 And we'll just wait, wait a moment, we may because the numbers are the numbers are coming rising quite rapidly. Okay. Right. Well, welcome everybody. Let me just, I think we've got. Yeah, I think that's we're ready to start. Welcome everybody to King's Maritime History Seminar. Thank you for joining us tonight. I'm thanking you on behalf of the British Commission for Maritime History, of course, who organize these these seminars. And I'm thanking you on behalf of the Lawton Naval Unit here in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, your, your hosts for for tonight and for these, for these sessions, I always like to mention the Society for Nautical Research, who have always supported the seminar series, we're very grateful to them, and to Lloyd's register, of course. Tonight, it's a great pleasure to introduce Professor Eric Grove, graduate of Kings is taught all over the place in Dartmouth he's taught in anapolis the Naval Academy there, the joint services staff college and shrivenham he's taught to granted she's taught at a university in Cambridge, and they have one, all over the place but he's known, of course, for his prodigious output for his energy for his enthusiasm for his contribution to naval and maritime history. We all know this from Vanguard to Trident is probably his best known book possibly it's a standard on post 45 British naval policy, but it's not just that period it's the past he's written about. I know the Royal Navy from since 1815 read about the future, the future of sea power he's written all sorts of other books and articles course of tonight, he's taking us back to World War one to the oft discussed but as I suspect we're about to find out the understood issue of the British blockade of Germany in World War one. I'm going to remind everybody if they would to type their questions into the q amp a box that you see rather than the chat you can use the chat to send panic messages to me if I'm messing things up. Questions into the q amp a please. Otherwise, again, it's an honor to have you here, Eric. And so it's with great pleasure that I hand over to you. It's an honor to be here and greetings from what has been a relatively sunny blackpool today. I was, I was encouraged to study the subject because I began to come across sources saying that actually the much wanted blockade of Germany in the First World War had not been quite so effective as many people say. Yes, it was certainly effective by the end of the war. But for most of the war, there were great problems with it and in fact the Royal Navy itself got extremely annoyed that ships it was taking and in fact the effort was quite considerable. The 10th cruiser squadron between March 1915 and the end of June, sorry, the end of the year 1916 was intercepting 286 ships a month. That's almost 10 ships a day, and they were sending them into Kirkwall. But the problem was that very few of them had their cargos put before the prize court, something that the Foreign Office had set up the contraband committee would intervene and usually allow the ships to be released. The most egregious example of this in 1915 was the American owned standard oil tank alarm that was carrying oil bound for Germany was taken into Kirkwall and the contraband committee. I presume to keep him, you can talk about the reasons for this later to keep friendly with the United States decided it would be released. So it sailed to Germany. And its cargo was put ashore in Gotenhaven. Then it was allowed out again, tried to do it again. And interestingly enough on its way into Kirkwall hit a sandbank and sank. I wonder if the pilot was getting a little bit tired of all these things going on. And in fact, if you look at some of the sources on the blockade, for example, Kiebel Chatterton's famous book written in the early 30s, where he says that that the cargos obviously intended for Germany were allowed to continue to their destination. And as the blockaders had no source of, had no sort of doubt, and the price courts would certainly have condemned such such cargos, writing in 1932 he says we know all too well how this misguided rule of allowing supplies to reach the enemy had the effect of prolonging the war. And even at the time actually one or two critical MPs, ignoring pressure not to talk about this said things like this on the 27th of March 1917. So Henry DL said, in the early 30 months of the war the Admiralty were in a state of despair with regard to the actions of the Foreign Office. They were bringing in day after day ships which were admittedly carrying cargo to the benefit of the enemy. What happened. A telegram was sent, was sent to London to the Foreign Office, and in reply often in the course of a few hours, a telegram came informing them that they ought to let the ships go through, which tended to make our sailors absolutely depressed and in despair. And it is a farce, though ship after ship to the knowledge of the officers carried goods to Germany. And that is borne out by the figures. My main source for tonight's talk is a fascinating book that needs to be better. It's the memoirs of Admiral Consets, C O N S E T T, who was our attache to the three Scandinavian capitals, Christianity as Oslo was called then, Copenhagen and Stockholm. And he wrote this book, which actually tells you all you all you need to know on the cover, an account of the triumph of unarmed forces, which of course is what he says happened later, an account of the transactions by which Germany during the war was able to obtain supplies prior to the collapse prior to her collapse under the pressure of economic sources for economic forces. And the story he tells in some respects rather a shocking one that in fact, if you look at vital strategic materials, the British just did not choose for quite some time to use the power they had to bring pressure to bear upon the capitals to stop trading with the enemy. In fact, Malka's instinct not to conquer Holland, and also the Germans allowing Sweden and Denmark and Norway to some extent to remain neutral, allowed them a tremendous control in the whole blockade that in fact stuff began to came in an increased quantities and we'll see how much increased in a moment in order to pass into Germany. And in fact, coal for example. Now, the British dominated the coal market, not just with Welsh steam coal but also with other types of coal vital for other parts of industry. In September 1914, the month after Britain entered the war, got equivalent to a seventh of its yearly requirement. 633,000 tons of British coal. And in fact, the coal trade with Sweden continued as if in peacetime. And in fact Scandinavian ships provided Germany with goods using British bunkers. It's quite remarkable. Norwegianship owners, even though the Norwegians on the whole were rather more pro-British than the Swedes or the Danes were, said that it was as said that they were having a splendid gain, making huge profits because of course the Germans under a certain amount of blockade pressure were paying all the Americans would say top dollar for their supplies. And the Germans said, okay, well if you don't, if the British won't supply with coal, we will. But the problem was that German coal was useless for any kind of steaming and it had to be mixed with British coal and so it was vital that British coal was actually imported. In fact, British coal was used on the trains and in the ships to bring Swedish iron ore, despite the efforts of British submarines at the time, across the Baltic. And it wasn't until early 1918, actually, that attempts were made to use coal to limit iron ore exports and these were in fact in the end unsuccessful. Denmark controlled its coal trade by something called a coal bureau, but it was entirely under Danish control and as Constance said was rather too popular. Large amounts of British coal were received by Denmark, 3 million tons a year in 1915. It was reduced somewhat to 2.3 million in 1916, but nonetheless, this did not mean that the Danes continue to provide Britain with large amounts of food. In fact, the amount of exports to Germany and Austria of German food, transported with British coal in trains, etc. increased in 1916 to 314 million tons. But it was still, it was still, it was a, sorry, 314,000 tons and it was still 200,000 tons in 1917. In fact, all over Scandinavia, there were German railway trucks being travelling in trains powered by engines, which were provided with British coal. And in fact, as