 Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back to a very important topic, very important session that we have here this morning. I can tell you, I hope I'm not the only one who is a bit confused about the time change here in Morocco. I can tell you that. But we are live, of course. We are on with a very important session. Welcome, of course, to those who are joining us via livestream as well, ladies and gentlemen. We have wonderful speakers here who couldn't be better equipped to tell us about what the state of Europe is. Some basic European strategic issues. That is what the topic is. And the gentleman to my immediate left here is, of course, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain and a former President of the European Parliament. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Joseph Borrell. I'm delighted to welcome the Foreign Minister of Austria here this morning. It's a great to see her, Karin Kneiser is here, ladies and gentlemen, who apparently brought her own fan club. I like that. Delighted, the odd man out, if you will, these days when you're talking about European issues. Welcome to you, sir. Yes, all the way in the back. Thank you. And, of course, I'm delighted back. We already had the pleasure at the WPC last year. The 10th anniversary is the member of the House of Lords and a former Conservative member of the UK Parliament. Michael Lothian, ladies and gentlemen. Not an easy task to be the representative from the UK these days on EU matters. But I'm delighted to hear from you in just a moment. He's a senior fellow at Bruegel in Brussels and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in DC. Nicolas Verron is here, ladies and gentlemen. And last but not least, he is a current member of the French Parliament and a former member of the European Parliament, Jean-Louis Boulange, ladies and gentlemen. Now, the way it's going to go, this is not going to be your typical future of the EU session, where all of us are going to bemoan the current state of the Union. But instead, all speakers have picked their own individual strategic topic that they would like to address when it comes to European affairs these days. And then, of course, we are going to open up for a very dynamic issue. So for Minister Vorel, the challenge of migration these days could not be more urgent. I am based in Berlin, Germany, where the topic is on the daily agenda, on the agenda of many of your countries. So I'm very curious and delighted to hear what you have to say about this particular topic. The floor is yours. I'm going to speak French. OK? Yes? Very good. It's not often that it happens, but I prefer to speak French. Well, listen, migration is a strategic issue for Europe with three titles. First, the point of political life. We have seen it well after the refugee crisis in Syria and migrants in the central Mediterranean, but now rather western. The question of migration is entered into a national country in a way that we could not have imagined a few years ago. It has a lot to do with the rise of populism. Migration has been used as a trap door, even as an excuse to approach in regressive recipes that touch the fundamental principles of the state of law, the separation of power and European values. These will have consequences for European construction. First, we insist on the debate, saying that there are some who want to open up the border and others who want to reform it. Europe for Teresse, an idea that takes the strength in the countries of the East. In the United Kingdom, migration has a lot to do with Brexit. And I believe that the immigration regime will become the most important risk for the European project in the near future. Great division between the East and the West. Second question, the economic perspective. We need immigration. We need immigrants. We will always need them. The reason is very simple. Everyone knows it. It is the difference between the demographic between the North and the South of the Mediterranean. We are old. Africans are younger and younger. We will need a job. The economic growth in Africa will not be sufficient to absorb the growth of its population. It will ask us for a difficult choice. What kind of economy will we have? It will be a digital economy that will not need a job. Will we be able to assimilate a work that is not too specialized? There will be a mismatching between the work that comes from Africa and the work of the European economy. And that is a question that has very strong economic problems. But finally, it is the social point of view that is perhaps the most important dynamic. We will have to build a complex, multicultural, even multilingual society. How will we achieve the level of opportunity for new citizens who arrive and who have major difficulties to integrate themselves? How will we be able to face xenophobia that rises everywhere? How will we be able to respect national identities and at the same time accept that a large part of the population will respond to other identity characteristics? I wanted to say to finish this brief consideration that we must not think that migration is a temporary phenomenon. Not a structural phenomenon. It is not a matter of management. It is a matter of strategy for the future. It will not happen. It will rise. All European debates will find the balance between solidarity and responsibility. And at this point of view, I would like to say that Spain and the Maroc kingdom have shown a very strong co-operation capacity to manage the migration flow that is found nowhere else in the Mediterranean. We must make a very clear distinction between asylum seekers and economic migration. It is not the same thing. But if we can make a distinction, we must be able to distinguish it. It is not possible. It is that in the Greek Islands, three years later, there are still thousands of people on the beach who have not been able to say that you are a asylum seekers. You have the right to stay or go to the continent where you are not an asylum seekers to enter Turkey. Neither one thing nor the other. The thousands of people who remain waiting for the administrative authorities to make their choice. We cannot say that there are asylum seekers or economic migrants and then not being able to make