 I would like to remind members and the public to turn off their mobile phones, and any members using electronic devices to access committee papers should please ensure that they are turned to silence. The first item of business on the agenda today is an evidence session on the article 15 negotiations, and the committee will take evidence from Professor Sir Anton Muscatelli, the principal and vice chancellor of the University of Glasgow, Akash Pon, senior fellow with the Institute of Government, and via video link Dr Fabian Zuleig, chief executive and chief economist of the European Policy Centre, who is joining us from Brussels. I would like to thank you all for coming along today. We know that significant amounts of legislation will need to be passed by the UK Parliament in the event of a no-deal scenario, but there will also be legislative necessities if Mrs May does manage to get her deal through. I wonder what your assessment was of the time scales here. At what time will the UK Parliament need to approve a deal in order for the legislation to be brought forward to make it happen before the deadline? There is not an absolutely fixed deadline, but it is quite apparent that time is already desperately short. We are two months away, of course, from the supposed date of Brexit. Even if the withdrawal agreement were to be approved, the Government would still need to get through the withdrawal agreement bill. It is required to do that under the terms of the previous act. That would have to be passed and ratified. There would also have to be ratification processes across other EU countries. I think that most people in Westminster will realise that now, and we will see that in the debate in the House of Commons and the votes next week, that this is absolutely crunch time now. To be frank, I think that no matter which way the situation is resolved, ultimately, an extension of the article 50 process now seems highly likely. I can see why people on all sides of the debate are likely ultimately to be persuaded by that. Even before the stalling of the chance of a deal getting through with the delay from December into January, it seemed very likely that a lot of the legislation would not be passed. I think that a technical extension to the article 50 process is actually not a problem in itself if a deal were to be approved by Westminster, because I think that the EU 27 would see that as something that could be managed, subject to other limits that we may go into later around the date and timing of the European Parliamentary election and a new Parliament taking shape on the 1st of July. I think that those are the issues that will be debated if and when a deal is passed. You are saying that, even if the deal is passed, article 50 will need to be extended. For the record, it should be said that the legislation that we have talked about would need to come to this Parliament as well. Is that the case? Yes. That is my understanding that under normal circumstances it would be subject to legislative consent. Can I ask you, Dr Zillig, what conditions do you think that the EU 27 will put on any request to extend article 50, because of course we need their permission in order to extend article 50? I think firstly it has to be the UK Government which asks, so this cannot come from Westminster, it cannot come from another part of the United Kingdom. It is the UK Government, the EU is negotiating with, so the request has to come from there. There will not be an initiative from the 27. So this is for the asking, but in case it is on the table, I think it is very clear that the 27 feel uneasy about an extension without a purpose. So the major condition I would see on any request for extension would be for what purpose is that extension and that would also determine what kind of length of extension we will consider. In the end, I think it is highly likely that an extension would be granted, but these are political processes which are very difficult to foresee. We have 27 countries which have to agree, it is unanimous, so it could well be that individual countries try to add some conditions or at least some considerations within that extension process. When this committee has been in Brussels a couple of times and certainly the last time we were in Brussels we were told that any extension to article 50 would only come out in response to a very meaningful change, for example if there was a referendum or if Mrs May dropped her red lines, what do you think the conditions would be for extending it? I think it depends a bit on where we are in the process. If we are really in a situation where a crash is imminent, I would expect that the European Union would consider even extending when there isn't a decision on the table from the UK, but that extension would then, in my view, be very time limited. It would not be something which would give the UK a lot more time, it would be about forcing a decision. If there is a decision I think then it would be a question of what time do we need to translate that decision into something which can be implemented, but always bearing in mind that we have this deadline of the European Parliament and that there is a significant reluctance to consider an extension going beyond the end of June. Thank you, Professor Muscatelli. Yes, I would agree with that. A technical extension simply because a deal is about to be approved would be far less of an issue. I think if it is a substantive extension because we are about to crash out and there needs to be consideration given to the direction of travel, as Dr Zullig pointed out, is a much more complicated one. As he said, I agree that it would create significant complications for the EU if it was an extension beyond the end of June. That has to be considered by the UK Parliament. Has anyone heard any suggestion that an arrangement could be made around the European parliamentary elections should the extension be required for long beyond June? Certainly we were told that there was no chance of extension beyond the European elections, but would there be any mechanism to allow that to happen? It would obviously be something bespoken, unprecedented. I mean, I've not seen any formal proposal for exactly how that might happen, but I've certainly heard speculation, maybe it's not much more than that, that in these very exceptional circumstances a way could be found if there were political will, not entirely sure what that might look like, whether there could be nominations of the current MEPs to serve a shorter additional term or something along those lines. I mean, it would be something very odd and I can fully understand why across the rest of the EU there's reluctance to go down that path, but potentially if there were no alternative but to seek a longer extension, some way might have to be found. Thank you very much. Can I add to the previous point? Yes, Dr Zuleig wants to come in. Sorry, but I think there's an important question there about legality of that. We're talking about something here which would have to be tested in front of the European Court of Justice. It's not something which can simply be decided because the European Court of Justice has made decisions in the past about the need for having a fully legally constituted European Parliament. And as long as the UK is still a member state, that would also imply that there are MEPs from the UK. So the most simple response to what would happen if you extend beyond the end of June is that they would have to be MEPs from the United Kingdom and we would then have to look at the process in which they would be elected or appointed if there is a possibility of that. Sorry, I was going to hold a hand over to Claire Baker, but if I could just follow up on that particular point. Clearly a European election in the UK in those circumstances could be extremely politically divisive. Is there any scenario that has been discussed that there might not be an election in the UK, for example, but you would still have MEPs holding on to their seats? As I was saying, I think that this would be something which would have to be tested in front of the European Court of Justice. I find it difficult to believe that you could have MEPs somehow appointed because in the end it is a directly elected parliament. So to have the legitimacy these MEPs have to be elected and I would also think that there are some very practical difficulties, for example, a number of the MEPs, which are there currently, have actually resigned. They are no longer MEPs so they could not be appointed for any longer period. Thank you very much, Claire Baker. Thank you, convener. There are a number of scenarios being presented at the moment about how we resolve the situation within the UK, one of which has a possibility of a second referendum. Mr Pawn has recently talked about being a serious possibility for the first time and Anton Muscatelli, Professor Muscatelli has also written about the possibility of a second referendum. I wonder if you think, Mr Pawn wants to expand on why you think that it is a serious possibility now and how the EU 27 might respond to that. I suppose that connects to the question around extension of article 50, if it is going to be a substantive extension, would a second referendum be a reason why we would end up in that situation? Certainly, yes. So I did not, in the piece that you are referring to, advocate that there should necessarily be a second referendum or that that would be a good solution