Constance puts it, British miners were effectively working for the Germans. The total amount of coal exported to the end of 1917 was 21.6 million tons, which did a lot to help the German war effort. Now I've mentioned already Danish agricultural produce. The last six months of 1914, some 68,000, 68,000 horses, well, sorry, 68,000 more horses were sent to Germany than pre-war. In the last six months of 1914, attempts to try to ration the Danes to an amount which was equivalent to their own supplies failed. In fact, the whole rationing system was a bit of a farce actually. And this very much helped Germany survive in food terms in 1916 and 1917. Denmark acted to some extent as a kind of German satellite. In fact, the East Asiatic Steamship Company, interestingly enough, didn't lose a single ship. In the First World War to the U-boats. They were too useful to helping bringing in supplies to help keep Germany going. At one point, the Danes provided enough meat rations a day for virtually the entire German army. And the Danes themselves actually suffered quite considerably. They were rather neglected because why sell stuff at peacetime prices, or at least at lower prices to your own nationals when the Germans will pay you. Food starts from Denmark, exports to Germany increased from about 125,000 tons at the beginning of the war, more than twice to 300,000 tons. And in fact, exports from the UK, or perhaps the whole empire, were 100,000 tons of that. So in fact, British exports were helping keep Denmark going so the Danes could provide material for the Germans in significant quantities. Now, certain attempts were made to make certain materials hard to get. In fact, copper was made contraband on the 20th of October 1914, but it's continued to be exported to Sweden. In fact, exports to Sweden went up to 1,085 tons in 1950, and British ships were used to bring this copper to Sweden. Norway's exports to Germany, as I said the Norwegians on the whole were more pro-British than the other Scandinavians. But Norway's exports to Germany increased from 406 tons to 1,229 tons in 1916, and they'd gone through 1,573 tons in 1915. So copper vital for many aspects of the war effort and weapons production was getting through. And this was because these Scandinavian countries were able to use material they got from Britain in order to produce this stuff and transported particularly. Nickel, important for the production of things like armor plate, was exported at twice the war level. In fact, in 1915, over 500 tons of nickel were actually exported into Sweden, of which 70 tons went straight to Germany and the rest was used to provide a material for Germany. Fish, now fish may not sound very dramatic, but in fact fish was the main item in the German diet in the first two years after the war began. And of course, fish oil was very important for the production of glycerine in the explosives industry. Attempts were made by the people on the spot to try to get the treasury to purchase all Norwegian fish, but the treasury wasn't interested, it wouldn't spend the money. And in fact, eventually, after a year or two, there was an agreement, but at three times the price, much to concerts, is just. Exports of fish to Germany and Austria from Norway increased from 68,000 tons in 1914 to 194,000 tons in 1916 came down to bed in 1917, but nonetheless, you can see the huge increase. And this of course helped keep fish on the tables, which one gathers were important in Germany in 1915 and 1916. Denmark increased its exports of fish to Germany from about from about from about 25 and a half thousand in 1913 to 107,000 in 1960. Again, you see this huge great increase. Now, what makes this these fishing exports. So in fact, actually, total Scandinavian exports, just to make the point again, 130,000 tons in 1913, 350,000 tons in 1960. So a huge great increase. And what made this particularly annoying as far as the attache was concerned was that the fishing gear which which caught the fish was supplied by the British. The fuel which fueled the trawlers, be they coal burning or petrol burning or petroleum burning was supplied via the British. And in fact, it wasn't until the end of 1916 that flows of petroleum were in fact stopped. Explosives, quite an important point in the world. Now oils and facts come in here. It means it seems a bit mundane, but actually oils and fats are important because this produces glycerine. Denmark was provided with the vegetable oil, fats and oil cake from the British Empire, far in excess from peacetime quantities. In fact, there was over over 20,000 increase in oil values in the in the early years of the war. Cattle exports were increased in 1913, something like 152,000 would you believe by 1916 305,000 each carrying not just meat, but nicely fattened up on oil cake that the British had supplied. So they could provide the Germans with with with a material. Increased imports of soya beans now soya beans might not seem to be a great strategic asset but actually they are and copper to copper had to come from Manchuria. This is a, you know, made from coconuts and huge amounts increased. In fact, once the, once attempts were made to try to limit imports of this. There was a, there were attempts made to actually provide other ways of making fertilizer, which Rio Tinto included but anyway, but I'm getting ahead of myself really. In two years, imports of British copper were in fact, providing 20,000 tons of grease and 70,000 tons of a fattening were actually imported into Denmark. And Germany was dependent on imports completely for its glycerine. Vegetable oil huge great increases to and the British were providing vegetable oil it wasn't just being produced from other imports lubricants, but I mentioned oil coming from the USA to to Germany in the affair of the tanker. Danish imports of lubricating oil increased in 1913 5500 tons in 1916 11,000 tons. Cotton was a particular factor. We may think of cotton just in terms of textiles but actually cotton was a vitally important part of explosives production. In the first five months of 1915. Sweden imported 3.4 million hundred pound bales of cotton from the United States. Swedish imports in 1913 25,000 tons of cotton 1915 123,000 tons of cotton and for the British Empire itself, an increase from almost 2000 to 19,300 tons of cotton. I'm sure the German armaments industry was very grateful. So we have these, these, these, even though cotton was actually declared contraband at the end of 1915, the British was still supplying the Scandinavian countries with 18,000 18 and a half thousand tons of it in 1916 and seven and a half thousand tons of it in 1917. Holland was producing 100,000 tons more cotton was importing 100,000 tons more cotton in 1915 than in 1913. And even after cotton itself was being limited. Cotton materials peace goods were actually being imported in 1916 46 million yards of cotton fabric were imported. That was 16 yards per head of the Danish population. I'm sure the Danish population got nowhere near where that that cotton was going. Sweden. Sweden had its, its exports eventually, eventually cut but actually self white pulp. It's interesting what you know what becomes interested in if you're dealing with this kind of blockade stuff. And this was great exports of that as a substitute for cotton was were in fact tripled to to Germany. And what makes this interesting. It's that all this self white pulp, which was exports as I say were tripled was produced with British coal binder twine doesn't seem very interesting, but actually, it was important to make the harvesting work. And in fact, huge amounts were actually exported from the British Empire to the, to the Danes and other Scandinavian countries fertilizers. A certain amount of cut off was achieved by 1916 phosphate rock was exported by the French from North Africa, and Rio Tinto with its headquarters in London, very kindly provided the pirates, which were allowed it to be used as fertilizer. See, how was this financed. Obviously, Germany's exports weren't, you know, were to some extent shadow of their former self but they got a lot of loan. Well, they issued a lot of bombs. And in fact, attempts to try to limit that financing were not very successful. And it may not be a coincidence that there were important financial links between British and Scandinavian banks. And the Scandinavian bankers would would would come to London to make sure that everything was still okay. Just to finish