 Unrhyw y gallwch i'n meddwl am ddiwedd. Mae'r ddodol yn gweithio'r dillunio ac yn dechrau'r ddiddordeb yn ei ddiddordeb. Dîm ddodol yn ei ddodol. Ddodol yn ddodol i gafodd yn eu ddiddordeb i fynd i gyd yn gweithio'r ddiddordeb a'r edrych yn rhan ffwrdd i'r digon o'r ddiddordeb i eithaf yn eu ddiddordeb, byddwn yn ei ddiddordeb yn y rhan o'i gofod ar gyd. Dwi'n ddiddordeb i fynd i ddiddordeb i fynd i'r ddiddordeb. I'm always nice coming over here but I confess to finding the current circumstances a little bit difficult. It's hard not to be reminded of the old joke of God and Archangel Michael talking about the creation of Ireland. When God says, here's the Emerald Isle, this is going to be the most glorious spot on earth of beautiful mountains, rivers, lakes, Cymru ei wneud. Croatol, cyflewnol a'r cyfnodfynol, yn gyflym mae Michael answer yn ceisio. Gwad yw'n ceisio'n ceisio. Pwysig hwn yn ceisio, gan rhai nesaf fynd i erbyn ar adael yma'n gweithio'n cymrydいいodol. Felly byddwn i'n zeddaf i ysgrifennu sy'n gallu cymryd yn arachelio mewn ddedwar i'r adeiladau bwysig a'r cyfnoddau yn Fbridd yn y cyflym sydd ar bethauYNau i mi-ein. Onig wrth iddo ddim yn ddigon nhw'n ymddylch yn ei brofieth bwysig fel y McHenry, ond ei roi'r cyflwyno i ar royalizio bwysigio i'r bwysigio i'r Briton a'i lŷau ar y cyflwyno ac ar y Randolol y Chymru – ac yn cael ei gysylltu'r byd yn gweithio'r llacol. Efallai, rwy'n gallu pwysigio gweithio'r cyflwyno a'r un o gweithio'r blameddau sydd yn bod yn cael ei ffordd o'r cyfan ohefnol y sorg hon. We have a possible compromise on money and the transitions agreement, and then on the ECJ and Ireland where we are present on the future relationship, such as its possible to say. Now, EU officials clearly understand that those position papers were for domestic consumption. They were issued as a way of trying to unite a Cabinet which is deeply split. But what frustrates the commission is that they mix up Article 50, the transition and the future arrangement to which the British officials reply, of course they do because you can't separate the free things. Now the common theme says the commission is that they're still still trying to find ways of retaining most of the benefits while cutting out the ECJ, which is essentially what many er skeptics are still trying to achieve. The commission is particularly hostile to the two papers that look at customs and Northern Ireland. The Irish paper which proposes no borders but doesn't say how has drawn particular criticism in Brussels and raised the suspicion that the British government is basically trying to set the EU up as a scapegoat for the reimposition of border controls because they know how badly that will play in Britain and how much damage it will do to British Irish relations. They are trying to line the commission up as a scapegoat. But that's their interpretation of it. For Brussels, neither of those two papers in particular, they're not happy about any of the papers really, but those two papers in particular show any understanding that the EU side has its own needs and pressures. So, easy on the risk of smuggling on the border here, but more broadly on its own legal order and on the policing of the rules of the customs union in the single market. What frustrates them most is just the lack of understanding running through those papers of the political realities facing the EU side. So, according to one commission official that I spoke to recently, the customs paper suggests that the British don't understand that customs controls are about enforcing the EU's regulatory union that the paper ignores services and regulations entirely, which is right, it does. Option two of the customs paper, according to which there will be no border controls anywhere, basically, and that each party would police each other's customs rules, is basically seen as a joke in Brussels. It's really not taken seriously by anyone. Even officials who are typically quite sympathetic to the UK are scathing, and one couple of weeks said to me, this is mad ridiculous and magic thinking, because it relies on technology that simply doesn't exist and ignores the politics. I think the blunt truth is, and we can come back to this later, if Britain really does leave the customs union and the single market, I think we are looking at hard controls on the Irish border, unfortunately, much as I'd hate to see that happen. Moreover, any trade deal that the UK strikes, say, with the US, will be done entirely on US terms, so the US will demand that the UK signs up to its sanitary and fighter sanitary standards, et cetera, et cetera. That will mean problems for trading agricultural products across the Irish border. Britain is going to be a rule taker in any trade negotiation with a big country, such as the US. Is there divergence between the Commission and the Council on the Brexit process? The UK makes the point that rhows over money, typically addressed by heads of state, and not by the Commission liaising with the country in question. Is it possible that the Council will intervene to force a compromise on, say, money, et cetera? I think some Council officials think it will. They agree with the British that the Commission's mandate restricts its room for manoeuvre. It's basically working within a mandate designed for trade negotiations with a third party, not for negotiating exit with one of its own members. However, the Commission strongly disagrees with this analysis, arguing that there's no divergence between itself and the Member States. On the face of it, there is something to that. We might see differences coming out once we've got over the initial hump. There is broad agreement among the Member States, although money does have a tendency to bring out differences. We'll see how that proceeds. The British think they will get what they want on citizen rights. That would mean basically that the EU accepts reciprocity, i.e. that EU citizens in Britain will be subject to UK law, and that that will be less advantageous