 Hello and welcome to the Newstick. Today we are joined by Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar and we are going to be talking about a country where he has served in, which is very much in the news right now for actually a lot of wrong reasons. That's Afghanistan. There's been a lot of violence. The US is withdrawing. A lot of concern about what is likely to happen in the coming months, but also quite a few possibilities. So Ambassador Bhadrakumar, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you. It's always a pleasure for some. Actually, so the first question is something I think that's on the minds of everyone right now, which is regarding what exactly the Taliban strategy looks like, because we do know that they have captured a huge amount of territory in the past few weeks. The number of districts under their control is risen considerably. And there is a lot of speculation that, you know, as soon as the US withdraws within a few months they might be pushing towards Kabul. They take over large parts of the country. So do you see that as being integral to the Taliban's plan or are there other aspects they're looking at? Well, this is obviously the most important and the most pressing question today when we discuss Afghanistan. I start with a stunner, you know, in the sense that, you know, it's in the Indian opinion, it is very difficult for a large number of people who are being from the Indian narrative to accept this, what I'm going to say. But the fact of the matter is that the Taliban is not terribly interested in a military takeover. My assessment has been for some time and continues to be that neither Pakistan nor the Taliban is interested in a military takeover. Not necessarily for the same reasons, but there is a congruence of interest there. I can explain it briefly. Most importantly, the Taliban is acutely conscious of the fact that it must have international legitimacy. And that international legitimacy, if they do in a ghastly way cease power in Kabul, will be surely denied to them at the United Nations Security Council. And so we'll have a replay of the late 1990s and the Taliban has gone through that. But in fact, the whole nexus with the Al Qaeda, for people who do not know or I would like to drop their memory. The entire nexus to Al Qaeda was actually a result of the denial of legitimacy and international recognition to the Taliban in the 1990s. They were insistently knocking on the toes of the Americans to give them a recognition and at least to know so that they can tap into the United Nations welfare programs and whether it is some food and public health and overall development and so on. But they were denied that. And all they were left with the Arab money from Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis whose sheikhs were funding the Taliban. So it naturally took them to the Al Qaeda. Now it is not in Pakistan's interest also to see that. Now this is the most important factor in the Taliban's, what I can call zone of consideration at this point. Then there are many other things also and one other important factor that the Taliban would certainly have in mind is that a military conquest of Afghanistan will require almost direct Pakistani intervention, as it happened in the 1990s. Is Pakistan ready for it? Is Pakistan capable of it? Is Pakistan willing for it? Is Pakistan's friends and allies going to, are they going to allow Pakistan to do that? All these are very important questions. You know, then we have to put these things, these questions in the context in the backdrop of the highly fluid volatile international situation today in terms of the US China rivalry and so on. Pakistan is also a huge stakeholder now in the regional stability, having waded into the river of the CPEC and is seeing the other shore already and seeing the potentials of it for a better future for Pakistan itself. Then there are many other strands there, which we do not recognize here because we have a stereotype views of Pakistan. Namely, that Pakistan also has a sense of destiny. It is not that Pakistan is reveling in association with these groups for its own sake. It must all lead to somewhere and that somewhere today is in terms of a regional cooperation, which is important for Pakistan to tap the full potential of CPEC. After all, what is the point in developing Guadar port? It is actually a port head for an entire region, the Central Asian region. So you can imagine if you look at the map itself that you know these dreams become such absurd notions if there is no stability in Pakistan. And then there is the blowback aspect, which is I think from recent statements of the top leadership, it's really worrying them that this blowback will sink Pakistan. If there is a blowback in the sense that if there is an untrammeled ascendance of Islamic militant trend in Kabul in Afghanistan, there is going to be a blowback into Pakistan. And that will be difficult for the Pakistani state to contain that and at the same time to proceed with the developmental processes and so on. So therefore, the short point is that the regional states and the international community and the Americans even today have a very good opportunity today to see that the energies are therefore diverted to the negotiating table. How do we do that? Basically the problem Pakistan is in a dilemma, Americans in a dilemma, Pakistan is United States is also in a dilemma. In the sense that the course that was chartered at the Doha talks by Khalil Saad and the Taliban leaders and Khalil Saad I think essentially got an optimal deal for the United States. There's a lot of criticism about him, but it's unfair in the sense that we are not really remembering the context in which these talks commenced and the talks went on. There is a very tortuous process and to bring them to the table, the Taliban to the table itself was a very, very, very big achievement. So considering all this, the effort should be to take the process to the negotiating table. Now my understanding of the Afghans is that an understanding, an agreement reached with them, they take it very seriously. So you see for instance, the Taliban sort of fighting shy of