off the figures total Scandinavian exports of food stuffs to Germany in 1913 it had been, it had been 250,000 tons. By 1916 it was 600,000 tons plus. Concert got slightly annoyed at all this, but attempts to try to get the British to find out what was going on fell on stony ground. One of the most notable events in here was when Lord Farringdon, as he soon became as a reward, I think, went over to Scandinavia and came back to Parliament and said don't worry there's very little getting through from Scandinavia to Germany. A complete falsehood. Now, why was this allowed to happen? One can speculate one can come up with wonderful extreme conspiracy theories that this was trying to make the war last longer. I don't think you have to come up with the elaborate conspiracy theories as I've said before I'm a great believer in the dark up theory of history, but it does seem to me that there were a number of reasons why the blockade was allowed to continue in this useless way that it did until the Lloyd George government in 1917 and other and particularly the American entry into the war and perhaps this is what this is the first thing we should talk about American entry into the war. The United States acted as the great protector of the neutrals. The Americans weren't very happy with British, not just because we were stopping their ships they wouldn't have minded they said if we'd actually put them before a prize court. What they didn't like was the rather arbitrary way the contraband committee, sometimes released and sometimes didn't American ships. So the Americans were very annoyed that British ships were trading in the materials the British were trying to stop the Americans delivering to the Scandinavians. I can't blame them really. And by the those who say that we should have been tighter with the United States that in fact the Americans have so much interest in the Allied cause, particularly economic interest and supplying the British and the French, that they would never in fact have taken serious action against us. I'm not so sure I think by the end of 1916. The Allies were not winning the war the Federal Reserve saying don't lend any more money to the British. But of course the Germans shoot themselves in the foot. In 1917 by introducing unrestricted submarine submarine warfare the Americans come in, and then interestingly enough the Americans start saying to the British stop supplying the neutrals. And once it says one must almost have thought, looking at the documents that in fact looking at the correspondence that in fact the Americans were trying to force the British into carrying out a proper blockade. Poacher turned gamekeeper indeed. There were the Swedes to now we the the British were very concerned. If alienating the Americans was something and of course Edward Gray said that the greatest great achievement as foreign secretary was in fact to keep the Americans on side. Now one can argue we can talk about it later perhaps you know would be, was it a great, a great problem keeping the Americans on site but if that meant allowing their tankers through to Germany okay so be it. Interesting, because Sweden was relatively pro-German at least the Swedish government was. And Sweden was important for contacts with the Russians. At that time, of course, particularly after the Dardanelles had been closed and Vladivostok was rather a long way around. And also there wasn't a railway to Murmansk until the middle of the war. They had to use reindeer apparently slidges to archangel when, when, when archangel iced up. So supplying Russia was quite important. And this had to be done across Sweden and the Swedes kept on saying yes you know it's very important that you supplies with stuff. So that we will continue to help supply the Russians. Sadly, a lot of the stuff that went via Sweden to the Russians never got there. There were stories of motorboats coming over from Finland from Germany with stuff that have been sent to the Swedes for the Russians, and being delivered to the Germans. There was a whole in the blockade. But one can see I suppose a certain strategic reason for trying to keep on the right side of the Swedes. As far as the Danes were concerned the Danes said look. If, if we don't, if we don't supply the Germans with this stuff if you won't give us the material to supply the Germans with the stuff the Germans will occupy us. To which concert said what a good idea it will mean that we'll, that we can blockade you properly. There's nothing in that I think. The amount of material that was sent. I think, as concert did made all the difference between the British blockade being effective truly effective against Germany in 1916 and 1970. Yes, there were hardships in Germany. There was great rent in the blockade that all this food, all this other material getting through to Germany supply transported by British coal in ships and trains from factories supplied with British coal with fish supplied from with British coal and petroleum and nets and this kind of thing. All this helped mitigate the effects of the blockade. The blockade did not in fact have decisive effect in 19, in 1916 and even into 1970, despite the ministry of the blockade, despite all these orders in council, despite all these things that look good on paper and which have been repeated in books. It didn't happen because merchants ship owners bankers were allowed effectively as concert puts it to trade with the enemy for their own economic advantage and perceived by the Foreign Office diplomatic advantage also concert puts it quite well towards the end of his book. He says, the policy of trading which was justified on the two full ground of the benefit to the exchange and our obligations to neutrals which have been justified that way would not seem to have been fairly balanced against the sucker that he brought to our enemies. This country was rich and could afford to make sacrifices, yet when the war had been in progress nearly three years, and our finances were becoming unstable trade was stopped. The end of the improvement of the exchange was put to one side as to our obligations to neutrals. There were also obligations to ourselves to be considered neutrals are protected by international law. No Scandinavian neutral has successfully challenged the legality, or I think even the propriety of any belligerent action of ours, once we started getting serious. And I'll end up with perhaps a call as one should on these occasions with a call in a sense for further research. Although we had a resourceful and determined for to contend with them could not have it all our own way during the economic struggle in which we were engaged. And although in the outconduct of the blockade there was certain features which, as the title of this book seeks to indicate it would serve no useful purpose now to recall. Yet the failure to prevent supplies from reaching our enemies on a less immoderate scale than the recorded stands I think in need of fuller explanation than has yet been given. Thank you very much. Great. Thank you very much. That was sparkling and controversial. I'm, I'm sure I'm going to kick off by sharing a drink with you. Here's to Admiral, here's to Admiral concert. Indeed. He died in 1945, by the way. Okay, I was going to ask that. I'm going to award a prize to the best background mind you. That that that price goes goes to you for sure. Speaking without PowerPoint, I'm always impressed. You need to be an engaging speaker to be able to get away with that. And we should all be able to do that and you certainly are so many thanks. Yeah, as an early modernist I'm surprised to hear about copper going to Sweden. Like calls the Newcastle in 17th century but there you are that was only one of the many, many surprises. They used it to electrify the line from Kiruna to the Norwegian border. And one of the things which is interesting is, I've yet to see figures for anything that comes through Narvik. Presumably, the weather doesn't change and in winter they would have had to have sent the sent the iron ore through Narvik. But it's interesting that they use what copper they had to electrify the line halfway up to the Swedish border. Okay, we've got some questions, piling in. I'm tempted to ask if this concert chap with some kind of crank, but I'm sure he's not. So I won't. There's a comment from Professor Hugh Murphy here. Yes, a good friend. This is Schleswig-Holstein question. Denmark, Aiding Germany had obviously forgotten all