 So, ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you to the United States Institute of Peace. We are very pleased to be able to open our academic year with Tony Blinken and Dr. Leif Kuba to talk about the events and previous work and looking forward events in Iraq. This is an important time. It's been a long time that these events have been going on, and I'm sure we will have an opportunity to go into some depth on this. Tony Blinken, of course, is a national security advisor to the vice president. They have spent a lot of time in Baghdad and around Iraq, most recently just last week, but they've been there, I don't know, six times in the past, the short months, and we'll have a lot to say about this. Tony Blinken will be followed by Dr. Leif Kuba, who is now the director of Mid-East and North Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy, but is a long-time participant and observer of Iraqi politics, and so we're looking forward to Dr. Kuba's comments as well. Following that, we'll have an opportunity for you to ask questions, and we look forward to that part of this discussion as well. So, Tony, with that one. Thank you. Bill, thank you very much, and good afternoon. It is great to be here, great to be with all of you. As Bill said, to try and kick off the school year. Bill, I just wanted to start by commending your own service. In Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Ukraine, pretty much any hotspot we can think of. You were there and performed tremendous service for the United States, so I wanted to thank you. I also wanted to single out a couple of people. Of course, the head of the Institute, Richard Solomon. Always great to be with him and a dear friend and colleague, Tara Sonnenschein, with whom I worked in the Clinton administration. And it's especially good to be here at the Institute of Peace because quite frankly, the mission of this Institute is more important and more significant than ever. To have a nonpartisan group of deeply informed specialists working on the most critical issues of the day in terms of peace building, post-conflict reconstruction, development, building governing capacity, it is simply more vital than ever. The administration deeply appreciates the work that you do when I worked on the Hill. I know that Congress appreciated it very much as well, and we are looking to you to continue to carry a very heavy load on these very difficult issues. President Obama ran on a commitment to end the war in Iraq responsibly, and last week marked a very important milestone toward that goal. Our combat mission in Iraq is over. The Iraqis now have lead responsibility for their own security. We've removed roughly 100,000 troops from Iraq since we took office from nearly 150,000 when we came in to about 50,000 today. And we will make good on our commitment to remove all of our troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. Until then, our remaining troops will advise and assist the Iraqis, take part in partnered counter-terrorism operations, and of course protect themselves, our civilians, and critical infrastructure. But just as significantly, we are not disengaging from Iraq. The nature of our engagement is changing, from a military lead to a predominantly civilian one. Put another way, even as we draw down our forces, we are ramping up our civilian engagement, political, economic, diplomatic, to deepen Iraq's sovereignty, a self-reliance in stability, and to build an ongoing partnership between the United States and Iraq. I thought I'd talk a little bit about these civilian efforts today, but first it's important to set the context that this change of mission is taking place in. If you step back and look at the big picture in Iraq over the past 18 months or so, I think it's this, violent incidents are significantly down, the capacity of the Iraqi security forces is significantly up, and politics has emerged as the basic currency for doing business in Iraq. If you were just reading about Iraq in the daily newspaper or watching television at night, you might come away with the impression that not much has changed there, that Iraq continues to be more of the same, suicide bombings and attacks. And to be sure, extremist groups continue horrific acts that take innocent Iraqi lives. Iraq remains a dangerous place, and so our civilians, our diplomats, our troops remain in danger. But the facts are these. The number of weekly or monthly security incidents in Iraq is at its lowest level since 2003. There's been a dramatic decline from the dark days of 2006, 2007, and the level has stayed down consistently. Two quick examples. A week that ended September 3rd last week, total nationwide attacks in Iraq decreased from 136 to 102 from the previous week, below the 12-month average of 111. Let me put that in perspective. During the darkest days of the insurgency in 2007, there were 1,800 attacks in one week in June, and for about two years, 2006, 2007, the average number of weekly attacks was about 1,400. Now if you're the victim of one of the 100 attacks that are taking place, that may not be much solace, but there is a clear trend, a clear picture, and it's been sustained. What does this mean for the Iraqi people? It means, as we used to say in another context, that the quiet blessings of a normal life are increasingly within reach. In Baghdad, people are going out to shops, to restaurants, markets are bustling, homes are being built. There are traffic jams and not all of them caused by security checkpoints. If you talk to reporters who are based in Iraq, they will tell you that for all of the remaining problems, they have more freedom of movement and access now than they've had at any time in recent memory. And maybe most important, while the attacks do continue, they have not achieved their strategic objective, which is to relight a sectarian fuse or fundamentally undermine confidence in the government. And in fact, when you talk to Iraqi leaders from across the political spectrum, they characterize the remaining attacks not as an insurgency, but as acts of terror by a relatively small group of extremists on different sides who are not getting traction with the Iraqi people. The progress that we've seen, of course, is due in substantial measure to the extraordinary skill and professionalism of the U.S. military forces who have been and remain in Iraq. And we had an opportunity to talk about that in Iraq last week, when the Vice President was there, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Mattis and others, for the change of mission and change of command that some of you may have seen on television. But this progress is also due in no small measure to the increasing capacity and professionalism of Iraq's security forces. We've trained about 650,000 Iraqis, including very effective special operations forces. And there's evidence of this increased capacity and professionalism. The Iraqis took the lead in securing the recent elections and did a very good job. In recent months, Iraqi-led operations based on Iraqi-developed intelligence have helped kill or capture 32 of the top 42 al-Qaida and Iraq leaders. And they are taking on Shia extremist groups as well. Pretty