 Gyda chi hefyd, yn ddewch i'r awr am 3r ymarfer fyrixon arredd hyd. Ardyn ni'n gwybodod y mae'r neud. Yn eich ymryd yn y cyd-feydd i'r awr, mae'n cyd-feydd fydd yn cymryd i gwirioneddol, ond maen nhw. Yn y cyd-feydd i ymryd ymryd i'r awr mae'r cyd-feydd i'r awr, ym drwyg ddiw. Eibol ymryd yn cyd-feydd i'r awr, ryf wneud y dwy arddyn ni, ydych i gael y cyflosio hen o ranolwgiau yn gystafell i gyflosio cynllunau ym Ystregwyr, yn cymdeithasun o unigol dros Yngyrchu Cyffredinol. Rwy'n cyffredinol, yn cyfrû o bobl o'r cyflosio ar gael'u honno i gael y gyflosio. Rwy'n gweithio yn ydw i gael y cyflosio, rwy'n gael ein cyflosio ar gyfer y cyflosio, i eich bynnag i'r bydd ammaedig o'r Lyngrau Gwyrdd mewn Cyfaint Oedon Fawr Gwyrdd ym Mhagel, of the Justice Committee. Gail Scott, one of the clerks to the committee. Diane Bauer, one of the clerks to the committee. DCI, Lorraine Henderson, Police Scotland. Good morning, Ben Macpherson, MSP for Edinburgh Northern and Leith. Good morning, everyone. My name is Michael Clancy. I'm the director of law reform at the Law Society of Scotland. I'm Ronan Martinbaugh, John Finnie, MSP Highlands and Islands. Good morning, I'm Claire Connolly. I'm representing the Faculty of Advocates. Good morning, I'm Liam McArthur. I'm the MSP for Orkney. Good morning, I'm Helen Thisbut, head of international co-operation at Crown Office. Liam McArthur, I'm representing the North East region. Maurice Corry, MSP for the West Scotland region. Lea Andrew-Muncan, a lecturer in EU law at the Edinburgh Law School. Mary Gougeon, MSP for Angus North and Mearns. George Adam, I'm Paisley's MSP. Dr Philip Glover, University of Aberdein. Daniel Johnson, MSP for Edinburgh Southern. Runaway Mackay, MSP for Strathkelman and Bairstain and deputy convener of the committee. Thank you all very much for that. The idea of the round table is to encourage a more free exchange with each other that you probably wouldn't get if we had to panel. It's still, although it's more informal in setting, very much on the record. Probably you don't need to touch your microphone. Those of you who have been here before will know that if you indicate you want to speak, I call your name then. Your microphone will come on automatically, so you don't have to worry about pressing any buttons. If we could just indicate through the chair, then it just makes sure that it doesn't get out of hand. That's quite sure it wouldn't. I thank all of you who provided written submission that's always very helpful that we get these in advance of these round tables. It gives an element of preparation for the committee. I refer members to paper 1, which is a note by the clerk, and paper 2, which is a private paper. Perhaps I thought the best way to start was with, as far as I know, the most up-to-date position, which is that the Prime Minister has proposed a new UK-EU treaty on internal security based on three areas. Roughly those three areas, those three priorities were continued co-operation, in redata drive, law enforcement and shared data bases, practical assistance, re-cross-border law enforcement operations and co-operation through specialised agencies such as Eurojustin and Europol. Perhaps if I could get the witnesses' comments on that treaty any problems, how effective it would be, any comments just on the most up-to-date position. Who would like to start? Michael. Since you're such a seasoned and experienced person at these committees. Come now, convener. I didn't say we'll can now. No, you didn't. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you for identifying me. Well, what did the Prime Minister say at the meeting in Munich? She talked about safeguarding our internal security in Europe. She explained it because of the various terrorist atrocities that have happened recently. It was something that was close to home and I know that personally. She also explained that we must ensure that nothing prevents us from fulfilling our first duty as leaders, she's talking to the European Heads of Government, to protect our citizens and we must find practical ways to ensure the co-operation to do so. When the Law Society started off looking at Brexit matters, we issued a set of priorities to the UK Government, which we saw from the perspective of Scotland's solicitors for the negotiations. We talked about the public interest areas, so ensuring stability in the law, maintaining freedom, justice and security, ensuring that there was mutual recognition of citizens' rights throughout the EU and creating arrangements to deal with pending cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union, and lastly, looking towards ensuring that respect is given to the devolved Administrations and Parliaments and Legislatures and also to Scots law. When one looks at the set of priorities that we were suggesting should be taken up in any negotiations in November 2016, you can see that we are still working our way through those priorities. Remember that, in December, the European Commission and the Task Force 50 negotiators issued a joint report from the negotiations that have been had with the UK Government, which explained that, among other things, there would be the readiness to establish partnerships in areas unrelated to trade and economic co-operation, in particular the fight against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy. That is something that we see has been talked about clearly through the course of 2016 and 2017, and we have got to the position where the Prime Minister comes up with the suggestion of a new treaty. If one is looking at the options for dealing with replacing the existing EU law, of course the European Union withdrawal bill tells us what is going to happen with some of that. The removal of the European Communities Act of 1972, the transposition of EU directors and the AQI from EU law into UK law, comes through things such as the creation of EU-derived domestic legislation and the incorporation of direct EU law. There is a process going on in the bill, which tells us that there is going to be a transposition effect. Most, if not all, of the criminal justice and home affairs areas have an element of reciprocity. That is important for us to identify. Looking at the question that you raised about creating a new treaty, clearly that is one of the options that one could adopt in dealing with the situation that we are in. It would be a possibility of keeping the framework decision and dealing with us as a third country. That would be one option. There could be a specific European arrest warrant agreement. We could rely on, for extradition purposes, on the 1957 convention. There could be separate bilateral agreements, but clearly the one that has been identified by the Prime Minister and the UK-EU Security Treaty is one that seems ideally in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, given the reciprocal nature of many of those obligations. However, there is the awareness-raising issue that we have to confront. Does any member have a capacity to go on to the internet at the moment? Can anyone access the internet? Could you look up Sky News Brexit countdown? Maybe we could shortchange this microphone because we have only caught an hour and a half. It will tell us that there are 402 days left until 29 March. The clock is ticking. We have got the picture. Is the issue. Thank you very much for kicking that off and setting it off. Any other views? There are a few issues concerning the priorities set by the paper on future cooperation in police and judicial matters related to criminal justice. The first one is that we cannot regard these three priorities, so shared databases, cross-border law enforcement and agencies as watertight areas. We really need a holistic approach because many of these instruments work together. We cannot think of, for example, having an agreement on the European arrest warrant framework decision or, let's say, a European arrest warrant-like agreement between the EU and the UK without having a related agreement on the accession of the UK and participation of the UK in the Schengen information system, for example. The Schengen information system is, let's say, the European arrest warrant framework decision. The Schengen information system works together because they basically allow Member States to enter in the Schengen information system, alert on wanted people, object missing people, object and so on and so forth. So this is a first point I would like to make that even though at the moment a comprehensive agreement on security, let's say, so including those two priorities seems unlikely, a fragmented and a piecemeal approach, I don't think that will be very much effective. This is one reason. The other reason is that when we talk about fallback regimes, so okay, we are not going to have the European arrest warrant. We are going to have