about that, which Palmerston as we know memorably recall that only three people really understood. I have an immediate answer to that. Go for it. The Danes didn't like us for not sticking up for them. And also they remembered Copenhagen, a particularly second Copenhagen. Right. So they weren't that popular in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein had actually worked against us as well as the Germans. The Danes felt somewhat isolated from both sides. Excellent. Okay, good. All right. Alex Pickering got the first question in. He was asking about about the money and I think I think you sort of answered it because the question was was the money necessary. The money that was being made, was it necessary to keep businesses going and to pay for the war? So I suppose actually that I didn't quite fully understand the question at first, but you know, was the money important? Well, it's a good point actually. I mean, I mean, there was no point Britain's Britain fighting the war and losing all her markets and so on. And so one can see the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office were in cahoots on this and one can quite see why. But in fact, you know, you didn't want to lose your trade. You wanted to make profits. You needed to make profits. And this meant maintaining as much Steedborne trade as you possibly could. And perhaps in retrospect, trading with the enemy, unquote, looks worse in retrospect than it did in prospect or actually when it happened because in people's minds, militaries did war. Traders and merchant shipping did peace. And the two were in different parts of people's minds. And I think there was a cultural thing here. Very good. Okay. Let's move on here. Ian Stafford, did the U-boat commanders have the info to be discerning? Yeah, also, was it the fault of Askwith? The U-boat commanders were discerning, particularly in the period of restricted warfare, although even in unrestricted warfare, that an interesting case where one submarine sinks a Norwegian ship that's carrying things for Britain, sinks a second ship and then allows another ship carrying corn, carrying corn cake, cattle food to Denmark, to go on saying, good, you're on our side. So they could be. And in fact, as I said, of the shipping line, this, this I think this day and she's not a single ship was sunk. Not a single ship. Okay. Tom Golden, thanks for an interesting and lightning talk. Do you have any idea how much the shortfall in supplies was made up through the trade through neutrals? Mr. Question. Well, I think, I think what I would say is this and I tried to say this briefly in my talk. If the trade through the neutrals had been stopped early on, at least, and I think more analysis perhaps needs needs to be done, but if it had been stopped earlier on, I think there is a very, in fact, immediately, which the Scandinavians expected, interesting enough, they tried to stockpile as much as they could, even better than the Germans in some ways, because they expected to be cut off completely. They were surprised that they weren't. In fact, British prestige suffered that they weren't cut off, because they expected to be, but the key point is this and to answer the question. I think that the stuff that came in the masses of stuff that came in, particularly food, and particularly materials for explosives, allow Germany to continue the war in a way that she would not have been able to, if these supplies are not leaked in. In fact, not leaked in cascaded in. Okay, Neil Dunstan has a comment rather than a question, although I think there's a question behind it. It should be born in mind that there was a strong lobby in Britain that actually believed in the immunity of trade. So I believe it was Lord Lorburn and who in 1916 told the House of Lords that we are not at war with the German people, but the German government and that we should not regulate trade at all. It would have been a factor, although it would have helped if Churchill has as First First Lord hand made speeches like saying oh the blockade is very effective and it will grind the Germans down. So, so yes, there were. But I think a basic factor behind this rather strange policy towards the blockade of Germany was very much as it was just been said that in fact you know, did we did you make war on the German people. You in fact affect your economic interests as we said earlier, and the answer was perhaps no. And in fact the contraband committee reflected that in its, in its decisions. But it must have been very, very annoying and I know it was in fact at points Jellico complained in fact that he had the 10th cruiser squadron people risking their lives in the Atlantic, stopping 10 ships a day in very difficult conditions the stuff comes to Kirkland and it sense, it's sent onwards. How about Andy Field then what caused the Germans to start going after the Norwegian convoys in 1917 18. They were by that time I think they were they were trying to into, I think one, I think up to a point they were trying to interfere with the supplies that we were getting from Norway. Towards, towards, towards Britain. There's also a slightly unjoined up thing in German policy, the German Navy attacks things which are sometimes operating in their own interest. As curve has been pointing out recently, it is a very good book the Kaiser's you know you but war against America, the German Navy was to some extent out of control. At times the Germans Navy did something that wouldn't necessarily make sense in terms of their overall policy. I mean there were times when ships were saved and not attacked because they were actually operating in Germany's interest, but there were times when in fact, the, the, the, the German Navy was actually doing things not least introducing unrestricted submarine warfare that was very much against Germany's interest, both in 1915 and 19 and 19 and 1917. I would have to look actually did did they attack only outward bound convoys or inward bound convoys I'm not quite sure. Okay, well we'll leave that one. Alex Pickering again. I'll have to do some work on that that's very, that's a very interesting point Andy in regards from me, old friend of mine. Fantastic. What role did Parliament play as Alex Pickering concerning the blockade so Parliament. Were there any select committees. Do you think a unified government undermined proper scrutiny. One gets the impression that in fact at times and I quoted DL there were in fact some hostile parliamentary comments about the blockade. But the, but the usual result was there's nothing to worry about everything's going well, and so on. And also I get the impression that some pressure was brought to bear against critics not to speak out too much. Okay. And, and, and this was very much allowed to go up now as time goes by of course the blockade becomes more and more effective. In fact as concert says it's surprising that all those factors which were held until 1916 17 to actually stop us doing more. We're actually forgotten about, because we were, we were trying to use the blockade and a much more in a much more intensive form particularly once the Americans were around. In fact the Americans are the key here. America became the greatest factor behind the blockade by the end of 1917 we don't have to have ships in the Atlantic. The 10th cruiser squadron is disbanded. We have a good intelligence system as Andy Boyd has pointed out in the United States we, you know we have a whole system whereby trade is being interdicted without the need to actually stop ships. We're actually the reducing the imports of the neutrals quite considerably. And I suppose this could be quite a significant factor. America was the great champion of the neutrals. And once America becomes an associated power that all changes. It all changes it changes the whole political economic situation. Okay, okay, very good. Okay, given the asks Dave Potter, given that one of the main aims of Fisher's Baltic plan was to expand the blockade to include the Baltic ports what effect. Do you think this plan would have had if it were successful in the face of the material being supplied by neutral parties to Germany. It's very important indeed and in fact that one of the, you know, one of the reasons what bull, I think one of the arguments concept makes is that actually, it's a great pity that in fact the Swedes didn't enter the war and Denmark hadn't been invaded because we could have allowed to operate the fleet much closer