most important, the Iraqi people have decisively rejected violence and their leaders have embraced the political process as the best way to secure the interests of Iraq's various communities. That political process is rarely pretty. It's almost never linear. But the evidence in recent months is that it's working. We've been through a series of sky-is-falling moments in Iraq, consider the events with the election law and the controversy that erupted around that, debathification efforts right before the election, the challenge to the election itself. Every time people said, this is it, this is a crisis, the sky is falling. Each time, the Iraqis use the political process and constitutional means to work through the crisis, the sky did not fall. Of course, it's also true that the sun has yet to rise on a new government in Iraq. But the length of time it's taken to get that government in some ways is not unexpected. Last time, in 2005, 2006, it took about six months, which is roughly where we are now in the process. This time, the election itself was extraordinarily close, as I think most of you know. Only two seats out of 325 separated the two leading coalitions, and neither is anywhere close to getting a majority needed to form a government on its own. And so we've had this process of coalitions working together to try and form a majority, 163 seats in their parliament. And of course, this time, the stakes were even higher. As the Iraqis know that we will remove our remaining troops by the end of 2011, and they are determined to get government formation right, even if it takes a little longer. Like last time, however, a dangerous power vacuum in Iraq has yet to develop. The lack of government formation does not mean the lack of a government. There is a government, a caretaker government, and it's basically doing just that, taking care of the basic business of providing security, providing services, expending the budget. But of course the absence of an elected government is not a durable solution for Iraq. Major challenges remain before the Iraqis, including Iraq's disputed internal boundaries and the status of Kirk Cook, laws to govern oil production and revenue sharing, constitutional reform, the integration of Kurdish and Sunni military forces and security forces. All of these issues would benefit. Indeed, they probably require the legitimacy of an elected government to move toward resolution. Similarly, we in the United States want to build a long-term partnership with Iraq that I'll talk about in a moment, but to build a partnership we need a partner. Here too, moving forward requires the greater certainty and legitimacy of an elected government. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Iraqi people voted in large numbers across all communities for a new representative, for new representatives, and for a new government. They expect a new parliament, they expect a new government, they deserve them. Let me talk a little bit about how we see things going forward. President Obama has been focused on Iraq from day one of this administration. In fact, even before day one, he sent Vice President-elect Biden, some of you may remember, to Iraq about two weeks before the inaugural, to do a baseline assessment for our incoming administration. One of the first things the president did upon taking office was to order a full review of our Iraq policy. He laid out a new policy going forward in a speech at Camp Lejeune. And then he asked the vice president to oversee Iraq policy because he was determined that we would have a sustained, high-level focus from the White House on Iraq every day. The vice president chairs a monthly cabinet meeting on Iraq. He's in contact every week and sometimes every day with Iraq's leaders, with our very strong team in Baghdad, now Ambassador Jeffrey, General Lawson, before that with Ambassador Hill and General Lodierno, and indeed with leaders throughout the region. As I said at the outset, we are not disengaging from Iraq. The nature of our engagement is changing to a civilian lead. And concrete evidence of that commitment is our decision, which the vice president announced last week in Baghdad, to open consulates in Erbil and Basra and MSC branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul. We want to ensure that our engagement continues to cover the breadth and depth of Iraq. The State Department is going to bear the heaviest burden in this engagement. Dozens of tasks that were previously the responsibility of our military have now reverted to the Department of State, including a major nationwide police training program starting in October of next year. The president and vice president determined that as state takes this lead responsibility, we have a whole of government approach to our engagement with Iraq, especially when it comes to our commitment to build up the strategic framework agreement with Iraq and to bring it to full fruition. That agreement commits us to strengthen ties of commerce and trade and investment, culture and education, diplomacy and security. We've already held a major investment conference here in Washington that brought about 1,100 U.S. and Iraqi government officials and private sector representatives together. Later this fall, the Commerce Department is going to take a delegation to Baghdad with more than a dozen companies looking at potential business deals and investment opportunities with their Iraqi counterparts. This June, the Department of Agriculture brought leading U.S. agricultural firms to Iraq to explore business opportunities, and we've seen a major contract flow from that engagement. Specialists from across the government, including from Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Centers, Interior, Energy, Health and Human Services, USAID, are working closely with Iraqi counterparts to develop Iraq's capacity. The State Department's largest Fulbright program in the Middle East is in Iraq. We also have a very active international visitors program. Just last week, nine Iraqi provincial council members came to the U.S. to study how our local governments interact with Washington, and I'm sure they've learned some very interesting lessons from that. In this summer, 25 Iraqi professors, administrators and deans from a number of universities across Iraq are spending 10 weeks here in the United States at American universities participating in programs on education, public health, linguistics, science and technology, and engineering. And we're moving forward with efforts to strengthen our cultural ties as well. As part of the Iraq Culture Heritage Project, State is working with the Iraqi government to make improvements to the Iraq National Museum, to establish a National Conservation Training Institute, interveal, and to provide training opportunities in the U.S. for Iraqi cultural heritage professionals. We'll also open an Office of Security cooperation as part of our embassy. This is something we do in embassies around the world where we have a significant security relationship. Working from that office, civilian and military professionals and experts will continue to provide advice to the Iraqi military and help them integrate American equipment. And of course, our diplomats in our embassy will be on call to answer any Iraqi requests for assistance in working through their internal challenges, developing stronger relations with their neighbors, strengthening their economy and the provision of services, and working through Iraq's continuing obligations to the United Nations under Chapter 7. So let me conclude where I began. President Obama's commitment to end the war in Iraq responsibly. The word responsibly is there for a reason. Ours is not a rush to the exit. This is about as much about what we leave behind as it is about leaving, and we're determined to leave behind a sovereign, self-reliant and stable Iraq and a long-term partnership between the United States and Iraq. There is a lot of hard road left to travel for the Iraqis and so for us. But maybe it's an occupational hazard, but I'm hopeful about Iraq's future and hopeful about the potential for a new relationship with the United States. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Bill. I thank the USIP for inviting me, and it's a hard act to follow. I think following the statement that was given by Tony. I think when it comes to the vision of the administration that was outlined on Iraq, one can hardly disagree that putting more emphasis on the politics and not on the military presence is the right approach. I think the development that took place in Iraq without a question, the US military presence and the surge had something to do with it, but more importantly, it's the shift in emphasis. And Iraq today has developed an army, and it can be sufficient, but the question is sufficient for what? I think on the first question, on the strength of the Iraqi army, everybody agrees that it has emerged. The Iraqi army today is not where it was four or five years ago. Today it can fulfill a lot of its duties in main Baghdad, in main Iraqi cities. To fight al-Qaeda, you do not need foreign troops, you do not even need an army of half a million or a quarter of a million. What you do need is strong intelligence and professionalism, and I think this is where Iraq needs the US in that front, and certainly, I think the vision that was outlined is very much in line with Iraqi needs. The reality is irrespective of that vision and the intention. I think perception is important. And how the US withdrawal from Iraq and that shift in strategy and in emphasis is going to be perceived by the players not only inside Iraq but outside Iraq is as important as the policy itself. I think it's not about simply outlining a policy, it's about seeing it through reaching all its objectives. There is no question al-Qaeda will try to take some tactical advantage out of the shift in policy. These attacks that took place in Iraq would not pose any serious challenge to Iraq, and I think they can be dismissed as being secondary. But more of a concern, I think, amongst the Iraqis themselves about the US commitment inside Iraq, a lot see that the US is pulling out of Iraq because it's been exhausted, because it's been stretched thin. And they follow up all the speeches that are said. They follow up the news about the economy. And I think the impression, it's a choice that has been more or less forced on the US by reality. And the concern is very real amongst Iraqi players about the extent of the commitment of the US to seeing Iraq through. And I think that's one area I would flag and I would raise as being critical. A second issue, which is very much, I think the elephant, there are many elephants in the room that one needs to talk about, but I think it needs to be spelled out. And that is with the US withdrawal currently amongst Iraq's neighbors, Iran is the most influential. It had many ways to influence and to some extent often dictate what goes on in Iraq. And I think the perception and the reality of American withdrawal from Iraq is going to be read carefully by Iran. And I just cannot foresee the next four, five years without factoring Iran into the equation. Everybody knows that the US is concerned about Iran's programs, Iran's regional position, and it's very much a subject of open debates and private debates. And I think you cannot detach the debates about the future of Iraq without directly addressing Iran influence and how this is going to materialize in the future. Looking internally, the most important achievement the US had after all these long years and sacrifices that were, that happened both from the US and from the Iraqi side, Iraq has a constitution and has a political process. But it concerns me a great deal that this constitution has been weakened recently by the politicians and not only initially they started by delaying provincial elections by year or two and then by looking at the outcome of the elections themselves and now it's been five to six months and that constitution is not adhered to. Now a weakened constitution in a country that is full of problems is not a good sign. The Kurds have a list of issues ahead and the only point of reference other than violence they have is the constitution and if the constitution has been marginalized or the Iraqis have been allowed to marginalize it to that extent without serious pressure or deterrent it's a real worry on the future of Iraq. On the second point, the political process, we had three elections in Iraq and the Iraqis participated by 70 percent and they took a lot of risks and sacrifices and really were proud to have the first real democratic elections taking place in the region in Iraq but they are extremely disappointed by the outcome of the process. The novelty of democracy is wearing off, it does concern me a great deal that what Iraqis have seen as the outcome of just elections is a high level of corruption and a dysfunctional government and time is running out. I think if there was a strong Iraqi army today and that Iraqi army staged a coup it would be welcomed by a lot of people because a lot of Iraqis would like to see a functional government. I think that issue is real not talked about often but the ordinary people in the streets there is that growing sentiment of frustration or of despair of the process itself. There is another important factor is that I think part of the US strategy is to strengthen the Iraqi army and the Iraqi army can be strong enough to hold security in Iraq up to a point. It cannot fill in if the political process fails. In other words if the issues between Baghdad and the Kurdish region are not resolved in a peaceful way the Iraqi army cannot enforce anything meaningful and I think there is prospect for a worry of real violence that can evolve if the political process fails. The other one if the political process for any reason excludes the Iraqi which is the under it a lot of the Sahwa, the ones that portray us strategically and correctly try to integrate them in the political process but today they are in a much, much stronger position and there is a balance of fear all groups are armed and I think everybody knows that violence is not an option and everybody would seek that the political process ought to succeed but the reality is if it doesn't then I think the level of violence that can erupt in Iraq would require foreign intervention