 Most happy to welcome our second speaker of this session. So Jayendra Soni who does not need any introduction yet. Let us say that not only he has extensively written on earlier giant authors such as Umas Vati and Kunda Kunda, but also he's working on later authors such as Prabha Chandra and Vidya Nandi in which there should be way more references to Buddhism. So Professor Soni today will offer us a presentation on the Vidya Nandi's discussion with the Buddhists on Svasam Vedana Pratyaksha and Pramana. So thank you. I'm not in this case. So thank you very much indeed. It is always a pleasure to be here and even a great honor. This presentation is a continuation of a short study that in 1999 was one of the earliest albeit brief textual studies on the scholar monk Vidya Nandi of the 10th century. It was based on a small section of his commentary, the Tattvartha Shloka Vartika on Umas Vati's Tattvartha Sutra 1.6. Unfortunately, I do not have to say anything more about the Tattvartha Sutra. The paper at that time dealt mainly with Vidya Nandi's rejection of the Buddhist view that only parts of an object are directly open to perception and that the object as a whole cannot be cognized in an unmediated way. In order to better follow the context in which Vidya Nandi dealt with the theme, I had briefly discussed some aspects of the problem with reference to Dharmakirti because Vidya Nandin quotes him. Dharmakirti, on the other hand, is unthinkable without Dignagar. And further, when dealing with the universals and particulars, the views of these two Buddhist giants also had to be briefly contrasted with the Nyaya Veshasika perspective, which I did. Vidya Nandin's commentary on this sutra entails a total of 56 shlokas with a prose vartika on each invading various lengths, ranging from a line or two to a couple of pages, sometimes combining shlokas, mainly two of them together. In 1999, I had dealt with the first 10 shlokas and their vartikas, showing how Vidya Nandin sees the Pramanas and Nyayas as respectively yielding a knowledge of the universal and of the particular, for which he uses the synonymous pairs, Aamshin, Ava Yava and Ava Yavin, arguing that an object as a whole from the Jain point of view is no less real than its visible parts. I am now, today, limiting myself here to some aspects related to the concept of Swasamvedana, Pratyaksha and Pramana in his commentary to this sutra, 1.6. I am particularly keen on knowing where Vidya Nandin obtained his basic ideas from, which allowed him to effectively direct them against the Buddhists. In vindicating the statement of the sutra he is commenting on, Vidya Nandin emphasizes the point that a Pramana is not a Nyaya because they serve two separate epistemological functions. In objecting to the Buddhist view, Vidya Nandin appeals finally to perception, which the Buddhist also accepts as a Pramana and crunches the argument by saying, at the end, the object as a whole is clearly perceived as a single gross object like its parts. In his lengthy vartika to this stanza, Vidya Nandin immediately then goes on to tell the Buddhists that the notion of an object as a whole is not a superimposed conceptual or mental construction. It is not a Kalpana, meaning thereby that the object as a whole really exists. It was here that I located two quotations from Dharmakirti's Pramana vartika. In commenting on this sutra, Vidya Nandin is obviously adopting a position that by his time became traditional about Pramana furnishing a cognition that is comprehensive and naya a limited one in determining its object only partially. Indeed, he's indebted to his predecessors for this insight and such a debt is not unique to Vidya Nandin because it is found in practically all the Indian traditions. This debt, however, takes on a special significance when in the spirit of discussion and debate, it is further developed and used effectively to contest an idea or an opponent and not merely utilized to simply explain a concerned point. Vidya Nandin seizes the opportunity to apply some of his predecessors' insights when debating with the Buddhists and the others. So for our purposes now, let us briefly see what Umaswati, Pujapada and Akalanka say on this very same sutra in order to set this record straight with regard to Vidya Nandin's reliance on them. This I had omitted previously. In his auto commentary to the Takvata Sutra 1.6, Umaswati says that both the twofold pramanas, so paroksha and pratyaksha, and the nayas, negama, et cetera, will be dealt with later. Hence, here, there is nothing significant by Umaswati on his own sutra. Vidya Nandin only defends it and is indebted to him for the sutra itself. Pujapada is a bit more specific in his Satvarta Siddhi commentary to the sutra where he strives in a brief way to draw a clear distinction between the crucial terms in the sutra, pramana and naya. Pujapada begins by saying