 The Monodology is one of the latest of the works of Leibniz. Having been written at Vienna in 1714, two years before his death, on this last visit of his to Vienna he had met the soldier prince Eugene of Savoy, who probably through Queen Sophia Charlotte of Prussia had heard of the one great work Leibniz had hitherto published, the Theodicy, which appeared in 1710. Having read the Theodicy, Prince Eugene begged Leibniz to write for him a condensed statement of the main principles of his philosophy. And having obtained this in the form either of what we now call the monodology, or of the principles of nature and grace, he was so delighted with it that he kept it like a jewel in a case, so that his friend, Count Bonneville, wrote to Leibniz, perhaps with a touch of humorous exaggeration, he keeps you writing as the priests of Naples keep the blood of Saint Januarius. He lets me kiss it and immediately shuts it up again in its casket. The monodology was written in French, but it was not published in its original form until 1840, when Erdmann, who had discovered the MS in the Royal Library at Hanover, printed it in his editions of the Philosophical Works of Leibniz. German and Latin translations of it appeared in 1720 and 1721, and it was for a long time combined with the principles of nature and grace. There being some doubt as to which of the two was the treaties written for Prince Eugene. The two writings are similar in scope and intention, and were probably written about the same time. Gerhard holds that the work written for Prince Eugene was not the monodology, but the principles of nature and of grace. The principles of nature and of grace certainly appears to be the earlier of the two. As to its contents, the monodology is to be regarded not as an introduction to the philosophy of Leibniz, but rather as a condensed statement of the principles expressed in many of his philosophical papers, and expounded after a somewhat desultory fashion in the Theodicy. Leibniz himself indicated this fact by putting on the margin of his manuscript of the monodology a series of references to sections of the Theodicy in which his views are more fully expressed. Thus, Erdmann says the monodology is, in the German sense, an encyclopedia of the philosophy of Leibniz, and the full understanding of it presupposes some general knowledge of his thinking. It is not possible rightly to understand it as a first reading. The monodology expounds a metaphysics of substance, and it may, for convenience, be regarded as consisting of two main divisions, in the first of which an account is given of the essential nature of all the substances, created and uncreated, which constitute the reality of the universe, while the second division explains the mutual relations through which they form one world. Section 1 to 48 make up the first of these divisions, the second consisting of 49 to 90. In the first division, three principal parts may be discriminated. A, section 1 through 18, in which the nature of created monads is explained. B, section 19 through 30, in which three great classes of created monads are discriminated. And C, section 31 through 48, in which the transition is made from the highest class of created monads, the self-conscious, to the uncreated monad, God, through the two great principles of reason, that of contradiction and that of sufficient reason. Thus, a philosophic view is taken of the whole universe, considered as a hierarchy of individual beings. The second division of the monodology, in which the mutual relations of substance are more fully explained, may also be subdivided into three principal parts. A, 49 through 60, expounding the general principles of interrelation of substances, through the hypothesis of pre-established harmony, and of the doctrine of the best of all possible worlds. B, section 61 through 82, explaining in more detail the relations of particular classes of substances to one another, in dealing with questions of organism and of the relations of soul and body, including birth and death. And C, sections 83 through 90, in which the whole system of relations is brought to unity in God. The distinction and harmony between efficient and final causes, which has been found to be the basis of the distinction between body and soul, being supplemented by analogous distinction and harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace. That is to say, between God, considered as architect and of the machine of the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine city of spirits. This brief analysis is to be taken merely as a suggestion of the line of thought in the monodology. The texture of the work is so close that it is impossible to make perfectly satisfactory divisions in it. The translation is made from the text given by M. Petru, who has collated the MSS at Hanover and corrected some errors of Erdman. End of prefatory note. The monodology. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recordings by Gary Geck. The monodology by Godfrey Wilhelm Leibniz, translated by Robert Latta. The monodology. One. The monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds. By simple is meant without parts. The Odyssey 10. Two. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds, for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things. Three. Now, where there are no parts, there can be neither extension nor form nor divisibility. These monads are real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things. Four. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by natural means. The Odyssey 89. Five. For the same reason, there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can come into being by natural means, since it cannot be formed by the combination of parts. Composition. Six. Thus it may be said that a monad can only come into being or come to an end all at once. That is to say, it can come into being only by creation and come to an end only by annihilation, while that which is compound comes into being or comes to an end by parts. Seven. Further, there is no way of explaining how a monad can be altered in quality or internally changed by any other created thing, since it is impossible to change the place of anything in it, or to conceive in any internal motion, which could be produced, directed, increased, or diminished therein. Although all this is possible in the case of compounds, in which there are changes among the parts, the monads have no windows through which anything can come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from substances, nor go about outside of them, as the sensible species of the scholastics used to do. Thus, neither substance nor accident can come into a monad from the outside. Eight. Yet the monads must have some qualities, otherwise they could not even be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ in quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any change in things. For what is in the compound can come only from the simple elements it contains, and the monads, if they had no qualities, would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not differ in quantity. Consequently, space being a plenum, each part of space would always receive in any motion exactly the equivalent of what it already had, and no one state of things would be discernible from another. Nine. Indeed, each monad must be different from every other. For in nature, there are never two beings which are perfectly alike, and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference. For at least the difference founded upon an intrinsic quality. Denomination. Footnote. This is the principle of the identity of indiscernible. For Kant's criticism, see critique