to them than the rights that British people living elsewhere in the EU will enjoy because they will be treated as EU citizens, so their rights will actually be stronger. The EU side has resisted that for obvious reasons, but the British side is fairly confident that they can get that through and that there will be no resort to the ECJ to enforce those rights in the UK. I'm sceptical. I think there is one way of reconciling it perhaps, which would be for the withdrawal treaty from the EU to include a very detailed agreement on the rights of EU citizens in the UK, and that those rights will be directly enforceable in the UK courts, but they'd be traced to that withdrawal treaty. That might be some way around it, which could meet EU fears that the British Parliament could dam it, could change its legislation over time and denude people of rights. This is a tricky one, but I think a deal is to be done, but it's not clear, it's not entirely clear. I mean, both sides see the deal that needs to be done on money and on transition, having senior figures in both the council and the commission agree with the UK that there is a way of solving this problem. I think, basically, Britain needs to sign up to a transition deal and pay perhaps 10 billion euros a year into the budget. Now, 30 billion would cover most of the unspent budgetary commitments that EU claims the UK owes it, and they would still be haggling over pension rights, contingent liabilities, et cetera, but those could be addressed by specialist committees. There's a sequencing issue here, but there is a deal to be done, although it will require the UK to put some significant money on the table. The UK thinks some of the top council people see this and would be happy for phase one of the talks to cover the transition arrangements, but they understand that they're going to have to put some money on the table. The problem is differences within the government, as we saw graphically illuminated at the weekend. This deal requires the UK government to appear at least to be speaking as one and to be acting in good faith. On money, ironically, some of the fiercest criticism of the UK is actually coming from countries that have traditionally been its closest allies, i.e. other net contributors to the EU budget, who are fearful of paying more money. So some of the biggest criticism of the position that Britain has staked out on the money is actually coming from the Netherlands and the Nordics, which only goes to highlight how isolated Britain now is within the EU that its closest allies are some of its fiercest critics. Money, of course, is not the only difficulty. If Britain does go for a transition agreement, which I think is all but certain, it will basically be a continuation of the status quo, but with no vote. It will be an off-the-shelf transition agreement, so membership of the single market ECJ free movement. Now, there is an understanding, certainly among most of the cabinet, in the UK, certainly by May and Hammond and David Davis, that that is the only transition deal that the EU is going to offer. But, of course, the Cabinet is not united on this. At the moment, I think it's a brave person that states with any confidence how that's going to pan out over the next weeks and months. I think it's quite clear that for sufficient progress to have been made come the meeting in October, the money issue will have to be, if not settled, but significant progress will have to be made over the next few weeks. The British side thinks it will be. The EU side is much more pessimistic. The Commission has, however, shifted its line on the transition. It used to be, you know, we cannot even talk about this until we know the shape of the ultimate relationship, the long-term relationship. That's gone. I think now they just want some sort of vague discussion of the future relationship. What they really want is article 50 sorted, the money on the table, and an office shelf transition agreement. They know that not probably it's highly unlikely that more than that can be agreed by March 2019. There just isn't enough time. Now, both sides would have an incentive to portray that transition deal as time limited to two to three years. The UK government, for obvious reasons, they want to claim, want to be able to claim that everything will be resolved before the next general election, which has to be held in May or June 2022. But it's impossible really to see that, how that could come about. I mean, the internal discussions that people are having, including us with the Treasury in the UK and everyone else, is that they think five years is the absolute minimum needed to establish the IT and infrastructure for customs posts in the UK. They just don't have the resources and nothing vaguely comparable has ever been attempted. The idea that it could be done in 24 months or 36 is just simply not seen as very plausible. So that really, to be honest, that alone makes talk of no deal a bit fatuous unless you're prepared to create a huge financial crisis and legal chaos, really. The EU line is that the transition has to be short to prevent the EU staying in the EU by the back door, Britain staying in the EU by the back door, having its cake and eating, et cetera. To be honest, I don't find that very credible. A transition deal that leaves Britain in a single market subjects the ECG and freedom of movement paying into the budget but having no say over anything is not the kind of deal anybody else wants. That's not attractive to anybody else. And the money would come in useful, Britain would continue. If it's five years, six years, then obviously it would continue paying into the EU budget at something comparable to the first three years, say 10 billion a year. I don't think that would be insurmountable. I think that would be acceptable to people. The EU line on dispute settlement and courts is also becoming clearer. Most, well, on the future relationship, most people on the EU side could live with a new institution modelled