to the current political crisis. But I did reach the conclusion that if Parliament is simply unable to make a decision on any form of deal, and therefore if we are simply drifting towards the legal default position of no deal, then given that the initial decision to leave the EU was of course delegated to the British people in obviously quite a constitutionally unusual way, it might be that yes, the only way out perhaps now might be a second referendum. But I do still have quite serious reservations about that. I am certainly not convinced that there is a majority in favour of that either in the British Parliament or among the British people either. We might get a clearer sense of that of course next week. There are votes on a series of amendments, some of which do mention the possibility of a second referendum. If it did become apparent that there was a majority for a second referendum in the House of Commons, then the way things are playing out at the moment at Westminster, the Government may well be compelled to follow that course of action despite its own reservations. We are in slightly bizarre constitutional times but that does seem to be one possibility and then certainly to make it work we would absolutely need an extension. We have looked at that at the Institute for Government and so have researchers at UCL and I think the consensus is that you need at least five months or so from the moment of introducing legislation for a second referendum before the actual vote could take place. That would take us definitely beyond the summer almost certainly or at least up until July or so at the earliest if that were to happen. Professor Muscatelli in the blog described it as a much simpler solution that is open to the UK than to ask the people to go to a referendum. I think that Mr Pawn has highlighted some of the difficulties that would be in a second referendum and there is still discussion around what the possible questions would be. Do you have any views on what the question is? You need to ask the people, I am not clear what it is that we ask them. I mean I have said recently that given the stalemate in the UK Parliament this would seem to be the obvious way forward. Let me expand on that slide because I think it is important. I think had the negotiations been approaching a different way with very different types of red lines on the part of the UK or a lot of other things. If there were less red lines then I think a softer Brexit could have possibly had the consensus of Parliament. I think the difficulty with a softer Brexit at the moment although that is still a route where we may end up, say a Norway plus type solution, is that the way in which you enact a Norway plus solution is through the existing withdrawal agreement or something very like it. You wouldn't need to modify the withdrawal agreement substantively but through a political declaration which changed the direction of travel in terms of the future framework saying essentially there are no longer red lines on freedom of movements and we would hope to end up in Norway plus. The problem with that is that I think from the point of view of the EU 27, the political situation is so unstable in the UK who would actually be in charge of those negotiations following the withdrawal agreement. If you had for instance a Prime Minister who was much more on the Brexit side of the Conservative party then you could end up, you know, there's no guarantee that that's where you'll end up. So I think it's the commitment towards that that becomes more difficult now where if you've begun on a route of EA plus two years ago we probably might have ended there actually. So this is why people like myself are saying given the stalemate that people's vote may be the only way to try and reverse the result of that referendum in 2016 and to try and break the deadlock. You're absolutely right however and Akash is right there is no clear majority for other alternatives at the moment amongst the situation is very fluid and we'll see what happens next week. And you would need to as you say absolutely frame the referendum in an appropriate way and that depends again on the parliamentary majority. You know, one possibility is certainly that one, you know, it's essentially the Prime Minister and the UK government says well look Parliament has rejected my deal, the deal I've negotiated but there is no alternative being proposed or there's no consensus. There's no consensus on what the alternative might be. I will then go to the country with my deal and logically at that point the alternative is my deal or remain, which of course would create quite a lot of difficulties for those who believe that there should be a different kind of withdrawal deal, harsher withdrawal deal. So I think this is where it gets really complicated. I think we are in the hands of what happens in Parliament. I accept what Akash said about the timing with the referendum. I have to say of all the scenarios around the extension of article 50, the sense I get in Brussels and from EU 27 governments is that if there were to be a new referendum, especially given where the polls seem to indicate, I think that is most likely to receive a sympathetic hearing in terms of an extension of article 50. I think people would see this as a possible reversal by the people of their decision in 2016 as the best way forward and as a result I think they would try, the EU 27 would try their utmost not only to grant an extension but to find ways around the EU parliamentary issue which we discussed a moment ago. I might just add to the comments about the referendum question. That of course is one of the major issues that very few of the advocates of a second referendum have actually directly addressed precisely what would be on the ballot paper. There are various models and I talk about some of them in the piece that you mentioned. My personal view is that as it stands and things may change again, there are three credible options ahead of us. I say credible in the sense of legally we can see the path to reach them, not that they are necessarily good things. Namely, we might remain after all the deal or some amended version of it might be implemented or we might leave with no deal. There are of course people who support each of those three options and other things as well. My conclusion is that if there were to be a second referendum and I repeat my caveats from before that I don't necessarily advocate this, I do think that for its legitimacy to be secure and the result of it to be respected you would need to have all three options on the ballot paper. Then you enter into a debate about what the electoral mechanism for that might be and there are different ways you can do that. One version that I am attracted to but I know that there are drawbacks to this as well would be a two question referendum in which question one is do you still want to leave or yes or no? I know in other words at the sort of repeat of 2016 and then question to if there is still a majority for leave which of these models namely deal or no deal Brexit do you prefer? That in my view might be a way to ensure that whatever result emerged would be seen as legitimate. As a brief comment you do make interesting comments in the article around legitimacy with the people and whether you have a result that would be respected across the country. We are a country that is divided on this issue. Do you think that our second referendum would help to resolve that problem? Do you think that the country would reach a consensus? Do you think that we would accept a different result? I think genuinely we are in a land of sort of least worst options here. So no I am not naive enough to think that another referendum campaign would leave to a happy harmonious country in which everyone satisfied with our future relationship with the EU. I think certainly we learnt from 2016 that referendum campaigns do not necessarily lead to the reaching of consensus through a healthy information rich debate and deliberative process in the way that one would hope. Of course it is hard to forecast how this might play out. It might end up with an even more polarised country but yes I can only repeat what I said that if Parliament is simply unable to deliver upon its constitutional duty to take a decision about this then this may end up as the only way to create the deadlock. We have quite a few members who want to come in with supplementaries on this particular question so if I could ask our witnesses to keep answers as succinct as possible I am going to go to Jamie Greene first. Professor Muscatilli can I just pick you up on a point you made in your previous answer and apologies if I am paraphrasing please correct me if I have misunderstood. You used the words we would need a second referendum because it may be the only way to reverse the 2016 decision is that what you said? Well I said it in the sense that it needs to be, I think Parliament itself would not choose to revoke, permanently revoke article 50 which is the other route forward here without some sort of engagement with the people. I think the feeling has been, I think this seems to be a consensus in Parliament that for Parliament to simply revoke article 50 and say you know what we will remain in the EU is not an option so that's what I intended. Essentially you need to either have a referendum or a general election to deal with the issue of whether to go in one direction I implement Brexit with