 So now Im Sung-Joon, first I would like to remind also that you also had a very distinguished career in the diplomatic service of your country, in particular as a national security advisor, so we have very experienced personalities with us this morning. I would like also to remind that you are one of the friends of the WPC of the longest standing, and I remember our discussion in a hotel in Seoul in early I think in 2007 when we discussed this project and you were one of the very first to support this. So thank you very much for everything. And now your views on this Indo-Pacific concept that South Korea joined lately with some a lot of hesitations and perhaps since time is short perhaps also you could add some remarks on a more immediate issue which is the latest developments in North Korea and the way they affect or up your seat in your country, please. Thank you Thierry for remembering me as one of the old friend of this WPC. I didn't say old, I said friend of longest standing. Longest. Well, I'm very happy to be back to WPC in three years. I was unable to make it because of all the pandemic related restrictions, but it's great to be here. And well, about the topic we are taking up in this session, Indo-Pacific and its relevance. So I focused on its relevance to the Korean Peninsula and to my country. As you mentioned, Korea is an Indo-Pacific country and but we have to admit that this idea of Indo-Pacific framework was first floated by Japan and later the United States. So I want to take a practical approach to understand and trying to explain where is the Korea's position vis-à-vis Indo-Pacific strategy. Well, Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept was floated more than a decade ago. However, it gained global attention only after US President Trump referred to the free and open Indo-Pacific during his visit to Asia. Soon after that US administration officially replaced the Asia Pacific. Which is very familiar in all the Asian countries, but with Indo-Pacific to describe the US strategic sphere across Asia. The US free and open Indo-Pacific is a nutshell, a manifestation of hegemonic competition with China. We have to admit this as preposition for the Indo-Pacific strategy. And the geopolitical scheme to counterbalance China, which has been extending its influence over wide region with its rising military and economic capabilities. US was very much concerned about Chinese building a sphere of influence from the eastern China Sea to the Indian Ocean. Thereby restricting US global power projection and leadership in the international system over the longer term. After that, the US has moved its strategic pivot westward from the Asia Pacific to include India and the Indian Ocean Rim. Finally, it modified its military doctrine to rename the US Pacific command as the US Indo-Pacific command. Biden administration, which denied everything made by Trump, but they inherited his policy of Indo-Pacific strategy and released Indo-Pacific strategy report in February this year. From the beginning, the US considered South Korea, Japan, Australia and India as key allies in its efforts of pushing forward the IPS. But Korea was not in the first membership and we delayed joining the Indo-Pacific framework proposed by the US administration. Well, there are now three pillars as our participants mentioned. I thought Korea was in earlier stage a member of Quad, but somehow of the Korean domestic political situation and the Korean Peninsula security situation, we could not join the Quad at an early stage. And Ocas is not Asian, it involves the UK in counterbalance China. And because we talked about what is the components of Indo-Pacific strategy, is it security or economy? Well, I agree that security size is more than economic size. So many Asian countries are reluctant to join directly the US-led IPS. So President Biden proposed an economic basket to include some lingering Asian nations as called IPF, in the Pacific economic framework. Korea joined the IPF already, but Korea's full policy of Indo-Pacific strategy has yet to come while they are preparing to announce maybe by the end of this year. So I'd like to explain why Korea has delayed its membership with IPS. Well, South Korea's hesitation was due to its preoccupation with North Korea, mostly the nuclear issue. The foreign and security policy of South Korea has been always set on inter-Korean issues, especially in the pro-North Korean administrations in Korea. Second, the US FOIP was formulated to target the rise of China, therefore supporting the US FOIP would complicate South Korea's relations with China. Now it's top trading partner. Well, we have normalized relations with China over the three decades. Well, as many countries regard China as number one trading partner, including South Korea, we have over 300 billion trade with China. And China is a long-time stakeholder in the inter-Korean relations. As long as South Korea's foreign policy revolves around North Korea and inter-Korean issues, South Korea cannot afford to antagonize China. So it delayed Korea's membership. And third, President Moon, taking office in 2017, embarked on a new South Korean diplomatic initiative called the New Southern Policy. We want to advance to the ASEAN region. So Korea has been very active in providing the development assistance for all the ASEAN countries. So we want to get beyond the Korean Peninsula, reaching the ASEAN area. So it could be called the Korean version of the Indo-Pacific strategy. By doing so, South Korea managed to secure autonomy and non-military engagement with the IPS. But after Biden took over the US administration, South Korea's stance on the Indo-Pacific started to change. This year, we had the conservative government led by President Yun Seong-nyeol, Suwonin, and South Korea participated in the first Quad Plus meeting along with New Zealand and Vietnam. A more noticeable shift in South Korea came during the Washington Summit between President Moon and President Biden in May 2021. In the later presidency of President Moon's administration, began to realize that President Biden's foreign policy was single-mindedly focused on maintaining US dominance over China and rallying its allies and partners around the anti-China network. If South Korea is isolated further, it would face the risk of damaging South Korea's inter-Korean relations, including the denuclearization of North Korea and US indifference to South Korea's policy. So President Moon also began to move toward align South Korea with the US Indo-Pacific strategy. But the election of President Yun only this year took a dramatic turn in shaping South Korea's future Indo-Pacific strategy. President Yun, a conservative party candidate, vowed to strengthen US-Korea alliance relationship and reset China-Korea relationship, criticizing the previous administration for its lukewarm stances against China's cruelty during the election campaign. When there was a tension running very high on the Korean Peninsula around 2017, the US and South Korea decided to deploy third batteries on the soil of the Korean Peninsula, which led a strong reaction from China. And China gave us some sanctions, three points. So Korea-China relationship really is strained, and now we are still under difficult situation in handling China-Korea relationship. So this is why Korea delayed being a member of the Indo-Pacific partnership. So I want to stop here for the time being. Thank you very much, Sun Jun. So let me say briefly how I perceive this part of our session. I think that this concept of Indo-Pacific reflects a kind of very subtle, but also unstable, implicit equilibrium. And the problem is that, in my understanding, no country, particularly in Southeast Asia, wants to take sides too clearly, too openly, in vis-à-vis the US-China rivalry. But since the whole construct is highly unstable, at any point something could happen that would in fact force some countries to take sides. Maybe not all. India, I think, has a very special role because India is becoming a giant. So as the current Indian Foreign Minister says almost every day, India is proud of her civilization and intends to make their own choices. By themselves, they don't want to be imposed any kind of strategy from outside. For Japan, Korea, the situation is much more complex. The margin of manoeuvres is much more limited. So I think we are talking about a very unstable situation, which is not surprising, because the whole world is unstable today.