to the Scandinavian areas, perhaps even got a base on the coast of Sweden. And then we could have really interdicted the supplies of magnetic or from, from Lulae down into Germany. There's one case actually which we sort of typifies you know the strangest of the blockade I didn't mention it. Apparently a ship was stopped and brought in I think to a Russian port. But it was allowed to leave because magnetic or wasn't on the list. I mean, these sort of extraordinary things happening. And I saw somebody say yes large numbers of Danish ships were sunk yes they were, but significant numbers of Danish ships word. Now we did manage to mobilize Danish ships on the in support of the allies, and the Danes couldn't do much about it and yes the Danes did suffer losses. But the Danish farmers made huge profits. Craig corner. Nicholas Lambert in planning Armageddon argues that the British expected to stop German trade by denying them finance, not necessarily by naval blockade, at least that's what he recalls me years ago. Was there any relationship or interaction between the counter finance campaign and the counter ship campaigns against Germany. I think the basis is concerned, I think I tend to agree actually with Andy Boyd's critique of it, that in fact it wasn't a agreed overall British policy, and then in fact all the factors I mentioned which mitigated against the blockade were actually considered at the time and said no we can't do this. We can't engage in this kind of huge great economic disruption is going to affect us as bad as anybody. The basis is concerned. My view is that there were lots of people in Britain in the financial world and in America in the financial world and so on, who saw advantages and the situation I described. Okay. Brendan O'Farrell, what legal steps had to be taken before imposing the blockade. The declaration was actually in the air because of course we'd, we'd been, we'd, we'd, we got together the infamous declaration of London of 1909. And in fact declaring. We had to declare various things contraband, both in terms of of the declaration of London, which we eventually abandoned, and also things we declared as contraband because of retaliation for the U-boat campaign and so on. But yes, there was a certain amount of a considerable amount of legal activity. The problem was not much got to the got to the prize course. Thank you the contraband committee, because the whole blockade was politicized via the contraband committee. So although it looks on papers if we have a very strong legal position and strong legal measures. In fact, the contraband committee make sure that they're not effective. The contraband committee needs a lot more, a lot more examination. Right. Yes, I suspect there's a lot more work to be done. Well it's been, it's been ignored because we've had this sort of comfortable sort of assumption that the blockade was working right from the start to me. For example, you know we had argued in 2016 that the Battle of Jutland occurred because the blockade was so bad the Germans were trying to break out of it. That's just isn't true. It's only in 1917, even though there is turn it winter etc in 1916-17. Nonetheless, Western Allied economic pressure could have been I think much more decisive if this cascade of stuff from the neutrals have been stopped. Well, here's a follow on question then because George Wilton is saying this the blockade is often seen as material in the defeat of Germany. So would a tighter blockade from day one have brought the war to an end much earlier, if at all. In my opinion, yes. Which makes these failures all the more egregious. Yes, it does. Yes, it does. Okay. David Richardson moving along. Grave was challenged in the Commons on Farringdon's report and said he wasn't prepared to answer detailed questions and had confidence in Farringdon. Does this suggest that Askwith's government was overly trusting of Farringdon or that it was complicit in the scandal? I think possibly complicit. I think Farringdon had been briefed by concert. He knew what was going on. And he deliberate and and he knew which side his bread was buttered and where his peerage was coming from. I know this may sound cheap, but on the other hand, I think there is a factor in this. I mean, there is a there is a that there is it seems to me the more I've gone into this, a whiff of scandal about all this. Okay, okay. I mean when you consider that this is a time when the poor old forces on the Western front are dying in large numbers. In fact, in fact, in fact, there was one chap actually to find it. Yeah, there was one very strong critic actually in parliament who actually had been an army officer who said it was utterly disgusting with all this had been going on and the soldiers were all dying. With explosives made with imported cotton or imported fats with copper bands on shells which had come from Britain. I mean, it's quite extraordinary. What we need to do I think I want somebody and I hope somebody is listening here. What we need to do is to look at the merchant shipping records and see who was carrying what to whom. And there must be something around in records that haven't been, shall we say, forgotten about. Yeah, quite okay. The fact that Corn Hill trading with the enemy committees was was all destroyed that tells you something. In fact, I owe Andrew Lambert, sorry, I owe Nicholas Lambert that that is a very, very important point. Yeah, yeah, yeah, the absence of documents can say something too. But I think that I think there's probably enough stuff there if people are willing to spend the time when when they can. And to look at who was carrying what where, because I'd love to know how many British ships were carrying stuff to Christiana Copenhagen, Rotterdam, etc. At the time and there were quite a few. There's a very good, very good sort of cartoon at the beginning here and there it is. I'll show it to you. So here we have a German officer, right, waving his arms in the air surrounded by bales of cotton cotton for Holland cotton for Sweden cotton for Norway. And he's saying, who said God punish England God bless England who lets us have the sinews of war. And that was in punch in 1915. Okay, one person who wants to do more research is john day he's asking, where should I look on how German, how Germany financed their war. He assumes the cost of material from Sweden so forth, increased considerably. It did. It did although I think what the Germans seem to have done is that they issued bonds. They issued bonds which were taken up by various Scandinavian banks. This is all part of their sort of lending policies that eventually ended in tears with the inflation. But they did issue bonds and in fact and in fact they had a, they had a mechanism by which they could buy this material and and afford the and afford the inflated prices. Okay, but I'm no great expert on German on German war finance is an important point and more people to sort of work on it. What I find surprising is that this material has not been publicized more. You know, as concert said, you know, there is an issue here. Very important issue. Absolutely. Okay, from G Leslie so I'm sorry I don't know your property. Was there not any surprise that Scandinavian suddenly wanted vastly more of everything. Was it not suspected these goods were not for Scandinavia but for Germany. Yeah, it was more than suspected. Yeah, I mean concert our naval attache was wandering around ports and he had one or two other people although the, the number of consoles was actually quite limited. And one thing I didn't mention is there was a meeting of the three Scandinavian governments of the towards the end of 1914 in Malmo I think it was led by the Swedes and the Danes saying we're not going to publish any more of our export imports. I didn't want to tell people what was happening, but it was pretty clear what was happening. I mean there were, there were occasions when people were going around docks in in Scandinavia, and just seeing cargo is being transported from one ship to another. You know they were coming in from abroad and then they were being, they were being put, you know put into a coaster that would go to Germany, etc. I mean it was pretty it was it was pretty obvious actually for anybody you wanted to see. Yeah, I mean the follow on bit of the question is you know how much did Germany control this I mean how much were they able to use the Scandinavians just to do their shopping and order amounts and