and history, aided in part the cultural collisions which occurred between the United States and Argentina especially during the crucial initial phase. And this served to bolster the British cause. So when the president of Argentina, General Leopoldo Gautieri spoke to President Reagan on the eve of the invasion, the cultural connotations that his language imbued, not only the words, but also their usage and their tone, created an impression, James Wrenschler, some that wants more, that his, so Gautieri's, mafioso type English made him sound like a thug. Indeed, as a result of such diplomatic maneuvers, the depiction of the military junta as a gang of thugs was a lasting impression on key members of the US delegation that passed over into the portraits forged in the US media as the shuttle diplomacy stalled and walled very closer. This lasting impression only served to marginalize the Argentine cause, moving the US closer and closer to a natural ally. So for Argentina, the invasion or the recuperation as they refer to it was itself a culturally imbued action. And the cause of such a grand national moment that the crowd in the Plata de Mayo, which resided Gautieri, so Buenos Aires's main square on the 3rd of April was reportedly 10,000 in number, according to La Prensa, an Argentine newspaper, which had previously been critical of the Argentine junta in the past. In the British press, however, Argentina was branded as the aggressor and John Silkin MP, seen here, described Gautieri as a bargain basement Mussolini and the times compared the islander situation to that of the Poles in 1939. In a notions barking British and US shared history, the US press referred to Argentine aggression and reminded the public of Argentina's delay in joining the allies against Nazi Germany in World War II. So despite prior warnings of Argentine aggression, US Secretary of State, Hague, was sent on a mediating effort to London and Buenos Aires and he's seen here with the Argentine foreign minister in the center and Gautieri on the left. A renter's account, which I started this paper with, was one of just many cultural misjudgments. And this attitude could be seen even before Hague's shuttle diplomacy when Ronald Reagan had telephoned Gautieri. Gautieri kept Reagan waiting as Renter described it once more, with all the evasive bullshit from palace flunkies. This unintended culturally inspired Argentine government action, which antagonized the US administration as further perpetuated from the moment of Hague's arrival. Believing Hague would be impressed, he was taken on a helicopter ride over the Platte de Mayo, which was filled with chanting crowds, shouting, Argentina, Argentina. But to add to the importance of evoking memories of a nation's history, is how Hague merely, a small remark later, that the scenes reminded him of newsreels taken in Rome and Berlin in the 1930s. This instance served to reinforce the earlier imagery the US press had been creating about Nazi Argentina, since Hague had actually lived through World War II and post-war, he'd serve as Supreme Allied Commander for all NATO forces in Europe. It was evident therefore for Hague an impression such Argentine action would create, being as he was a cultural product of his era. An Argentine action only served to distance them from the US and ally the US closer together with Britain. By stark contrast, Thatcher met the US delegation and led them to portraits very similar to these of Wellington and Nelson, to sort of reinforce the imagery that Britain's history of fighting dictatorships and aggressive powers in order to secure freedom and democracy. Over dinner, she referred to Neville Chamberlain to invoke again a sense of Anglo-American shared history, expressing the view that we in Britain simply refuse to reward aggression and that's the lesson we learned from 1938. For the US delegation Thatcher's reference enabled them to identify more closely with the British cause, a view which was subsequently pressed for by the New York Times and perhaps strongly influenced by the cultural connotations of 1938. The newspaper advised, if the British Navy lacks the strength, negotiation can only occur after a clearer American tilt towards London. Not only was the New York Times response being influenced through the nation's history, but its support for a US tilt towards Britain was clearly being made evident to the Reagan administration at a crucial stage during Hague's shuttle diplomacy and it provided a clear media support for the British cause. For the Argentines, the Malvinas cause was such that there was limited room for compromise without Argentine sovereignty over the islands being agreed. For them, the Malvinas were part of Argentine national identity, but for Britain tolerating what she saw as armed aggression would not be acceptable and Britain had a duty to her citizens and the Islanders were her citizens. So what's significant here then is the sharp contrast of which the British and the Argentines dealt with the US delegation. So in a final example and to conclude, the Argentine negotiations of nine hour straight sessions with Hague deeply angered him and prompted him to write, progress was made by syllables and centimeters and then vetoed by men who'd never even been part of the negotiations, such as Hague's disillusionment and irritation with the Argentines, the British head of Chancery, Robin Remrick commented, it was disconcerting to find ourselves dealing with the US Secretary of State who under the strain had developed facial tics reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove. Sharp contrast it may seem then to straight talking thatcher and good diplomacy some may say, but the fact that Britain knew how to handle the US delegation and portray Britain in a good light in US eyes is surely evidence of the British and US shared culture and knowing what will impress them. Whilst at the same time, evidence of not just poor diplomacy on the Argentine behalf, but a cultural clash not understanding how the actions would be misunderstood in a match or rhetoric style by the United States, which marginalizes Argentina and ultimately leads to the United States declare official support for Britain on the 30th of April, 1982. Thank you. Thank you very much for that very interesting presentation and we also have a speaker coming up soon on the US perspective, so we'll be able to see some of what you talked about as well. So we'll move swiftly forwards and thank you all so far for really keeping to time. Next up, we have Dr. Adrian Pierce who is Associate Professor of Spanish and Latin American History at University College London. He's going to be talking about a new history of the Falklands War. And I think this is research for your current book project, if I understand correctly as well. That's right, can you hear me okay? We can hear you and I can see your slide. So we're good to go over to you. Well, thanks very much. So I teach in the Department of Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American Studies at UCL and I'm writing a new history of the Falklands War that aims to draw more widely on the Spanish literature from Argentina as well as on British sources. At the moment though, I'm still working my way through the vast literature on the war in English. And this paper is about British personal diaries and memoirs as a source for the history of the war. So personal diaries and memoirs began to be published even before the end of 1982 and they've continued to appear ever since. It's hard to say how many books of this kind have been published in total, but it certainly runs into the dozens on the military side alone. And these are now appearing more frequently than ever before. So across 2021 and 2022, at least 20 new books on the Falklands will be published in the UK and most of them are memoirs and diaries. So as a result, there are memoirs representing all of the services and most of the units involved. Some are by senior commanders, including probably the three most important memoirs by Sandy Woodward, Michael Clap and Julian Thompson. Ship-based naval memoirs are also numerous. There's more than a dozen accounts written from the perspective of ships. There are also about a dozen memoirs written by Royal