that pramana is mentioned first in the sutra because it is more important than the word naya with lesser syllables. And here he is showing his acquaintance with panini. He then makes a special effort to clearly distinguish between the roles, saying that a pramana cognizes an object as a whole and naya, only its specific state, namely a part of it. So it is clear that Vidya Nandin utilizes this point against the Buddhists. This is what Pujapada says in a part of his commentary to Tatvarta Sutra 1.6. It has been said, after grasping an object through pramana, naya determines the object accurately according to its specific state. Further, a pramana grasps the object as a whole. Thus it has been said, pointing out the whole rests on a pramana, pointing out a part of it rests on naya. I'm interested in these two quotations that Pujapada gives. The Hindi commentary and explanatory translation says that they are argama quotations. What is intriguing for me is that the first of these is no longer retained, kept alive, but the second one is. And I meant, I'm showing this to you because perhaps some of you recognize from which argama it might be. Pujapada then goes on to talk about naya, dravya arthika naya, and pariyal thika naya, omitting gunar thika naya. And he says at the end of what I'm showing you here, all these dravya pariyaya and the aspects related to them are to be known through pramana. So naya is to be known through pramana. Vidyanandin obviously relies on Pujapada for this basic view that the pramanas and nayas are different in their roles, as the sutra itself implies. And also that these roles can be insightfully associated with the knowledge of universals and particulars respectively. It is interesting that in his Sarvathasiddhi commentary, Pujapada speaks of the two nayas, dravya arthika naya and pariyar thika naya. And the question is how to relate these to universals and particulars. What is the difference between, for example, pramana grasping the object as a whole and the naya called dravya arthika naya? At the end of the quotation, Pujapada says that the nayas are to be known through pramana. We know that in Jainism, a dravya, it's guna and it's pariyaya thematically belong together. So substance quality and it's mode or modification. Pujapada takes these into consideration when commenting on the sutra by clearly distinguishing between the roles of the pramanas and the nayas. Whenever these were first mentioned in the Jainic tradition. The statements attributed to the argamas have not been identified. And for my purpose, this is all I want to say about Pujapada. Perhaps we can talk about that more in the discussion. Akalanka's commentary that that part the rajavartika on this sutra is in five pages divided into 14 sections of the critical editions that are used and is thus more elaborate than Pujapada. In section three, Akalanka repeats Pujapada's second unidentified quotation but omits Pujapada's quotation beginning pragriha pramanataha. It is noteworthy that in his tatvata shloka vartika vidyanandin also omits the one quotation, but refers to the other when commenting on the same sutra in his vartikas to 1621 to 1645 and also in other places. For example, ashtasahastri yuktyanushasanatika in two places. So how do I know about all these places? And it might be interesting for you to know that I wish to thank Himaltrika for this information. He has a very valuable resource, the Digital Corpus of Vidyanandin's works. It enables a search for the word, a phrase or parts of them, the search function is generally made available online. So I thank Him for His help here. In the last section, Akalanka uses the word trayakara, the threefold form of the grasper, the appearance of the object and the role of consciousness. His commentary here is very brief and I wonder whether he is hinting at a crucial issue in Yogachara epistemology, namely the doctrine of tri-svabhava, dealing with the triple nature of existence and the problem of reality and appearance with the intricate discussion of the status of the object in relation to the manner in which it is known, namely the distinction between the object out there and the object as it is known. Akalanka is evidently presenting the Buddhist view that consciousness, Vidyana, bears or carries in itself only the form, the akara of the object and not the object itself which is out there. The word samviti, which he uses, is a synonym for samvedana or awareness and swa samvedana or self-awareness is involved in the mechanism of how we cognize things and it implies that cognition is self-valid. It does not need another cognition for its admissibility and legitimation. Vidyana then takes up these points in his commentary to the sutra in more detail than Akalanka, as we shall see. Akalanka also briefly deals with other views and the general trend of his commentary seems to be that the Jainas