things like that. And they helped in fact were a large number of German real of German railway trucks around Scandinavia. It was, it was, it was mentioned, and on the, and they cooperated again this is a very interesting issue how the German. I'm not quite sure I should know actually the street wasn't the Reichsbad in those days it was the various German federal companies, but certainly it is said that there were very large number of German railway, trucks in Scandinavian harbours, and the things just, it just got transferred either to either to either to railway trains, or to other ships, etc. I mean it was, it was blatant. It was absolutely blatant. And I feel sorry for coral concert he must have gone spare about this. Because he would nobody listen to him. Right. Apparently. Well, no, well they will now. You're up for a couple more. Yes, I am definitely. Okay, so Chen Xiaowu, who got that right is asked one. So, didn't the decisions, didn't the fact that the decisions of releasing captured ships by the committee of contraband prove that Britain was acting according to rules, and therefore enhance Britain's reputation in contrast to Germany. I'm afraid it didn't because the Americans in particular, who saw themselves as the referees of the Atlantic War, said that the rule saying that you that you take a ship in and then you put its cargo in front of a court. What the Americans had against the contraband committee was that the decision seemed to be completely arbitrary. And that annoyed them considerably. I have an interesting one. So I was to hearts asking sounds like the German fleet had very detailed, you know, from what you're saying very detailed intelligence on vessel cargoes and the destinations and so forth. And so it seems, there must have been a very large, perhaps successful spy network related to British ports and shipping agents and so forth. I mean, how much did they, how much did they know. I think I think actually it was more sort of from the sort of the from the continental side I mean the Germans knew that certain Danish ships were friends and shouldn't be attacked. The Germans knew that, although to a diminishing extent once the unrestricted campaign started that in fact, you know, there were certain ships that were operating in their interest. I suspect in 1915 as a colleague once said you know that the Germans sank a lot of their own cargos in 1915 in the first stage of the unrestricted campaign. So I think the German Navy did have a certain amount of intelligence. I'm not sure. I don't think you needed that many spies actually. Once the stuff had come to Scandinavia. The system worked in your favor, because people wanted to get rich. As always, many people got very rich indeed. May I say this seems to be working quite well the technology but it doesn't always work in everyone's favor because it is being pointed out by Professor Hugh Murphy. Now one of the books over your shoulder may well be one that he sent you for review back in 1998 and never received. I don't realize which ones that we'll have to get him to tell us pop it in the chat with you. Which book is that or type where we'll let him we'll let him we'll let him answer we'll come back. We'll come back to that. The only books I haven't I haven't reviewed yet as far as I know for for the Mariners mirror two books on anti slavery, which are in which I'm going to. I think I'm up to date. Otherwise, I'm sure you are he probably doesn't know this time. No, no, no, come on. Okay, an anonymous attendee now. So this is ominous. I want to know what British goods were directly exported to Germany regardless of what the British government wanted. I couldn't cat would like to answer this question live I'm told so couldn't I'm going to stop in my tracks and hand over to you. Do you know how this is going to work. I need to be mute you is that right. Oh dear, hang on. Yeah. Sorry, that was her bad right no never mind. Technical glitch. Let's start that one again. What British goods were directly exported to Germany regardless of what the British government wanted. Who are the members of contraband committee. How did they become. How did they deliberately sabotage what they were supposed to do. Those are some of the basic questions we need to answer. Doesn't it tungsten tungsten was actually exported some of the tungsten we sent to Sweden went straight to Germany. I think I'm right in saying that copper was the same. We also, I think some of the, some of the oils and fats were actually actually transported to the main factor though was that British imports allowed the Scandinavians to export a massive amount of material of their own to Germany. In fact, but yes, but certain stuff did I mean certainly certainly copper copper page here. The, my tungsten page nickel yeah, we sent to Sweden 504 tons of nickel in 1915, of which 70 tons went to Germany directly. And the rest was used in Sweden to make material for the Germans. So stuff was, there was a certain amount was sent directly. But the major factor was we were able to help the neutral that nor Denmark could not have provided the amount of food and fats and other things that it did if it hadn't had supplies from us. I have a question from John Ross that I very much approve of. Did the French taken interest in this trade and the blockade at all. They did and they tried to force us to for example to stop cotton being used. However, when it came to exporting stuff from North Africa to make up for the fertilizer shortage. As in fact, concert says, in a rather ironic way, they wanted to keep up with things. So Rio Tinto use the stuff the pirates from their minds to help these people with their fertilizers. That probably would have come up in the in the in the Corn Hill committee but of course that's all being forgotten. I wonder in the real to Rio Tinto have archives. How very interesting what a thought. No, no, I do. Okay. Let's keep going here. I was a failure of the blockade a signal of the dominance of the foreign office in directing Britain's blockade policy. I think the short answer is yes. For most of the time but but things begin to change when Lloyd George comes in. We take the war a lot more seriously in 1917 and 1918. And the various and this again is worthy of further thought and the various political factors that have mitigated against the blockade being effective began to change. And people began to think well, you know, we're fighting this war seriously. And therefore we have to take a more serious approach and by 1917, all the figures I mentioned have begun to come to come down. It wasn't perfect. The Swedes continue to use British coal to export stuff to export iron ore to Germany in 1918, but nonetheless, things changed and got a lot better. And all the graphs in in in concerts book come down in 1917, because we get serious. But I think the key here is, as far as the foreign office is concerned, the Americans are now not just on side they're in the war. And to some extent we're following the Americans who wants to who will take measures that we never even thought of taking in 1915 and 1960 against against the neutrals. Here's one Tom bowling I'm digesting. There were points in the war, where the German commerce rating campaigns were more effective against the against the Anglo-French war effort and the British blockade of Germany was to central powers with their times. I'm not really sure about that. I think that. In 1950, there was so so few you boats at sea, but in fact, although they tried to use terror, as Curva points out by deliberately sinking liners. Very good book this if you haven't read it Curva k o e r v e r. The the Kaiser's you both campaign against America that they deliberately were trying to use terror to stop ships ships ships being used it didn't work. In 1916 control is exerted over them. In 1917. Yes, the you but you both campaigned as well but actually doing well doesn't help the Germans too much because it stops the neutral sailing. So the Germans lose the trade that the neutrals were carrying. And in fact one gets the impression that in early 1917 the Americans coming into the war, the unrestricted you both campaign. And the fact that the allies that the allies and associated powers are willing to take a much more robust attitude means that the whole overall context of the war changes. And it becomes the serious kind of war we imagine it was from 1914 but it wasn't. Okay, Greg Kennedy has one for you. Nice to hear from