a particular deal or remain. So that's what I meant, that's what I meant by my expression, it was essentially saying I think Parliament does feel there has to be an endorsement of whatever is decided in some way if it's not the current deal that's on or off. In other words you feel it's more of a technical point that that would be the way to achieve that result if it was so desired. I guess the reason I mentioned it is because one of the reasons perhaps there seems to be no majority at the moment subject to amendments that are voted on next week for our second referendum at the moment, certainly amongst the principal parties is precisely that reason that many of the proponents of the second referendum are doing so because they want to reverse the decision of the 2016 rather than offer which type of Brexit people would like. I think this is an interesting conundrum. What do you ask? What is the question that you're asking in a second referendum? Can it simply be a binary in or out question as it was in 2016 or are you presenting a number of options? I think it's a fascinating concept. Indeed, and there are different structures, as Akash pointed out. I think my only concern about the two stage referendum and including what no deal implies is that effectively you are asking the people either what is on the table, which is what's been negotiated with some very tight red lines, or essentially you're saying all we will crash out with no deal when even at the moment when you're having discussions about no deal, I don't think the full implications of no deal have become entirely apparent. This is where it gets really very messy because if you were to hold a referendum now, I suspect you would get into rather complicated debates in which some of the proponents of no deal have been painting it as if nothing would change, which is of course a personal view and not a travesty of what no deal would imply. It would be interesting to see what would happen if we did crash out and then at that point you said, now you've actually experienced but it's like to crash out. Let's now have a referendum as to whether you think that's what you would really like. You would get a different result. I really think it's a very complicated situation and I would rather have had a situation in which Parliament resolves it personally, but I can see the attractions given that there's complete stalemate that you feel you have to go back to the people if you want to move in a different direction than the original Brexit endorsement that happened. I'm just taking questions on this issue of the second referendum, so I'll bring in Kenneth Gibson. The difficulty for the two major UK parties, not the Liberal Democrats of course, is that 80 per cent of the MPs currently in House of Commons were voted on pro-Brexit manifestos and if they go back to a general election they've got to then fight among themselves about what's going to be in that manifesto. I'm not convinced that's necessarily a way forward, but one thing that we've found out in the last five minutes alone, Professor Muscatelli, is that you've commented that there's a much simpler solution open to the UK. Clearly isn't there a much simpler solution? It seems to add a number of complexities. For example, we still aren't very clear on the wording of the question, which has to an extent been body swerved, the timescale of such a referendum, but assuming we had such a referendum in Scotland again voted to remain and England and Wales voted to leave, where would we be then? On your first point, it's a simple solution. It's a matter of comparison. I think how the referendum is structured is clearly a matter for debate. I personally think it's undesirable to go to the people with a blank sheet of paper. That's what we did in 2016, which is why I would favour a one question. This is the only deal that has been negotiated inside of this or the status quo. It's a much more natural referendum, but I can understand why some people would regard that as a legitimate. On the issue of what we would do in terms of different nations of the UK voting and whether that would matter in terms of the overall outcome, I think that would be clearly a major issue for the UK parliamentary parties to discuss and see whether they wanted to put any more, if you like, barriers to that. I personally don't have a view on that. There's another scenario. Inverse to the one that occurred in 2016 whereby England might vote to leave again, but more narrowly, and the overall UK result might be to remain. That would cause a different set of quite complex political problems, I would suggest. Dr Zuleig has touched on this, in his evidence. I'm just wondering if you've been patiently listening to this over the last few minutes. Doctor, I wonder if you can say what your view and the European view on this is, perhaps? I think from a European perspective, if the UK makes a decision to hold the referendum, I would think it's very difficult for the EU to then not grant an extension to Article 50, so I would expect that the time would be given. But there would be a lot of pressure to firstly make sure that that referendum result would be decisive, that we would not end up in a situation where after referendum we are still in this limbo situation we are now. And the second would be that there are no options on the ballot which are unicorn options, so the idea of getting something from the European Union which is not on offer, access to the single market without freedom of movement, etc. I think that would be the main concern for the 27, but certainly I think at the moment most people, I would say, don't believe that there's a realistic chance of that happening and in the end the negotiations have to be conducted with the UK government and the UK government at this point is very clear that there will not be a referendum and that they will not ask for an extension to article 50, so that's the status quo from a user point of view. The reason the referendum was held, let's be honest about it, was that David Cameron wanted to head off a civil war in a Conservative party and he clearly miscalculated. There's still a strong possibility of a split in the Conservative party if, for example, there was a referendum. Is that not the biggest impediment to possibly another referendum being held that the party of government would perhaps split as a result of that? I agree with that and I think it's clear that this is what's conditioning a lot of the current manoeuvring in terms of where the government is going, that the Prime Minister is trying very hard not to split the party, but it's almost impossible because there's more than two positions within the same parliamentary party. I would totally agree with that. At one point I wondered whether what she might do is to say, look, I can't get this deal through. This is genuinely the best deal. I'm going to go to the country. If Parliament won't approve it, I'll go to the country. I'll take my deal to the country. I thought that that might have been a tactic at one point but it doesn't seem to be the case. I agree with Kenny Gibson's analysis but the only thing I think he missed out is that it splits the Labour Party as well, which is why I don't think there will be a second referendum. Isn't the more likely scenario now that the Brexiteer amendment next week, which time limits the backstop, passes, as does Yvette Cooper's amendment ruling out no deal. There is, as far as one can tell, a parliamentary majority for that. Those two amendments then pass, the deal then passes. What do you think the EU would do in those circumstances? If I would understand it correctly, it would mean that they would have to renegotiate the backstop bit of the formal drawl agreement. Do you think the EU would countenance that in the circumstances where the Commons had actually passed overwhelmingly the deal but with those two amendments? I don't think the EU would renegotiate the backstop. I think that's pretty much unlikely. It would be interesting to hear Dr Zoolog on this but I think what they're likely to do possibly in those circumstances is to offer more reassurances to say that the drawl agreement stands, the legal binding document stands. We will do our very best to ensure that we can negotiate a free trade agreement that avoids the backstop kicking in but there's no way, I cannot see a way in which they would renegotiate the backstop. You can just put in a time limit. Well, they wouldn't put that into the actual legal document. I think they would say that there might be an aspiration there to conclude the negotiations within a period of time but I don't think they would put that in the legal document. And so you could potentially end up in a stalemate type situation if that's what the Commons want. I thought Michel Vanieu was quite definitive, well not for the first time in statements yesterday. I think it's been fairly consistent line taken that there can be no legal time limit to the backstop otherwise it doesn't fulfil the function, it is there to fulfil. So, yes, it may be that the amendment, I think it's the Andrew Mohson one you're talking about, maybe that will pass. I mean there was some suggestion that the government might of course support that but that won't change the legal position. It changes the politics of the situation because it then means that the House of Commons has actually passed something. That's very different from where we are now. That may be the