Marines, about half that by parrots. Five brigade is represented somewhat more thinly but with books from the perspective of the Gurkers as well as the Welsh Guards and the Scots Guards. One recent boom has been in memoirs of special forces and especially the SAS. So these three examples have all appeared in just the past 12 months, for example. I could go on, as I say, there are dozens of published memoirs and diaries in all. Now these books pose a number of theoretical challenges for historians. They're quite diverse internally. Some are diaries published more or less as they were written 40 years ago. Most are memoirs that might be based on diaries kept at the time or might have been written largely from memory or in consultation with other sources. A particular problem is that of verification and validation. So most of what's said in these books can be readily verified from other sources. But some of what they say is essentially unverifiable if we base ourselves on the books alone. Nevertheless, taken together, these books clearly constitute a large and important corpus of primary materials for the history of the war. They can tell us a great deal about all sorts of things from the centrally important to the relatively trivial. Since there's limited time here, I'm gonna focus on the operational history of the war and the evidence these sources present for how the campaign developed. And I'll give just two examples. My first example is the bombing of the Welsh Guards and others at Fitzroy on the 8th of June and the complex train of events that led to it over the period from the 2nd of June when Brigadier Tony Wilson made his impromptu move forwards with two para to Fitzroy and Bluff Cove from Goose Green. Of course, the personal accounts published by leading commanders are key here. The most important of those by Michael Clapp and Ewan Southby-Taylor alongside that of Sandy Woodward. These accounts tell us in great detail not only how the operation to reinforce Wilson to para actually developed over the key few days but also about the specific train of events that led to two landing ships logistics lying during daylight hours at Fitzroy, essentially unprotected with most of their troops still embarked up to the moment of the Argentine air attacks. No history of those events can be written without reference to these key memoirs then. But other accounts add a great deal more detail and texture to the story. Tom Martin's memoir of service with Corona Battery, the Royal Artillery on how close they came to shelling the Scots Guards on their arrival at Bluff Cove on the 6th of June from just a hundred yards away in what could have been an awful blue on blue incident. Nick Vo's account of watching the gas from Mount Challenger as the two LSLs sat at Fitzroy only five kilometers away in what he describes as looking like a NATO exercise scenario rather than an urgent wartime one. Tony McNally's book about his experience with a rapier air defense battery on how he was in the operator seat of his unit when it failed at the crucial moment and so allowed the Argentine attack to go ahead unhindered. David Morgan's relation of how he flew a combat air patrol in a sea harrier from Hermes and shot down two of the A4s involved in the attacks of the 8th of June within seconds of each other or even Rick Jolly's medical memoir on his treatment of the grievously wounded. In other words, personal memoirs and diaries not only provide the essential outline to an episode such as this but much of the detail and the context and the atmosphere as well. So my second example is based on Cedric Delvis account of his leadership of D Squadron SAS across an angry sea that was published in 2018. I found Delvis book quite revealing above all because he's almost entirely open as to the nature of the SAS's involvement in some of the more controversial operations of the war. The SAS played central roles in both the first and among the very last actions of the war in South Georgia on the 21st of April and against Cotley Ridge outside Stanley on the 13th of June and I'll discuss both of those briefly. Both these operations have been subject to criticism on different levels and Delvis is actually very frank about the role of the SAS in them. To begin with South Georgia and Operation Paraket the contribution of the SAS was originally intended to consist of a single troop the D Squadron's mountain troop. But firstly, Delvis tells us how he persuaded the two key men involved Brian Young the captain of HMS Antrim and the overall commander of the South Georgia group and Guy Sheridan the commander of the land forces to embark all four troops of D Squadron. He did so by giving them to understand that he had and I quote some authority even instruction to do so despite the fact that he himself acknowledges that this wasn't true. At this point Delvis didn't have authority to embark the whole of D Squadron although this seems to have been approved after the fact. From the 13th of April then the whole of D Squadron became involved in Operation Paraket. Delvis calls this shaping our own destiny and it had significant repercussions. It caused some confusion notably around the command arrangements and not least because Delvis was a major like Sheridan. And certainly from this point Sheridan ostensibly commander of land forces seems to have been largely sidelined. The SAS itself took a leading role in the planning of the operation. And this led to perhaps the most controversial involvement with the development of a plan for the recapture of South Georgia that was based on preliminary reconnaissance from the Fortuna Glacier. The use of the Fortuna Glacier as an approach to the Argentine positions was opposed by all the men present with relevant expertise on the ground that it was simply too dangerous. These included Guy Sheridan himself an expert mountaineer, Nick Barker the captain of HMS endurance the only Royal Naval vessel stationed in the area in 1982 the British Antarctic Survey Scientist stationed on South Georgia and the air crew of HMS Antrim who would later rescue the SAS from the Glacier on the morning of the 22nd of April in hazardous conditions. All these expressed reservations about the Fortuna Plan and it did indeed turn out to be flawed to the extent that the SAS had to be retrieved from the Glacier having spent a night there in miserable conditions and at the cost of two helicopters. So to read Delvis's own account of the lead up to these events and from the perspective of the SAS is quite revealing. And this is also true of among the last actions of the war the SAS and SBS attack on Cortley Ridge just north of Stanley on the 13th of June. This raid was intended to be a diversionary attack to cover among the last of the key battles two parrots assault on Wireless Ridge to the west. It too has provoked criticism on the grounds that it was uncalled for and proved a distraction. It actually gets a mixed right up in most accounts though with some arguing that it did draw fire away from two parrots and contribute to the Argentine collapse. Delvis's rate account of this raid across a whole chapter of his book is certainly among the most important yet to appear. And again, this is arguably because he's so frank as to the deficiencies in the planning if not the execution of the operation. He writes that ultimately he and his men were faced with mounting this raid at short notice and I quote, from a cold start without supporting intelligence to conduct attack against an attack against an unknown target behind a water obstacle to be crossed using unfamiliar motorboats driven by people we'd never worked with before. The team inserted onto the shore of Cortley Ridge was immediately pinned down by heavy fire and was forced to withdraw across the water to the north on the way they were lit up by a spotlight mounted on an Argentine hospital ship and began to take further fire. And Delvis tells us that he was asked by an SAS man from G Squadron for permission to take out the spotlight with a Milan missile which raised the prospect of a British missile attack on an Argentine hospital ship in the last hours of the war. Delvis declined permission for this but again, his memoir will be a key source for this episode as for so