giving any undertakings and agreements because they take it seriously, it's in the Afghan nature. It's not only typical of the Taliban and the assurance was given to them that there will be a certain mainstreaming of the Taliban in terms of a transitional process in Afghanistan through the formation of an interim government. An interim government in which they will be present along with all the other Afghan groups. It was a tremendous achievement to get them to agree to that because these are people who were wedded to the Islamic Emirates and to come from there to say that they have prepared to work within a broad-based arrangement was a very big achievement on the part of the Americans. They managed that up to that. And then they came against the rock, you know, and the rock was the Afghan government's reluctance to advocate. Now, here we get into the theater of the observed in the sense that this is a government which is only a government notionally. It's mandate is like I wrote recently that Ghani pulled something like five lakhs votes, something like five lakhs votes in a country with a population of 400 lakhs. This was put in perspective when you speak about the legitimate legitimacy aspect of this government that we are really in the theater of the observed. No one minded in 2019 when the election was rigged and the Americans imposed these fellows on Afghanistan and the region and the international community because the international community knew that the Americans were calling the shots. And therefore it really didn't matter who these fellows were at that point in time. But now the situation is very serious. We are getting into a situation where Afghanistan is going to regain its sovereignty and independence and will formulate policies which will be representing the wishes of the people and which will impact regional security profoundly. And therefore everyone is interested to see that, you know, the legitimacy aspect is important. And it is precisely this legitimacy aspect, I would say that necessitates the creation of an interim government in Kabul. So when you speak Prashant about the shape of things to come. It's in our hands to mold it. And I hope that this Shanghai Cooperation Organization Ministerial where China is taking the initiative to have a regional process begin seriously will take us somewhere. And because this is probably the last train leaving the station. Now I do not want to even think about it, but I must still mention it. What will happen if this process towards interim government doesn't materialize? The Taliban take over. I don't think that any state including India which probably you know is supporting to the hilt this government in Kabul will be in a position to stop it. And in that case, if that kind of a process an operate setup like in Haiti or somewhere taking place in Kabul in Afghanistan, then with a tacit American support or without American support tacit American support will be there for these guys. If that happens, you know, it will be a replay of what you have in Haiti today. You know, that is what we are going to create there. And how long is it going to be terrible? Which country is going to be interested in perpetuating that sort of a thing in the region, a cancer, creating a cancer in the region. So I think the Taliban will win inevitably later. And Pakistan will then have to see to it that the Taliban will win as a factor of stability for the region. So the choice is to answer your question. We are really at a T junction. You know, we could take either either road. And by this weekend, I think things will clarify to some extent as to where we are heading. Right, absolutely. So in this context, you mentioned the kind of issues of legitimacy that is faced by the Ashraf Ghani government. And that's a very important point because in recent times, for instance, they have declared that they're willing to arm some of the militias. There's a long history of regions being dominated by very powerful warlords, some of whom were integrated into the government. Right now, assuming that, of course, the process of this interim government formation, if it happens, will still take time. Do we see this existing government being able to continue its influence or do we see more of the warlordism that we saw in the late 80s and 90s? You see, I see some hopeful signs through the last 48, 72 hours. Now, I see the signals primarily from Kabul. Hamid Kansai, former president, we may not realize because India is today stands for Afghanistan to an extreme extent as a nationalist, and it doesn't really match with Indian policies. So we probably don't have much time for him. But I think he's very important role. It's a very important role that he's playing. He went and with Syaf, Rasul Syaf, who is, by the way, who is, I have met him and probably the only Indian diplomat who has met him. He was the leader of the Itihad group, which is a Wahhabi group in the Afghan jihad of 1990s. And for those who do not know, Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani network, as we call it today, was his commander. So you can imagine where he stood at that time. And in fact, when I went to meet him, when I was going to meet him and I informed Masood that I was going to see him, they discouraged me. They said that he is rabidly anti-Indian. We will not go because we have no control over his territory. And if you move into Parwan, then we will lose touch with you and you will not be able to rescue you. So I said, I'll take a calculated choice because I have the signal that they will make sure of my security. So I went there and I met him. Now, you know, I said this about him, his background because Karzai brought into that room for the meeting with Ashraf Khani two days ago, where Abdullah was also present, a proposition that the country has, what I explained just earlier, that the country is at the threshold of a big decision. And that unless we, and he said according to some versions that what is it that is preventing us from talking? We are all Afghans, that is Taliban and Ghani and everybody, we are all Afghans. Why are we fighting shy of it? We should talk to each other. So I have a feeling