the Council of Euroconventionist tradition or whatever it is. They are not absolutely a two comparable system of interstate cooperation in criminal matters. The European arrest warrant is not just a variant of a tradition. The European arrest warrant is the flagship of a complete new system of collaboration based on mutual recognition. I don't know, I don't want to say very, very much, very well known things, but mutual recognition in criminal matters within the European Union means that any judicial order, a specific judicial order issued by a judicial authority of a Member State to another Member State must be recognized and executed without any further formality unless specific grounds for refusal apply. What does it mean? It means that cooperation is not anymore for the executive but is for judicial authorities, so there is a further guarantee like judicial oversight. There is the drop for 32 areas of crime of the so-called principle of double criminality, so if we want to surrender someone under the European arrest warrant and mutual recognition broadly, we don't need that specific offense to be criminalized in both countries, and we have the partial drop of the so-called nationality ban, so the prohibition for a Member State to surrender is national. And we have time limits, very, very strict time limits. If you compare average time for surrender under the European arrest warrant, you have around maybe 60 days as compared to over one year in the case of the system of extradition, and you can take this example when it comes to the European arrest warrant and you can translate it in other areas of interstate cooperation in criminal matters. The UK is part of the European investigation order, which sets up a system of mutual recognition and distinction of evidence within the EU, and I have at least two points to make, but I will... OK. I'll bring Claire in next, and then there's a couple of members who would like to come in. I think it's worthy of note that the development of co-operation in terms of criminal justice issues across Europe has paralleled a development and an increase in international crime. So crime is now a global issue in the way that it would previously certainly been perceived for the most part to be much more of a local or domestic issue, and we can see that there have been very positive developments made when we've been part of the European family in terms of primarily, as mentioned by Leandro, the European arrest warrant, which has become hugely efficient in terms of us both bringing home our own criminals who have sought refuge elsewhere and also being able to send those accused of crimes in other countries to face proper trial or to receive punishment that's already been given to them. But there have also been developments more widely than that, for example, to address counterfeit and currency, to address terrorism, and one of the most recent developments is found in the Medi-Crime Convention, and that addresses the use in the dark web, for example, for drugs that are not properly tested, produced, etc., being made available to individuals. So the issue of co-operation being able to protect the citizens of this country and the broader EU, I think, is most commonly known to the general public in terms of the European arrest warrant, and that type of co-operation, interpol, data exchanges of intelligence, which are clearly hugely important, but there is a broader aspect to this co-operation that has gone on, and certainly in the view of faculty that the harmonisation, that co-operation, that mutual recognition must continue, and it must continue not only so that Scotland doesn't become, and the United Kingdom of Scotland in particular doesn't become a haven for those who commit particular types of crime and will either be able to hide from being pursued or will be able to receive punishment that's not in line with what is available elsewhere and may be more favourable to individuals, but also in terms of individual members of the public, they may not be aware of how this co-operation impacts on their day-to-day life to their security and to their person, but it does, and we must ensure that that continues post Brexit. Mary, you have a very specific point on that. We had the committee took a visit to London where we met the EU Justice Subcommittee in the House of Lords, and I've been interested in some of the work that they've done on this. Lord Thomas said, given evidence to one of their committees, that the European arrest warrant operates in a fundamentally different way, unlike treaties that's premised upon judicial co-operation. It's very difficult to see how, if an instrument operates on that basis, it can do so without somebody at its apex to determine the rules by which it works. There is a total lack of debate about the two very different approaches to the problems of the relationship between two judicial systems, the treaty-based mechanism and the one based on co-operation. I was also interested in the evidence from COPFS where he said that, in terms of the European arrest warrant, its key features are to make extradition a judicial rather than a political process. In terms of that comment that I'd initially just read out there from Lord Thomas to see if that's an element that you agree with in terms of the lack of the debate on that and the current position as it stands at the moment. Why having the system of judicial co-operation is important in that way and how it is different from any other political process? Maybe if you bring in your point too, you can see who wants to pick up in these. It follows directly on from what Mary was just saying there. When we're looking at what our alternatives are or how this might work going forward in the future, we've heard that this is rather than just a simple bilateral treaty, this is a very complicated institutional and judicial relationship going on. So what do the other models look like? In particular, thinking about Norway and given that it has a specific treaty that recognises that the European arrest warrant, how does that work? Is that a potential model for the UK? Are there drawbacks? Are there other relationships that the EU or indeed the UK has with other jurisdictions which might serve as a model for a future relationship to enable this to work? Dr Glover, do you have a view? On that, not so much. I would pick up on what Claire said there. I think that the devil in this lies in the data and the arrangements that are made for intelligence transfer and for data transfer. Less certain on the EU law in relation to it, but retention of the databases to which they currently have access to would be critical and the on-going role of the court of justice is critical to making that work. That said, I think that it's worth remembering. I think that there is a will, or there seem to be, on the basis of whatever it is. There is a will, I think, to make this work between the two parties and to keep as much of the status quo post Brexit as they can. I wonder perhaps Helen from the COPF's point of view, if you could comment. From our perspective, it's a very practical consideration as to whether we will be able to serve the purposes of securing surrender or extradition or securing evidence from European colleagues in the way that we've been able to do until now. To go back to your original point of the Prime Minister's wish, as expressed in the Munich speech, if this all-embracing treaty were to be delivered and it were to have both preserved the position in so far as can be done, albeit under a different legal basis, as is present, but also importantly, and as I have understood, the UK Government's position to preserve the capacity to further innovate in the future in terms of its relationship with European partners, that it might be said that the practical impact of Brexit from the point of view of the Scottish and UK prosecutor might be minimal. I think that colleagues around this table have identified the two issues that might, are the real challenges to that, and that is the issue of data sharing and the issue of who arbitrates in the event of dispute, and I think that these are still the challenges that need to be properly bottomed out. Until we know how that's to be dealt with, it's difficult to give a proper assessment as to what the practical impact will be. Ben, you had a comment, and John, did you want to come in this area? Thank you, convener. I just wanted to pick up on that point and also what Dr Clover said about the ongoing role of the Court of Justice. I think that point about who is the final arbiter is so crucial. That was also highlighted by the report from the European Union Committee of the House of Lords when we spoke to them, too. For me, that comes down to how we will operate in practice. Given the expertise around the table both in theory and