of pure reason. Probably the first statement of the principle is to be found in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa, 1401 to 1464. He says that there cannot be several things exactly the same. For in that case, there would not be several things, but the same thing itself. Therefore, all things both agree with and differ from one another. Detecta ignorantia. Three. One. Quote. All things must of necessity differ from one another. Among several individuals of the same species, there is necessarily a diversity of degrees of perfection. There is nothing in the universe which does not enjoy a certain singularity, which is to be found in no other thing. Unquote. His theories are full of suggestions of Leibniz. Reference may also be made to a very interesting article by Zimmerman. Nicholas Cusannas Ahl's Vortiver Leibnizens. There is no mention of Nicholas of Cusa in any of Leibniz's philosophical writings. But in a letter to the Akta Eruditorum 1697, Leibniz refers to him as a mathematician. Intrinsic qualities are those which have in themselves example, figure, motion, and the such, while extrinsic qualities are those which arise from their relations to other things. Example, being perceived, desired, and the such. There are some modes which may be called internal, because they are conceived to be in the substance as round, square, and others which may be called external, because they are taken from something which is not in the substance as loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the actions of another, and this is what is called in the school's external domination. End of footnote. 10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, as consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each. Footnote. There is constant change in created substances, even though there may appear to be no change. What appears to us as absence of change is really a very small degree of change. We have here an application of the law of continuity. End of footnote. 11. It follows, from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. Theodicy 396, 400. 12. But besides the principle of change, there must be a particular series of changes, which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple substances. 13. This particular series of changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit, or in that which is simple. For as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged. And consequently, a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts. 14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit, or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called perception, which is to be distinguished from apperception, or consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this matter, the Cartesian view is extremely defective. For it treats as nonexistent these perceptions, of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led them to believe that minds alone are monads, and that there are no souls of animals, nor other intelligies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate from bodies, and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal. 15. The activity of the internal principle, which produces change, or passage from one perception to another, may be called appetite. It is true that desire cannot always fully attain to the whole perception at which it aims, but always obtains some of it and attains to new perceptions. 16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in its object. Thus, all those who admit that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity in the monad, an m-bale, ought not to have found any difficulty in this, as he has done in his dictionary article Raurarius. 17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable on mechanical grounds. That is to say, by means of figures and motions, and supposing there were a machine so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work upon one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus, it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound, or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this, namely, perceptions in their changes, can be found in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all internal activities of simple substances can consist. 18. All simple substances, or created monads, might be called intelligies, for they have in them a certain perfection. They have a certain self-sufficiency, which makes them the source of their internal activities, and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. 19. If we are to give the name of soul to everything which has perceptions and desires, in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances, or created monads, might be called souls. But as feeling is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of monads, or intelligies, should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of soul should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory. 20. Footnote. Memory is thus the sign of consciousness as distinct from unconscious perception. This is in harmony with the view, emphasized by modern writers, that conscious sensation presupposes memory, because we can know one sensation only when it has been brought into comparison with others. Leibniz, in one of his early writings, suggestively remarks that the body is, quote, momentarily mind, i.e., mind without memory, unquote, end of footnote. 20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing, and have no distinguishable perception, as when we fall into a swoon, or when we are overcome with a profound, dreamless sleep. In this state, the soul does not perceptively differ from a bare monad, but as the state is not lasting, the soul comes out of it. The soul is something more than a bare monad. 21. And it does not follow that in this state, the simple substance is without any perception, that indeed cannot be, for the reason is already given, for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned. And when one turns consciously round, in the same way several times in succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make a swoon, and which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can, for a time, put animals into this condition. 22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future. 23. And as, on waking from a stupor, we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them. For one perception can, in a natural way, come only from another perception, as a motion can, in a natural way, come from a motion, the Odyssey 401-403. 24. And it thus appears that if we had our perceptions nothing marked, and, so to speak, striking and highly flavoured, we should also be in a state of stupor, and this is the state in which pheromones are. 25. We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs, which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the air, in order by uniting them to make them have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste, and in touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses which are unknown to us, and I will explain presently how that wish takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs. 26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them, and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led by means of representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in its previous perception, and they come to have feeling similar to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and they howl and run away. 27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many of the oft-repeated ordinary perceptions. 