are not irrational and that their ideas are compatible with those of Sankhya, Vaisheshika and the Buddhists. Akalanka implies, as the key words to section 14 say, that neither the Buddhists nor the others can object to Jaina views because there is no incompatibility in all the utterances. It seems here that in this commentary to Tathātasruta 1.6, Akalanka is unusually conciliatory in saying that the Jaina views can be reconciled with what the others say. This conciliatory tone applies probably only in the context of the mechanism of the process of knowing what we know, not in the ontological context of there being a permanent conscious principle, the jiva, which for the Jainas in the final analysis enables cognition and a knowledge of the Jaina Siādvāda. Vidyādandin is much more forthright in his commentary and even more detailed on the same sutra. And although one can see his debt to his immediate predecessors, especially Akalanka and Puja Pada, it is clear that he adds other insightful dimensions to the ideas related to epistemology and ontology and to the Buddhist position itself. It is known that several ideas in Buddhism are not uniform. For example, the concept of Svarasamvedana, the definition of Mano Vidyāna, and its relation to Manasa Pratyakṣa, to name but just two. The concept of Aleya Vidyāna in Yogacara would be an added topic in Buddhism. To obtain a clear picture of the development of these ideas and other intricate details in Buddhism and to back them up by textual evidences is even for the Buddhist scholar, a major task. It demands a thorough study not only of the Gnāga and Dharmakirti, but also of Vasubhanu and the Sautantrika influences, apart from Nyāya Vaisesika. With a basic acquaintance of the Buddhist ideas, I am trying now to follow Vidyānandin's main line of argument. What I'm attempting here is to see how he interprets specific Buddhist ideas and not to investigate how his presentation of them may or may not correspond to a Buddhist text or tradition he might be referring to. It is well known that in Indian scholarship, ideas are often mentioned just for the sake of argument and are not necessarily direct quotations. You are lucky if you find a couple of them. Often the poor Vapaksha is not clearly identifiable. Moreover, it seems that at times, Vidyānandin springs quickly between the major ideas of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, perhaps even including Sautantika nuances. Further, the shades of differences among them, without specific references, makes the task of following Vidyānandin all the more difficult and complicated. Once again, I'm confronted with the thought that Jain philosophy without an insight into the other schools is incomplete and indeed vice versa, that a study of the other schools will be incomplete without also stating Jain ideas either as a contribution or as a critique. The term Sversamvedanā, with its synonym Sversamviti, is indeed a complex one and the dictionary meaning is knowledge derived from the self. In its technical application, it is variously translated as self-apprehension, self-cognition or self-awareness. It also seems to be generally accepted that the concept of self-awareness is by no means uniform in the Buddhist tradition. The main thrust in interpreting it is that self-awareness entails a cognition of itself, that cognition is aware of itself as cognizing an object and that this cognition itself is the result, the pillar of cognition. A special issue of the Journal of Indian Philosophy was dedicated to the topic of Sversamvedanā in 2010 edited by Birgit Kellner. Among the thought-provoking articles in it is one by Dan Arnold and I cannot help withholding a footnote I wrote in this presentation here where I say that his article seems to have an anachronistic starting point and is like the proverbial cart being put before the horse. Dan Arnold says on page 329, we can then usefully equip ourselves with some conceptual tools for reading Dignaga and his Indian followers and critics by briefly considering Franz Brentano and David Hume to exemplify certain aspects of a perceptual understanding of self-awareness and by then considering the sense it makes to say that one of Kant's main transcendental arguments against Hume is in the service of an essentially constitutive understanding thereof. And I must say that without this mattering of Buddhism that I have I wouldn't have understood his perceptual understanding and his constitutive understanding. Should one not rather say that Dignaga's and Dharmakirti's conceptual tools help in understanding Brentano and the others when one reads or re-reads him, especially when one tries to make fruitful comparisons. Anyway, this just by way of an aside. The key term Swar Sambhvedana is unmediated direct cognition. It is a kind of production and it is said to have been introduced into debates on logic and