case. It won't of course change that what is in the withdrawal agreement. Doctor Zulu, do you have a view on this one? Yes, absolutely. There is no way the European Union is going to get rid of the backstop and the time limit is getting rid of the backstop. That essentially a backstop with a time limit is not a backstop. So, there will not be a renegotiation of the backstop. I think this has been made very clear. If there was any question of this, it would have to be agreed with Dublin in any case. There is no way that 26 will overrule the Republic here and there's no sign of that whatsoever. So, my question would be what is the purpose of going back to Brussels with something where it is already very clear that this is not going to happen. It smacks to me of something where you are actually trying to shift blame to the European Union because it's very clear that this is not going to be the outcome. Okay. Thank you very much. Annabelle Ewing. Good morning, gentlemen. Just very briefly at this stage, I was just picking up a point that Mr Pond made in terms of the timing of any second referendum in terms of what would need to be done to pave the way for that to happen. Of course, if we recall the position with regard to the referendum in Scotland and Wales in 1997, the legislation received royal assent at the end of July 1997 and the further to a white paper, which I think was issued early July 1997, and the vote in Scotland was held on 11 September 1997. So, I think that it is important to recognise the precedent there already established for a much shorter period of time that could pass to see such legislation allowing a second referendum to take place. The ready is precedent for that and it doesn't really seem to me that there should be any different position pertaining to a second referendum should that be what happens next. One significant thing that's changed since the 1997 referendum is the passage of the Political Party's Elections and Referendums Act, which does set out unless there were to be set aside, which primary legislation at Westminster could always do. The parliamentary sovereignty has to be recognised, but assuming that the established statutory processes for referendum campaign were followed, then there's a fixed 10-week period for the campaign, including time to nominate the official campaigns and so on. Before that, of course, you've got the legislative process. As mentioned, the studies that I've seen and the work that we did concluded that around about five months would be not only the minimum, it would be a lot faster than other recent referendums, such as indeed the 2014 referendum here and the 2016 Brexit referendum. Yes, I take your point but prepare it by the same token. As you say, it should the House of Commons decide to go down that route. I'm sure that they would find ways to smooth the passage within a reasonable time frame. It was just really to make the point that it is possible if that's the political decision, it is obviously possible to accelerate the process. Yes, our constitution means that if the House of Commons, well, if Parliament so decides, then yes, it can't be bound by previous legislation, so that could be one way around it. I think there would be risks involved in that. There's a reason why the timetable was set out in that way to ensure that the referendum question is clear and comprehensible and not biased to any particular outcome to ensure that there's time for a proper campaign and information can be conveyed to the public about the choices on offer. I'm sure that was the intention but as we perhaps can reflect on what happened in 2016, I think the opposite of all the good things you've just suggested happened in fact, so that's what happened when we took longer, so maybe actually taking a shorter period of time might help matters. Thank you. Another supplementary, I think the last supplementary on this topic from Stuart McMillan. Thank you, convener. A few moments ago you put a different scenario onto the table, which I find really quite interesting. You suggested that if there were to be a second referendum, and if the final outcome was different for it to be a remain, but England still voted to leave, then you suggested that that would throw up some of the different consequences in terms of the debate. However, if the same principles apply that the UK Government has been stating to Scotland for the last two years that it was a UK wide referendum, just got on with it, tough, then why would the different circumstances apply for England? Well, I think if we were to have another referendum, almost certainly the legal position would be that there is a single UK wide result, there's a single mandate for whatever outcome emerges. My point is not that there would be any legal question as to the legitimacy of the result in that specific scenario, but simply that, as of course there has been in Scotland, there would be political questions about the legitimacy. In that entirely hypothetical scenario, this is not based on polling analysis or anything like that, but it's potentially something that might happen. People in England who had voted twice, campaigned twice for Brexit only to see it not happen after all because of votes elsewhere in the UK could, of course, not only make the argument that people in Scotland, the Scottish Government has made, that there's no mandate for that result, but also they could say, well, it was taken away from us after we'd already voted once, so I think there would be a powerful case to be made by people on that side of the argument that the ultimate outcome was democratically illegitimate from an English perspective. Legally is a different question. Hypothetically, again, that means that any decision that's taken, a so-called UK wide decision, is based purely upon England. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? Hypothetically, any decision that's taken, particularly referendums that are UK wide, then the final outcome should be what England wants as compared to the other three nations within the UK? I don't think that's what I was saying. I'm just pausing the question to you. Well, no, that isn't what I'm saying. I think if we have a referendum, we don't have a federal system. There's a whole debate to be had about whether we should move to some completely different constitutional model, and that's an interesting and important debate to be had, but as it stands, we don't have that when we have referendums on a UK wide basis. The result that matters is the result across the UK as a whole, and then people will make arguments about the political implications or legitimacy of it, but this is not even my particular perspective on the debate. I'm just speculating as to the questions that might arise. Given my point is that, if that were to happen, the guiding principle should be how do we design it so as to be most likely to ensure a legitimate outcome that leaves the country less divided. That's why it would be a concern to me. Ross Greer. I'd like to go back to the discussion around extension of article 50 for a moment. The debate around this in the UK, like most of the subtopic debates in Brexit, has been incredibly domestic, rather than acknowledging the fact that this is a negotiation of two sides. The debate seems to have taken place in the assumption that extension means extension until the end of June, so there's a broad recognition of the difficulties extending beyond then. As the convener mentioned earlier, when we were in Brussels not that long ago, there was a strong message sent to us that extension beyond the end of June was unacceptable to a large number of people. There was also a significant number of people who said that extension beyond the day of the European elections in May was something that they would find unacceptable. Given that extension requires unanimity and that the UK may be in a position of requesting an extension without a clear route out of this situation, i.e. we could request an extension without the UK Parliament having agreed to a referendum or without having agreed to a deal that just needs time for implementation, what is the likelihood of there being objections to an extension that lasts until the end of June? Is there a scenario in which the extension does not go beyond the day of the European elections in May? I think there is a risk and I think Dr Zulaig highlighted that risk that with 27 having to show unanimity on this you could always have some other considerations. I have to say again, if it's a technical extension, if it is a situation where Parliament is getting there, whether it's a softer Brexit because that's with a different political declaration, but we need time to implement all the legislation, I suspect that that would be granted. I can't imagine that many of the EU 27 would have appetite for imperiling a deal in order to try and strike a point in that because of some national consideration. I think if it's let's have an extension because we're about to crash out and we don't really know where we're going yet, it would then lead to the sort of discussions that Dr Zulaig pointed out. It gets very complicated at that point and it's not predictable what might happen. Although again, a number of EU 27 countries would of course want to avoid a no deal at all costs because it impacts on them more than some of the other 27 countries. Does Dr Zulaig want to come in there? I fully agree with that, I would say. The one thing I