 This is Tactical Air Firepower. It was born in World War I. It was immediately effective. 1500 aircraft were used against the German Army and Air Force in the San Mejil salient. This unique use of Tactical Air Firepower was devastating. 16,000 Germans surrendered and the salient was destroyed as an enemy strong point. North Africa, World War II. Greatly improved fighters and fighter bombers smashed targets in close support of ground forces. Controlled by ground commanders down to division and core level, tactical aircraft were employed cheaply against immediate objectives of individual ground units. Enemy airfields, supply lines and communications were only occasional targets. This uncoordinated use of tactical air firepower assisted the advance of a few service forces, but was unsuccessful in speeding the movement of the overall Allied force, which suffered constant attack from German aircraft. A new doctrine, established jointly by Allied military leaders, placed all air forces under the control of a highly placed air commander. This enabled massing tactical air firepower for use, where and when it was most needed. Enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air, on the ground far behind the lines. Hostile troop concentrations, transport, supply lines, communications, ammunition dumps, all were pulverized. This firepower helped pave the way for the advance of the overall Allied ground forces. Three months after the new doctrine was implemented, all access elements in North Africa had surrendered. The new doctrine was further proved in Sicily and Italy. Pre-invasion bombing and strafing destroyed or drove out 50% of Axis aircraft, providing air superiority before the invasion by ground forces. Tactical air firepower was further used to isolate the battlefield and in close air support of ground operations. The German theater commander in Italy, Field Marshal Kesselring, had this to say, the air force was constantly attacking our supply lines and always kept close on our heels. If the Anglo-American air forces had not been in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, the German forces would never have retreated there. The British commander, General Montgomery, said of the new doctrine, if air is placed underground command, the battle will be lost. The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility. General von Sanger, commander of the German 14th Corps in Italy, spoke of his retreat across the Po River. We lost all our equipment, he said. North of the river, we were no longer an army. General Mark Clark, Fifth Army Commander, said, the effective air support given us will go down in history as a classic example of the competent employment of air power in the close support of ground forces. In Western Europe, massive tactical air fire power used in conjunction with ground forces, in interdiction and air superiority, effectively furthered the overall war effort. From D-Day to the German surrender, almost 11,000 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Over 60,000 vehicles smashed, 4,500 tanks and armored vehicles, 43,000 railroad cars, bridges, 367 gun emplacements, 11,000 buildings flattened. From 1943 on, the greatest single cause of enemy armed forces casualties was air fire power. Leading the list of air-inflicted casualties, strafing, not bombing. An outstanding example of command and control of tactical air fire power was the covering of General Patton's Third Army right flank. So effective was the devastating fire power of the 19th Tactical Air Command that 19,000 Germans surrendered without opposing Patton's ground forces. The Pacific War was conducted under the same doctrine of centrally controlled air forces. The attacks on Japanese airfields in New Guinea, the bombing of bases in the Bismarck Archipelago and the attack upon shipping in the Bismarck Sea and surrounding waters were instrumental in the final victory. The Korean War clearly emphasized that the element of speed was to play an important role in further tactical operations. Speed became necessary to survive not only enemy air fighters, but enemy ground defenses as well. Conventional fighters like the P-51 suffered higher losses because of enemy ground fire while performing the close support mission than jet aircraft with their greater speed range in payload. Speed was an important part of the jet fighter's armor. In initial stages and prior to the Incheon and Moonsan landings, air superiority was attained and held while close air support prevented the complete destruction of outnumbered ground forces during their withdrawal to the Busan area of operations. The late General Walton Walker who lost his life while commanding the Eighth Army and the United Nations forces in Korea said, No commander ever had better air support than has been finished by the Fifth Air Force. If it had not been for the air support we received, we would not have been able to stay in Korea. Later when the front lines became static, emphasis shifted to interdiction. During the entire Korean action, centrally controlled tactical air forces annihilated over 145,000 men, 74,000 vehicles, 800 tanks, and 7,000 gun replacements. Three American soldiers were killed on the ground by enemy air action. Tactical fighters capable of maneuvering at sub and supersonic speed can strike several targets with pinpoint accuracy on a single mission. Their speed and multiple ordnance load capability represent a quantum jump in fighter effectiveness since World War II. For reconnaissance at the RF-101, the aircraft have played such an important role in the Cuban crisis. Speed will continue to be of the utmost importance in tactical fighter operations. High speed and effective tactics still provide the best means for a fighter aircraft to defend against air and ground defenses. One of the most difficult problems to encounter is air defense weapons which are completely mobile and difficult to target. Future developments will make the relation of speed to survivability even more important. Air Force aircraft must deliver the greatest possible firepower in the shortest possible time. Today, the tactical air forces of the United States stand ready to tailor their ability, organization, experience, and firepower to the specific requirements of any condition or scale of warfare anywhere in the world.