epistemology by Dignaga in the fifth or sixth century. It was further developed and elaborated by Dharmakirti soon thereafter. Since then it continued to occupy a prominent place in the debate on epistemological matters, not only specifically for Buddhism but also for Indian thought generally. Vasubandhu's earlier works also feature prominently in Buddhist epistemology since the time of Dharmakirti and Dignaga. Without going into the details of the differences with regard to Dignaga and Dharmakirti and there are several differences between them, we can note here, Dharmakirti's four kinds of direct cognition, each being called a specific type of pratyaksha. There is a big debate about whether these four are also traceable in Dignaga. The four pratyakshas that he mentions are Indriya Pratyaksha, Manasa Pratyaksha, Swar Sambhvedana Pratyaksha and Yogi Pratyaksha. So I'm of course interested in Swar Sambhvedana Pratyaksha which is self-awareness for example of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure and pain and also a self-awareness of every cognition. Let us delve into perception a little bit. Pratyaksha is by and large the cognition derived through the sense organs and their respective objects seen generally as being direct without anything intermediary between the object and the perception of it. The senses, the Indriyas are the instruments through which the perception takes place enabling us to cognize and identify the object as such and such a thing. However, the instruments themselves, the Indriyas cannot be said to account for the cognition as such namely for the knowledge, for the Prama or the Pramiti of the object as something. For this consciousness needs to be acknowledged, a conscious principle that is inalienably associated with the cognition process. The crux of the matter is that Vidyanandin in this commentary to this sutra is using the generally accepted view that the entire Pratyaksha process is a direct one and regarded by all schools as the only unmediated means of cognition and that it is the basis of all other means like Anumana and so on. You need Pratyaksha even when you use Anumana as a Pramana. In the debate it is assumed in the background so in Vidyanandin's background and indirectly thematized here that for the Jainas cognition finally takes place because of the inalienable role of the Jiva. When Vidyanandin deals with Swasam Vedana in his commentary to the sutra he leaves out the intricacies of Manasa Pratyaksha which has been referred to as a conundrum in the Buddhist Pramana system and about which there is an ongoing concern also in special issue that I mentioned. Vidyanandin sees Swasam Vedana as the most important kind of Pratyaksha Pramana highlighting it not only because it is the basis of every cognition but also to bring out the element of consciousness intrinsically associated with it when we cognize an object. In this sense he is taking the compound Swasam Vedana as a genitive Tat Purusha to mean an awareness of one's self of the conscious principle which is responsible for the awareness at all and awareness of its inalienable role finally. In epistemological matters the status of the external object is crucial for both the Jainas and the Buddhists. The Jainas are realists and so they acknowledge the existence of the external object allied with their acceptance of universals and particulars which are also revealed in cognition. As for the Buddhists the matter is quite complex and complicated. Matthew Capstein, I hope that he would be here gives a succinct account of the issues involved in the inquiry into our knowledge of the external world. He says, while Dignagar held that the objects of our perceptions are particulars bearing unique characteristics his concept of the particular becomes the point of departure of a number of difficult questions. Is the object that we perceive actually something that exists out there in the world just as we perceive it or is it or is the object something that arises within our sensory field perhaps corresponding to an external object that served as a stimulus but not in fact identical to it or is the object exclusively an object of consciousness on the basis of which we construct the idea of an external world that does not exist in reality. As depressing as what this all demands in our study of Vidyanandin with regard to the Buddhists let us in any case see how all these aspects that I dealt with above are encapsulated in three shlokas of Vidyanandin's commentary to this Tattvata Sutra 1.6 where the word swasamvedana occurs. We barely have time now to briefly look at them in concluding this work in progress. Vidyanandin says, if the pratyaksa that is swasamvedana is the only real pratyaksa then why is there no proof for a sentient principle which has the form of aamshah aamshin? The reference to aamshah aamshin I think is a reference to Dravya, Vuna and