wouldn't exclude is in the scenario where the UK has not made a decision that the EU would then grant a very short extension simply to avoid crashing out at that point but with the right on it that it is now up to the UK to decide and they will not be given until the end of June. I would like to continue the debate. To move to another hypothetical, if the UK decides to revoke article 50 either by referendum or by a resolution of the UK Parliament, the European Court of Justice has ruled that legally that is a simple and a clear process now the UK doesn't lose any opt-outs etc. Politically it's quite different and be interested in Dr Zulaig's position on this in particular. What are the potential political implications for the UK's continued relationship with the EU in the event that we revoke article 50? I think firstly there's the question of how you can revoke article 50 and I think it's important to be clear about that. If it is after referendum then yes there's the right for the UK to unilaterally revoke article 50 but to get there the UK would have to ask for an extension which is a unanimous decision of the 27. So in those circumstances it would have to be the 27 which allow that process. I think it's very likely they would for the reasons which have already been discussed but still it then effectively is not a unilateral decision anymore. The unilateral decision would be to revoke article 50 through Westminster before the date of exit. That means there has to be a clear decision within the Houses of Parliament to not leave the European Union. So this is not a mechanism which can be used to extend the article 50 negotiations. The idea that this could be a way to buy time and then to re-enter a notification of article 50 at a later date, that's not what could be discussed. They would have to be a clear constitutionally legal decision of the UK not to leave the European Union. If that is the case the European Union remains a member state. It is legally as if they have never put in the notification of article 50. But of course this has political implications in terms of the willingness of other member states to work with the UK, the kind of alliances which the UK has had in the past. I personally think that a lot of bridges have been burned in this process so it would be much more difficult and for example when it comes to the discussion of the next multi-annual financial framework, the multi-annually new budget, the UK rebate would be under intense attack from other countries. That would not be legally but simply as part of the normal political processes within the EU. Any other views on the burden bridges? I totally agree with Dr Zoolog's analysis and it comes back to the point I made to Mr Greene earlier. I cannot see Westminster politically revoking article 50 without there being some sort of event, whether it's an election or a referendum. One can argue as to whether there might be a majority for people's vote eventually but I certainly don't think that there would be a majority for revoking article 50 without some sort of referring this matter back to the people. A deal with the EU is certainly much more preferable than a no deal and we've gone through quite a lot of length about that. It's because of the uncertainty of all that process that government and business have put in contingencies. Can I ask about the contingencies that the EU and how it would react to the possibility of a no deal continuing to increase? Perhaps I can kick off. I think we've seen some of the contingencies, of course, with the publication of the considerations from the commission before Christmas where they highlighted their preparations. Increasingly we're hearing of the preparations that a number of EU companies are making around some of the changes they're making to their supply chains. We're seeing decisions being taken about where investments are located. We're seeing increasingly that companies that operate across the EU say in financial services are increasing employment in their EU operations and by implication, over time, decreasing employment in the city of London, for instance. I think that we're seeing these being implemented but it is something which let's be very clear and I think most people have pointed this out. It will cause damage on the EU side as well as the UK. The damage that Dr Zuley pointed out in his written statement is asymmetric and that's certainly been our assessment also around the expertise around the Standing Council on Europe that there is damage done to the EU 27, some more than others, and they are preparing for it. But there are some contingencies you simply cannot assure again. You cannot overnight re-engineer your supply chains. So there are some things that will be economic damage, whatever the preparations on both sides. I don't think I'm close enough to those economic questions to offer much on this question. I apologise. Does Dr Zuley have any comment on that? No, I fully agree. I think there have actually been preparations for this for quite a long time. I would say probably longer than in the UK. So there is an awareness of the costs and there are potential ways of trying to mitigate some of that. But I think it is very clear that you can't mitigate for all of the impact. I would just add one little qualification to that, which is that it is not only that it is asymmetric. There is also, for some sectors, for some companies, there will also be a benefit in this. Even in a no deal scenario, if this effectively takes out your UK competitors, that's not necessarily a negative thing for all companies. So there is a balance as well. I would say overall it is still a loss. But for individual sectors and maybe even for some individual countries, the longer term effect could be beneficial. As you already identified, the deal is much more important to have and if we can secure that, that will stop that uncertainty. But there will be, as you have already indicated, winners and losers in all of this process, depending on which situation we find ourselves. And that creates even more uncertainty potentially for the EU 27 going forward. Yes, absolutely. And I think from an EU 27 perspective, most people would now conclude that the best possible outcome of this situation is to agree to the deal. Because in the end, the deal which is on the table at the moment does respect the red lines of the European Union. It does respect the red lines of the UK as they were during the negotiations. And the political declaration actually leaves the possibility still open to go into other directions than a very hard Brexit. So from that perspective, certainly the deal would be the quickest way of resolving the immediate uncertainty which is on the table. Thank you, Cymru. Thank you very much, Annabelle. Thank you. I'm just really picking up on that discussion. I know that Dr Zuligan, in his short paper that he had submitted to the committee, mentioned in his view the need for a common strategic negotiation position to be formulated in early course by the EU 27. One would have thought that, aside from specific planning in certain sectors that we have heard referred to already from Professor Muscatelli in particular, but the idea of this common strategic negotiation position in the event of no deal Brexit, could doctors really give us more information of what he means by that? And if he has any intelligence and fact that is what is happening or if it's not happening, why is it not happening? Because one would have thought for the EU 27 that that would be the obvious next step at this stage in the way that this is all playing out. The EU 27 and the institutions have certainly been thinking about what would be the reaction in case of no deal, what would be the next steps from an EU perspective. But what has guided, I would say, the thinking here has been that none of the countries or the institutions want to give the message that in some way this is where we want to go or that in some way this is a mechanism by which we can punish the UK for making the wrong choices. So the emphasis has always been on the positive engagement, it has always been on we want a deal, we want to negotiate something which works for both sides and that has stopped to some extent at least the public discussion of what will happen on a strategic level if we have no deal. Now we are in a situation where the UK Parliament has rejected the deal with quite a large majority. I think whatever one believes in terms of the probability of no deal, it has to be a very substantive possibility now. So my thinking behind the short paper you referred to was really to say we really need to get serious now about what would we do in such a situation. For example, what kind of many deals would we consider in particular areas to avert the situation that planes can't fly, that medicine would get stuck in transit. So are there things we would be willing to do even if the negotiations break down? How would we react to particular initiatives, particular ideas from the UK in that situation? And I think for that we should be having something which looks very much like a negotiation position even though of course in those circumstances there would be very little negotiation going on. I think that it's very interesting that you say that in terms of where they sit publicly may not be exactly what is going on in private, one would have thought at this late stage. You talked about many deals and I was wondering in that