many others that the SAS were involved with. So to conclude then, British personal diaries and memoirs constitute a rich source for the history of the Falklands war some including those by the leading commanders have long been recognized as key sources. Others offer new insights into particular aspects of the campaign. Most don't necessarily bring new revelations but the cumulative effect of them is to add rich layers to the history of the war as it's already established. And I'll just end by noting that the accessibility and the impact of the personal narratives presented in these books together with the sheer number of them and their availability through cheap good editions means they may have a greater impact on public understanding of the war than any other sources, including academic histories. Thank you so much for that, Dr. Pierce. So not only a few for reading lists of these presentations but I think you mentioned more than 20 coming out soon. So I think we've got enough reading for the next 40 years when we look back on 80 years of the conflict. And so we'll move now Nick to our next presentation and our next speaker is going to be Kip Diogenio who's chief of staff at the Air Force, US Air Force and PhD scholar at the University of North Carolina and Chapel Hill which is actually a partner of King's College London a partner university. So we're very glad to see the collaboration coming out in the topics we're looking at as well. And he's going to talk to us about the impact of the Falklands War on US strategy because of course as David Jordan said earlier none of this was happening in a vacuum and we also need to think about how this impacts strategies of allies and other players as well. So Kip, are you with us? I am, can you hear me Dr. Griffith? Yes, I can hear you and we can see you. So comes check all good. Perfect, thanks so much for the kind introduction as an active duty captain. I have to say that the views that follow are my own and don't reflect those of the Department of Defense but with that out of the way it's a really great privilege for me as a war studies alum to be part of such a wonderful event and among the sticker scholars and academics, leaders and veterans. And as we reflect on the 40 years that have passed since the Falklands War it's just remarkable to observe and we've seen from this panel too the diversity of scholarship on really what is one of the 20th century's most compelling conflicts. This has been referenced earlier but I think too often some scholars will depict the conflicts as in the words of Max Hastings recently in the foreword to the Delves' memoir actually is he labels the Falklands a freak of history in an acronym such as the world we'll never see again. Yet in the year 2022 projecting power thousands of miles away from a homeland to prevent an unlawful invasion of a sovereign island seems all the more relevant. And while many commentators then in sense have characterized the war of something more akin to the Second World War than maybe a conflict of the 21st century with a perspective of history we now know that instances of combat in the South Atlantic did offer us glimpses into future trends in the character of warfare. And perhaps no moment underscores the global reach of the Falklands War more than the one that took place exactly 40 years ago tomorrow when a ghost of Badaqarats and Amanda Mayora took off from the airfield at Naval Air Station Rio Grande. And those of this event know well the details of the sinking of the HMS Sheffield and I'm not bore you with recounting them here but what I'll do instead is illustrate and illuminate the reverberations of that moment. The exorcism missile attack shocked not only the British task force we know but it also sent tremors to naval powers around the world. And indeed in the United States the attack took on a particular salience for just as the Sheffield was slipping beneath the waves U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Layman was before Congress defending his request for two nuclear powered aircraft carriers. And even in an era in the United States of Defense Largesse and the Reagan administration Layman's request for two nuclear aircraft carriers in one bill drew ire from both sides of the political aisle. Layman had joined the course of U.S. Navy admirals who believed that the Soviet Union had eroded the Navy's advantage at sea and he sought to restore what he termed command of the seas to the U.S. Navy. And to do so Layman wanted to construct a 600 ship Navy with 15 nuclear powered carriers at its back boom. Successive U.S. chief of naval operations had advocated for such an investment but now with Layman as second nav the Navy had the political capital to sell its pitch to Congress. But if there were questions about Layman's maritime strategy before the Sheffield attack critics in the United States seized on the Falklands war as evidence of the program's bleak and possibly ruinous future. Journalists raised alarms about the implications of the attack for the U.S. Navy and prominent publications across the country. Newsweek ran a feature with a foreboding headline our big warships doomed. In a similar spirit, the New York Times warned about the U.S. Navy's unsinkable carrier admirals and their insistence on nuclear supercarriers. The Falklands war the Times editorialized offered a fiery lesson about the vulnerability of surface ships to attack by computer guided missiles. And likewise, the Wall Street Journal proclaimed that precision guided munitions were the great equalizers in military conflict. And so seemingly overnight in the United States the Sheffield had become synonymous with naval vulnerability. We heard that alluded to earlier in this panel. And the idea went that if the Argentine Navy could acquire sophisticated weaponry employ it with little training and cripple a component of the Royal Navy's task force what would that pretend for the U.S. Navy's in an engagement with the Soviet Union? So before the Argentine forces surrendered on June 14th, 1982 a debate over the lessons of the Falklands war raged in the American press and on Capitol Hill. The lessons observers argued cast out on layman's program. The Falklands war then had for the moment thrust layman's vision of a 600 ship Navy onto the American consciousness. And more troubling perhaps for the Navy was the reality that the Falklands war publicly revealed the institution's fissures between two competing visions about the U.S. Navy's raison d'etre from future conflict. The lens through which the U.S. Navy viewed the Falklands war was rooted in the services efforts to reimagine its contributions to grand strategy. But to understand that lens it's necessary for us to first grasp the competing visions within the U.S. Navy and how they interacted with national strategy as well as how they drastically shifted from the Jimmy Carter administration to the Reagan administration all within a Cold War context. And so whilst Rewind quit three years ago or three years prior to the Falklands war in 1979 the chief of naval operations in the U.S. Admiral Thomas Hayward was testifying before Congress on the question of why do we need a Navy? Hayward painted a grim picture of the Navy's future and he warned the house that soon the Navy would lose its margin of superiority to the Soviets. And more alarming was Hayward's assessment of the type of war the Navy had to be prepared to confront. Any conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Hayward told members would inevitably be global in scope but at its current strength the Navy couldn't fight that type of conflict. In order to carry out that type of conflict Hayward asked for new aircraft carriers. Hayward's testimony in 1979 marked a very public split with Jimmy Carter and his administration. The Carter administration designated the Navy's mission then as guaranteeing military and economic resupply and sea control of the Atlantic Ocean and nothing about global power projection. And while Carter did believe in the efficacy of carriers he raised questions personally about the number, size and type the U.S. Navy needed. And the president himself supplied that answer. In 1978 Carter had vetoed defense legislation explicitly because it