Pariyaya which applies not only to Jiva Dravya but also to Ajiva Dravya. The second shloka where the word appears is if even the accumulated knowledge is such an error, then what is without error? Because otherwise the evident self-awareness would not make known the cognition and the atoms out of which the object is made up. This in itself would be a theme for the paper. And my final example of how we use swasamvedana is like the external objects here in our cognition of the objects of the world, self-awareness is never what is bereft of the parts which make up the whole because perception makes known the one thing with its parts both the external and internal objects. Thank you very much for your kind attention. Thank you very much for your lecture. And I think the project to tackle the many, many consequences of the integration of a non-realist stance into a realistic one is a fascinating project. So is there any question on this or I myself have to process a bit on this? So yes, you do have a... As the James are concerned, there's no problem about it. But when you're comparing it with the Buddhist, then you are getting into a maze of different positions. I think if we take just Vidyanandin as a Jaina alone, we have no problem. But he discusses the others as well. And that's where we end up with all this talk. There are other questions. We have two minutes left. Yeah. According to the definition that is given in the Sankyakarika, it was mentioned, whatever does not have consciousness. According to the, yeah, so this table, for example, would be regarded as unconscious as a thing, yeah. The jainists say that all the elements are animated through the jivas that inhabit them. So the body is material. It becomes animated through the jiva, the conscious element that is in a living being. That would be the distinction. If there is no living being, then the object is inanimate. I'm only presenting to you what the Indian think of it. Okay, over the last quick, yeah. Yeah, but prana itself is not jiva. It is a prana is material. I wouldn't say prana is present in the jiva, but chetana is. And chetana and prana are two different things, I think. I think that would be an extension. I think the basic point is chetana. If something else is added to chetana, then I think this would not belong to the Swabhava of chetana. Okay, thank you very much again. And no last but not least, our youngest and very promising scholar is to close this day. I'm just happy to welcome my colleague, Elaine de Yonker, starting a PhD in Ghent University with Eva de Klerk on the conception of the other in Jainism. And today she will talk about the examination of the Buddhists in Amitagati's Dharma Pariksha, a reflective look on Jaina criticism. Early in my PhD, you noticed that my title has changed a bit and also the content since I've written the abstract because at that time I was still really starting with the whole thing. So as we all know, the Jain tradition never developed in an isolated environment but instead was confronted with and influenced by all sorts of ideas and practices that were circulating in the subcontinent. Many texts give evidence of these context between the Jain and other traditions, be it oppositional or not. The Dharma Pariksha, on which lies the focus of my PhD, is an example of how the Jains dealt with their others, especially with the dominant Hindu tradition. More specifically, this text deals with the Hindu Puranic and epic stories by criticizing them in a satirical way. As such, the text can be placed in a tradition of the Jain Puranas and Jain versions of Mahabharata and Ramayana. Other than this, the Dharma Pariksha is also often compared to the Dhurta Kiana by Hari Bhadra, because next to having a similar content and structure, both texts are somewhat special in that they are satirical towards religion, which is not that common or does not seem to be that common in the Indian tradition. Using stories in satire to criticize other religious traditions, the Dharma Pariksha was most likely to be read or to be heard by a Jain lay audience, with the goal of converting them or directing them back on the correct path. Of the Dharma Pariksha, there are several versions written from at least the 10th century onwards by Vigambara Jains, and there are also some latest Shweta Amara versions. The oldest one was composed in Apabramsha by Harishena in 988 of the Common Era, but Harishena himself states that he based his work on an older version by a certain Jayarama, but up till now this text has not been found. The most popular version of the Dharma Pariksha is the text by Amitagati, written in Sanskrit in 1014 of the Common Era, and this text is also probably based on the same text as Harishena's text was based. And manuscripts of this Sanskrit composition can be found in many collections all over India, at least North India, and it's supposedly