context, what will be the priorities? Whose interests will be put to the top of the tree? Will it be business or will it be the individual citizens? You will obviously have a particular impact on individual citizens and all walks of life that you can think of in terms of travel, working, health provision, holidays and so on and so forth. If there were to be many deals, what would be the narrative in terms of the overarching priority here? Would it be business or would it be individual citizens of the EU? I would think the key consideration firstly would be the scale of the impact if you don't have those many deals. So it's the question of identifying those areas where it would be most catastrophic if there is no deal and then trying to mitigate in those areas. I don't think from an EU perspective there would be a prioritisation of business over citizens or the other way around. It would really be a question of making sure that the negative impact on EU businesses and citizens would be minimized in such a scenario as long as that is compatible with the overall legal framework. I think that's an important rider which always has to be there. These many deals could not overwrite the overall framework. It would still have to be within the confines of what is possible, so within the confines of WTO rules, within the confines of single market rules, which will restrict the possibility of making many deals to mitigate the worst. I think that's a real concern within the EU institutions at the moment that to get many deals in areas which are simply trying to deal with, as Dr Zoellys said, catastrophic circumstances is perhaps the easy bit. We've seen in some of the EU preparations what's been said about UK aviation carriers and UK safety licences, the 12-month extension and the 9-month extension. Those are the easier things. I think that when it comes to trade and goods, then the danger of having many deals which are effectively ad hoc arrangements that continue is that they can be challenged in the WTO because we would be a third country, we would not be in the EU, we would be out of there and effectively the EU would be granting without a formal deal, trade deal or trade agreement advantages to the UK which it wouldn't be granting to other countries and that takes you outside the WTO rules. I think this is where it gets really complicated. I think what would happen would be pretty chaotic frankly, it would be pretty ad hoc. You'd see things being put in place perhaps to make sure that aviation doesn't get disrupted immediately but there would still be a lot of disruption and frankly, non-essential goods would not be a huge priority in terms of blockages at borders. I think one of the interesting issues and I'm not an expert in this, it would be interesting to explore however is what they would do in Ireland because there's been already some discussion because clearly Ireland doesn't want a hard border, nobody wants a hard border in Ireland and yet if the UK crashes out then there's an issue of what you do in terms of trade and other controls on the Ireland, not on Ireland border. Yes indeed all those issues that sadly were not really, certainly not part of the debate in 2016 and not even in contemplation. I mean they point there about preferential treatment under WTO rules and that not being in keeping with WTO. Of course, I suppose that there's an exception for free treatment of commerce and navigation treaties that may have been there predating that framework but having said that, that might provide a limited relief, I would imagine in certain areas but it would not provide the relief that would be necessary for the UK to reach the many deals and comply with the WTO provisions so frankly it still remains a complete mess or boorish as we say here. Thank you. Since we're on the topic of trade it was revealed recently you'll all be aware that the UK Department of Trade has failed to renegotiate any of the 40 EU preferential trade deals which they have to do whether there's a deal or not by March 29. I wonder if you would care to comment on that and the significance of that. I mean perhaps if I can kick off very briefly. I mean I don't think many of us were hugely surprised by this. I mean I think this was always going to be a difficult issue particularly because you know there's no incentive on the part of many of these countries to strike these deals until they see exactly where the UK is going to be in this relationship with the EU. So you know and I think this is one of the things about the whole Brexit business that really you know does get to you because a lot of these things were predictable two years ago as has been pointed out and including the fact that you weren't going to strike deals of this type generous or otherwise with other countries around the world until you saw exactly what relationship the UK was going to have with the EU. I mean I would entirely agree with that. It certainly hasn't been a surprise to see how that has unfolded and viewed from the perspective of countries with which the UK might be trying to strike deals. I mean it's not just a question of whether the incentives are not there to enter into those negotiations. I mean what would actually be the substance and the sense in entering negotiations when there is so much uncertainty still about what the UK's ultimate relationship will be with the EU and to what extent we may end up within a single customs territory or potentially quite a long time hence and that obviously shapes what kind of deals the UK will be able to do with any other countries. So until we have clarity here domestically I don't think one can expect much progress in terms of trade agreements elsewhere. I think the UK was hoping that whatever happened these deals would at least for some short time roll over. Dr Zuleig what do you think the chances are of these 40 third countries rolling over the deals that they have with the EU for the UK post Brexit? I think there was always a misapprention or maybe a deliberate misrepresentation of what the world of international trade looks like. The world of international trade is a very hard business and countries are quite ruthless in pushing through the interest. Yes there is a WTO framework but the WTO framework is really there to forbid certain practices. It is not there to encourage trade in that sense. It is not a framework which leads to free trade on a global level and I think there was always an illusion about what kind of trade position the UK would have post Brexit or in the run up to Brexit. So my expectation would be that yes maybe there will be some small deals where it is in the interest of the other country, sometimes in the political interest of the other country. But the idea that the UK could in any way in any form replicate the extremely successful position of the European Union was always an illusion. Thank you very much. Stuart McMillan. A couple of questions on inter-governmental relations but I have one primarily on Northern Ireland. Excuse me, if we do have the no deal scenario and the UK leaves and the dialogue that has been increasing over the last few days particularly around Northern Ireland and the border issue. How could that actually be fixed or how could that be sorted because as you said a few moments ago nobody wants to have any type of hard border between the Republic and Britain on the island of Ireland? There is no obvious solution. I mean if we crash out with no deal and I think there's been some initial comments on this I think the other day I can't remember if it was Michelle Barnier or others that commented. But at that point you do need, the EU will be worried about the integrity of the single market and will need to and apart from anything else WTO rules do require the EU to have some sort of customs border. So it's a genuinely difficult question. It's not one that has been resolved. I think it's obviously one that Brussels is looking at at the moment about to do in that particular contingency. But we are really into uncharted territory but I don't know if my colleagues have particular insights as to what might happen there. No I mean I think it's clear that there's no obvious solution in that scenario hence the lengthy and complex negotiations about how to avoid a hard border in Northern Ireland via the backstop mechanism. So if the deal is not approved, not ratified then the normal default would be that there would have to be checks on that border but clearly for the reasons laid out there would be a desire on all sides to minimise the practical impact of that in terms of the visibility of the border and so on which obviously has a huge significance in Ireland. Perhaps if I could come back in for a second. I mean we're into obviously the world of fantasy politics and none of us could predict what happens then but I mean one scenario if we did crash out with no deal at that point would be that the UK Government tried to reach a mini deal on the issue of well let's implement the backstop because that's the only thing that will stop so that we guarantee that Northern Ireland remains in regulatory, homogeneous regulatory alignment with the EU for the moment. It is there now because we are part of the EU and that let's effectively implement it. That politically would cause an absolute storm of course but on the other hand it's the only way you would do it in the short term and I'd be interested to hear what Dr Zullig has to say but I think I