included funding for a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. That bill Carter argued would weaken our defenses and would erode our contributions to NATO to pay for a carrier we don't need. While the cost of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier loomed large in Carter's thinking his veto was also reflective of the administration's national security strategy. And here Carter articulated a vision of naval thought that valued a large number of small ships at a reduced cost. And not all naval officers in the U.S. disagreed. In fact then Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner later Carter's director of the Central Intelligence Agency had long expressed doubts about the survivability of aircraft carriers in conventional war. Carriers Turner argued will certainly be the honey to which the bear is attracted. And the emergence of sophisticated Soviet anti-surface weaponry made aircraft carriers vulnerable. Moreover the carriers costs Turner argued did not justify their investment on mass. But cost wasn't a hurdle for Carter's successor and atop the Reagan administration's priorities was a pledge to reinvigorate American grand strategy as Reagan saw it. Under the Carter administration the United States sought to maintain an overall balance in military power. Reagan instead vowed to reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence. And an integral component of that philosophy for Reagan was the United States Navy. For Reagan maritime superiority was a necessity. He identified the Navy as the force most suitable for maintaining U.S. presence and threatened areas around the world. And whereas the Carter administration viewed the Navy's contributions in defensive terms Reagan believed in the Navy's offensive potential and in global terms. Central Europe no doubt remained significant but Reagan emphasized the need for the U.S. to conduct offensive operations on the Soviet periphery and to regain maritime superiority Reagan vowed to restore the U.S. fleet to 600 ships. That line sounds familiar of course and had originated with the Reagan campaign's upstart naval advisor who would also become the administration's nominee for secretary to the Navy John Layman. So the lessons of the Falklands war and most prominently the sinking of the HMS Sheffield collided with a Navy that was 16 months into redefining its global mission. Through the development of a maritime strategy based on global power projection Layman sought to achieve President Reagan's vision. However, the intellectual underpinnings and the price tag of Layman's vision did generate widespread scrutiny. For example, Senator Barry Hart, a layman critic exemplified congressional skepticism following the attack on the Sheffield. Senator Hart believed that the exorcist missile had ushered in a new era of naval warfare and he asked rhetorically how effective will our Navy be if we keep on buying very few ships because each is so expensive and at the same time modern missiles and torpedoes are making every ship more vulnerable. Hart warned that the Sheffield illustrated a Navy dependent on just 15 carriers looks rather fragile when the Soviet Union can launch not just one missile, but dozens at each carrier. Stansfield Turner agreed. Turner argued that one lesson of the Sheffield is that Navy should distribute their power and value over as many ships as possible rather than concentrating them in just a few. The Falklands War Turner proclaimed ushered in the day of the missile in which technological trends indicated that missiles and not aircraft will soon dominate our battlefields. Layman, however, valued this public debate and saw in the Falklands War not an episode of despair but recognized it as an opportunity for the Navy. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt, the US Army had assembled a team of experts to identify potential lessons from that conflict to inform the Army's modernization efforts. The Falklands War, Layman surmised might serve similar ends for the Navy. He gathered a group of expert officers, civilians and defense consultants therefore to mine the Falklands for lessons. The US Navy shortly at thereafter released an unclassified study entitled lessons of the Falklands War in advance of Layman's next appearance before Congress. The study evaluated the Royal Navy's maritime performance and surmised how the US Navy might have fared if it faced the same scenario. The study's authors left zero doubt about what lessons the Falklands War offered. The US Navy, they said, has been structured to project power anywhere on the globe and most of what happened in the South Atlantic supports the judgments that underlay all that is being done in this administration's naval recovery program. The study attempted to settle the public debate, particularly over carriers. The study's authors concluded that virtually none of the aircraft which hit the British ships from mainland bases in Argentina could have done so had there been a modern, full-size carrier air wing in the opposing force. Moreover, if an Argentine fighter had leaked through the US Navy's defense system, it is doubtful if any of the attacks sustained by British ships would have penetrated a vital space or done significant damage to a modern US aircraft carrier. In short, for the Navy, the Falklands War confirmed that small carriers were both more vulnerable and less effective than their nuclear-powered counterparts. And this study was a complete endorsement of Layman's naval vision, as one might expect. So ultimately, Layman succeeded in using the lessons of the Falklands War to defend the US Navy's modernization efforts. And despite acrimonious debate over the war's lessons, the Navy concluded that the conflict validating pre-existing conceptions about maritime power. So more broadly with the Falklands War, we can see that it illuminates how the US military learns and applies lessons from foreign conflicts. On less inflammatory issues, such as the importance of naval presence or the role of merchant marine logistics, the US Navy did implement lessons learned from the Falklands across the force. But debates from the Falklands War that touched politically sensitive issues, such as aircraft carrier size, failed to produce consensus. And paradoxically, officers and analysts on both sides of the debate used the same events from the Falklands War to buttress their diametrically opposed positions. So in short, the Falklands War revealed the battle for the soul of the US Navy and that John Layman succeeded in using the conflict to drive the Navy shipbuilding program did make significant contributions to US grand strategy and also to the backbone of the naval force structure that the United States depends on to this day. But that force structure is one, ironically, that has become increasingly vulnerable to many variants of the nascent threats that Augusta Vedicurats and Armando Mayora demonstrated to the Royal Navy and American observers 40 years ago in the South Atlantic. Thanks so much. Thank you very much. Another really well-timed talk ended on a bit of a troubling note leaving us vulnerable to vulnerabilities identified 40 years ago. Perhaps we can think about how to mitigate some of that from the lessons that you spoke about and you raised. And so we move on to our penultimate presenter for the session, Professor David Manley, who should be with us. Yes, I can see him. So he's Professor of Naval Architecture at University College London, and he's going to talk to us about the Falklands War impact on naval architecture. OK, I'm just going to try and... Can you hear me OK? We can hear you. So soundcheck works. OK, let's see if I can get the screen share to work. So I can see it. It's just not in presentation mode yet. Yeah, OK. How's that? Perfect. So over to you, Professor. OK, thank you. Thank you, Hillary. Right, so I'm going to talk to you about lessons of modern ship design from the Falklands conflict. We talked about lessons identified. Hopefully I'll be able to show that actually some of the lessons or many of the lessons identified we did actually act on. We have acted on. And I should say at the moment, so for the outset, that this is an extract of a presentation I gave