academia and in practice, without the Court of Justice as the final arbiter, is there a way that such reciprocity that we have right now can continue? Can such effective operations in the way that, for example, the European Respawn has provided, be sustained without that final arbiter being shared and that reciprocity being understood? Thank you, convener. It's specifically for Ms Nisbyt. It's about the practical implications that have been alluded to. Presumably, there's a bit of a lead-in time before a warrant is applied for. There will be complicated cross-border cases. Transitional arrangements would be crucial if there were any change, presumably. What are the practical implications if there were to be a delay or, indeed, be nothing in place to secure the arrest of an individual, please? There are two aspects. It's almost something that you need to model through. We're still actually in the process of doing that. You would need to model through two scenarios, one where you were effectively one-day operating under EU law and perhaps with the same investigation and the same prosecution the following day operating under whatever followed it in whatever way. That's not a unique and unheard of proposition. There are examples where, for instance, Scotland can't take a decision to move from a common law offence to a statutory offence. There are models for looking at that. On the other point of what could follow, ultimately, if there was no deal—if I can express it that way—the working assumption is that we would fall back on the Council of Europe conventions of 1957 and 1959, which deal with extradition and mutual legal assistance, respectively. There are some questions within that that still need to be answered. There are provisions in both the framework decision that governs EAWs and the directive that governs the new European investigation order. That at least poses the question as to whether they replace for participating states within those systems, whether they replace the pre-existing conventions. That issue needs to be bottomed out. There are also separate issues, particularly with relation to extradition, that, under the 1957 convention, a number of member states will not surrender or extradite their own nationals. Again, there are practical impact assessments that need to be done country by country to determine what the impacts would be in terms of future relationships. Before I bring Michael and Lauren in this, are you nodding? Is there anything that you would like to add? It just regards, obviously, the repeal. A number of countries have repealed the 1957 act. The comment with regards to whether we can have a similar system that nor we have, what we need to be mindful of, is still part of Schengen. In that respect, that may not be open to ourselves. As Leandro says, things can't be looked in isolation. They have to look at the interoperability and how each of the different justice and home affairs measures rely on each other and are able to work efficiently. Michael? The EU is considered to be a partnership against terrorism and international crime. The UK is a deep and special partnership in terms of practical and operational co-operation. That looks like it is not that far apart, but when you dig into the detail and find the red line of the EU, that presents a difficulty. That will present a difficulty sooner rather than later. If one remembers the agreement in December about citizens' rights, those citizens' rights are still going to be capable in the transitional period of being referred to the CJAEU. The joint report in December tells us that that will continue for eight years. That is in relation to citizens' rights, eight years from exit. The difficulty is that, in the transition arrangements, the UK will not be participative in the EU institutions. Therefore, not only will we not have a commissioner and MEPs and all the rest that goes with that, we won't have a judge. In fact, the three judicial officers from the CJAEU will have to leave. We could have the peculiar situation of the CJAEU dealing with cases where there is no British judge in post. That presents some difficulties. However, treaties invariably have some kind of mechanism for dealing with disputes. The question to be asked of the UK Government and the EU would be, in this proposed treaty, what would be the idea for dealing with any disputes that arise out of the topics? I take Leandra's point that it is a much larger vista than the European arrest warrant. There is all the other practical co-operative elements, Eurodact, Eurojust, the EU, Lisa and the rest. That was the point that you brought up in the case of a dispute. Would international arbitration rules help in any way? In response to that and also in response to the MSP, Ms Gorgian's question in regards to Lord Thomas's quote, the Faculty of Advocates provided written evidence to the House of Lords EU Justice Subcommittee in respect of Brexit enforcement and dispute resolution as there a role for the Court of Justice of the European Union. The quote from Lord Thomas, which essentially said that for the operation of an extradition treaty with the EU, is different from a European arrest warrant. As I said in the quote, a European arrest warrant is premised upon judicial co-operation. Lord Thomas said that it is difficult to see how that instrument could operate without abiding its apex. The Faculty agrees with that. In its written evidence, it went on to say that, in the event that rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union lose their status as biding authority, there is nothing to stop those rulings remaining as persuasive authority. Scottish courts routinely draw from cases and other jurisdictions, and there is no reason why that should not apply to those from the CJEU. It is possible that there may be some divergence in approach by the courts, but that should not be overstated. CJEU rulings have become embedded in UK jurisprudence, and it is unlikely that they will suddenly be departed from, especially in the area of criminal justice, where it should be obvious and desirable that a consistent approach is applied in both jurisdictions. In the written response, it goes on to raise issues that may arise where you have inconsistent interpretation of jurisprudence, but it is certainly a question that the faculty shared the concern expressed by Lord Thomas. Certainly, where we are in terms of the provisions and the agreements that have been reached in terms of what the future will look like, worst case scenario is that the decisions of the Court of Justice would continue to have a persuasive authority. Diolch yn fawr, Leandro. I have to decide on the legality of an agreement. What about the Court of Justice decide that they are not willing to leave their control and interpretative monopoly over such a sensitive area such as police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Let's not forget that the Court of Justice not that long ago has had no problems in throwing in the bin, let's say, years and years of work on the accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights on the specific argument that it was undermining the autonomy of European Union law. So this is like the first point we should take into account. Let's not just jump to the conclusion and let's not take for granted that there will be an autonomous body or an international, like an international arbitration model on a potential agreement, because the Court of Justice will have to decide whether such an external body, the presence of such an external body is compatible with European Union law. Secondly, there is, let's say, the dark side of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters that is law enforcement, but there is also the bright side. So how actually judicial cooperation in criminal matters helps improve and increase the standard of protection of individuals subject to investigation and criminal proceedings all over Europe, and which I think has been somehow neglected in the debate and especially in the police paper so far. An example is the European Supervision Order, which is another instrument of mutual recognition in criminal matters within the EU. So the European Supervision Order, the framework decision on the European Supervision Order allows for mutual recognition of pretrial measures alternative to deprivation of liberty to detention. Which means that if I'm, for example, a UK national and I'm subject to investigations in another member state, on normal conditions the judicial, the competent authority in that member state will not be very keen to grant an alternative, a pretrial measure alternative to detention, because they have no way of, let's say, controlling me, because I'm not resident there, I'm not a resident in that country. And so, as happening like 95% of the time when they don't