cannot see any other way of avoiding it given the way in which world trade functions. That may be a potential technical solution but as you say I don't see how that could be something that would come on the majority in Westminster. Dr Zullig? I think the difficulty is that unless there's some form of agreement whether it's the backstop, the deal whatever it might be then we are in a situation where even if neither side were to introduce border checks it would be extremely difficult for companies to continue trading across the border because you would have liability issues, you would have legal issues, you might be in a situation where you have even criminal liability issues for some of the trade which would then be illicitly crossing an international border. So I think this situation is one where certainly bigger companies would be extremely reluctant to continue trading across the border. We also have a legal framework which can be called upon not just by governments if companies in the Republic of Ireland for example would take companies to court on competition grounds. This is something where they would have the right to be protected from what would then be illegal competition from non-EU companies. So we're talking about a situation where even the practical difficulties would make trading across the border extremely complicated. I would think that we would have serious disruption in any case, we have also considerations around security which would have to be taken into account in such a scenario. So for all of those reasons clearly having some sort of deal would be better than none but whatever is there cannot contradict the legal framework and it cannot contradict the obligations the European Union has in international law as well. That's been very helpful but there's also another element to this too and that's the issue of the economic consequences to the Republic of Ireland. They utilise the UK, but 80 per cent of their exports go through the land bridge that is the UK. In this particular scenario, if the economy were to suffer as it will, certainly after what you said a few moments ago Dr Zoellig, then these consequences are there for the people of the Republic of Ireland who didn't even vote for this situation to actually take place. Would you agree with that? That's absolutely true. We can already see that discussion in the Republic. What I wouldn't, and I'm not saying that you did, but some Brexiteers have concluded from that that would mean that the Republic in some way would side with the UK. There has even been talk about that Ireland would leave the European Union. For me that is utter fantasy. It's very clear that within Ireland there is a very strong public majority or staying in the European Union and a strong recognition that this is the way forward for the Republic. Thank you very much. Jamie Greene. Can I just pose a scenario to the panel? Obviously a deal was agreed between the EU 27 and the UK. That deal was overwhelmingly rejected by the UK Parliament. At that point the EU said, well, the ball is in your court now, you come back to us with what you want. I'm intrigued on the scenario that Tavish Scott mentioned earlier. Let's look at a scenario where the UK Parliament votes on a deal next week and variations of it. I have no idea what will happen in that vote. If there was a scenario where amendments were accepted and there was a majority for something, wherever that something is, the UK Government then feasibly could go back to the EU and said that the UK Parliament have agreed on the following. What would happen in that scenario, given what sounds like the EU's own red lines of what they would and would not accept in terms of a new deal, because they have said, come back with something, you tell us what you want, UK Parliament decides on something, would we end up with a stalemate between the UK saying, well, this is what the only thing we can get Parliament to agree on, which has not been easy, versus what the EU 27 want to do in this scenario, given that the asymmetric negative outcome that anodial presents, both parties, what do you think would happen in that situation? First of all, just to clarify, the votes next week on the motion laid by the Prime Minister, they're not votes on the deal, it's not a second meaningful vote, just on the terms of the withdrawal agreement. The Prime Minister made a statement to the House, of course, on Monday. You might question exactly how much detail that gave about precisely how she plans to proceed, but obviously there's some aspiration to potentially get some amendments to the agreement or at least explore the possibility of that, and then the votes are on a take note motion that the House has noted the statement, and then there's this series of amendments which do all sorts of things. Your question, what might subsequently happen after the House presumably, hopefully, we might say votes for something, it obviously rather depends on what that something is. Mr Scott mentioned a couple of the amendments that have been talked about quite a bit. So, if there were to be a vote for this time-limited backstop, we've already explored why it doesn't seem likely that that would lead to a change on the EU side, and Dr Zuley obviously sort of set out the reasons for that from the Brussels perspective. That's the premise of my question. What happens if that something, the UK goes back to the EU with, is unacceptable to the EU, then we do have a stalemate? Well, yeah, we would do. The amendments wouldn't necessarily bind the government to take that position, but yeah, if the government came out in support of that amendment, it would then presumably, yes, there would be stalemates. So, I would question whether that would be a sensible approach for them to take then. Well, I think it isn't a sensible approach because we know the backstop is one of those red lines that will not change. I mean, I think we have to think of next week as conditioning the sequencing of what happens afterwards in the UK Parliament. I mean, if that's where the scenario of where to happen, I think pretty quickly it would become apparent that there would be no renegotiation of the backstop. There might be assurances, verbal assurances by the EU around the fact that they don't want to invoke the backstop, and that's where it would lie, and we know that wouldn't be enough to get the EUP on board. We know it wouldn't be enough to bring part of the ERG group, the ERG on board. I think what it would do is potentially condition support for what an alternative might be. So, for instance, and this is completely hypothetical, supposing it then creates more momentum towards a softer Brexit, towards a Norway-type, Norway plus-type Brexit, which does, of course, solve the problem of the border. These are the sort of things that would then happen. I don't think it would fundamentally change the negotiation with Brussels. I really don't think that that is likely to be a factor over the next few weeks. It's more likely to be how it affects the sequencing in terms of the parliamentary dynamics at Westminster. Perhaps I could ask Dr Zulaig. Previously in the past, the narrative from Europe was very much as being this is the deal, take it or leave it, and Parliament said, well, we'll leave it, thank you. Do you think there is any genuine flexibility in the EU27 to look at some new type of deal? I think firstly, it has to be clear that this is a deal which was conditioned, yes, by EU principles, but also by UK red lines. The EU has always been very clear that if the UK red lines change, then there might be the possibility of a different deal. What is not going to change is the EU red lines, because this is about principles which have an existential impact on the European Union. It is fundamentally in the overriding political and economic interest of the 27 to stick to these principles, and that's why we have seen this remarkable display of unity of the 27 in this process. That is not going to change at this stage. I think what I would respond to this question of stalemate, no it is not a stalemate, because what it does not do is remove the ticking clock. In the end, it is a situation where unless the UK can find a different decision, then there will be a crash out with enormous consequences for the UK. Yes, it will also hurt the EU 27, but the overall consensus on the 27 side is that that is manageable and it is better to ensure that EU principles are kept than to concede on this to the UK to avoid a no deal. In the end, the EU 27 will live with no deal if that is the only possibility and the cost will be far greater on the UK in those circumstances. So what this is now in the end about, I would say is that the UK finds which one of the options on the table are acceptable, but I would think that the chance of creating a new and different option which takes us in a whole different direction, it is too late for that. We have had the negotiation, that is what this whole two year process has been about. So just by that logic then you are saying that the EU would rather have no deal than concede any of its own red lines? Absolutely yes, because those red lines are about the principles which have been set out from the beginning and the EU has been very transparent about these. They were in the negotiation position from the start, it was always clear that we would have to find a deal which meets those red lines. By the same token, the EU has also made it clear that