and if that foreign intervention does not come from the US it might come from other sources. I think on the final point I make the US has brought a lot of hope to the Iraqis not only by getting rid of Saddam Hussein and setting up the political process but also by advocating a set of values to do with human rights, the rule of law, respect for the constitution and under day-to-day politics and under many, many pressures I think the US-Iraq relationships goes under maybe those issues become secondary because there are other more important urgent issues that are forced on governments but I think it's important strategically in the long term that the US ought to keep the pressure both politically and otherwise it has many leverages over the Iraqi government that those achievements on the areas of human rights, on the rule of law, on the freedom of the press is not challenged yet legally but it might but all these areas need to be maintained and need to be I think central in the vision and the approach that the US government should take on Iraq. I think as far as Iraq, other neighbors which is primarily Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria one view I've always held and advocated that is if the US was to leave Iraq as it's leaving now it ought to put some pact, some political pact that involves Iraq neighbors to avoid the vacuum and to avoid a power grab that can take place on a much bigger scale. The power grab that we saw in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein was messy but it can be much worse if the US was to leave Iraq leave vacuum without a pact with Iraq's neighbors on how to bring order to the region and to Iraq. Thank you. Excellent questions. Tony if you agree I will give you an opportunity to say a couple of words in response or to answer some of the questions. I thought Leith asked very good ones in terms of the extent of the US commitment and the obvious question is if Iraqis who are ambivalent about departure and we ought to be very clear we're talking about departure it's not departure it is military departure Americans are not leaving the military is going down. There's been conversations about what would happen if the Iraqis asked for some delay and I know it's a difficult question and probably not want to answer explicitly however the question about Iran is a good one. The weakening of the constitution and the possibility of frustration Leith even mentioned to coup. The Arab Kurdish dispute being one that will have to be old groups that are re-armed you mentioned and finally the pact with the neighbors to maintain some stability there that was not there there earlier but Tony if you'd like to deal with any of those and then we will open up for questions from the rest of the crew and you can do it right from there if you'd like. Great thanks Bill. Look for the most part I find myself in a violent agreement with Leith on everything he said or warned about I think the concerns you expressed are many of the concerns that we share and that we're very vigilant about looking toward. Most specifically in terms of the ongoing commitment I think there are two things going on if you look at the polling it's very clear that an overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to see us remove our troops from Iraq 75 or 80 percent in most of the polls I've seen and one of the things that has really benefited our relationship with Iraq is that we are making good on our commitments. I think many Iraqis did not believe that we would get out of the cities a year ago and we did. Many Iraqis did not believe that we would end our combat mission and get down to 50,000 troops. We did. Probably there are Iraqis who do not believe we will remove our troops pursuant to an agreement with the government of Iraq by the end of 2011. We will and making good on these commitments is a very important way to build credibility and build the relationship with Iraq. But Bill as you said and Leith as you as you warned we've also been emphasizing again and again and again as I said a few moments ago that we are not disengaging from Iraq it's just that the nature of the engagement is changing and even as we draw down our forces over time we are ramping up our civilian and diplomatic engagement and indeed presence in Iraq because this too is something that the Iraqis seem to want and every Iraqi political leader from what virtually every coalition or party with the probable exception of the Sadrists has made it clear that they want to develop a strong relationship with the United States. They want to see us bring the strategic framework agreement to life and we're committed to doing that as long as the Iraqis want to do it. When it comes to Iran and Iranian influence let me say a couple of things. First on one level Iran is always going to have influence and engagement in Iraq simply by dint of geography and history and religious affinity and that will not stop and on one level nor should it that's that's just part of the facts of life in the region. However it's also clear to me and to many of us that Iraq has developed very strong antibodies against foreign influence and excessive foreign influence and intervention from wherever it might be coming and that includes us and so what we've seen in recent months is a very strong resistance to meddling by anyone including the Iranians. The Iranians spent a very large sum of money on the election and they got very little to show for it in the outcome of that election. No doubt they are trying to influence government formation as we speak as are a number of other countries in the region but again I would suggest that what we're really seeing in Iraq beyond the emergence of politics is the emergence of a new nationalism and within the proper boundaries that's a very positive development if nationalism has overtaken sectarianism as the dominant feature of Iraqi life. I don't see any any signs of a coup or military takeover what we see as Iraqis committed to a political process and the evidence I suggested whenever there's been a crisis and there have been a number of so-called crises over the past year Iraqis have not reverted to extra constitutional means. They pushed the envelope for sure but at the end of the day I would argue that everything they've done has been within the constitutional framework and within a political process. As to the Arab Kurdish differences and issues these are very significant because what we don't want to see is Iraq moving from sectarian conflict to ethnic conflict and here again I would argue there been some very positive developments although they're not by any means definitive. First we've worked very hard and I have to give credit to General Odierno who did a remarkable job in setting up on the security side of things a tripartite mechanism with the Peshmerga with Iraqi security forces and with the United States having joint patrols and checkpoints along the fault line in the north and that has really had a very important effect in minimizing tensions in averting problems that might arise but something we're going to continue. The integration of Peshmerga into the Iraqi forces is also something that's very important going