to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors 30th anniversary conference updated slightly with some sort of information that we've received or I've generated since then. And if anybody would like a copy of the full version of this presentation, I can send that later. OK, so what I'm going to talk about... Well, I'll just get straight into it because I'm time limited. So in the aftermath of the Falklands conflict in the aftermath of Op Corporate, the Sea Systems Controller and others instigated a thorough review, the outcome of which was a document called the Corporate Action Grid. And it says that it's comprehensive post-war review conducted in 1982 to 1983, which covered a wide range of areas of ship design and operation. And it was very frank in its review. It was, you know, nothing was sugarcoated. I've seen some of the original papers from that and it was quite damning in a number of areas and quite rightly so. The purpose of generating this document was to, as I say, identify those lessons, but also to act on them. And it led to the development of a roadmap for change in existing ships and the derivation of lessons learned in the design of new ships. That could be seen immediately in the design of the Type 23. So the Type 23 frigate went through a radical design change as a result of lessons of the Falklands. But more widespread change was fed into later designs as well. And in a very, very charitable move by the UK, those lessons were shared very widely with our NATO allies. And the quality of NATO warship design in survivability in particular, in damage control and firefighting was significantly improved as a result. The Corporate Action Grid covers all of these subjects here. These are the topics that were discussed in the ship design aspect. There's a whole load of extra sections that covered ship operability, but I'm just listing the actual ship design issues here. So obviously I'm not going to go through all of those, but just to focus in on the headline lessons, really. Some of these obviously relate to the loss of Sheffield, where the prevention of blast spread would have given the ship a significantly improved chance of surviving, as it was blast spreading through the ship, damaged watertight doors and prevented smoke boundaries from being formed. And that was the primary cause of loss of the vessel. Resilient firefighting systems, it was noted that firefighting systems in damaged areas of the ship themselves became damaged and were unable to contribute to recoverability efforts. And also the provision of those firefighting systems in terms of things like the numbers of firefighting pumps and their operability was significantly underestimated in earlier designs and has been increased significantly since that point. Other subjects, aluminium is a commonly myth from the Falklands conflict that Royal Navy ships were lost because of burning aluminium superstructures. There is actually no evidence that any ship was lost as a result of aluminium superstructure or aluminium failure, where aluminium was an issue, was in the use of its use in ladders and deckplatings, in internal compartments to save weight. And those ladders and deckplates would melt or become very brittle under fire conditions so that if crew were trying to escape up them, after they've been affected by fire, the thing would just collapse. But a whole range of very significant issues for ship designers. Just to look in on the Sheffield as just one example, the diagram at the top shows the extent of compartments initially affected by blast damage from the detonation of the Exocet Warhead. It's quite extensive. As you can see, there's six main watertight sections of the ship reflected, and fire and smoke spread beyond those compartments, sometimes after the initial hit. The diagram below that shows the extent of damage which we would have expected to have seen if the ship had been designed using the kind of design techniques and mitigation measures which have been developed since Operation Corporate. And that case is eminently survivable. So key lessons going forward. Op Corporate reminded us and continues to remind us that the Royal Navy needs warships. There are frequent forays into studies looking at the adoption of civilian standards to reduce the cost of warships. It is possible to use those in some cases. In most cases, they should be adopted with caution or not at all. Conops, concepts of operations and scenarios used in modeling. Our recommendation, believe those at your peril. No Royal Navy ship, as far as I'm aware, has ever been used solely for the purposes which it's designed. Mission creep, operation creep, we always use ships for different purposes to those that they're intended for. So designing very tightly within requirements gives us issues in the future. Reliance on technology is an issue. We've seen it only recently with the loss of the Moskva, another survivable situation. But before that, the attack on the Stark, the attack on the Israeli ship, Hanit on the Kohl, all ships with very significant self-defense systems, all of which failed. And the use of risk-based design is fine as long as you're aware of the risks that you're taking. In many cases, our designers and others are probably not aware of those risks. Or maybe they are, but they're not prepared to acknowledge them. We like to use this argument as a reason to go away from design standards, military standards in particular, whilst we forget that those standards were written that way for a reason, and often with a very steep learning curve. So I would argue that the need for modern warships to go in harm's way into fight hurt must be paramount in the warship designer's mind. And after all, that's why we design warships. They are warships for a reason. Failure to do that may mean far more than just the loss of the vessel. Losing a key ship in a task group could mean the end of a mission. In the post-corporate environment, great strides were made in addressing these issues. And many of those were invoked through improving design standards in things like materials used on ship, structures, blast resistance, firefighting systems, for example. Financial pressures since then have repeatedly tried to push away at some of those lessons learned. And our designers continuously have to rebuff those issues to keep us with that winning edge. So I'd argue that designers today, it's essential for them to acquaint themselves with these lessons and others from operational experience and other theater operations to ensure that those lessons are not forgotten. In today's environment, we've increased safety management, which is indeed very, very sensible. But he's now being extended the definition of safety to include wartime risks. Designers have a duty of care. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Ministry of Defense has a duty of care to its personnel in combat. So designers have a duty of care to address foreseeable incidents. And one could argue that having learned those lessons from 1982, those could hardly be considered as anything other than foreseeable. And just to conclude, well, a quote, or maybe a frequent misquote, but something which as a Royal Navy ship designer and advisor to warship projects, and also an educator for the current generation of the UK's Royal Navy ship designers, these are lessons which we must remember. We must learn from. If we don't, we are doomed to repeat them. Thank you. Thank you so much. And so we'll come now to the final presentation for this session, but then we will have some time for questions afterwards. So we've got last and certainly not least with us, Major from the US Army, Antonio Salinas, and he's affiliated with the National Intelligence University and KickScoledge London. And he's going to be talking about lethality and war from 1982 to the Ukraine crisis. And so I can already see your slides. So that's brilliant. And let's do a sound check. Hi, can you hear me OK? OK, great. And I keep it on this view that way I can manipulate certain icons. So it's a unique way of presenting. OK, well, good afternoon, everyone, or good morning if you're here in the States or good evening if you're in Australia. So my name is Antonio Salinas. And first of all, thank you for inviting me to be