a distinction between one thing and the other. We must combine responsibility and solidarity to clearly say that we must have agreements with the countries of origin so that those who do not have the right to go to the asylum can enter Turkey quickly and efficiently. On the contrary, we will have thousands of people who will be disciplined in the underground economy and who will mine the foundations of our society. Thank you Minister Borrell for once again underlying the urgency of this topic saying rightfully this is not a temporary dilemma that we find ourselves in in Europe but a long-term problem and a long-term issue that we have to tackle with. An issue of course that is hotly contested and debated in Austria as well Minister Knaiser but I know that's not the topic of your presentation this morning instead it's my understanding you would like to speak about the implications of Chinese foreign policy in Europe these days. The floor is yours. Moderator, hello my ladies and gentlemen this is my brother this is my sister I thank you first of all Thierry de Montbryal it's a great blessing to renew this contact as someone who as a student read with great passion the publication of Ramses among others it taught me a lot geopolitical psychology and I also thank our others in the Kingdom of Morocco and thank you for inviting my presence here among you I would go further it's not only the foreign policy of China but it's an economic policy of investment that finally becomes a geopolitical strategy and that's what interests me in this subject the deliberations that I also made in my last publication before taking my mission as Minister of Foreign Affairs the title of this last book that I had written last year is called what in French we could translate by the relapse of La Garte moving from a transatlantic to a more peaceful which was already discussed in the American universities in the 1980s I remember the conference Asia Pacific Rim and then there was everything to change we focused again on the widening of the time etc but the American president of the time George Bush who also served as if you will the first ambassador to Beijing in the 1970s before the opening of an ambassador to Beijing Louis in his Chinese Diary had already made reflections on a subject that is very very current of our time especially this gap that started as a go-west strategy especially the relapse of the western province of the popular Republic of China and which became the road of self the road of investment I want to know all of you I don't want to summarize all of this as a foreign minister what is happening in southern Europe I prefer the term the word of the south-east instead of the famous Western Balkans one of this term that the European Commission developed and which lacks a semantic historical geographic basis but for us it is the word of the south-east Sarajevo is a beautiful European city which among you has seen once the Museum of Contemporary Art or visited a ballet at the Sarajevo Philharmonic here it is and it is a vacuum that we created because as I like to say before the 11th of September of 2001 many capitals had Balkan experts and after the 11th of September we exchanged them with experts for the fight against terrorism and we left this region it became a risk to become a certain vacuum and it is in this vacuum that several actors engaged economically but also politically we all know them I'm not going to waste time to talk about what is happening among all these actors but to put the point on the activities of China and also in Spain as we also left in the Mediterranean Occidental aimed at crucial infrastructures ports, airports ferroviares and often when we discuss this with colleagues of the region whether it's in Bosnia-Segovina or Montenegro the answer is a very logical question these are partners that do not cause too many questions they come with the investment and the assurance of all this infrastructure which is established and I would like to make some reflections because we have to first and foremost that's the demand of the European Union that's also the demand of the European Union we did not make a mistake of the Chinese potential but in demand of transparency in demand of the rules of play that are balanced in the Hainan Forum the Boao Forum the Davos of China we demand it but we are still waiting for the implementation and when we say really the strategic partnership that the European Union had concluded in 2003 which ten years after had given place to a strategic agenda from here in 2022 the way that the European Union has chosen is to establish more and more networks and strengthen the partnerships for a sustainable connectivity this approach to raise the challenges is first and foremost for the benefit of the citizens both in Europe and in Asia and we have to reinvent with China the multilateralism and reinvent first the notion of what we hear about the rules of play it is in this regard that I would like to draw your attention first of all also on all these programs that I just mentioned the root infrastructure et cetera we know the role of China in central Asia in the Middle East and it often goes in tandem with the problem of overuse and this question of overuse in my opinion is understimated especially by my colleagues within the Commission when it comes to Tenders I would like to conclude by the fact that I know nothing about the relationship of forces that exist in all initiatives international, structural where they come from so I do not think together the necessary to apply I come back to the rules the transparency the openness in the public market the respect of these rules of competition especially the intellectual property and the sharing of risks so we have to go beyond some acquisitions in the framework as it is currently going on so I am convinced that Europe and China know together to understand this essential principle to define a methodology that respects the interests of all of us and that this initiative will be able to develop the reconstruction of a more of a multilateralism effective as a response to the challenges that we face together we must never forget the historical context that is happening I remember when I taught in China 10 years ago I went to