forward as is the continuing integration of the Sons of Iraq but there's another important element. Right now based on the results of the election the Kurdish alliance is the pivot in government formation. Maybe Kingmaker's too strong but clearly absent their support it's going to be hard if not impossible for anyone else to get together and exclude them and that gives the Kurds a significant voice not only in the government formation process but in the government going forward because think about it this way the weakness of a coalition government is also a strength. Any one member of the coalition if they're unhappy with the way coalition partners are acting in government can walk away and collapse the government and that gives a tremendous amount of strength to anyone who participates in the next government with a swing with a swing block of votes. In terms of old groups re-arming again I think the critical thing here is to move forward with integration of the Peshmerga and full integration of the Sons of Iraq both militarily and in civilian jobs and actually the Sons of Iraq program has moved forward quite well there's still a lot of work to be done but our sense based on the way the budget's being allocated is that the Iraqi government has been serious about this and it's certainly something we continue to urge them to be serious about. And finally in terms of the neighbors and a pact with the neighbors we've spent a lot of time engaging the neighbors on Iraq. The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and others have all been regularly and deeply engaged with virtually every neighbor talking about Iraq. But I think it's very important again to emphasize that Iraqis are not looking to have something done behind their backs or over their backs. This is about helping Iraq develop normal relations with all of its neighbors. And as we used to say in a very different context our basic approach is nothing about you without you so we are not going to be trying to build packs around Iraq we're going to try to help Iraq fully integrate the region and I think that's actually an area where Iraqis will continue to look to the United States for help and assistance. Tony thank you very much. Okay I as expected we have some immediate questions here yes sir right here and there's a there is the mic that you can use. Barish wide AP before I forget it isn't your last point built on require terrible sensitivity that you have to know the exact point at which Iran is being a helpful neighbor or being an anxious neighbor and I don't know because people have argued Jim Dobbins prominently among them that we missed an opportunity to bring Iran into the situation and it might have been better than what happened. I don't know how you're going to measure that I will leave aside in fact what right you have to measure it but how are you going to measure that. And if the event the dust up last weekend involved al-Qaeda front groups is he was now in an on combat group role except where al-Qaeda might be involved. Thanks Barry. Thanks. You're absolutely right about the sensitivity but in a sense it's not for us to gauge that or judge that it's for the Iraqis and we will follow their lead. As I suggested our assessment is that there are very strong antibodies that have built up in Iraq toward foreign noxious foreign interference from anyone Iran but also any of the Sunni neighbors and from us and we have not seen at least in recent months the Iraqis reacting well to perceive pressure from Iran or for that matter from anyone else and so I think the gauge the measure is really from the Iraqis and we will follow that lead and we'll see going forward what role the neighbors all the neighbors play in in Iraq going forward but again it's really the Iraqis of the Iraqis to make that that decision. The mission going forward of the 50,000 remaining troops there are a couple of things that are important to point out. One our combat mission is ended but the presence of American combat troops is not the 50,000 that remain include combat troops but they're not in combat units or combat brigades these are folks who are prepared for any contingency. Second while their primary mission is to advise and assist the Iraqis and continue to develop their capacity they will also continue to take part in what we call partnered counterterrorism operations. Iraqis will be in the lead but our guys will be there and if necessary they will take part directly in these operations so that is something that continues. The Iraqis have made tremendous progress against al Qaeda in Iraq in recent months as I mentioned a few moments ago since the election. Iraqi led operations based on intelligence developed primarily by the Iraqis led to the killing or capture of 32 of the top 42 al Qaeda in Iraq leaders so we're seeing Iraqis having developed a significant capacity to take on these fights but again part of our formal mission going forward until the end of 2011 is partner counterterrorism operations and again the combat mission is over but we still have combat troops in Iraq. In the back. I'm Wally Hayes an independent consultant and my question is in both president's speech which I didn't see but read and in your comments today there hasn't been any discussion of how this change in policy from military to from the Pentagon to the State Department advances critical U.S. interests in the region for example containing Iran or ensuring a stable secure supply of energy. Can you talk a little bit about how U.S. interests are advanced by this policy? Sure. Thanks. Thank you. First and foremost I think U.S. interests are advanced by fulfilling the president's commitment to end the war responsibly. It is not in our interest to be engaged in an endless war in Iraq. It's not in our interest to have those kind of resources tied down to continue to put our people in jeopardy at a point in time in which the Iraqis most fervent wish across every community is to regain their full sovereignty and at a point in time in which Iraq has increasingly developed the capacity to assume that sovereignty and so the administration believes that the single best way in the first instance to advance our interests is to make good on our commitment to end this war responsibly and to in a very pragmatic thought-out way disengage U.S. troops while at the same time ramping up the engagement of American civilians, American diplomats and continuing to develop the capacity of Iraqi forces. I think demonstrating that we're good to our word, that we're good to our commitment, that we have no interest in occupying Iraq or dominating its resources sends a very powerful and positive message to every neighbor. As I suggested a few moments ago I think Iraqis have been surprised that we've made good on our commitments. I suspect that many in the region are equally surprised. This is not the picture they painted the United States. They paint a picture of the United States as a force bent on occupation and domination and war. We are demonstrating exactly the opposite by making good on our commitment. So I would submit to you that moving forward in a pragmatic careful and thoughtful way on our commitment and the war responsibly