here. I feel honored to be here amongst the legends who participate in this war. And he's been writing about this for decades. And it's truly an honor. So again, my name is Antonio Salinas. And I'll be presenting excerpts from my paper, a mortal reminder, reexamining lethality from 1982 Falklands War to the Ukraine crisis. And because I'm still in active duty, everything I say, whether it's ignorant or brilliant, I hope for the latter, it's me. This is not the official policy of the United States. These are my own opinions, my own academic undertakings. So my perspective is a little different. I am not a sailor. I've been in the military for about 24 years. I was misguided as a young man and I joined the Marines. Following grad school, I did some time in the infantry with service in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I taught military and European history at West Point. And I'm currently over in the Pentagon. And I'm pursuing my PhD via distance at King's College London. And I also teach at National Intelligence University. So I am utterly fascinated, like most of you hear about the Falklands War, right? It has it all. From air to air engagements, right? Infantry bayonet charges, special forces, wow, which everyone loves. And with respect to this presentation, anti-ship cruise missiles. And this will be the crux of what I talk about for the next nine minutes or so. So what's in it for you today? We'll talk about lessons learned. And lessons learned is always awkward when you talk in academic circles, but we'll try to mine something out of this. And then we're gonna look to the future by looking at the past to see what certain theory is presented. And then we'll look at anti-ship cruise missiles and the character of war, right? The nature of warfare does not change, but this class was tells us its character certainly evolves. Why do we study military history? I always give this point whenever I teach and it's different, right? Whether you're a student, whether you're a force to take it, whether you're a scholar, whether you're a policymaker, or our service member, yeah, why do we do it? What I always ask people with this is who's had surgery in the room? inevitably someone will raise their hand and I'll ask them a question. That's kind of awkward. And I'll ask them, did you have dinner with that doctor who cut you open? And they'll say, no, what do you mean? I'm like, so we like complete strangers. Give us a knockout drug and cut us open. Why do we do that? You know, as a trust and so on. And I'll eventually get to you. The first time they cut you open was at the first time cutting open a human, right? You hope not. So this is what I use for military history. I think military history is our cadaver, right? Where we can dissect it, we can cut it open and we can ask the questions. You know, why did General Blue go right when he clearly should have went left? Why did they attack when they should have held? And with respect to the Fultons, I think it is absolutely vital, especially in the contemporary multi-domain battlefield that we dissected. Whether you're a historian, whether you're a strategist, whether you're a member of the armed forces, and I think these lessons are mortal lessons. So hopefully you're thrilled and captivated by the intro. We'll talk about anti-ship cruise missiles, we'll look at theorists, and then we'll dabble into some countermeasures, right? It's just a harbinger of doom or just an evolution into this profession of warfare. So here's kind of the crux in my paper here. I really believe this shouldn't have been the conflict that foreshadowed the evolving character of warfare. In particular, anti-ship missiles need to be studies. And these lessons echo to us in names like Sheffield, Convayer, and Glenn Morgan. And even a few weeks ago, with the Russian loss of Moscow on the Black Sea, are these now lessons learned to lessons confirmed? So the crux of this paper and the studies, do we recognize the impact of anti-ship cruise missiles on the character of warfare? This paper is a greater part of my thesis, my PhD thesis, which I'm working on currently, where I think this could have been the military disaster that foreshadowed the dangers of anti-access in air denial to the United States and the Allies. But I think it's been overlooked as anomaly, but to our adversaries, particularly the Chinese, they might look at this as a blueprint of how to destroy the Western Gulf War, Blitzkrieg. And the Falklands War is important, right? This is the first anti-access air denial war, which pits a joint evolutionary force against somebody at home, right? Somebody with a home field advantage has supreme advantage in firepower, which we've seen in the Falklands, and we're seeing even now in Ukraine. And this begs the bigger question is, what will war in the future look like? Military historians and especially intelligence officers, we make poor profits. But through my study, maybe our next war, or at least parts of our next war, was foreshadowed or fought 40 years ago. A big point as overall military historian, was this the asian corps that we missed? Not to give you a lecture on medieval warfare, but in 1415, an unnumbered English force beat a numerically superior French force, composed mostly of mountainous mountain knights through muscle-fueled firepower, through arrows. And cavalry charges did not go away after that, but their character changed for centuries on after that. So were the Falklands as devastating as a lesson as asian corps was? So going over the lessons here, it's easy when I'm here in my basement office, air conditioning to talk about these human losses. But for those of us who are combat veterans who've seen gunfire or smelt death, right? These echo different lessons to us. So I make no light, easy light of these lessons here. So the loss of the Sheffield later, the conveyor, the battle on St. Carlos also felled to exocet anti-ship cruise missiles, and then Glenn Morgan by a land-based one. And the Chinese, they're very, very interested in this. They state, when Argentina fired the exocet and sank that advance to warship, that this changed the method of naval warfare. So they particularly pay attention to this. And I'm wondering if we have, or if we should do it more. Also, what if Argentina had more than five exocets? Would this have changed the outcome? And then just recently, within a few weeks ago, these lessons learned, now lessons confirmed with a Russian ship. So my little harbinger of doom preview for this is perhaps the burning hulks of the Sheffield, the conveyor and the Glenn Morgan, and now the Moskva, and the brigades of Russian vehicles on the Rosikiev are about a preview trailer. These horrifying images might only be preview for the horrific bloodbaths that await the next conventional contests. Perhaps we should pay heed to these images as a new no man's land consisting not only of hundreds of yards, but rather thousands of kilometers. And the issue with this is anti-service cruise missiles are even more lethal now. No longer 72 kilometers, about the 400. And if you put them on an aircraft, they can go well over 1,000 kilometers. I traveled now a mark for. So the problem in this entire paper is that we're at a time where technology far outweighs the tactics or doctrine. And when this happens in the American Civil War, or in the Great War, the 20th century of World War I is the casualties are devastating. The first few months of World War I had devastating casualties. And then the death toll drops dramatically as trenches are introduced. So is this a new no man's land? Right, as we approach it no longer hundreds of meters as in the Great War 20th century, but thousands of kilometers. And are we prepared to make a way through here? And what will be the cost of our forces as we move west into Pacific or in other places? Briefly, we'll take a look at a few lines from theorists. Klaus Witz, especially if you say land warfare or any type of warfare, most of you start with this. And he states that theory is indebted to the last war. But have we seriously begun to pay off this debt? Or is the Falklands War or the Moscovite, will this be a payday loan? Which will incur interest that we will not be prepared to pay. Or when we