have this possibility, they just go for detention. What the European Supervision Order allows for is that basically we recognise a pretrial measure alternative to detention and we send back the person to the country of like residents of nationality. So we have effectiveness of law enforcement and cross-border criminal prosecution, while, however, improving the standard of protection and the individual rights all over Europe. So this is another aspect that we should... I was just going to come back to the idea of data and the mention of alternatives, perhaps the idea of alternative methods of dispute resolution. As I understand it, the fallback position or the position that the UK has been advised to take on data protection is to seek an adequacy decision if it falls, in order to ensure that data transfers, if it becomes what's like a third country, necessitates like it has done for the US and the privacy shield and the umbrella agreements to seek CGEU approval, that the measures in place to secure data transfers flow uninterrupted. I'm guessing that that might be why there's been such readiness to concede the CGEU redline for the next two years, as I understand it. As regards alternatives, I'm going to plagiarise Professor Catherine Barnard here. I'm a Professor of EU Law at the University of Cambridge. I can't claim this as my own. I'm not sure how much traction it's gained so far, but there seems to be this UK redline over the CGEU, which might be as much about semantics or posturing as anything else. I don't know, but it's the idea that arbitration could be undertaken by the European Free Trade Association Court, or EFTACourt. It is judges from the three EFTACountries under its jurisdiction, and its judgments aren't binding on its members nor are they obliged to seek guidance from it. It's never deviated really from what the CGEU has to say, but what they can do is issue findings that the UK might be able to sell as palatable to those who would find the same ruling from the CGEU, less palatable. I'm not sure, but the idea is out there, and the idea perhaps that there are no alternatives to CGEU is maybe premature. There may be other models. EFTACourt potentially could fill the gap. Clare, you wanted to come in, and then I've got some members wanting to come in. In a commercial environment or in terms of civil liability, arbitration has a very effective role. However, when it comes to determining an individual's liberty and the restriction of that liberty, it's faculty's opinion that arbitration or other forms of alternative dispute resolution would not be appropriate. If something as serious as the withdrawal of liberty is to take place, whether that be through transfer or imprisonment of an individual, then that must be subjected to reasoned legal analysis and the process of arbitration would not be suitable. That's helpful to rule that out, but keep EFTACourt in this possibility. I know that you want to come in, Michael, but I'm going to bring in a couple of members. Liam McArthur, then Rona. The question that I was going to ask has largely been touched on by a number of witnesses. It was following on from Ben's question about whether the red line in terms of arbitration is an absolute or are there degrees within it, and I think that we've already explored a number of contributions. I think that one of the issues that arose in our earlier sessions in relation to civil law and the impact of Brexit was around alternatives, and I think that Helen mentioned reference to councillor Europe mechanisms. In previous sessions we've heard of UN resolutions that have been a fallback, and we had quite a lively debate as to whether or not those processes were more advantageous in terms of their development, in terms of their reach, etc. I'm not getting the impression that in the area of policing and criminal justice there is anything like that prospect possibly for the reasons that Claire has just elucidated, but it would be helpful to get confirmation that that is indeed the case. Rona, just to bring in your point. Part of it follows on from what Liam McArthur said. It was really just to get a general view of how you think the negotiating positions on the EU and the UK are going, and do you think they're getting their priorities right in terms of policing and the effect it'll have on the Scottish legal system? The proposed treaty, if I'm understanding it correctly, is a treaty, but the detail is still to be decided. How much of an input is that a Scotland is going to have to that is my thoughts. Michael, you wanted to come in? I have to say that I'm not convinced about the EFTA court, because EFTA is a free trade association, and it doesn't really do crime, to be honest, from what I've seen of it. The Carl Baddenbacher, who is the president of the EFTA court, said in a talk that he gave in Edinburgh last year, that you either have to be in the EU or in EFTA in order to get the advantages of free trade between the two, and you can't switch between the two to get the advantage of a court or something like that. You would have to be a member of EFTA to be able to access the EFTA court, and that tells us something about then accessing the EFTA treaty and so on and so forth, so our 410 days get sliced down to even less, fewer days. I'm not persuaded by Professor Barnard's suggestion that you could use it as an arbitration for the reasons that Claire has enunciated, and also because it's just not suited to do that kind of job. Can I say something about where one thinks that the negotiations are? I think that we were in the process of negotiations during the course of this week, and if you look at the agendas for the negotiation meetings on the Task Force 50 website, they are scant. They just tell you that a meeting is going to take place. It doesn't tell you anything about the meet of the agenda of what is going to be discussed. What we know is that we are moving from the basic phase of—and that happened in December—into the future relationship, and that is a significant undertaking to view the future relationship. There are so many competing issues that might be considered. Clearly, keeping our people safe is considered to be one of the prime objectives of government. If government takes that as its priority, the proposed treaty and any other form of agreement between the EU and the UK should be the priority. Underpinning the rule of law in our society means that other things can then happen, such as making contracts and having families and doing our jobs on a day-to-day basis without fear of crime or terrorism. So, making the rule of law a fundamental part of this process, access to justice and the interests of justice—we don't hear very much about this—when the discussions about the CJEU were going on in pending cases last year, both the UK and the EU issued papers about how the CJEU should be perceived. However, it was essentially a managerial exercise about pending cases. The law society wrote to both Michel Barnier and David Davis to say, but where are issues like the rule of law and the interests of justice in all of this? Those are important features that we ignore or forget about at our peril. I am interested to know, Police Scotland and the Crown Office, if you think that we are going to have enough time to reassure the public that they will be safe. Times are getting on and things have not been decided yet. Is there any sense of panic? I think that we are almost crystal ball casing with that question, Rona, but by all means reply if you— From a policing perspective, our law enforcement perspective, there is a lot of work getting done by the NCE and the NPCC of a number of law enforcement agencies to identify as practitioners what our priorities are to keep people safe. There is a lot of work getting done in the background and they are reporting directly into the Home Office to their EU team. Alongside a number of colleagues from Scottish agencies, we are working in contingency work with the Home Office, so whatever pace they can go up because it is crystal ball time. There is work getting done in the background and there are certainly monthly, if not more, meetings regarding that. To build on Claire's point on the answerability of arbitration or EFTACOT model for police and judicial cooperation in communal matters, and to stress the uniqueness of being part of the European Union and of the EU law system in this specific area. Judicial cooperation in communal matters and police cooperation within the European Union are built on the fundamental principle of mutual trust. That means that operates as a presumption that fundamental rights are respected throughout the European Union. What happens when a country leaves the European Union or what happens when interaction takes place with some countries outside the European Union? That means that that