it will respect the UK red lines, which is why we now have the deal on the table. Thank you. Thank you. Did you want to come back in on that Professor Muscatelio? Just a simple point, I think one of the things that is really concerning is that there are still segments of opinion within the two main parties in Westminster that believe there is some sort of deal that hasn't been discovered yet in the middle. If you look at the possible options, there's no way, there's integration with the single market, possibly adding a customs union, there's where the Prime Minister would like to go following the divorce settlement. There's nothing in between, there's only one example of partial integration into the single market and that's Switzerland and that doesn't solve the Irish border issue anyway, so you would have to maintain a different regime anyway for Northern Ireland. I always have problems when people say that there's a different deal to be had, but what is it? It's not because there isn't a continuum there, you're either in the single market, you're not in the single market and if you're not in the single market then you cannot have frictionless trade across borders. We're now running out of time, so by way of a conclusion, could I ask our witnesses if they could perhaps briefly speculate as to what they consider the position will be on 29 March? Dangerous game though. We've talked quite a lot about extension of the process. There's a lot of uncertainty about what the purpose of it would be and how long it would be and so on, but I do on balance think it's likely that for one reason or another the Government will have certainly asked for and probably, based on what we've also heard, will have agreed some degree of extension to the process, so things may change, but my prediction would be therefore we will still be in the EU at that point, but I don't suppose that all these other bigger questions will have been magically solved by that point. I agree on the need for technical extension at the very least, but I suppose the probabilities in my mind are all along the following lines that there's probably around 30 per cent probability of no deal at this point, there's probably about 10 per cent of a probability that the Prime Minister will find, will rally people around her deal through some political maneuvering. It's difficult to see that given the scale of defeat and it's pretty evenly split the remaining of the 30 per cent each on a different kind of approach by Westminster which changes the direction of Brexit, either to a very soft Brexit in Norway style or that there's such deadlock that in the end there is a decision to go towards a people's vote and that would probably come relatively late in the day because as people have reflected there isn't a majority around that at the moment. Thank you very much Dr Zuleig. Yes, I'm a little bit more pessimistic. I would think that the probability now of not reaching a deal at all is the highest probability with all the consequences that has. I don't think that will happen at the end of March. I think there will be some form of extension but unless there's a very radical change within the UK which leads us to a majority for something which also the EU can accept, I think the chances are quite high that the UK will crash out without a deal. On that rather despondent note, I'm afraid that we have to wind up but can I thank all our witnesses for coming to give evidence to us today and we shall have a short suspension. Our next agenda item is to consider correspondence received from Historic Environment Scotland regarding Scotland's links to the slave trade. The background to this is a member of the public who wrote to the committee concerned about the origins of some artefacts and as a result of that I wrote to the Historic Scotland asking them what their policy position was on that. The letter outlines that they're actually about to undertake a research programme into the subject which I thought was most interesting. I don't know if anyone else has any comments to make on the letter. Just a brief one. Given the scope of this work, we expected to take place over a number of years. That could be two, three, ten. I just wondered if we had any expectations of when they might report back to us or if it would be within this session of Parliament or the next. I noted any other comments. The other parts of this are fine but they actually find out the impact of slavery, which ended 185 years ago in the British Empire. How would that be distinct from looking at the impact of Calvinism on Scotland's built environment over the years with industrial revolution or international trade or all the other things that have impacted? What really is the end game here of this? I believe that the member of the public who wrote to me, who represents a fairly broad range of opinion, made the point that in visiting the particular property that she visited, there was no indication that much of the wealth had been created on the backs of slavery, which happens throughout the UK, not simply in Scotland. She was interested not just in the historic environment of Scotland but in how often those artefacts were presented. I personally think that it is very interesting that they are undertaking this research programme and I would be very supportive of it myself. I was at primary school. The only aspect of Scottish history that we get taught at all was about the tobacco lords of Glasgow. There was no mention of slavery, interestingly, but it was all about the wealth of those lords who traded with Virginia. I think that there is an appreciation in Glasgow that a lot of its wealth originated from that trade. I think that it is a difficult thing to try and break down because the money that came in was also used for street lighting and pavements and house building. I think that it is an interesting project, but I am just wondering what the real purpose of it is, if you like. It is a curiosity more than anything else. I would have thought that the purpose would be to resolve the fact that there might be specific areas of the country with a relatively broad level of knowledge about that. Overall, there is an incredibly low level of knowledge in Scotland about the significance of the slave trades to our story of Glasgow as the second city of the empire about where a lot of the wealth came from and where a lot of the physical legacies of that still are. I entirely took the point that much of that went to the kind of infrastructure that has been replaced since, or is not particularly notable, like pavements and street lights. A lot of those historic buildings are some of the most notable fixtures in Scotland, and it would be appropriate and responsible for us as a nation to acknowledge why they came to be and who paid for their construction. Where did that come from? I imagine that if you surveyed the overwhelming majority of people in Scotland, their level of awareness of that would be incredibly low. I would also say about the commitment of people who were cleared from islands or came over as a result of the Irish farming or just poverty and industrialisation of Scotland, people leaving their historic farms, etc. In terms of Scottish history, how many people in Scotland know much about the Enlightenment or any other aspects of Scottish history, other than Kings and Queens? Possibly a minority might know about the Union of the Crowns or the Daryne exhibition. I think that there's an issue about Scottish history and all that and the knowledge of culture generally. I'm just curious about why that particular aspect of it, as opposed to, say, witch burning or something like that, or any other aspect of Scotland, is somewhat awful past. I think that we have to look at Scotland's history in the round, the good parts, the bad parts. I'm interested in, for example, how it came to a society that allowed, I thought it was okay to send children of five or five years old down the mines or up chimneys as well. Maybe we could ask, in addition to asking about the timing of the proposed project, about the proposed budgetary implications. If they say that it's a major research project, ambitious research projects, the phrase they use, what are they proposing to spend on this? Tavish, do you want to come in? I'd rather not, thank you. I believe that the University of Glasgow is undertaking a similar piece of work, so it might be useful just to get a briefing from them on what their proposals are, what their endgame is, to potentially help us shape any thoughts that we want to have in the future. I'm supportive of the work that they're undertaking, and I'm pleased to see the letter. We can write to them and maybe ask for more details, because I'd imagine the research that they're planning is linked to properties that they own and that are open to the public, and we'll already display a certain amount of information that I'd imagine about that property and possibly the owners. I think that it's looking to add additional to that, but I think that we could write and maybe ask them. They say that they're having their early planning stages at the start of this year, so maybe we could ask what came out of those initial stages and a bit more detail on what's planned. I propose that we write back to Historic and Violent Scotland, asking them for a little more detail, particularly on the budget and the timescales, and then discuss it when we hear back from them. Does everyone agree to that?