you. This is it so how could Britain also a defender of neutrals as the rationale for the country's entry into the war right a defender of the rule of law how could it have invaded neutrals to improve the blockade measures and how could they have done it seems big counter to the state of war aims into both domestic morale and international benevolence. No serious analysts blockade would be total or affected within any short shorter time frame. So is this not more that this reality shows the limits of British power and economic warfare the limits of bridge power effectively. Well we wouldn't we wouldn't have invaded the neutrals. We would have encouraged the Germans to invade Denmark and possibly Holland. They also got the Swedes to declare war. In fact, that interesting point of course because the other parts of the wall, just the war starts that the Russians are thinking of attacking the Swedes because they thought the Swedes were about to attack them. Now if they done that and Sweden and come into the war. I think we would have had a totally different situation. Now the Germans actually didn't want to invade Denmark because they did, or Holland because they didn't think they had enough forces. So, I don't think we actually plan to invade any country what we wanted was for these countries to come into the war so we could take some action against them. But concert is very interesting he says that all these bloody neutrals effectively, they were helping the Germans so we've gone to war to help a neutral country. The ideology on the British side was that look we've gone to war to help neutrals and now the neutrals are trying to undermine us. Okay, okay, good. They keep coming, they keep coming Eric. All right, fine, fine, fine. I glad I've been provocative. You have been provocative and I knew there'd be a lot of questions. I have some time for it. So you've asked for it, I suppose, was any minion trade. Alex Pickering. Again, was any dominion trade going to Scandinavia or Germany. So, for example, how much control the Britain have over over the Empire's trade. And it is the same as the amount of British stuff I mean the British Empire provided materials for the neutrals that went to Germany. And what is it it was the it was the, was it the copra I'm not sure but but the various materials that were provided to the to the neutrals, many of them came came from the Empire. I don't know if they came came necessarily in Canadian ships or whatever but yes I mean I mean the, the, the, at that time Britain control this kind of policy. I'm not sure if the dominion governments had much thought about this. But yes, I mean, this is all part of this general attempt to the British Empire to continue with normal economic relations even with an enemy you're supposed to be in a total war with. Can I put you at least a little bit. Hugh Murphy was his only joking. There was no book there is no book over your shoulder that he's waiting for since now typical hue. Yeah, and you did. He did get you because you did look aghast I must say you did look horrified by the very idea. Not Neil Datsun again surely graze great anxiety was not to antagonize the USA and it could possibly be argued that the British war effort could have been broken very swiftly by US antagonism. Probably the danger appeared much more likely to him that it does in retrospect. Additionally, the Russians were terrified of Sweden joining the war on the German side. That's all true. And I do not disagree with it. But on the other hand, there is the alternative argument that in fact the Americans were becoming so committed to the Allied war effort. But in fact there was no way that they would actually be provoked but as I said in my talk I'm not so sure about that. There's a strong anti British feeling in the United States and 82nd to none in 1916. The, as I say, the other, the Federal Reserve's advice and this kind of thing, I think Anglo American relations were a pretty bad state. I think one can see in fact and I can see why Gray would console himself with the argument that he stopped a major conflict between ourselves and the Americans. It's a matter of judgment. I mean I don't have a strong feeling one side or the other. But I think but I think the Americans were the key actually. I mean at least you can say that objectively the Americans were the key. Once after the Americans stopped being the great defenders of the neutrals, the whole position of the neutrals declined, the political economic position of the neutral strategic position of the neutrals declined. And the Americans began to push for blockade to a degree that we never even imagined. Okay. So what about Andy fields question then so that, you know, being being generous is a part of the issue that the British were not fully familiar with total war. I think, I think Andy's right actually yes I mean I think that there was not until certainly until the Lord George government I mean I don't think there was the political. There was a sort of political context and actually thought of fighting the total war that in fact you know we continue to trade. It was important that continue to trade. And if the Germans game from this well so what. Okay, we back to the Germans then because the G Leslie sorry I again I don't know you know this following up a question from from earlier wants to know what the markup what was the markup on goods from Scandinavians to Germany, you know did you know that I should have noted it about about 100 about 200% Okay, something like that. Yeah, okay. And did you really indicate you know how much of x y they send in orders they say we want so much copper so much so much cotton and and and which was sort of asked early and and which of the Scandinavian countries was the most greedy regarding prices Well, well the Norwegians work because they couldn't be because we pressurized them. One gets the impression that the Danes were willing to screw the Germans as hard as they could. As we've heard because of Schleswig-Holstein they know liking for the Germans. They were trying to make as much as they possibly could out of them. But the markups were very significant were very significant. The point I mentioned the buying the fish. We could have bought the fish for about was it 45 pounds a tonne or something and by the time we was about 150 so we're talking we're talking about 200%. All right, what damages the war effort to some extent well it was no it was a it was a markup but but the Germans were willing to pay. And of course this of course raises very interesting questions about the whole running of the German war economy about the black market, which was very important to Germany, but not in Britain. But in fact the complete disorganization of the German food distribution system where the people and where the peasants in the countryside in Bavaria ate well and the people in the towns didn't. So so the German, the Germans had various weaknesses but I think the point is this that, and I think I would I would support this and sustain it until I see some changes in my mind. But in fact, if this great cascade of material from the neutrals had stopped. I think the blockade would have would have been much much more effective. And I've seen a very interesting thing about the Danish East Africa company lost lost two ships so that's all right well that's not not what my sources said but it wasn't said at the time but perhaps you know modern modern historians. But the numbers were quite small and the Danes, the Danes in a sense to be fair to them we're in a very difficult position they were caught between a rock and a hard place really. And if you can make huge amounts of money by selling stuff to the Germans, and if the British will provide you with the material to do it. Why not. It's not your war is it. No, okay, okay, okay. David Richardson wants to know how Farringdon's book was received when it was published in 1923. To be frank, I'm not sure. I shall look it up. Okay, good. And of course he had a locomotive named after a four Pacific 6034. So he was a shareholder of the idea or at least his son was or something. Okay and numbers attendee says that you weren't very clear about who the members of the contraband committee were how they became members and their motivations for sabotaging what they were there supposed to do. I'm not, and I would like to know more and if you'd like to do some research please do. Okay, very good. Thank you for a fascinating presentation. And