presumption does not apply anymore and it means that while when you are part of the European Union you benefit from that presumption which means that unless and until you are, let's say there are concrete evidence that in that specific situation you are not complying with fundamental rights, judicial cooperation and police cooperation operates, it cannot be limited. This relationship between rule and exception is reversed when you deal with someone like a country that is outside the European Union. Of course this different relationship between rule and exception operates in different manners depending on the context, but this is an example I think that we can see also in the case of data protection with the SHREMS case of the Court of Justice and on the ruling of the Court of Justice on the basically impossibility to presume the US in that specific case complying with the EU data protection standard, so this is another thing that we should, like another drawback of not being part of the club, let's say. The UK will not be presumed any more as complying with fundamental rights standard. You have specifically on that point where you just talked about data protection and what you raised earlier, Dr Lover too, because that was one area that I was quite interested in and data adequacy. It was just really, if you could generally just explain a bit more about that, why that's going to be so important, because I think that when I've been looking into this, there have been fears expressed by some that in terms of deeming whether or not the UK is going to meet the standards of data adequacy, the time that it can take for that decision to be made by the European Commission could slow things down, but also the fact that it's how the UK then deals with other countries as well and it's about the free flow of data with other countries that we have through the EU at the moment. For example, if we don't get that adequacy decision, what does that mean? Does that mean that we lose free access to data from any other nations such as the EU-US privacy shield that you mentioned? Does that mean that we would lose that until another agreement where we have to reach individual agreements with each of these other countries too? We want to address that one and probably factor into, we're looking worst case scenario here, is it bad for us but equally bad perhaps for EU countries? In other words, would there be any reason why it would be an advantage not to co-operate in the sharing of data? And if they didn't, obviously, Mary's questions come very much into force. Anyone like to look at that? I'm wondering if perhaps you want to look at the FTA and maybe address this one too because you did say FTA court just now complies with just about all the judgments but the points being made out of the European Court but the judgment, the points being made perhaps isn't suitable for justice for criminals. It's by no means certain that the UK would have to seek an adequacy decision. That's kind of a fallback should it become necessary to treat it as a third country, probably on a very hard Brexit, as I understand it. I'm reasonably confident that they can agree or will agree. Firstly, on the standard data protection or flows of data, we have the GDPR, which the UK is going to honour from May 2018. Intelligence sharing and national security related data and law enforcement data are subject to slightly different rules and they are subject to, when I say different rules, they're outside the idea of general data protection. And they are subject to the CJEU's oversight and they are a jealous, that court is a jealous supporter of fundamental rights to data protection. It takes a very dim view, you referred to the Shrems case there, it takes a very dim view of where it sees threats to your fundamental right to data protection as recognised in the charter. That said, there are a number of arrangements now, sadly scanning up and down, this document is slower than turning a page, but there are a number of satisfactory data sharing arrangements with third countries that have been entered into by the EU, not least the US. The court of justice, I appreciate it, is still not settled in the court of justice of the European Union, just how legal, for want of a better term, the current privacy shield or umbrella arrangement with the US is. Adequacy decisions, Dancer, at your point, are time consuming, but where the political will sits behind the current arrangements, I don't see that as a threat to getting a rubber stamp on how the UK currently transfers data to the EU and receives data back from the EU. I personally think that it's unthinkable that any of the practitioners here would lose access to the databases or intelligence that they currently have while the details of this treaty are thrashed out. Data is simply the gold currency now between nations and I just find it unthinkable that they won't get an adequate settlement worked out. That said, if it falls to an adequacy decision, that will take time to formalise. As regards your point, I accept your point about the EFTA court. That said, it was purely in the area of adequacy of data transfer that that point is being mooted rather than as an overall arbiter for the whole treaty perhaps. It's more in relation to data that I was referring to. If I could perhaps pick up again the point that Liam McArthur made, if worst-case scenario some of these things don't come to fruition, is there other treaties? Is there a convention, a hate convention that can play a part here in helping out any of the areas where there may be a problem with transfer? Anyone like to take the hate convention? Outside everyone's area, is it? Nobody wants to comment on that? Leandro, the hate convention, is there anywhere that it might play a part or other treaties if the negotiations fall down and this is the fallback position? Would it? I think that's what you were asking, wasn't it, Liam? A discussion during our evidence on civil matters that those conventions could play a role in plugging a gap, but as I say, I think that the impression I got was that there wasn't a similar opportunity in relation to the criminal justice issues we're discussing here. The body language of Leandro was giving me my answer, but maybe he wants to put something onto the record. I'm pretty skeptical. For the reasons I mentioned earlier that the two systems, because we tend sometimes to think about the system of cooperation, police and judicial cooperation, which of course are connected but have to be kept separately. We tend to think of these forms of cooperation as just another form of international law or international law cooperation in criminal and criminal matters and in policing, but it's not. I think that we should be realistic enough to accept the possibility that any fallback regime would be far, far, far less effective from both enforcement perspective and right protection. Helen, do you want to come in? I think that there's a general consensus amongst practitioners in law enforcement that the evolution that's taking place over 40 years within the European Union has allowed us to reach a point where we are operating in a mutual cooperation, judicial cooperation basis, as optimally as we can be. We're in the cusp of future breakthroughs in terms of being able to do further live-time interrogation of systems that would get information back to home countries more quickly. I think that it's important to say as a practitioner that international cooperation will not cease if there's no deal in the course of Brexit negotiations. Scotland and the UK deal with other countries all the time. For the first time, you can sometimes deal with a state for the first time or sometimes not a state for the first time. What I'm thinking of is a recent extradition case involving Taiwan. There is always a scope if the will is there on both sides to reach agreements and to secure cooperation, and that happens with states all across the world. The point is, and I think that it's a point that Leander is making, that without the interdependent network of options, suite of options that we have at the moment, we are faced with something that's going to be somewhat less effective than the point that we're at just now. I'm conscious that we've got that another half hour, and you may have come with a particular issue that you wanted to raise, so I'm going to go round the table and just see if there's anything that we haven't covered that you would now want to put on the table or out there. Llyryn, could I start with you? Could I ask you maybe to cover a wee bit more on the medecrime and cybercrime aspects and just how that's all playing out? Unfortunately, I can't. I wouldn't be able to assess at all with a medecrime, because it's not within... Is that organist or people used to human? I couldn't begin to tell you, so