do pay, will cost hundreds if not thousands of lives. This quote here, right? He's recognizing this where distance matters in the French Revolution. But these will continue to get more and more lethal and harder to detect as time goes on. The issue with technology is that they come with the destruction manuals, not doctrine. And I think through dissecting the Falklands War and even the recent lessons in the Black Sea, we should take a close look at doctrine and ask ourselves, are we ready? Our anti-ship cruise missiles, the great equalizer of war, right? As in David Goliath, will having this weapon system give places whether they're great power or not, the ability to compete in an international form or even against great powers? And then finally for Klaus, what he mentions, the defensive form is stronger. Is this still true in the modern era? With respect to Ukraine, we're seeing essences of this, but we don't know yet, but we must dissect what lessons we have. With respect to Julian Corbett, he says here, right? Theory is not the silver bullet, right? There are no silver bullets in history, but they'll help us make sure our plan covers all the ground. So hopefully we can make sure our theory and doctrine can reflect this modern day threat. He's, Corbyn also talks about the command of the sea, right? We don't necessarily have to have fleets there, right? It's where the weapons systems can inflect their influence in the seas. So we need to study that as our adversaries are. And then finally with Mahan, he says, we have experimental knowledge and practically none as fleets adapt. The falcons, this is all we have of a modern maritime conflicts is the battle midway. So we should continue to look at this and hopefully if our doctrine does not reflect it yet, we should ensure that. And also what is the weather gauge of 21st century that Mahan writes about? Is it this kill chain, right? The ability to identify, to track, to target, weaponize and finally kill. Whoever do that faster and faster and the falcons has many examples of that. Finally, some solutions, which are around in my paper and other academics, right? The idea of drone swarms to overwhelm or pickets, right? Less ships, not just carriers or frigates, but maybe even Coast Guard cutters that have anti-ship cruise missiles themselves to counter the enemy. There's really a panel of operational art, right? We can't just go for phase lines, we might have to go step by step. And also a theorist from the East, right? All warfare is based on deception. So as we enter the 21st century of the multi-domain environment, it is harder and more difficult to hide. But while we can be seen, we can also, while we can't trick the sensors as much, maybe we can deceive enemy commanders, right? By taking an indirect approach to make our true intent not known of what we're going. So do we teach in our doctrine or to our commanders? Brief and long bows of 21st century, right? Not just anti-ship cruise missiles, but with javelins and then most recently where they tracks on drones of the Black Sea, something to be looked at. So in all, taking back the middle of the times, how did David B. Goliath, right? It wasn't as big, but using that muscle fuels firepower. So this can be for example, Ukraine against Russia, but what happens when Goliath chooses to sling over the spear with respects of great powers like China? So in all, we do not yet have a battle-tested doctrine to face this threat. So it's vital for us to learn from these lessons and not violently charge into the TV enemy. We should definitely not seek to remake the Psalm of the 21st century. So with that, I think I'm briefly over time. The big question I'll leave you with here is when you think about the past wars, when you think about the theorists, maybe we need new theories and new theorists, maybe someone that was sitting here on this panel and asked ourselves, are we ready for the next war? Thank you. Thank you so much. So that brings us to the end of the presentations and we've still got a little bit of time before the closing remarks. So we do have an opportunity to have some questions and get a bit of a discussion going. It would be great if the panelists who've just spoken could appear so that we can see each other in the discussion if your bandwidth allows it. So thank you all once again. I'm checking in the Q&A box and there is a question from Peter Hoard that I think was a bit specific where he asked, the Franks report says there was no intelligence warning of the Argentine invasion. When police did kind of clap and Major General Tomseprous hear about the invasion. I don't know if anybody knows the specific response to that very specific question, but I wanted to flag it. And if a panelist does know, give me a wave. Yes. Yeah, I got one for you. So the British intelligence assessment a year out, gave warning that the Argentina junta might use force. Yeah, I have it right here. I can share with you. Well, I can just talk it through here. The JIC assessment, so this is the British assessment here. If negotiations continued to fail, there'd be a high risk of it resorting to forcible measures against British interests. In such circumstances, military action or full scale invasions of Auckland's could not be discounted. And when I teach this, I kind of talk about sometimes strategic misconceptions can outweigh the live intelligence, simply believing that they're not willing to do it. So that's one instance of a strategic warning. Thank you. And Peter said that he had a second question, but it hasn't come up. Is Peter on the call? Would you like to submit your question maybe in the chat or let us know. And in the meantime, in the meantime, pose a question to the panel. So we had, I mean, all your talks are absolutely fantastic. I did notice towards the last two, perhaps we could, there was some, I don't want to say negativity, but there are some troubling themes that emerged. You know, we talked about, people talking about vulnerability. And Anthony is asking us, you know, are we really ready for the next war? Are we paying the debt of previous conflict? So maybe I'd ask from the, from studying this new research and the directions you panellists are taking your studies in, do you think the lessons give you course to be optimistic about us learning the lessons in the future direction of warfare? Are you thinking there's much more to be done before we can turn that into a more glass helpful perspective? What are your thoughts? As we reflect on the anniversary? Yes, David. Yeah, just very briefly. I think I touched on it in mind. There's a, an ever present need for ship designers to keep those lessons in people's minds. I think we go through cycles. We learn lessons, we write reports, we change standards, we improve things. From the Royal Navy's perspective, the pinnacle of this, I think, was Type 45. There are features in Type 45, which have come directly out to the Faulkner's conflict, which have made that the most survival surface escort that we've built since the end of the Second World War. And then having reached that pinnacle, the lessons are 20, 30, now 40 years in the past. And people question whether they're relevant. And there's this inevitable, do we really need to do that? Do we really need to spend that money? Can we use that material that, yeah, maybe it burns, but hey, it's cheaper than this other stuff. Hey, and we're a cost count project. So we're always having to fight that battle. I think Kip spoke about cost as a hurdle as well in your presentation. But yes, you wanted to come in as well, Kip. Yeah, I think just to add, I think a lot of studying this conflict too and conflicts like it, just remind us that when we're looking for the so-called lessons learned to be applied, a lot of it depends on the questions that we ask of the conflict itself. In the Navy's case, I don't think the officers and analysts who looked at it were being dishonest in the way they evaluated the conflict. But the question they asked was one that would reaffirm or validate the plan that they had with the 600 ship Navy for the United States and so on. And it's always interesting, David Fitzgerald, a political scientist, he asked this question of counterinsurgency doctrine. But I think