profoundly advances the interest of the United States in the region. Thank you sir. Hi thanks. I'm Bob Dreyfus with the nation magazine and Rolling Stone. I want to follow up on Barry asked but let me ask it this way. Are there any conceivable circumstances under which the United States would not withdraw the rest of its troops by the end of next year particularly if Iraq falls apart or some of these bad scenarios that have been discussed occur. Would the president renege on that commitment and I don't mean residual force to protect the embassy but is this an absolute commitment by the end of next year regardless of whether Iraq falls back into civil war or not. And second in that context and this is why I want to follow up on Barry's question. If Iran which certainly has the capability of stirring up the Sadrists Shiite militias other forces so forth does get involved in that. Are we talking to Iran now. I mean the Bush administration had a dialogue which I haven't seen replicated yet by the Obama one with the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad on working to stabilize Iraq. I know we're of course we're trying to do stuff with the nuclear program but are we talking to the Iranians about Iraq and if not why not. Thank you. The United States has an agreement with the government of Iraq to withdraw all of our forces by the end of 2011 and we intend to make good on that agreement and on that commitment. Beyond that the first rule of commenting on any hypothetical future oriented question is not to comment. So I don't want to engage in a hypothetical discussion. Let me just say this. We do have 50,000 troops still in Iraq. They will be there until the end of 2011. As I suggested while the combat mission is over the presence of combat troops is not. They're fully prepared to deal with any contingencies that may arise between now and their departure and our belief and expectation is that we'll also be using that time to further help the Iraqis develop the capacity of their own security forces and that will put them in a position after 2011 to be able to deal with any problems or contingencies that arise. In terms of Iran we do not currently have a dialogue with Iran about Iraq and of course the focus of the international community at this point in time is convincing Iran to make good on its obligations to that community on its nuclear program. Yes ma'am. Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Inquirer. Tony, at the risk of raising a hypothetical you said the gauge was Iraq and perhaps the more operative question is if the Iraqi government in the next year feels that as Dr. Kubas said the perception in the region will be of a vacuum if there is no U.S. military presence and if they raised the idea of a new agreement are we ruling out cooperation on that front and also as far as the civilian presence can you say something about the protection for that presence there's been stories of a 6,000 man private army or whatever there's going to be we all know that there are still serious security problems and will this greatly enhanced civilian presence be able to get out of its compounds and engage with the Iraqi people. Thanks Trudy. You're right again I don't want to get into a hypothetical discussion about what an Iraqi government may or may not ask for right now we still need to see the government formed and then we'll engage with that new government just as we're engaged with the caretaker government now. If the Iraqis put any issue on the table for discussion of course we're prepared to discuss it but beyond that it's as I said a hypothetical again in anything that a new government may put on the table or may ask for. In terms of the protection of our civilians you're absolutely right that there is a very significant mission going forward in terms of making sure we can protect our civilian and diplomatic personnel who will be engaged around the country in a number of very important missions in our consulates, in our branch offices, the police training program, etc and much of that effort will fall to private security contractors that's the way in the absence of the military we do business along with diplomatic security but as I think you know diplomatic security can't cover the entire responsibility and we believe we have a good plan to do just that it wouldn't make any sense to go forward with a civilian and diplomatic mission if our civilians and diplomats couldn't do their jobs couldn't get out beyond the wire to engage Iraqis we have a good plan to enable them to do that and I'm confident as we move forward that we'll be able to do it but it is it is it is a difficult task and one that's we spent a lot of time thinking through and maybe this is an opportunity to add one more point that's not directly responsive but I think it's important. This transition that we've gone through the change of mission that many of you witnessed was not the flipping of a light switch on August 31st it's been a carefully thought out and planned process that's taken place over the last year and indeed will still play out over the next year we began to hand lead responsibility to Iraqi security forces over a year ago when we got out of the cities and they have taken on that mission for many months now and so it wasn't all of a sudden handing the ball to them and saying run with it good luck second the transition to State Department and other agency lead in many of these tasks will happen over the coming months and indeed the coming year and the consulates won't be fully stood up until October of next year full state responsibility for the police training program won't take effect until October of next year so this is a process it's not a singular event and in that process we're able to evaluate what's working what's not working make changes where we have to and we'll continue to do that. Like that any point if you'd like to make a comment you'll I'm sure let me know. Yeah please help me out. Yes right here. Yeah. Hi Faris Dockman with the Boston Globe. I was hoping you could tell us a little bit about the sources of leverage that the U.S. will have left on the Iraqi government. It's not obviously just the troops on the ground but what other means you have to influence them and the other question I had is you were talking about how everything they're doing is within the framework of the Constitution but there's a lot of people who look and see that the fact that the Parliament kind of adjourned and hasn't met for so many months was was tricking the Constitution was sort of throwing it out and I was wondering if you could address that. Thanks for first to the question of sources of leverage. That's a very important question because there is this perception that there is a direct and proportional relationship between the drawdown of our troops and our influence in Iraq. And I think that's a fundamentally flawed view and premise. Of course there is significant influence with having 150,000 troops in a country. But that influence doesn't go away as they draw down in the case of Iraq. It changes in nature and I believe we will have positive points of influence going forward because there are a number of things that Iraqis are