I wouldn't even like to guess. Perhaps someday I'll be able to pick up on that. But no purely from a practitioner's point of view, we have a number of measures that we've identified as being our priorities. That link, as Eileen Andrew has said, is one will not function without the other. The Schengen information system that Eileen Andrew alluded to earlier on has only been in place since 2015, but it's a hugely effective tool for front-line policing to keep both the community safe and our police officers, because they get real-time information with regards to if somebody is wanted in another country or if they're a violent individual with regards to the crimes that have previously committed. Prior to the year, prior to it coming into effect in April 2015, we executed 73 European arrest warrants, and that jumped to 111 because we had real-time access to this information, and that will be lost if we don't have access to the system. Although Norway has been mentioned again, it has access to history, even though it's not an EU member, but again, they're within the Schengen area, so they have access. I think that it's just to put it across from a practitioner's point of view. There are key measures that we would be keen or we have, obviously informed Home Office, which are our priorities, and are more interdependent than others. Can I ask about Turkey? I saw that mentioned somewhere as a candidate state, so it wasn't any formal trees, but it seemed to be copied in or partied to some of the kind of agreements just on that basis. This will be, for Europe, a lot of hope to do with Europe and its access to information in Europe. At the moment, the UK enjoys full membership within Europe, so we can influence the direction of Europe and the priorities, and one of the new priorities, which has been influenced by the UK this year, is wildlife crime. When we no longer have full membership, we won't have an influencing opportunity. You become either a strategic member, such as Albania and Russia, where no personal data is exchanged, or you go to operational, such as USA, Canada and Norway, which is fuller membership than your strategic partners, but you still don't have full membership, so your influencing opportunity is gone. I think that the UK Government is seeking to eke out a more unique relationship with Europe, but how realistic that is, we don't know. Thank you for that, Michael. Something that is quite important for us to appreciate is that we will be safe the day after exit. At every conference, that will be the case. I would like to think that the negotiators will reach agreement on the key points, and that even if we don't have a full-blown treaty, we will have heads of agreement, which could give an indication, and that could be lodged at the UN and be used as a basis for an agreement between the UK and the EU. I'll send this on to the committee, but there was an ad-hoc working party on article 50 in Gillian Maudsley, who's in the audience, and dug that out for me on police and judicial co-operation and criminal matters, and that took place on 23 January this year. It talks about the various default positions if there is no agreement, so either international conventions such as Council of Europe or UN, interpol, bilateral relationships that we have with member states, and what they are terming soft measures, that's exchanges of non-personal data and other kind of global initiatives. I think that if one looked at the consequences of applying the third country model to the UK, although you don't get access to the database, there might be data exchange. Any kind of interruption in the flow causes delay, delay can be troublesome, but I think that there might be ways to work around that. A new treaty will open up all of the issues that it contains to further examination and debate. One of the things about the debate in this country is that it is introspective. We are wondering what we are going to get in the negotiations, how we are going to make sure that the EU yields to our position. That might be the mantra that Government ministers are using, but, in fact, there are 27 other people involved in the room, and we don't know enough about what the other member states will want in this debate. The treaty opens up, let's say, the European Arrest Want. Leandro has written, I think, about the issues that have come up in the European Arrest Want, in the ECJ and the difficulties that member states have with aspects of the Arrest Want, and that will apply to the other initiatives as well. I think that that means that we've got to be alert to the fact that what might come out will be something completely different from the status quo that we have at the moment. It might not be an improvement, indeed, on some of the things that currently hold back the European Arrest Want from realising its full potential. Things like issues of proportionality, the questions of dual representation, relationship with fundamental rights, those kinds of things will start to be debated more openly, I think, and that's something for us to be alert to, because we need to be able to make representations. You asked earlier about the position of Scots law, and, of course, when one looks at, let's say, the UK's partnership paper on security, crime, et cetera, for the future, there is, I think, one paragraph that says, and we will also talk to the devolved administrations. Now, we have a particular system in Scotland which means that the Lord Advocate is independent. Although he is a Scottish minister, he conducts the operation of prosecution of crime independently of Scottish ministers. I think that it was a point that we made to the UK Government when we responded to that paper, but I think that we've got to be alert all the time to issues which may come up, which might have an impact on the Scottish legal system and our legal heritage. Not an aspect frozen legal heritage, but one which is open to change and which will go with the flow to improve the lives of people who live here. I don't have a great deal to add to what I've said already on behalf of the Faculty of Advocates, but I would say that clearly mutual co-operation is in the interests of all countries, but time is of the essence. To develop what my co is saying on the unique position of Scots law, I think that it was reflected in our paper. I think that in terms of our planning and our technical provision of technical advice and feeding into UK Government colleagues, the key things that we are wishing to emphasise is the unique nature of the Scottish legal system and its criminal justice system and also the proper take account in terms of the development of any thinking of the role of the Lord Advocate. A secondary aspect in terms of looking forward is our desire to preserve the identity that COPFS and the International Co-operation Union have been able to create for itself within Europe and to allow us to continue with direct contact and co-operation with European colleagues in whatever arrangements emerge. It is also a secondary level to emphasise the importance of Scottish law enforcement to be able to do that as well. Speaking of the Brexit paradox, what does the UK need to do to get part of the clump? One example we were mentioning before was being part of Schengen, and other third countries that want to fully join the system of police and judicial co-operation of criminal matters. There is another interesting issue and it is the compliance with European Union law and the charter in particular. If we say that the UK is going to reach an agreement with the European Union on a comprehensive agreement, a specific agreement anyway, on police and judicial co-operation criminal matters, basically the UK will have to comply with European Union law standards. There is no scenario when the EU signs an agreement with that third country, without that third country giving reassurance that the EU law standards, especially when it comes to fundamental rights protection, will be complied with. It will be a very interesting situation to see one of the main arguments for Brexit, so we don't want to be bound by the charter for fundamental rights anymore than getting back through the window at the moment of signing this agreement between the UK and the EU, and which condition the UK will need to comply with. This is something that we should consider. On which condition the UK will be able to sign an agreement on this issue, specifically for fundamental rights. Thank you for that, Philip. I have much more to add other than that. It seems possible. Indeed, the US, much pilloried over its surveillance activities, for instance post Snowden, has shown that it is possible to continue to co-operate with the EU on an acceptable basis. Their current operational arrangement with Europol includes co-operation in relation to drug trafficking, human