28. Insofar as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals, resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our action, we are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight tomorrow, we do so empirically because it has always so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on the rational grounds. 29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguish us from mere animals, and gives us reason and the sciences, raising us to knowledge of ourselves and of God. Footnote. The necessary and eternal truths are the first principles of all rational knowledge. They are innate in us. They are, in fact, the very principles of our nature, as of the universe, because it is our essence to represent the whole universe. Thus, consciousness or knowledge of these truths is knowledge of ourselves, and it is at the same time knowledge of God, who is the final reason of all things. End of footnote. 30. And it is thus in us that is called the rational soul or mind. 30. It is also through knowledge of necessary truths, and through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of reflection, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that this or that is within us. And thus, thinking of ourselves, we are thinking of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial and of God himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. And these acts of reflection furnish the chief objects of our reasonings. 31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction in virtue of which we judge false, that which involves a contradiction, and true, that which is opposed or contradictory to the false. Theodicy 44 and 169. 32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold, that there can be no real fact or existing, no statement true unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. Theodicy 44 and 196. 33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary. 34. It is thus that in mathematics, speculative theorems and practical canons are reduced by analysis to definitions, axioms, and postulates. 35. In short, there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given. There are also axioms and postulates, in a word, primary principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of proof. And these are identical propositions, whose opposite involves an express contradiction. 36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connection of things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on in endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of past and present forms, and motions, which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing. And there is an infinity of my new tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final cause. 37. And as all this detail again involves, other prior or more detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar analysis to yield its own reason, we are no further forward, and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be. 38. Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source. In this substance we call God. The Odyssey 7. 39. Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also connected together throughout, there is only one God, and this God is sufficient. 40. We may also hold that the supreme substance, which is unique, universal, and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it, this substance, which is pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible. 41. Once it follows that God is absolutely perfect, for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in this strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds and things which are limited, and where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. 42. It follows also that created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. 43. Fort is in this that they differ from God. An instance of this original imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of bodies. 43. It is far the true that in God there is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences. In so far as they are real, that is to say, the source of what is real in the possible. 44. For the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or the ideas on which they depend, and without him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in existence, but nothing would even be possible. Theodicy 20. 44. For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must need to be founded in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is to be actual. 45. Thus God alone, or necessary being, has this prerogative that he must necessarily exist, if he is possible. And as nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this his possibility, is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of God a priori. We have thus proved it through the reality of eternal truths, but a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or sufficient reason only in the necessary being, which has the reason of its existence in itself. 46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on his will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Hoiré, appear to have held. That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is fitness, or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths depend solely on his understanding, and are its inner object. 47. Thus God alone is the primary unity, or original, simple substance, of which all created, or derivative monads, are products, and have their birth, so to speak, through continual vulgarations of the divinity, from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being of whose essence it is to have limits. 48. In God there is power, which is the source of all, also knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of the best. These characteristics correspond to what, in the created monads, forms the ground, or basis, to the faculty of perception, and to the faculty of appetite. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite, or perfect, and in the created monads, or the intelligents, there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of perfection of the monad. 49. A created thing is said to act outwardly, insofar as it has perfection, and to suffer, or be passive, in relation to another, insofar as it is imperfect. Thus activity, action, is attributed to a monad. Insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and passivity, passion, insofar as its perceptions are confused. 50. And one created thing is more perfect than another. In this, that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a priori, what takes place in the less perfect. And it is on this account that the former is said to act upon the latter. 51. But in simple substances, the influence of one monad upon another is only ideal. And it can have its effect only through the mediation of God. Insofar as in the ideas of God, any monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it. For since one created monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent on the other. 52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige him to adapt the other to it. And consequently, what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view. 52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige him to adapt the other to it. And consequently, what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view, active insofar as what we distinctly know in it serves to explain what takes place in another. And passive, so far as the explanation of what takes place in it is to be found in that which is distinctly known in another. 