 These are obviously very upsetting and hard times. We'll take the chance here not to so much talk about the earthquake, but more about how we came to where we are today. It's kind of fascinating actually, because it's important to remember under which circumstances the AKP governing came into power. The party was founded in 2001 and they came to power one year after the foundation of the party in 2002. And it's very important to understand the backdrop of this for everybody, I think, because they came at the aftershock of two maybe very important events. One was the 1999 earthquake that was a major earthquake that caused up to 18,000 deaths officially, most probably more. And of course, on the backdrop of a major economic crisis that Turkey went through in 2001. Already, the Turkish government was in crisis as a backdrop to the Asian market crash. And that was made, so there was already negotiations, loans from the IMF, and then came the 2001 crisis, which crashed the economy and got rid of the government at the time and bought in the elections then in, that bought in Erdogan. So there was austerity, deflation, very hard times for everybody, big crisis, reeling from the earthquake, reeling from economic pressures. And now if this tune is kind of sounding similar, it's because ironically, this is also exactly how it is today. The Turkish economy has been suffering and people have been suffering from high inflation for quite some time now. And there's been now a major earthquake. So it's interesting how things turned out. Adon's governments came on this backdrop as anti-Austrian. And we will build, build, build with this type of very specific developmentalism because, you know, the AKP is Justice and Development Party, this very new liberal developmentalist ideas with private partnerships. Adon, although came as a populist leader, he was in no way like left populist as we would understand it. He was basically the revenge of the old Islamic oligarchy against the secular oligarchy of Turkey, not so long after, you know, AKP became construction and construction became AKP. They grew a massive class around construction industry. So this is what makes also this crisis so remarkable. Also, the government has made very strange claims trying to clean themselves, protect themselves of this very obvious truth that everybody knows is by saying that, oh yeah, like 98% of the buildings that collapsed were before his time or some strange, like ridiculous number that nobody was like, that things were more than two seconds can believe. This is the backdrop. And now I'd like to also talk a little bit about what happened after the earthquake. It was extremely delayed responses. People were devastated for two days. There was almost no aid coming to these regions. And like every day, people were on social media, on news channels saying, where is the state? And the state was almost like, but with all us, this kind of public structures and institutions and aid has almost been a forgotten concept because for them the state was like construction, building, military power, intrusion and nothing, all this thing of care and maintenance has been long forgotten although Erdogan had came into power by criticizing the previous governments on their failure on the 1999 earthquake. And we also saw the typical cronyism and corruption in the, what very little institutions that were left like the search and rescue institutions were filled with party members and their relatives with mostly that were like lack of any kind of expertise and showed on the ground, nothing was planned. It was really surprising, the scale of the chaos and the confusion almost of the state. So since there was no state, it was people and solidarity that was trying to prevail and this also panicked and scared the government for some reason because I guess like polarization has been such an important part of their body politic for such a long time. At the height of the second day where people were really communicating through social media, trying to organize their own aid, their own extraction teams, the government decided to close the social media and internet. So like it was really incredible to witness what the few reflections of the state has. Just block social media, do PR, try to, I mean, they already own all the, have all the media. So the emperor has no close moment. And the other shocking thing was the absence and very delayed response of the army. So normally in big catastrophes as we most of us seen during floods and fires in our inquiries and even in COVID here in France, for example, field hospitals, army. And, you know, because the roads were closed, the things you think that material, the army house could have been directed this regions, but the army was not deployed for an unquestionable amount of time. And I remember one of the interviewees in Marash said that the first time I heard a helicopter sound was the helicopter that brought Erdogan to the region. A reminder that we are NATO's second largest army. This is insane. We have all the army power and determination to affect Kurdish region in our own territory in Iraq. And of course in Syria, they needed the army. The army was not deployed. The only solution the whole time is the government officials saying on screen say, oh, don't worry, we construct in one year, we will construct everything back in one year, which terrified people even more because extremely handle developmentalism and urbanism and urban sprawl that the AKP had directed had caused, had played such a big part in this disaster. And the state was somehow thinking this would reassure people while it frightened and angered them even more.