the idea of lessons learned applies is that the lens of which we look back on conflict seems to change across our own lived experience. I think that phenomenon is interested and it's one that as historians, we have to always remind ourselves about. And I have, Chris. Two points that I feel are in line with your challenge, you just issued. Firstly, the whole nature of seaborn trade has not in any way diminished. It's always going to take up a very big part of maritime activity. And even when we talk about countries like China, which is a potential aggressor in the future, we have enormous maritime trade arrangements with them even so. And I think we haven't thought through how do you balance those things in a practical sense? That's point one. The other one is one that was made by an earlier speaker and that is the very low cost and ubiquitous availability of uncrewed vehicles of all kinds. And the fact that they can be easily weaponized and used in swarms and other collaborative ventures. And I challenge my younger colleagues, are you actually wargaming this? So are you going through the modeling of dealing with that situation? And I haven't been reassured at all by the responses I've been receiving. End of comment. Thank you very much. Yes, David. I just like to say without going into any specific details, the answer to that last question is, yes, we are wargaming it. We also got a wargaming network at Kings, maybe there should be some Kings UCL unexpected teaming up on this. It could be the conflict that actually unites the university. Funnily enough, we are down at Kings next Monday. Brilliant. And so we're almost out of time, but I thought I'd give the floor to you if there's one more question or anything anybody else wants to raise. Yes, Adrienne. I just had a question for Louise. Listen to a very interesting presentation. I mean, are you at heart saying that much of the US attitude to the Falklands War and eventual kind of swing towards the UK, supporting the UK, came out of cultural prejudice against Latin Americans in general and Argentine specifically? Thanks to your question. I think it plays a significant role in the way in which Hague is handled both in London and Buenos Aires. I recognise it's not the main overarching feature, but I do think it plays a significant role and deserves more attention than it has been afforded, particularly if you think when Reagan was born, what he lived through and Weinberger and obviously Hague himself as well, allying with Thatcher. They're all part of that sort of World War II or post-World War II and World War II generation. And I think they haven't been lost on them that the sacrifices that had been made in the Second World War. And no Argentina doesn't declare war on the Axis powers until March 1945, I think, and doesn't break off relations with the Axis powers until something like January 4th or 4th. So I think sort of that sense as well, particularly of very prominent Nazis, for example, Mengele, who they didn't realise had died in 79. They believed he was still alive in Argentina in 1982. So the fact that they were sort of harboring Nazis is brought out in the US press as well, which I didn't put into the talks of sort of space and time, but the press did weigh quite heavily on the Reagan administration's decision, I think, as well, because if they hadn't supported the British and ultimately like officially, because I do realise they were supporting them sort of militarily from around the 2nd, 3rd of April. But in terms of gaining weaponry, et cetera, particularly Weinberger, but if they hadn't supported the British, there might have been sort of a threat and repercussions from the press turning against the Reagan administration. I hope that answers your question. Thanks very much. Thanks very much. So the very last question in the chat comes from Joshua Downe, who's asked, thinking of perspectives that may be less explored, how has the role and function, status, et cetera, of the Falkland Islands Defence Force changed since 1982? Does anybody want to weigh in on this one? Perhaps one left for us to go away and think about. He's given us some homework for after the webinar. And so Joshua, we'll hang on to that and have a think. Well, Tom's coming in and said much more professional, so at least that's a good sign. And hopefully talks like this and the sessions today will only add to that into lessons learned as we've been talking about. So please let me take a moment to just thank you all so much for your presentations, David, John, Louise, Antonio, Kip, Adrian, Christopher, they were all absolutely brilliant. And it's so exciting to see the range of new research that's coming out on such a diverse panel, working on so many different topics, spanning from BUS to Australia. We've managed to keep Christopher awake even across the time zone. So I think it's testament to your presentations and your energy. And so after this, do go out and buy Adrian and Louise's books as they come out. And just before that, I'll pass to James to do the closing remarks. And thank you again, James, for organising this. It's been absolutely brilliant. Down to all your hard work. Thank you, Hilary. It's been a pleasure. And I think it's fair to say some excellent papers and discussion here. Just some thoughts. And I gathered quite a few, so a good sign of how good our presentations are today. It was fitting our final panellist is a King's PhD student who's starting out. And he ended with a question, are we ready for the next war? And to think of Klauschritz and Sir Julian and Mahan, they spent entire careers looking at questions such as this. But in the British context, Sir Julian Corbett reminds us that for an island nation, maintaining the peace is our primary objective. And certainly the British way of doing that and the British way of war is by the presence of a sea power around the world. We set out with this Falcon's 40 event offer up some new perspectives and research. And I think it's fair to say we've covered a massive spectrum of discussion and this is a real healthy sign for the future. I've no doubt that research and witness statements will continue to be released, published and developed from both sides of the conflict. We've discussed an awful lot. I think in Western terms would probably be the way of putting it, Britain, America, Europe and Commonwealth as well. But there is work being done by academics in South America and the Brazil Institute in Kings, I know which is covering this quite a bit. So, and that's very illuminating to see what is thought in South America and Argentina. So there's no doubt that new research will be published. I know the focus will remains a popular thesis topic for bachelor students and master students in war studies. The war continues to be a source of debate in education and have a role to play in military education. And I know we have PhD researchers who will have the advantage of distance and time for events to continue to expand our knowledge and the wider history of the Falkland Islands. We look very closely at 1982 but of course the Falkland Islands have a far longer heritage range but it's back to the age of sale, the period of exploration, industrial revolution and particularly the First World War. We've just passed the centenary of the First World War but I know I'm certainly looking forward to seeing all of this research in the public domain. I am very grateful to the high representative for his time today that we heard at the beginning and our academics, of course, are thankful for the service of our veterans and current service personnel. Also a big thank you to my colleagues, Dr. David Jordan Griffa, have been a pleasure to work with you and often overlooked our admin staff at Kings who really do help out by the scenes and dare I say they also tolerate us academics as well. But on that note, thank you for attending. We will have a recording on the Kings War Studies YouTube channel in the future. We're going to include a few additional interviews and papers with that so please give us a bit of time to get that online and on that note, thank you very much. Thank you, James. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks everyone, it's been a fascinating afternoon. Good night.