the summer palace of the emperor and when you look there as the echo of 10 years 12 years without presenting the destruction of the opium war of the middle of the 19th century that's what that's what the European barbarians have done that's how we present you sorry? yes yes yes I don't remember I remember those who haven't seen this site and that at the time it gave me a lot of reflection because it reminded me of my first visit to Persepolis so that's what we must never forget that there is this nation the oldest before Persepolis who also has a specific look at the relationship with the rest of the world besides a very specific historical socialization and that's what I think is sometimes underestimated or not really grasped by other actors so I would like to choose you for the debate on this question thank you minister for underlying the importance of the future of Chinese-European strategic issues that are yet to come sometimes we focus perhaps too much on transatlantic relations and inter-European relations of course for obvious reasons but it's very important to keep that side of the globe inside as well now Michael Lothian we meet it seems like it's the crucial period for Brexit it was so last year it seems to be this particular time I'm very curious to hear from you how you assess the current states of Brexit relations even though it's my understanding that you already in your talk you will already be a step ahead and talk about UK in a post-Brexit world thank you very much I'm delighted at the invitation to be asked to give a British contribution to this European discussion this morning I had hoped after doing so last year that when I came this year Brexit would be settled and I would have an easier time than perhaps I had last year but unfortunately that's not the case Brexit seems to grind on and on and like Margaret Thatcher once said she would go on forever I wonder whether Brexit will as well but I want to start again with a simple premise and that is that the UK is leaving the European Union with Brexit but it is not leaving Europe and that to me is an essential factor we are inextricably part of Europe our security is part of Europe's security our democratic traditions and cultural values let alone our history are inextricably linked with those of Europe but we are an island and it's there that the problem arose we've never felt at ease with the constricts of the European Union we could have lived quite happily in my view with the Europe de Patrie of General de Gaulle we could have made progress in the economic community which is what we originally joined but we were always uncomfortable with the drive towards ever closer union and eventual integration and that is where the crisis arose what I want to do is not to go back over the Brexit arguments but to now look forward to the post-Brexit future for now many areas remain shrouded in the midst of uncertainty if not the obfuscation of the negotiators so in a sense it's OTOs to discuss where the negotiations have got to that's not a criticism I did many negotiations in my time as a minister and I know that it's the end of the negotiations that are always the most difficult and where you keep your cards closest to your chest of course on the economic front Brexit will not be without pain not only for the United Kingdom but for the rest of the European Union as well and I think we have to face that Brexit involves fundamental change and fundamental change invariably in the short term at least causes turbulence and while some of this turbulence can be mitigated in the longer term my own view is that water will find its own level and that in the end mutual self-interest will bring about a resumption of profitable trade even if that takes a little time but there are certain areas already where we should be looking very closely at our future role in Europe first of all security in the face of current global insecurity it's already necessary to envisage a coordinated European response and I use the word European because this is not about the EU it's about the wider capacity of the nations of Europe inside and outside the European Union to deliver at a number of different levels and the first of these is intelligence I have an interest in intelligence I'm still on our intelligence committee in the United Kingdom in this turbulent world with growing sophistication of terrorist methods and monitor various levels of cyber and communications activity of these terrorists has already become crucial and it's generally accepted that the United States through the NSA and the United Kingdom through GCHQ are at the cutting edge of the ability to do this all European nations have the capability to one degree or another but here there is no room for false pride combining and sharing intelligence with a dead brainer the United States and the UK already do it at a very high degree and more widely as well and we've done so for a long time we may not stop every insurgent plot but between us we do stop the vast majority of them because of our ability to share this information Brexit may create a little more proper on all sides but it would be mad to allow it adversely to affect our counter-terrorist programs we should be preparing already to ensure if anything that the United Kingdom, the nations of the EU can share the maximum of intelligence most effectively to combat international terrorism this is an urgent matter of cooperation and it serves no one I have to say to have senior European Union members threatening to expel the United Kingdom from the Galileo project which after all we have contributed to for a long period of time the next area where we will need to cooperate is in facing the cyber challenge and this is becoming an increasing threat as well the scope of cyber warfare is expanding exponentially and we've already seen in certain parts of Europe not least in the Baltics the damage that it can do no one nation is likely to be able to combat that alone highly sophisticated cooperation and collaboration will be required and we need to be working urgently on that vital area now another vital area will be on the defence front with all the various elements that this must encompass over the next decade or so the United States will increasingly