 I very much appreciated Roger's remarks and I think I agree with the very large majority of them. I've always thought asset prices, the real wealth, had a hugely important impact through the demand side on unemployment and so we very much agree on that. Of course what I've been doing is estimating conditional models which provide partial insights. To solve out for general equilibrium we need to incorporate those conditional models into larger models that allow all the feedbacks to operate but I think they help a great deal in that process. So let me open the floor for a few comments or questions given that the two issues are obviously interrelated so we can also come back at the end to what is being discussed now but we can have a first time for a few comments and I guess we can have a special role that Vitor you always have the right to ask the first question. If you want, no, it's an option. So is there any, no, yes, Philip, please, please be short, Philip. So the shortest I can. Concentration is not a very good measure of market power so you showed that one chart on inflation and that concentration makes a difference in terms of explaining the inflation dynamics in the US, the core inflation. So if you double check that for other market power measures because we know that in macro and in micro if you throw in different measures of competition or market power actually results very easily turn around if you take an IO perspective or more aggregate perspective and so on. So I think it would be very important to be broad and I wonder whether for other measures of market power or then concentration this looks as beautiful as an explanatory variable as it does in that one. We haven't done that. Let me just say two things. One is that the coefficient on concentration is remarkably stable. So we can take the data back to 1977 to show you a relatively short sample but if we can go back further it's completely stable. The Grunau paper shows that the profit margins are highly connected, strongly connected to the level of concentration. So the micro evidence and the profit margins if the gap between cost and revenue is strongly affected by concentration that suggests, you know, circumstantial evidence that there should be a macro effect as well. But you're right, we should certainly explore other measures of market power. Thank you. Any other? I mean, one question I wanted to ask if I can abuse of my position is that in the back and forth between data and modeling that you've described and led you to your conclusions, it's always, there are cycles. No, sometimes theory is leading data, sometimes the data is leading theory and theory catches up, et cetera. And so how would you qualify these current circumstances in terms of what data has to tell us? And let's say the reason I'm asking the question is that we've invested a lot in central banks, including the ECB on building micro databases, matching micro data and bank data in particular, but not only. And now we have a tsunami of big data coming. So that may be a more philosophical question, but how will that shape the way we do modeling looking forward? I'm very enthusiastic about what's coming out of micro data. I mean, as I said, some of the micro evidence that's coming out on credit constraints, liquidity constraints, buffer stock behavior is very consistent with the theoretical work inspired by West Joe's signals that Angus Deaton and Chris Carroll have done. So, you know, the fact is strongly confirmed by the micro evidence is very good. The limitation very often is that panel data are pretty short. So they don't tell you much about what happens when there's a big structural change in the economy. So in other words, we can find, let's say, quite strong housing wealth effects or housing collateral effects in recent U.S. panel data or Australian panel data or Norwegian panel data. But that doesn't tell us how things evolve over time. For that, you need a long history and macro data is all we have in order to discuss long histories. And I think it's very important that modelers look at the long historical record. Part of the reason is that structural breaks happen and by controlling for them in the past to see what effect they have in the past, it makes you more humble about the future. It makes you think, well, there could be another structural breaks, what might it do? What are the implications for financial stability, for example? Thank you very much. Yes, one other one last question. Yes, please. Thank you. I'm happy to see the macro of finance research is moving towards recognizing that perhaps we are phases where the trend that we observe is an excess trend that we revert perhaps to a different equilibrium and different state, which is actually partial correction of an unsustainable path. I think that's part of what we can do to interpret things which is more useful than just assume there is a bad shock and that we need to go back to where we deserve to be because I don't think that's realistic. But here is my question. If that's the case, if we corrected after the crisis and moved to a sort of lower gold trend that is maybe a little more realistic, and the question is what can monetary policy do? Can monetary policy do more than subtract from the future to bring to today, are we affecting the future trend by sort of alleviating the current circumstances? I'd like to answer that question. So let me bundle that question with Yanis Sornar's question. And then we'll come back to John. Thank you. I think we had two excellent presentations. One question for John Mulebauer, the other for Roger Farmer. So the conclusion that the dynamics to hazard journey equilibrium models have failed, more or less failed, does it lead to us to come back to order a few equations more to like one price equation, wage equation plus ISLM? This is my first question. The same question goes to Roger Farmer. Your diagram, which shows the integration between unemployment rate and real wealth. The causality is which from the unemployment rate to real wealth or the other way around? Because I can think of theories justifying both kinds of causality. So this is one of the problems we have in this kind of correlations. Thank you. Yes, are we simply postponing problems to the future through monetary policy? Well, the John Duke diagram of the financial accelerator in the US, I think, made it very clear that if there had not been very strong state intervention, we would have had a crisis worse than the 1930s. So in that sense, I very much agree with Roger. But there are multiple equilibria possible. And policy can shift us to different equilibria. One of the problems of monetary policy, I've been worried about this for years now, probably because of my research on the role of debt and asset prices. If you encourage the buildup of debt through low interest rates, then of course, that subtracts from future consumption. And our models make that a lot more precise than we had before. On the other hand, do nothing leads to the hysteresis issues that Roger was talking about, the decay of capital, the lack of building human capital among the population, and so on. So there's a fine balance between the two. My view, of course, is that fiscal policy should have taken by now much more of the strain, particularly on the investment side, not left so much to monetary policy. On the question of a price wage equation, ISLM, well, I'm not very enthusiastic about simple models. They can provide nice kind of sketches of reality, but without credit markets and understanding the linkages between credit markets and asset prices and the housing market, ISLM really doesn't handle it. So very quickly, so the causality in terms of Granger causality tests runs from the asset markets to unemployment, but there are two ways of thinking about that. So I call one the weather forecast model. So if you go to bed at night and you watch the news and the news says it's going to rain tomorrow, the weather forecast Granger causes the rain, but it's probably not very helpful to issue a directive to the weather forecaster to say it's not going to be raining, instead it's going to be sunny. So that's one view of what's happening. The other is the Cain's beauty contest view, or I call it the think of a forest fire. If you drop a lighted match in a dry forest, you're going to set off a forest fire. If you stop people from smoking, you'll probably prevent forest fires. So the real question is a causal link in the second sense, and my view is yes to that, but that would take much longer to explain. OK, we'll read the book. OK, we'll read the book. And meanwhile, Marcus, you're also for the second part of that.