also the basis on which later versions have inspired their version. The later versions were written up to the 18th century in Sanskrit Hindi, Gujarati and even Kannada. They seem to have more or less the same content and differ only in language and style. And for this paper I will only focus on the text by Harishena and by Amitagati. The Dharma Pariksha consists of a frame story into which many smaller stories are embroidered, and it tells a story about two Vidyadharas, Vidyarajini possessing humans with the ability to fly in search for the truth, at least according to the Jain religion. One Vidyadhara called Manu Vega is concerned about his friend Pavana Vega because Manu Vega is a devoted Jain and it seems that Pavana Vega has diverged from the right religious path. So in search for help to get his friend back on the right track, he goes to... so he comes down from his mountain and he goes to Ujjain where he meets a Jain monk, Jina Mati. Hearing Manu Vega's problem, Jina Mati advises him to go to Pataliputra, a city dominated by Brahmins, portrayed as experts of the Hindu scriptures. There Manu Vega engages in discussions with the Brahmins proceeding from incredible stories he makes up about his life. What happens is that for every story, the two Vidyadharas take up a different form, as Vidyadharas are able to, before entering the city, thus playing a different character. So upon entering Pataliputra, they are approached by Brahmins who ask them who they are, upon which Manu Vega replies them with an incredible story from his supposed life. When the Brahmins do not believe him, he justifies his story by referring to parallel episodes from the Hindu Puranas or from the Hindu epics. And in this way he proves the inconsistency of Puranic Hinduism. After every such discussion, the Vidyadharas go outside of the city where Manu Vega explains to Pavana Vega some didactic passages on the Jain doctrine. In the end of the Dharma Pariksha, Pavana Vega is converted and he accepts the vow of a Jain layman. So from this plot it's clear that the real venom of the Dharma Pariksha was directed towards the Hindu tradition. It were the Brahmins about which the Jain audience had to know that they had to write the wrong ideas of writing wrong, yes, the wrong conduct and the wrong stories also. And this is made clear in the several sub-stories where we all talk about Madhukara, the Tomara King and the cow, a servant and the aloe for fools and then the pulinda and the skat, etc. Stories that are afterwards compared with Puranic or epic stories such as the story of Yama and Chaya, the sacrifice of Ravana, the birth of Vyasa, etc. And then in the end of the text, in the second to last story, we find a story in which two Buddhists are staged. This is the case both in the text by Amitagati as it is in the text by Harishina. Because the text is about criticizing the Brahmins, we might be wondering why exactly the author chose to stage people from other religious affiliations or why the author on which they base their composition chose to do this. Staging religious others other than the Brahmins has no real functionality in refuting the Hindu tradition. The exemplary stories might be about any kind of person or character. So why exactly are the Buddhists playing a role here? Before going into that question, I first want to explain to you the plot of the story of the two Buddhists. Okay. So in this story, the two protagonists of the Dharamparikshad, Manovega and Pavanavega once again enter the city of Pataliputra, this time dressed up as two Buddhists. So they are Raktapatta in the text. As they enter the city, they are noticed by the Brahmins who approach them to ask them who they are and if they want to discuss with them. Manovega, the devoted chain of the two, tells the Brahmins they are the sons of two Buddhist laymen. Once they were protecting the clothes of Buddhist big shoes that were lying in the sun to dry, when two terrifying jackals came near. Immediately the two sons climbed upon a stupa to flee from the jackals. However, the beasts took up the stupa and flew with it into the sky. The two sons started crying and upon hearing their cries, the big shoes came back outside. Immediately the jackals went even further. It's this 12 or 32 Eugenas where they let the stupa fall down underground. As they were about to devour the two sons, some hunters with dogs and weapons arrived there, scaring away the jackals. Happily saved from these frightening beasts, the two sons decided to start travelling and to become Buddhists amongst themselves. Wandering around, they arrived at Tapata Liputra, the city of the Brahmins. Hearing this absurd story, the Brahmins do not believe the Buddhists and they ask them to stop lying and telling the truth. Manovega, dressed as a Buddhist, he reacts by asking the Brahmins why they do not believe his story as there are also such