turn its attention away from the Atlantic theatre towards the Pacific and the existential military and economic challenge of China and this is not just Mr Trump talking about this I was in Washington two weeks ago very senior levels of the administration recognise that fact and hope that we recognise it as well it will not necessarily mean the end of NATO in its present form or indeed the United States military support for the European theatre however Europe in the widest sense is going to have to undertake more of the heavy lifting and the United Kingdom in my view is central to this in the military circles that the US in this engagement the military forces available to the member steps of the EU alone would not be fit for purpose in filling the breach that's going to leave the world around Europe becomes ever more fraught and it's a dangerous fantasy to believe that the European military capacity could step up to the plate without a substantial British component involved as well British military might be solely diminished from our glory days but we still have the equipment and the expertise to make our participation vital in particular in a war scenario where boots on the ground will matter less than technical know-how and top-flight machinery this will be even more the case because these are Britain's current military strengths add to that our acknowledged expertise in the field of special forces which will increasingly become the weapon of choice in any land war and Britain's role becomes even more relevant Britain will have a significant role in Europe in the future and I have to say we will be more than ready to play our part thank you very much thank you so much Michael and I'm sure in the Q&A part I know you have to leave a bit early at some particular point because you have a flight to catch let me just ask you one simple question is it possible to get a quick yes or no answer I mean there is momentum building in the UK right now people asking or demanding a second referendum saying we want to do this again we want to have a cast or a vote again do you think such a second referendum is realistic do you think such a second referendum will take place I don't think it will for two reasons one is we can't have a second referendum without having a parliamentary vote in favour of it and legislation and if you look at the British Parliament there is a majority for nothing and so I don't think you would ever get a majority to back it and secondly the argument for it is that it is somehow going to be a different referendum it's the same referendum on the same question and once you get into that it's not part of our constitution to have referendums you have a second referendum you have a third referendum you have a fourth referendum where do you stop really informed about the ramifications of this particular decision well if you have a referendum on a yes no basis and you must know this is a broadcast it's very difficult to get a full debate on every single issue it's bad enough during a general election and I think what's being suggested at the moment is a rerun of a yes no referendum I don't think the result would necessarily be any different thank you Michael yesterday we had a very important very very interesting session on the future of the euro and that's why I'm delighted now yield the floor to Nikolas Veron the senior fellow both based in Brussels and Washington DC Nikolas what can you tell us about the state and particularly international role of the euro yes thank you first I have to apologize because I wasn't there yesterday so I hope my remarks will echo bring a complementary perspective the euro has a bad press and generally panels about the euro are about all the problems there is a reason why there is this bad press because the crisis has been very long and protracted we've been through depending on where you put the starting point about a decade of crisis in the eurozone and very bad policy reactions at several critical points so a litany of errors especially in the first few years of the crisis and it also has a bad press for other reasons there is another reason which is a form of confirmation bias in academia a lot of observers of the euro have spent the 90s saying the project wouldn't fly it wouldn't take off when it did take off there was a sense of frustration so there is a temptation for some of the observers to say you know I told you so and let's face it there are also political interests at stake european strength is not is welcomed by some geopolitical actors it's not welcomed by others and therefore the success or failure of the euro becomes part of this more broader international political game what I would like to emphasize very briefly is that the story of the eurozone crisis is certainly a story of policy mistakes and learning frankly but it's also a story of survival and let's remember mid-2012 which I think was the most critical moment of the whole sequence of crisis even so by many aspects the Greek crisis of 2015 was more colorful but in mid-2012 even the most level headed observers could not take it for granted that the euro would not break up and we came probably pretty close to that moment of break up and at the crucial moment of decision which for me was the European summit of late June 2012 the eurozone countries decided to hang together rather than hang separately and I view that as the turning point of the entire sequence of crisis so as even Krastev's political philosopher has mentioned the fact that the eurozone has survived creates legitimacy just out of the sheer act of survival people trust more a construct which has demonstrated its ability to withstand crisis even with mistakes but it's not only that so basically survival creates legitimacy as of itself but it's not only that the eurozone construct is now much stronger than it was at the beginning of the crisis there are two main differences one is the creation of the European stability mechanism which is a kind of big pot of money about 500 billion euro which is far from negligible in lending capacity so that's pretty easy to understand the other thing which is slightly more complicated than more for half way house is a banking union but that makes also a big difference because those who