I think he's striking the right kind of tone because we should probably think about releasing you back to your, to your, your life. This has been one of the most enjoyable evenings I've had for a very long time. Excellent excellent and I'm sure the almost 90 people in attendance feel the same way. George Wilton. So to George Wilton, I understand the blockade remained in place through to the Treaty of Versailles in 1990. Yes. Okay, was it relaxed after the 1918 armistice. Right. And that is very interesting, very interesting point. The blockade was more serious and severe after the peace that it had been until the beginning of 1917, which strikes me as a bit weird. We get serious about the blockade. I'm not against that. I mean it's a perfectly perfect, you know, and the standard of the way of utilising seaport but but I think it's a bit strange that we blockaded the Germans more heavily after the end of the war that we've done for most of the war. Discuss. Peter Bottomley Winston was very exercised by iron ore movements from Sweden to Germany in 1939 40. Interesting that he missed this and other similar trade as First Lord in 1914 15. That's an extremely good point. And what I'd like to know is how much Swedish iron ore came down the railway line from Kiruna changing to a steam locomotive at the border. British coal down to down to Narvik and coming and I haven't seen figures on that but it must have been because the weather hasn't changed and if and if the layer had actually I stop which I think you probably would have done. I'd like to know how much stuff came through Norway, because but I haven't seen that in any source and it's something that needs to have perhaps, you know, a bit of investigation. But but certainly I mean I think Winston was very conscious of the fact that the Swedish supplies of iron ore had actually been been very important for the German industry. And we hadn't been able to stop them we even we weren't able to stop the even using British coal to transport the stuff across the Baltic. I'm sorry. I'm concentrating on different things and I'm noticing some people are tapping their their thanks and their goodbyes in the enchanted seems to be popping up and and I think that's something that we can, you know, encourage or allow, as we continue to use questions to the QQ and a some of the stuff that I think we're at. Again, we were allowing, then British flag ships, which is the whole empire this at this date to sail on. Were we allowing British flagships in other words from the whole empire to sail on or were the committee allowing only the neutrals to sail on were we stopping ships leaving UK ports for example. We were stopping neutrals but British ships continue to sail as far as I can make out. That's where the research needs to be done. What British ships took what to wear in Scandinavia in in 1914 to 1917. Neil Datsun. Bray sites an instance when a known block raid blockade runner was stopped by the French Navy, rather than the Royal Navy as a as a policy decision taken at the highest level, so as not to antagonize US opinion. He claims the subterfuge was successful and US opinion thus modified. I think it's important because because he was I mean he made a very great great principle of this policy that we mustn't alienate the Americans. And one can see the reasons for that. One can see the reasons for not alienating the Swedes because of connections with Russia. And so on. But one can see that we're being desperately serious in our attitude. Now, the big question here is and it's a matter of judgment. And I haven't really got a great answer to it is, were the Americans as potentially hostile as we suspected of the gray for example suspected they might be. And I think that's an important point. I think that the sources like concert etc who say the Americans were totally committed against the Germans, maybe a little bit. I'm not sure is optimistic or pessimistic. I think that keeping the Americans on side was very, very important. But the basic point is this that without the Americans on side, the blockade wouldn't work. I asked your question from David Richardson about Farrington's book in 1923 and of course it was concerts book and I should he's apologizing I should apologize that just shows me to have been on the automaton but I think it was answered appropriately so we'll just move on from from that spare our precious concerts book should be read by everyone. Everybody. It is brilliant. Dave Potter, regarding your comments on the German motivation to engage the ground fleet shut when not being connected to pressure from the blockade. What do you think the true motivation was. She was very annoyed that they had not introduced unrestricted submarine warfare. He'd been a strong supporter of it. But when the German leadership for once exerted control over the Navy and said no you mustn't do it. And integrate the U boats of the rest of the high sea fleet and try to come across and try to produce some kind of alternative strategy of wearing the British down. And what happened at Jutland was the first was the first sort of iteration of that and he sort of continues truck trying to do it over the summer with the August sortie and this kind of thing in a way she is sulking that the government will not introduce unrestricted submarine warfare, sheer support for unrestricted submarine warfare is not a result of the Battle of Jutland is what he already thinks. And what he doesn't what he's trying to show perhaps is that fleet actions are not that productive. And I said to a colleague yesterday in a phone call, you know that perhaps when he's chasing the British northwards, he's thinking oh to hell with this, you know, sort of, you know they won't allow unrestricted submarine warfare so we'll take some risks. Only then, but only when his you boats are withdrawn for a restricted campaign which he didn't really believe it. Does he actually stop taking sorties out to sea, but that's very much a sort of lesser alternative he wants unrestricted warfare. But the German government for once will not allow him to have it but then of course the situation changes in late 1916. And of course you get unrestricted submarine warfare, and she is happy, but a lot of people aren't, especially the Americans. Okay, there are two remaining questions. So maybe I'll just request that it stays at that and then we'll we'll we'll run through those and then say our goodbyes. This is G Leslie again. Did none of the anti German British exporters think to send Duff components or Duff goods to mess up some German manufacturers says to make money, but also cause some problems. I get the impression it's largely raw materials. It's not manufactured products. I think it's, I think it's raw materials it's fodder it's a coal. It's it's sort of fishing, fishing nets, and so on. I mean, it's basically raw materials to help the Scandinavians. Scandinavian economy continues so that they can. Well, just in theory to help it continue but actually in practice to help them supply the supply the Germans. Okay, Alex Pickering, I presume the blockade was tightened to promote British naval strength and ensure Germany did not. There's a typo there to not renege during the peace negotiations and perhaps prevent enemy business gaining advantage too soon. I'm not reading this well Alex you. Well, I think I think I think there is a something to be investigated I think still about sort of the way the blockade was continued after after the armistice. I mean the, it was to keep pressure on the Germans mean after all, one of the main factors in the defeat of Germany had been the break in domestic morale. And if you could continue pressure on the Germans to keep them depressed and to make them sort of malleable and to stop them thinking in terms of restarting the war that was all in your favor. But I do find it strange that the blockade was much more effective after 1980 that it had been in 1960. This is this is this is clearly a very important subject and, but I want more people to research this is a huge area for research I think. Right. Okay. Well, all right, thank you. We know we know what to do next then. Thank you so much. Pleasure, absolute pleasure. It was, it was as excellent as I expected it would be very kind thank you as did all of the many many perhaps even record setting attendees thought I'm very sure. So it's with the usual. Thanks that we will, we will say goodbye to us. That's right. Right. Bye bye.