that what we do not understand is that the Afghans have also their own traditional culture for consensus making. Because of the Pakistani interference and so on, that has been lying mute through the past couple of decades or something. But that is still there, the tribal culture, the network and their Pakhtunwali sense of honour and all that, it is still there. How can it go in an element which is deeply embedded in their psyche? So you see, Ghani also must be realising this that there are certain people in this circle who were essentially CIA agents and occupying high positions today, who were trained by the CIA and in intelligence work and put in the keys, nerve centres of the Afghan establishment to see that the American wishes are carried out. So that it is a close shop, the intelligence and defence establishment of Afghanistan and the NATO. Now these people are, some of them, couple of them at least, are occupying very high positions, at least one of them is very important position. Now for these people it is obviously the end of the road, because they have settled their families abroad in India or wherever, but they too will have to leave and that is actually becoming Afghanistan government's agenda, is in plain terms that is what is happening. And I think in fairness we should give them safe passage and encourage them to get lost, that is all one can say. But Ghani himself I don't think would be obdurate in this on the spot and after this meeting and to continue what I was saying, I have noticed that Abdullah left for Doha and now there are a lot of other things, you know, this didn't happen in a vacuum. Khalil Sath was in Kabul and was in Doha and all that was taking place is in Pakistan and all that. So all that is there in the background. So there's so many churnings there. And it is amidst that that this has happened that Abdullah left, Abdullah has an official titular position. He heads the team of negotiators notionally and he's taken an assurance that he will seriously negotiate and it should not be that somebody uses him as a front. So he left and the important thing is Kazai has accompanied him and then word has come from Doha that they are meeting this Friday. And now you know, so you see the sequence of events, you know, China has the biggest stakeholder in security and stability of Afghanistan today because their internal security is linked to this and they take it bloody seriously, I can tell you that, you know, that they'll take it seriously. It's not the seat, it's not the BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative or anything. It is their internal security and stability of Xinjiang, frankly, that is what it is bothering them. And they are now, you know, really gone almost at the diplomatic plane, they're gone berserk and they don't have an option and they will not want to exercise an option of the military intervention in Afghanistan. They are not foolish enough for that and it will be inconsistent with a fundamental principle in their foreign policy that they will not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, simple as that. So you see that process is taking place and it is going to play out in Dushanbe and Tashkent today this week. There's an international conference where Imran Khan is going, where Khalil Saad is present, Kani's people are there and all that. So, you know, that it is against that, that this team has left for Doha, Abdullah and Qazai. And I'm very sure even people like Syaf are associated with that because Syaf, Abdullah, I mean, Qazai took Syaf for this meeting with Kani. So all of this are hopeful signs in the sense that there is a realization and the spoilers of the American side dare not now try to derail this because that is essentially the Pentagon and the CIA and so-called deep state in America. But they know now that Biden wants seriously this war to end and he is not in it in any form for a continuation, you know, a plan B, so to speak, for the war to continue. So I think they are now, it is symbolic that debut for yesterday, the commander of the American forces relinquished. Now this is very highly symbolic. It is a distancing. It's a distancing that is visible there because it is just the Pentagon spokesman had said just a few days ago, we had a briefing that with the White House's consent, Jamal Miller is going to stay there at least for two more weeks, at least for two more weeks. And now he's just left and handed over the charge to a successor who will be in a virtual mode operating out of Florida. And you can imagine what kind of a war the Americans are going to be capable of fighting with the general sitting in Florida, you know, in a big country like Afghanistan. So you see, they tried all the Americans, this military people tried all kinds of things, you know, the deep state tried all kinds of things like getting some kind of basic facilities in Central Asia and so on. But China did, I think, along with Russia, a splendid thing in ensuring that there is no place for this war to continue, to be staged from anywhere in the region. So you see this sign, if it moves forward, I think the scenario can change because then if there is going to be an agreement towards an interim government, I can tell you 100% Taliban will announce or enter or agree to immediate ceasefire. Right, absolutely. But Russia will stop. They are indulging in this. One reason is this, that they feel cheated after the Doha pact that they waited patiently and this interim government, which is promised because they also are exhausted. They also want to get back into mainstreaming, you know, is there. And then the second part is these spoilers I mentioned to you, these guys who have nowhere to go, who are around in Chinese circle, they keep needling the Taliban. And you see, this is something which we know can happen. And it is in the culture of all intelligence security establishments of any country. And I will not exclude any country. It is this that, you know, that they have this shenanigans, you know, they play by, you know, false encounters and all this are part of it. So you see, from this point of view, there are some hopeful signs we have to wait and see.