stories to be found in the Puranas, upon which the Brahmins react that he should tell them what is so in the Puranas if they should believe him. And so then Manovega starts telling the story of the Setubanda from the Ramayana. When Sita is abducted by Ravana to Lanka, Rama wants to get her back and therefore orders his monkey army to go to the south of India and build a bridge crossing the ocean to Sri Lanka. In order to do this, the monkeys lift up mountains and rocks very easily and here is a parallel with the jackals who elevate the stupa. The Brahmins then realize that if they do not believe the story of the Buddhists, they should also not believe the story from their own Ramayana. And after this, Manovega takes Pavanavega outside of the city and explains to him how the Brahmins and their stories are wrong. This is how the story is told in both Harishinas and Amitagatis dharma pariksha. From this telling, we cannot include what opinion the two authors had towards Buddhism. The story does not say anything negative about Buddhism. In the end, the two young lay Buddhists even turn towards the Buddhist way by taking diksha themselves. This might even seem rather positive. Ose, who studied the dharma pariksha together with the Dur Takyana as examples of Indian satire, he thinks that this setting is just a favorable setting for a marvelous story because there are also a lot of fantastic elements in Buddhist stories. And also because the main plot is set in Pataliputra, which is also Buddhist present at a time. The use of Buddhist characters in the story might be completely neutral, although I do found it noticeable that the story comes in the end right before a story about Shwetambaras, which is then the last story. The position and the combination of the two religious others gives the impression that the author wanted at least mention the religious others before ending the composition of dharma. By mentioning these religious groups by giving them certain characteristics they are maybe demarcating their philosophical worlds existing of only those others that are relevant to themselves for their own demilitation. Further, we maybe can see some mockery in here because the story is completely absurd. Two young Buddhists climbing a super and then the super is lifted by two animals. It's not only sense at all. Also their decision to become monks after they were saved does not really have a rational base. So the aspect of mockery is certainly present here but still it's not clear if it was directed towards the Buddhists or just towards the Brahmins. Overall it's hard to draw any conclusions on the why of using Buddhist characters in the story and you might just say that this is just a short idea in refuting the Puranic version of the Ramayana. If both Harishina and Amitagati take up a story I just told in their composition can we see some differences there? So the story in both texts develops in the same way and has almost the same content. So the only differences are that in the beginning of the text Harishina gives a bit more details. He says that the two sons come from the city of Vikrama and East. In the Harishina's text also the jackals fly 32 Ujanas away whereas in Amitagati's text they flee 12 Ujanas away further but that's it and then stylized overall it can be said that Harishina's text is more dynamic and has more quicker dialogues whereas in Amitagati's text we find a lot more metaphors and it feels more contemplative but this might just be a difference in language because Harishina's text is in Abhabramshah. So no, there are no essential differences in both texts and we cannot make any other conclusions on this story from just the comparison of the two. However, a bit further in the Dharmapariksha we do find relevant difference between Harishina and Amitagati related to Buddhism. In the 17th chapter of the Dharmapariksha by Amitagati we find a passage that directly attacks Buddhism. This passage is not fine in Harishina's text and is this a personal addition to the plot by Amitagati. It comes right after the last of the invented stories for which the two Vidyadaras had taken on the form of Shweta Amiras. Where at that point in Harishina's Dharmapariksha Pavanavega asks Manovega an explanation of dharma which is the Jain Dharma. In Amitagati's Dharmapariksha Pavanavega asks his friend to tell him the characteristics, the visualization of the doctrines, Shastra of the Brahmin and others and this is Adi. Upon this question in Amitagati's text Manovega first explains what aspects are wrong in the Brahmanical doctrine and then turns his criticism towards the Buddhists and this is the Adi. For Manovega Buddha's birth out of the armpit of his mother as such breaking her body does not show any compassion but it shows that the Buddhist tradition approves of violence. That the Buddha eats meat also approves that there is no compassion