trafficking, trafficking of nuclear and radioactive substances, people smuggling, terrorism, and an on-going exchange of intelligence and information. I think that there are 16 of those operational agreements that Detective Chief Inspector Ryan Henderson spoke of. As I say, it is difficult, obviously, while negotiations take place and no-one really knows what is happening in them. We are left with the media to guide us as to what might be happening or what might not happen. That is where we all are, frankly, in my view. The idea, as I say, I remain fundamentally optimistic that any type of Brexit will see a comprehensive settlement on policing and justice co-operation that I do not think will have to concede very much. That is it. There is just one last issue that was mentioned in one of the submissions. That was the Irish situation that is being called the 20 cases pending and perhaps some jubiety about whether there would be was it an extradition? Was it the Law Society of the Crown and Procurator Viscals submission? Would you like to comment a little bit further on what the various scenarios are? It is hard to know at the moment, but I think that it is an example of how, as negotiations continue without a concrete clarity as to which direction they are heading and how that lack of certainty can come to the foreign individual court cases. NS is just to gum up the works in a way that maybe has not always been particularly anticipated. That decision was just earlier this month and, as I understand it, it is to be referred via the Irish Supreme Court under an expedited procedure to the CGEU. I do not think that it has yet been determined whether the CGEU will accept it or not, or the parameters in which it will accept it. It will also allow an opportunity for all member states and other parties, for that matter, to enter into the proceedings. It offers a situation where we are watching closely to see what may flow from it, but I think that the practical implication of the 20 pending cases in Ireland is that that might start to be something that is generally in terms of extradition to the UK as individual parties are looking at the Brexit situation and saying, well, what advice, if I'm a lawyer representing someone in Belgium who's facing surrender under an EEW, what advice should I be offering my client as to what approach they should be taking in their extradition proceedings given the uncertainties around Brexit? Is it the case that, before Brexit, that would have gone through without any question, that there would be no question of the member state exercising its right to perhaps say, well, in this case, I'm not sure if I'm going to comply? I think that it certainly seems, in terms of this decision, it's Brexit that has been invoked as creating the problem, as being the impediment to the surrender process under a EEW taking its normal course. Could they have exercised their right as the member state to say, in this case, we have doubts for some other reason? Theoretically, yes. There's a limited number of bases for challenge or non-recognition of a EEW, but at the end of the day, it's always open to someone to try and develop an argument that's a bit of an imponderable, but there's always scope for developing it, but it's not something that's been countered up until now. Certainly, in terms of this case, it's very much been Brexit that has been posited as the problem here. Liam, you wanted to comment on that. I think that what Leandro was saying earlier on was that, while there are grounds for challenge, actually the time frame is one of the benefits of the European arrest warrant process, has been the strict time limits in the way that they're applied. I'm struggling to see how grounds for challenge can be based around a Brexit process, rather than the issues that are material to that specific case. That may ultimately prove to be the case, but the problem is that where we are just now is that someone has put forward a challenge that the Irish courts have been prepared to entertain to a certain extent thus far, but are saying that we want to refer that on to the CGEU for a final determination, and it may be that the CGEU says, no, the logic now is that the EW is in force in the UK's part of the EU, and therefore these time limits and whatever should apply, but we're just not there, and it's supposed to submit to come in from the left field that we had necessarily anticipated. I suppose that's the problem. It's a moving feast, isn't it? I suppose that's just one thing that strikes me looking at all this. Obviously all these different matters that were involved and we want to be able to continue in these post-Brexit as well, and looking at it beforehand, it's like we've picked and chosen what we want to be part of anyway through the opt-ins and the opt-ins, so essentially we're kind of looking to do the same thing, except we won't be in the position where we're a member of that organisation where we can choose, and I do. I just have concerns that, at some point, obviously are they going to look as kindly to the pick and choose and opt-ins and opt-ins as what we've had before, but I'd really just like to come back to something that Michael Clancy said about earlier. It was really in terms of the Law Society of Scotland's submission, and you talked about it there, that the UK Government has indicated its intention to work with the devolved Administrations recognising that Scotland has a separate legal system. Do you feel that that is something that has been adequately recognised so far? Because, again, I feel like that's another fear that I have. Given the number of times that the GMC's met so far, I think there was a gap of about nine months between meetings last year, there hasn't been the adequate time to give this, and the Scottish legal system in particular, the attention that it deserves in these negotiations. I think a question for us here as well is how we ensure that Scotland's voice is heard in all those discussions and negotiations. You've already expressed considerable concern about the timeframe, Michael, but please respond. Thank you, convener. It's an interesting point about the extent to which issues like the Scottish unique system of criminal justice is discussed around the Cabinet table. I wouldn't like to venture how many times that has been raised around the Cabinet table in number 10 Downing Street. I might get it wrong. I think that it is important for us to recognise that discussions between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations go on at many levels. I have every confidence that officials are keeping one another in touch on various aspects relating to justice, civil law and other elements in this. It might be much more difficult at the point at which ministers are meeting for these issues to be raised on to that agenda. However, as I said earlier, I think that the underpinning of the rule of law means that all the other things can function, so that the negotiations about agriculture and financial services and company law matters are all underpinned by the idea that we can go about our business without fear of not being able to go about our business. It is clearly very important. I think that it is in the minds of ministers that I believe that UK ministers are aware that there is a distinct nature to the Scottish jurisdiction. The Lord Advocate's speech in Brussels has been heard by people in Brussels at Ucrep and Scotrep. The Lord Advocate, I am sure, has frequent discussions with his UK counterpart, the Advocate General for Scotland. I know that during the course of the debates in the House of Lords, which are due to start tomorrow, in the committee stage of the EUWB, that issues around and about the Scottish legal system will be raised because I have made sure that amendments have been prepared, which have been tabled, to raise these issues. Therefore, I have no doubt that UK ministers are aware. The difficulty, of course, is that, when it comes to the negotiations, there may be in the red heat of discussion if we can describe it like that. There might be things which just don't get remembered or something like that. That is a possibility. I live in hope. Liam McArthur, you wanted to say something on that. I would say that this is somebody who is appalled at the prospect of what Brexit holds by and large. I think that there are any number of examples of where UK ministers are grossly overestimating the strength of our negotiating position. It does strike me that this is an area of where there is mutual self-interest. While one cannot determine what the outcome will look like, the political drivers behind that look very different here than they do in other areas. I was looking at the quote from Richard Walton, the Metropolitan Police Service counterterrorism command, who suggested that there is no way