remembers the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty remembers that banking supervision was very actively discussed at the time of Maastricht and in the end it was ruled out because it was considered politically impossible so from this perspective the establishment of the banking union the single supervisor mechanism centered at the European central bank which means that all the financial system in the eurozone eventually comes under a single point of oversight what is the banking system which is the vast majority of the system that is really a big gap being plugged compared with the initial discussion of the creation of the euro now of course the counter argument is Italy look at Italy it's a disaster the eurozone crisis is not resolved nothing has changed I would like to take the point of that view and to say that the current developments in Italy demonstrate precisely how stronger the eurozone is now compared to previous points of the crisis and the first indicator of that and I speak under the control of Josep Borrell is that there is no contagion so spreads on Spain have not risen because of the rise of spreads on Italian debt there has been a bit of rise in Spanish spreads in the recent weeks for Spanish reasons and more generally you don't see the kind of patterns of correlation and contagion that were the rule in previous stages of the crisis and indeed if you compare the Italian government now with the Greek government three years ago or three and a half years ago which is a natural benchmark there was a Greek government who was constantly tying with the threat of exit and the possibility of exit idiosyncrasies of the current Italian government that's not the case so Italian leaders in their rhetoric and I would argue also in their actions are effectively committed to doing a lot of things that I wouldn't necessarily advise but staying in the eurozone and that's a huge difference so basically what I would say about Italy is to paraphrase the poet that Italy has 99 problems but your exit ain't one of them the strength of the eurozone is also observable in the restarting of the cycle of accession Bulgaria has entered a formal process of accession this is likely to be the case of Croatia and Romania pretty soon and even outside of eurozone accession there is a new process of joining the banking union without joining the eurozone which is probably going to be decided in the next two years and possibly later on by Sweden so basically you have the coming together of the EU 27 assuming of course which I do that there is no second referendum and the UK exits the EU as planned and probably on time then you have a greater coincidence between the eurozone, the banking union and the European unions and has been the case until now all EU countries to adopt the euro for example Poland, Hungary are probably not going to adopt the euro under the current leadership but you have an even greater dominance of the eurozone and banking union in the EU construct which I think is also quite important so what about the international role in his speech distributed outside mentioned the fact that the international role of the dollar is probably going to come to an end eventually. Is the euro going to be a substitute? That's an old debate people like Jean-Pizani Ferry who is in the room have contributed to that from a very long ago and it is pretty clear that the European Union is not ready to take the kind of leadership that comes with exorbitant privilege as Valérie Giscard d'Estaing put it famously of being the world's dominant currency Iran is going to be a testing ground of the ability to conduct transactions outside of the dollar zone and outside of the control of the US it's not just a currency issue it's certainly not a swift issue so it's too early to tell and it depends on what attitudes the US administration will take next month so I won't comment too much on this but I will simply say that if the eurozone the single most critical element for future international leadership of the euro is its ability to finish the job of building a single powerful financial system out of the 19 or 27 depending on how you count individual financial systems that we had before the crisis so completing the banking union, building a genuine capital markets union this is what will make or break the international rule of the euro going forward thank you thank you so much thank you Nicolas for giving us the overview of the international role of the euro which you argue is actually contrary to what some might believe is actually quite strong because it has already braced the worst crisis that we had in 2012 and is now prepared for the future currency that if I understand you is here to stay last but not least I'm delighted to welcome here from the French Parliament of course and somebody who knows Europe very well as a former member of the European Parliament Jean-Louis Bourlon Monsieur you have the floor I'm curious about your input I have a privilege I know we don't ask a precise question thank you I would like to talk in a different way that is to say in a more long term is located on a level of a different temporality and then in a more political way and you have talked with great ideas I would like to make a little bit of a political discussion in a few months of the European elections because I think it's interesting to see how Europe is the European project is in relation to our long-term sensitivities and how it presents on the electoral consequences I think the first thing to have in mind is the deeply contradictory character of the evolutions we have faced since the end of the Cold War since the collapse of the Soviet Union we have both a deep rise after a period of disappearance of the threat an absolutely deep rise of all threats which again creates a pressure to the European unification extremely strong Europe has never brought me that during the Cold War and especially during the Second Cold War which preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union and Europe has felt the European Union and felt again as extremely necessary geopolitical threats aggressiveness Soviet aggressiveness Russia sorry American uncertainty Islamic threats economic threats with the emergence of China as