looking to us for assistance with that will retain our influence. First and foremost there's bringing the strategic framework agreement to life and we have made it clear in our interaction with the Iraqis that that's something we're determined to do but it's not a one way street. There are many things that they need to do in order for example to attract investment to engage in trade and commerce to move forward on education and cultural exchange as well as to move forward on security cooperation in terms of the integration of Peshmerga and integration of the Sons of Iraq. So they know that there are a number of things that are their responsibility as we try to meet ours. Second the Iraqis have made clear to us that they are very interested in our help in continuing to help them develop more normal relations with all of their neighbors and that's a position I think where we can be very helpful. And finally when it comes to Iraq's obligations to the United Nations under Chapter 7 we've made a commitment to Iraq to help Iraq move out from under Chapter 7 and there again they look to us for assistance. So in all of these areas I think our positive influence will remain. But that influence is limited only by one thing really and that is what do the Iraqi people want and what do their elected representatives want. And as long as they want US engagement as long as they want a partnership with the United States our influence will be there if they choose otherwise that is really the marker of whether we have influence or not not the presence of our troops. And then in terms of the constitutional framework and resolving disputes for sure as I suggested in each of these areas where we've had problems or some of called them crises in recent months the electoral law, debathification, the election itself and so forth. There's no doubt that one group or another has tried to push the envelope on the constitution or interpretations of the constitution. That's something that's probably not unfamiliar to many constitutional based countries around the world. But I would argue that in each case while people have pushed the envelope they haven't pushed through it and that everything has been done within the framework of the constitution. You can argue for example about whether the failure to move forward with government formation on a certain time frame violates the constitution. There's an argument that it does. There's another argument that by keeping the first session of the parliament open and in session they actually haven't triggered some of the clocks that are that are in the constitution. And again maybe the predominance of the argument would be with one interpretation or another but again I would maintain they have not worked outside of the basic framework of the constitution and that's very important. You're okay on all this? I mean slight disagreement on this. I really think even the head of parliament who is Fouad Maasoum when a number of NGOs came out to say you're violating the constitution and this is not on. He admitted he said if you take me to court to the Supreme Court I'll play guilty and we have violated the constitution. Just for the record. I think like after that comment there probably will be a court case brought against him so we'll see what happens. Tony and Leith, I can't think of two people I'd rather hear talk about Iraq than the two of you. I'm Daniel Sir where I work here at USIP. A comment first. It seems to me what lace intervention, initial intervention amounted to was concerned that the current constitutional system may not persist and it seems to me that that's behind a lot of the problem you're facing in government formation. These guys are worried that this is their last chance at power. The question is really whether there's any way of alleviating some of that concern. We've done that in other situations post-conflict. It's not an unusual concern. Iraq is particularly difficult place because foreign intervention is not all that welcome but have you thought about ways in which we can try to ease the concern that the constitutional system will not remain in place? Secondly on the administration's strong position which you restated today Tony that all the troops will be out by the end of 2011 as if there is a light switch which of course is not the case and yet you talked about an office of defense cooperation. Now we all know those of us who worry about these things that the Navy and the Air Force and Iraq aren't going to be ready to operate fully independently at the end of 2011. Can you square that circle a bit? Won't there be a real need for a fairly substantial number of ODC type people after the end of 2011? Dan thanks very much. Both obviously good questions. In terms of alleviating the concerns that Iraqis have I think there are a few things that we've pointed out to them that are having that effect although we have to see if that's decisive. First of all as they work together and right now what we're seeing is a process of the leading coalitions working very closely together and trying to negotiate basically a power-sharing deal. We're seeing daily engagement between Iraq and state of law, Kurdish alliance, ISKI is also engaged and we pointed out to them two things. First if they do come up with a power-sharing arrangement and concrete ideas for doing that, those ideas and those agreements can be legislated and have the force of law behind them. Second we've pointed out something I mentioned a few moments ago which is that in a coalition government the very weakness of coalition government is its strength. Any one partner if they have a decisive block of seats can leave the government and collapse it and that gives a tremendous amount of power and alleviates a tremendous amount of concern for anyone who chooses to participate in the government. If one party or another to the government is not making good on whatever commitments they make in order to get a government formation agreement then the other party or parties can walk. So that's something that we've pointed out and we've certainly suggested to them that if they do agree on forming a government and that there are commitments that are made by each of the coalitions to that end we will expect the Iraqis taking part in the government to make good on their commitments. So I think all of that has at least for now gone some distance toward alleviating very understandable concerns that the Iraqis may have but again it's not decisive because we still haven't seen a government and that's exactly the hurdle that they'll have to jump I think to get there to have enough trust in each other to feel that they can secure the interests of those they represent in a coalition government. In terms of the Office of Security Cooperation this is something that we have in embassies around the world in countries with whom we have a significant security relationship and so our expectation is that the office in Iraq once it stood up as part of our embassy under the authority of the ambassador will have some dozens of experts some from the Pentagon other civilians who will be helping the Iraqis with a couple of things increasing continuing to increase their overall