that European countries will want us to stop sharing with them and vice versa. They need us as much as we need them. Our security does not depend on engaging with the institutions of the EU. It does depend on collaboration with European countries and that will carry on regardless. That maybe overstates the point to some extent and ignores what Leandro was saying earlier about the view that the ECJ may take on this irrespective of what member states may themselves see as in their own self-interest. I was just wondering whether, amongst the witnesses here, there is a general sense that that mutual self-interest gives a degree of confidence that whatever emerges from this will be something that approximates towards what we have at the moment, even if it is deficient in some areas. Is that too early to say, or is that grossly over? Can I add into the mix, maybe, that caution and the kind of cutting-edge work that is done there that I think is internationally recognised and how that may be something that is a wee bit of a trump card if you like in Scotland here? If they have got data, which is very much at the cutting-edge and proceeds or processes going on there or work going on there that is helping combat terrorism or various bits of crime, how does that fit into the mix? I wonder if—I think it was the crime in Fockery to Fiscal Service submission that mentioned that, so perhaps Lorraine and Helen would like to comment on that. Helen, would you like to kick off with that? I think in terms of putting forward what is achievable. One of the things that we want to focus on, from the point of view of maximising what you can do with international cooperation, be it with Europe or more widely, the way in which we have organised ourselves in Scotland and the development of the crime campus are key factors that we can put forward to our advantage. In shaping any future arrangements. To deal with your point, Mr MacArthur, I think that there is an alignment across Europe as to the mutual benefit that there undoubtedly is from the justice and security arrangements that are in place just now. From my point of view, I feel that it is too early to say whether we will confidently deliver those. I think that there is an aspiration there, but I suppose that it gets back to the point that I was making Helen with the Dublin case. Things didn't come out of the left field that you don't quite anticipate. I can go so far as to say that there is confidence, but I think that there is a mutual aspiration to preserve matters as much as possible as they are at the moment. Lorraine? I'm just picking up from where Helen's left off. From a policing perspective, will we still be able to co-operate with our partners throughout Europe? Yes, will it be as slick and effective as it is at the moment? Probably not if we don't maintain full membership, but it will be more time-consuming, cumbersome, bureaucratic and possibly financially constraining because the measures are there to cut away all the bureaucracy or a lot of the bureaucracy. With regard to Gart Cosh, personal experience is probably one of the most efficient areas that I have worked in, due to the fact that you have so many agencies working within the one building, and it is held up internationally. We have had visitors from all over, both the UK and EU and further afield, who herald it as being a groundbreaking, so to speak, and the EU commissioner, Julian King, has also commented on his recent visit. To address your initial point, if the measures are there for reasons that are not there, then it's going to be more time-consuming. If the political will is there, if both the EU and the UK benefit from this mutual co-operation, then does it come a political priority on both sides, and if it does, with some of the concerns that you have, then not be concerned? Again, that's a crystal ball that we're talking about, but I think that it is everybody's benefit for them to maintain this relationship and influence as we come. In any way, the world's getting smaller in terrorist terms. Well, not just terrorism. Local crime affects the EU and our next-door neighbours and all the relatives, and that's just as important. Okay, Ben. Given what's just been said there, and also what you said earlier, Michael Clancy, about security being one of the prime responsibilities of government and what's also been said by the Crown, and in a similar way to what the convener just asked, but from a different perspective, do you think that the UK Government's evident political approach to the issues of security in terms of the Munich speech and seeing those as negotiating positions rather than seeking primarily to come to an agreement is irresponsible? Given the absolute importance and imperative nature of tackling criminality, that politics shouldn't be a prevailing factor in this and that responsible government should be the overarching persuasion of politicians. Is that the position? Is it a negotiation or at least seeking agreement? I suppose that would be the key point to get views on if there are any, but I'm not sure that it should take us very much further because anyone wants to comment on that. Because it shouldn't be a negotiation tool, it should be of a heightened importance than a negotiating position. Is it a negotiation or is it trying to seek agreement? It may well be a time-glotel question. If nobody wants to address that, can I thank you all very much for your attendance? This is obviously a very complex issue and it's been useful to tease out behind it. There's not just an agreement that we're looking for here. There could be broad brush-up votes but many other factors to be looked at underneath and hopefully we've got an idea of the challenges and possibly some solutions and areas that we may look to. Cranai, thank you all very much for coming and say we will be considering the evidence we've heard today as part of our work programme and see where we go from there. What you said and giving us an overview has been very much appreciated, so thank you all very much for attending. We now move into... We're going to suspend briefly just to allow the witnesses to leave and then look at agenda item 3. Thank you all very much. Agenda item 3 is an invitation to members to delegate responsibility to me as convener to arrange for the Scottish Parliament corporate body to pay on-request witnesses' expenses for the Brexit and policing and criminal justice evidence session. Are we all agreed? We are all agreed. Thank you. Agenda item 4 is feedback from the Justice Subcommittee on policing on its meeting of 8 February 2018. Following the verbal report there will be an opportunity for brief comments or questions should members have any. I refer members to paper 3, which is a note by the clerk, and invite John Finnie to provide feedback. Thank you, convener. The Justice Subcommittee on Policing met on 8 February and on that occasion we took evidence from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland on the strategic review of undercover policing in Scotland. We took evidence from Michael Matheson, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Derek Penman, the Chief Her Majesty's Chief Inspector and Stephen Whitelaw, who was the lead inspector on that particular review. We also considered, as part of that meeting, our work programme, and we agreed the following. That was, A, to keep that under review, the evidence that we had heard under review about undercover policing, B, to invite written evidence from the Association of Police Superintendents, Police Scotland, the Scottish Police Federation and Unison Scotland in relation to the on-going review of Police Scotland that has in respect of custody provision. We also, C, was to undertake further work in the financial management and ownership of Police Scotland and the Police Authority. We agreed to write to the Public Audit and Post-legislative Scrutiny Committee, seeking an update on any future work that it might have planned in relation to the finance and governance issues relating to Police Scotland and the SPA. Finally, to write to the SPA seeking clarification in relation to issues relating to the SPA board. The Subcommittee met this coming Thursday and we will hold an evidence session on the Government Constabulary's reports on Police Scotland's counter-corruption unit. Thank you for that, John. Are there any comments or questions from members? That being the case. Thank you very much for that. We now move into private session. That concludes the public part of the meeting. Our next meeting will be on Tuesday 27 February, where our main business will be consideration of stage 2 of the Vuhence of Behaviour at Football and Veteran Communications repeals Scotland Bill and the Civil Litigation Expenses and Group Proceedings Scotland Bill also. We now move into private session.