on this tradition. He criticizes the Jataka story in which Buddha sacrifices to a tiger because she would otherwise eat her own cups because this shows that the Buddha lacks of self-control. Then Manovega attacks some trinal aspects of Buddhism. He says that if everything is empty including the Buddha how can there be the establishment of attachment and liberation? If the soul does not exist it remains meaningless and if everything is just momentary then nothing really exists. For these reasons Buddha is only a fool and he cannot have omniscience. So from this passage it is very clear that at least for Amitagati he had a negative attitude towards Buddhism. He does not only find it necessary to explicitly refute the Brahmanical tradition which is the overall goal of the text which is to make sure his audience knows for sure that the Buddhist way is also not the one to follow. Amitagati here uses a more negative structure than Harishena does who in the end wants to convince his audience of the merits of Jainism in a more positive way. Harishena seems to put more trust on the formative power of the stories and for him it is enough to ridicule the Brahmans in order to effectuate the refutability of their tradition. Amitagati on the other hand wants to build a rational base upon which the refutability of the Brahmans and Adi can be proved. He wants to give the audience a reason why. Furthermore by explaining what is wrong in the other traditions he also tells his audience what Jainism is not. In this way he marks the borders of the Jain identity. For Amitagati surely the Buddhists and their ideas and conducts are to be found on these borders. If we think again about the earlier story of the two Buddhists, lay sons in this slide, we are now sure that the story at least for Amitagati did not want to convey anything positive about Buddhism and I also think for the other authors. The idea that the Buddhists are mocked at through this absurd story now seems more likely. However, because the explicit refutation only comes in Amitagati's text there is no direct link between the two so we still cannot say this with certainty. What I do believe we can see in the usage of Buddhists in this story about Ajakles and the Supa is a demarcation of the relevant philosophical worlds. So by naming them and giving them some characteristics, notably at the end of the text, they are marked as a certain religious group with a definite identity. The definition of the Buddhists has some implication. One is that the Buddhists are a group with a definite identity and that it is a different religious tradition. Another is that they are opposed to an us that also has a definite identity. So the author says to his audience something like we are all Jains and we are not like them. Further, the story and especially the refutation in Amitagati's text shows that the Buddhists are still thought of in the 10th and 11th century as part of the Indian philosophical world relevant for the Digambara Jains. They are still important enough and they still pose enough challenge to the Jain identity to argument with and to refute them. Thank you. Thank you for this very lively and most insightful presentation. We still have a few minutes. Does anyone have any question? Yes? Sorry? Yes. I've searched for this. I tried to find the same story somewhere else. I couldn't. I think Jackals also appear in Buddhist stories sometimes. So I think maybe that's the reason why. No? Yes? Yes? Yes? Yes? Yes? Yes? Yeah. Thank you. It was actually one of the things I wanted to do, so thank you. No more questions here. Well, as it is no time to conclude our annual workshop, I would like to thank again all the speakers for their very stimulating and I will now let Peter make the final remarks safely. Yes, not much to add really, except again to thank all the speakers and the audience for the wonderful presentations and discussions. And the remark that, of course, we are planning to, or at least offering the possibility to publish the papers. And as usual in our current frame, we suggest submitting papers to the IJGS, the International Journal of Jena Studies, which is published online here, and individual papers can be published as they come in. And the journal is peer-reviewed, so the publication is not guaranteed, but I think all the papers here were excellent and would brilliantly fit into that journal. And every three years, a print version of the papers that accumulated are published in Mumbai by Hindigrant Karyale. Yes, the speakers are invited for the conference dinner, which will take place at about seven, and we have to walk a little bit. But to maybe possibly thank you, accompany us. So at least two guides, it's better for you who don't have a modern implement and can find through the map the place to follow one of us. Thank you very much for coming, and hopefully next year we see you again.