52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige him to adapt the other to it. And consequently, what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view, active insofar as what we distinctly know it serves to explain. What takes place in another insofar as what we distinctly know in it serves to explain what takes place in another. And passive insofar as the explanation of what takes place in it is to be found in that which is distinctly known in another. 53. Now as the ideas of God, there is an infinite number of possible universes. It is only one of them can be actual. There must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads him to decide upon one rather than another. 54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness or in the degrees of perfection that these worlds possess. Since each possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ. 55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that his goodness makes him choose it and his power makes him produce it. 56. Now this connection or adaption of all created things to each and of each to all means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, inconsequently that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. 57. And as the same town looked out from various sides appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects, even so as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes which nevertheless are nothing but aspects of a single universe according to the special point of view of each monad. 58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as possible along with the greatest possible order that is to say it is the way to get as much perfection as possible. 59. Besides no hypothesis but this which I venture to call proved fittingly exalts the greatness of God and this M. Bell recognized when in his dictionary article rararius he raised objections to it in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God more than it is possible to attribute but he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of the universal harmony according to which every substance exactly expressed all others through the relation it has with them. 60. Further in what I have just said there may be seen the reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are for God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part and in particular to each monad whose nature being to represent nothing can confine it to the representing of only one part of things though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things in the whole universe and can be distinct only as regards a small number of things namely those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the monads otherwise each monad would be a deity it is not as regards their object but as regards the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object that the monads are limited in a confused way they all strive after the infinite the whole but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions 61 and the compounds are in this respect analogous with simple substances for all is a plenum and thus all matter is connected together and in the plenum every motion has an effect upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance so that each body not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some way feels the effect of everything that happens to them but is also immediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is in immediate contact where for it follows that this inner communication of things extends to any distance however great and consequently every body feels the effect of all that takes place in this universe so that he who sees all might read in each what is happening everywhere and even what has happened or shall happen observing in the present that which is far off as well in time as in place Cynthia panta as apocrates said but a soul can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly it cannot all at once unroll everything that is unfolded in it for its complexity is infinite 62 thus although each created monad represents the whole universe it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it and of which it is the intelligent and as this body expresses the whole universe through the connection of all matter in the plenum the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body which belongs to it in a special way the odyssey 463 the body belonging to a monad which is its intelligent key or its soul constitutes along with the intelligent key what may be called a living being along with the soul what is called an animal now this body of a living being or of an animal is always organic for as every monad is in its own way a mirror over the universe and as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order there must also be order in that which represents it i.e. in the perceptions of the soul and consequently there must be order in the body through which the universe is represented in the soul 64 thus the organic body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata for a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts for instance the tooth of a brass wheel has its parts or fragments which are for us not artificial products in which do not have the special characteristics of the machine for they give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended but the machines of nature namely living bodies are still machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum it is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art that is to say between the divine art and ours the odyssey 134 146 194 403 65 and the author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely wonderful power of art because each portion of matter is not infinitely divisible as the ancients observed but is actually subdivided without end each part into further parts of which each has the same motion of its own otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe 66 once it appears that in the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures living beings animals and telechies souls 67 each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fishes but each branch of every plant each member of every animal each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden or pond 68 and though the earth and the air which are between the plants of the garden or the water which is between the fish of the pond being either plant nor fish yet they also contain plants and fishes but mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us 69 thus there is nothing fallow nothing sterile nothing dead in the universe no chaos no confusion save in appearance someone as it may appear to be in a pond at a distance in which one would see a confused movement and as it were a swarming of fish in the pond without separately distinguishing the fish themselves 70 hence it appears that each living body has a dominant intelligent which in an animal is the soul but the members of this living body are full of other living beings plants animals each of which has also its dominant and teleki or soul 71 but it must not be imagined as has been done by some who have misunderstood my thought that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it forever and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings which are devoted forever to its service for all bodies are in a perpetual flux like rivers and parts are entering into them and passing out of them continually 72 thus the soul changes its body only by degrees little by little so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs and there is often metamorphosis in animals but never metham psychosis or transmigration of souls nor are their souls entirely separate from bodies nor embodied spirits alone completely without bodies 73 it also follows from this that there never is absolute