capacity in military matters and also helping them integrate any American equipment they may choose to purchase for their military going forward and that's going to be the connective tissue on the security side going forward and again we are now still some time away from the end of 2011 and we're going to be using that time with the ongoing significant military presence that we have to continue to help the Iraqis develop their capacity so that by the end of 2011 they're in a place where they're confident that they can really assume responsibility for these missions so I think the combination of the time that we have between now and the end of 2011 and this Office of Security Cooperation as it gets stood up will help answer those questions. Yes, did you have one? Yes, I promise just while you're formulating your question here I promise Tony that he could walk out of here at 315 he's got a meeting he's got to be at so I will keep this promise. Lane has promised to answer any remaining questions. And Lane will answer any further questions. Very good. Yes, ma'am. Hello, I'm Elaine Cireo. I'm a foreign aid through education and my concern is the issue of the coalition government and the importance of it as you've pointed out to the stability not only of obviously Iraq but to the region and right now it's a very fragile coalition can you address a little further about the importance of the particularly the Kurdish role in the coalition? And I say that because I'm just observing I deal with other areas of the world usually like Pakistan but right now I've been observing what's going on with the Kurds and for instance right down the block on 16th Street the Kurds have have their own sort of mini embassy what I call it that I don't know so anyway with that in mind with with with their sites in mind and with what the sites of the region and the needs and everything can both of you speak a little further to the Kurdish issue. Sure, thank you. One of the things that we've said to all of our Iraqi interlocutors is that the United States is deeply committed to helping the Kurds sustain the significant gains that they've made in Iraq in terms of being fully and meaningfully integrated into the life and leadership of the nation but also retaining the day in and day out control of their of their daily lives this is something that we feel very strongly about and we've made that clear but what's very interesting is that in the context of this government formation process and all the discussions that are going back and forth there's an understanding by the other leading coalitions in Iraq that both to get a government and then to have a government that functions and to keep Iraq moving forward and together they have to address the outstanding concerns of the Kurdish region and so I think the the Kurds are in a good position to make sure that their interests are taken into account and the outstanding issues that they put on the table are dealt with in a forthright and in fair manner and certainly we've seen a lot of courting of the Kurds by various other coalitions looking to form a government and it's not the kind of situation where you can make a promise in order to entice one group or another to be in on the government and then renege on the promise the next day because again any member of a coalition government despite its complexities has the ability if they have a decisive block of seats as the Kurds almost certainly will to walk away from that government and collapse it so I think that's important second will continue to work very closely as requested with the Iraqis to work through some of these outstanding issues and I might add the United Nations has an absolutely central role to play in working through these issues the and the United Nations has been doing a terrific job in doing just that the leadership of the UN in Iraq with a number of very important people has really helped bring Iraqis together to talk about and work through the outstanding issues and so we're looking to the United Nations to continue to play that role going forward including on Kurdish Arab issues. Lace, do you need that? Sir. Oda Aberdeen, Tony how could you have a stable Iraq when you don't have a national army or a national police? Let's be clinical today in Iraq you don't really have a national army nor a national police because the loyalty of the police and the army to us certain parties certain individuals and certain foreign countries I think it's a major challenge to creating stability if the situation continues and then I have one other question on Iran, Iraq and sanctions Iraq today is the biggest Iraq is the biggest market for Iran the Iranians are dumping their substandard goods which they can't sell anywhere they're selling electricity to Iraq I have seen numbers that say that Iran earns between seven and ten billion dollars from its trade with Iraq what are we trying what are we doing to stop a flow of trade and money from Iraq to Iran? I would submit that there actually is a national army and that it is developing not only its capacity but its sense of nationalism every single day it continues to be a work in progress but what we've seen again in recent months in particular is that the army has remained loyal to the government of Iraq not to individuals or coalitions that it is taking on extremists of various stripes from emanating from various communities it has not been just going after one group or just going after another and critically moving forward you're right that until there is real integration of the Peshmerga and full integration of the Sons of Iraq we won't have a fully nationalized army but that process is ongoing and I've actually been encouraged by the performance of the army not only in dealing with extremist groups but in the way it's done that and we have not seen overt factionalization or the army doing the bidding of one coalition or one individual or an outside country again to the contrary what we're seeing at least thus far and I acknowledge things can always change but thus far we've seen an emergence of nationalism in Iraq that includes the army and if that process continues that will be I think a good thing in terms of the trade and commercial relationship with Iran there's actually something very striking that's happened over the past year trade with Iran has been stagnant if you look at the numbers trade with the Europeans as well as with us has been going up and we're seeing Iraqis determined to diversify their commercial relationships both in the region and indeed around the world but again Iran is a neighbor by geography by history by other affinities it's going to have a relationship and that relationship can in as many aspects be a positive one we hope over time but everything we've seen including the trade numbers suggests that Iraqis have been significantly diversifying their commercial relations beyond Iran particularly with Europe as well as with us I'm going to have to call this initial session of this academic year Tony to a close I think this is I agree with Dan Serwer it said this is it couldn't have been a better pair to start us off on this thing great explanation please join me in thanking our two panelists