on the after court. The recent paper, the recent UK paper on dispute settlement is the one that's seen a bit more positively. Since it implies Britain could accept a role for the ECJ so long as it has no direct jurisdiction, this does open the way to the UK agreeing to submit disputes to something similar to the after court. So whose opinions on the interpretation of EU rules are advisory formally, but of course, they're not really advisory. In Norway's case, in theory, they could disregard it but they never do because if they were to do that, they would call into question their membership in the single market. But for British political purposes, that might be a way of fudging things and engineering one of the many face-saving exercises that would be necessary in order for the country to retreat. Okay, the future relationship between the UK and the EU. Now both sides claim that the other doesn't know what it wants to say the other's wrong. Britain talks of reducing, this is terms of the long-term relationship, talks about reducing friction at borders through negotiating many mutual recognition agreements whereby each side recognises the other side's standards. Now, as we all know, the EU side has said that won't ensure frictionless trade. These such agreements, one could see them covering the automotive sector, pharma, one of two others. There's no free trade agreement in the world that has MRAs for all goods and then it leaves side services as well so there's an awful lot of uncertainty there. And from the EU side, their argument is, look, if we give the UK MRAs on everything, we fear it will change its rules over time and gain advantage hence and it falls foul of their determination for Brexit to carry a price. Which raises the prospect that it won't just be leaving the customs union that will necessitate an EU-UK border or border controls but also leaving a single market. Leaving a single market will also necessitate those. I think the EU will insist that any FTA allows the EU to punish the UK for undercutting social tax environmental standards but of course, no-one knows quite yet how that will work. It's very difficult to know how that would work in practice. In short, I think a lengthy, given the sheer complexity of all of this, I think a lengthy transition is more likely than not. But there are other questions. Is it possible that Britain could still salvage its membership? Lots of people, not least in the UK, still hope that there could be some way out of this. The toys know that walking away with no deal is not really an incredible threat. There are a couple of head-bangers. You'll probably know some of their names. Some are like Jacob Rees-Marg who really don't care. Just any chance of getting Britain out as soon as possible is enough. He doesn't really care what the impact on the Conservative Party or his own seat or the country is. But most of them, even the really sort of quite doctrinaire ones, and David Davies and people, they know that walking away is not credible. They know that a definitive breakdown in negotiations, so long as it happened a good time before the end of the Article 15 negotiations, would lead to a huge financial crisis, almost certainly a fresh election in the UK. It's very hard in those circumstances to see how the toys wouldn't get badly, badly damaged at that election. It would be very hard to distance themselves from the economic damage having been caused. And we would have almost certainly a Labour-led government, whether that would be Labour in coalition with the Lib Dems and the SNP would depend obviously on the arithmetic. But such a government, depending on how vague Labour had been in the election campaign over Brexit, would open up the possibility of Britain applying for an extension, either of the Article 50 negotiations, or to evoking Article 50. Now, I think that EU would certainly allow it to extend. What kind of reception would Britain get if it applied to evoke? I think that it would probably happen. Obviously, the longer they leave it, the harder it's going to be, but not withstanding the huge frustration with the UK, particularly with the Conservative Party and the country's media, there isn't really much to be gained from leaving the EU for anybody. And it would be a huge propaganda queue. Let's face it for the EU if Britain turned around and did that. Clearly, they would extract their pound of flesh. The rebate would go very slowly. I don't think anyone would put Britain under any pressure to join the euro, not withstanding what Mr Yonfa said last week. But there would be concessions, but I think they would probably be allowed to evoke. Could Britain rejoin from the transition period? I think this is possible and much more likely than Britain revoking and staying in the EU because of the democratic legitimacy issue. It would be much easier to address that issue if Britain reapplied to join. I don't think this is beyond the realms of possibility. It's sometimes hard at the moment not to despair about what's happening in the UK, but the demographics of the country do point to a strongly pro-EU electorate going forward, which is easily forgotten, given what's been happening. I think Britain joining from the transition status is as likely as Britain exiting the transition into some kind of very poor FDA. I don't know what the probabilities are, but I think there is a chance that it won't happen at all, although I think that's slim. I think there's a significant chance that it will end up reapplying, and that's advantageous terms, and an equally significant chance that Britain will indeed end up leaving entirely into some kind of not particularly attractive FDA, which would have huge implications here, obviously. I mean, if I had to bet one way or the other whether Britain would be in the EU in 15 years' time, I would, if I had to bet one way or the other, I'd say yes, it will be. But only after having done an awful lot of damage to Britain and a number of others not least here.