birth nor complete death in the strict sense consisting in the separation of the soul from the body what we call births are developments in growths while what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions 74 philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms intelligies or souls but nowadays it has become known through careful studies of plants insects and animals that the organic bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrification but always come from seeds in which there was undoubtedly some preformation and it is held that not only the organic body was already there before conception but also a soul in this body and in short the animal itself and that by means of conception this animal has merely been prepared for the great transformation involved in its becoming an animal of another kind something like this is indeed seen apart from birth as when worms become flies and caterpillars become butterflies 75 the animals of which some are raised by means of conception to the rank of larger animals may be called spermatic but those among them which are not so raised but remain in their own kind that is the majority are born multiply and are destroyed like the large animals and it is only a few chosen ones that pass to a greater theater 76 but this is only half of the truth and accordingly I hold that if an animal never comes into being by natural means no more does it come to an end by natural means and that not only will there be no birth but also no complete destruction or death in the strict sense and these reasonings made a posteriori and are drawn from experience are in perfect agreement with my principles deduced a priori as above 77 thus it must be said that not only the soul mere of an indestructible universe is indestructible but also that the animal itself though its mechanism machine may often perish in part and take off or put on an organic slough 78 these principles have given me a way of explaining naturally the union or rather the mutual agreement of the soul in the organic body the soul follows its own laws and the body likewise follows its own laws and they agree with each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances since they are all representations of the one and the same universe 79 souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions ends and means bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or emotions and the two realms that of efficient causes and that of final causes are in harmony with one another 80 day cart recognized that souls cannot impart any force to bodies because there is always the same quantity of force and matter nevertheless he was of the opinion that the soul could change the direction of bodies that is because in his time it was not known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total direction in matter had Descartes noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established harmony 81 according to this system bodies act as if to suppose the impossible there were no souls and souls act as if there were no bodies and both act as if each influenced the other 82 as regards minds or rational souls though I find that what I have just been saying is true of all living beings and animals namely that animals and souls come into being when the world begins and no more come to an end when the world does yet there is this peculiarity and rational animals that their spermatic animalcules so long as they are only spermatic have merely ordinary or sensuous sensitive souls but when those which are chosen so to speak attain to human nature through the actual conception their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of minds 83 among other differences which exists between ordinary souls and minds some of which differences I have already noted there is also this that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created beings but that minds are also images of the deity or author of nature himself capable of knowing the system of the universe and to some extent of imitating it through architectonic ensembles each mind being like a small divinity in its own sphere 84 it is that this enables spirits to enter into a kind of fellowship with God and brings it about that in each relation to them he is not only what an inventor is to his machine which is the relation of God to other created things but also what a prince is to his subjects and indeed what a father is to his children 85 when said is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the city of God that is to say the most perfect state that is possible under the most perfect of monarchs 86 this city of God this truly universal monarchy is a moral world in the natural world and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God and it is in that the glory of God really consists for he would have no glory were not his greatness and his goodness known and admired by spirits it is also in relation to his divine city that God specially has goodness while his wisdom and his power are manifested everywhere 87 as we have shown above there is a perfect harmony between the two realms of nature one of efficient and the other of final causes we should hear notice also another harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace that is to say between God considered as architect of the mechanism machine of the universe and God considered as monarch of the divine city of spirits 88 a result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by the very ways of nature and that this globe for instance must be destroyed and renewed by natural means at the very time when the government of spirits requires it for the punishment of some and the reward of others 89 it may also be said that God as architect satisfies in all respects God as law giver and thus that sins must bear their penalty with them through the order of nature and even in virtue of the mechanical structure of things and similarly that noble actions will attain the rewards by ways which on the bodily side are mechanical although this cannot and ought not always to happen immediately 90 finally under this perfect government no good action will be unrewarded and no bad one unpunished and all should issue in the well-being of the good that is to say of those who are not malcontents in this great state but who trust in providence after having done their duty and who love and imitate as is meet the author of all good finding pleasure in the contemplation of his perfections as is the way of genuine love which takes pleasure in the happiness of the beloved this it is which leads wise and virtuous people to devote their energies to everything which appears in harmony with the presumptive or antecedent will of God and yet makes them content with what God actually brings to pass by his secret consequent and positive decisive will recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe we should find that it exceeds all the desires of the wisest men and that it is impossible to make it better than it is not only as a whole and in general but also for ourselves in particular if we are attached as we ought to be to the author of all not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our being but as to our master and to the final cause which ought to be the whole aim of our will and which alone can make our happiness footnote it is not to be taken as meaning that it is impossible to make the world better than it is at this time or any particular moment of time livenants is speaking of the world as a system including all time and accordingly he does not exclude progress in time end of footnote end of the monodology recording by gary geck of the gary geck podcast at www.garrygeck.com