we have seen and now from a China really hard it's something different ecological threats with the climate problems with Laurent Fabius and which really gives us the feeling that we can't face all this together we are from this point of view never the phrase of the Gospel of Emmaus it's getting late let's stay together was so strong and then parallel to that we assist to a total total fragmentation of political societies a threat of ideological attacks against the European Union against the Brussels system but I am very struck of the parallel character between the movements of dislocation which is the threat of dislocation which strikes the European Union and the fragmentation of our national society from this point of view Brexit is exemplary we have both a attempt to break the United Kingdom in relation to the European Union and never at the same time the United Kingdom has been working to strengthen such vigorous centrifuges for several years but for several centuries but it's the same thing in Spain obviously with the Catalan we have seen a lot of nations especially those that were made at the initiative of France Belgium, France and England in the 1930s Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia which are either destroyed or threatened by destruction we have everywhere a reply on ethnic values and inside our societies we have a social fragmentation a political fragmentation a generalist party crisis and movements that turn more and more towards the small is beautiful and in France we saw this extraordinary form of political sociability which was the ZAD the Zone to Defend that is to say a few lands around an airport to protect or a center to avoid so we have a general fragmentation and between these two movements these two movements are deeply contradictory one is centripetal it favors the reunification the constitution of a strong union on other basis simply open a more defensive union a Copernican revolution Europe in the middle of nations and not the nations at the heart of Europe and at the same time we have these forces of implosion that nothing goes we have an anti-terrorist reply a protectionist reply an anti-elitist reply and an inability to remove common actions so in front of this we have I think a very deep involvement of the European political game I will define it quite simply by saying first a deep reply and that Emmanuel Macron should be aware of it it seems to me a deep reply of the European progress the European progress is something great we are in our Europe my dear friend Borel we developed it it was both the idea on the economic plan globalization is very good we look at protectionism secondly on the plan of values it is the migratory Europe we have to exchange welcome Europe and on the plan of the political organization what matters is the defense of fundamental rights a very strong corpus a corpus that exists a corpus that is even more powerful especially at the commission but it is even more electrically in a delicate position compared to that you have a conservative tendency what dominates is the conservation we want to preserve the climate we want to preserve our populations and our living modes we want to preserve our living level we want to preserve the euro we want to preserve the security you have all the projects and it is not legitimate the conservatism is legitimate but the projects are conservative including those who are reformers those who are reformers want to reform to preserve the conservatism takes two forms a form change something so everything remains the same it is the mainstream what can we change we have to do more Europe more European control we have to do more solidarity of the euro zone we have to have a much more voluntary and coherent in terms of the fight against climate warming we have to affirm our security to protect us against external threats we have to reinforce the fight against terrorism we have to make our democratic values a whole set of things that leads to a current which is a current that I will actually qualify as reformist euro that is to say both conservative and European and on the side of that we have a conservative reactionary or revolutionary movement that says we can't satisfy all of this all these people bring us to the brink we have to react deeply and there it gives the populist currents with their triple declination identity identity that is to say sovereignist protectionist xenophobic then a current a current egalitarian that is to say we have enough to be directed by elites on all of what we don't want and that is a current in the strict sense of the populist term and finally an authoritarian current democracy it doesn't allow us to fight we have to put the liberalism that is the second trend so the problem is between these three forces that the political game is playing a progressism that has a bit of a plomb in it a conservative Gato Pardis who is looking at the middle class and an ultra-reactionary conservatism the ultra-conservatism so how does it distribute I finish here how can it be distributed on the plan of the European elections the populism the reactionary conservatism is very strong but it is limited because it is revolutionary and therefore it makes the hole and I completely agree that it would not be economically but politically it is an absolute success everyone will be linked to the euro of all the right movements first it started with Cyprus which made a real conversion it was followed by Podemos I speak left on the right it was followed by Gardvilde it is the right the right to the Trichene all those who were in a contestation accepted the euro and so we have a kind of fascination of the anti-European discourse of a part of the populism and at the same time electorally all the projections that are made we have just done a study at the Jagdollor Institute which is quite interesting where we show that the populist movements should flatten around 25% and it would not be a measure to represent a counter-majority second movement the end of the condominium why? because both the right and left are deeply crossed by the progressive left-wing against revolutionary conservatism let's say the social let's say Borel against Mélenchon if I may say the things that way and with a great difficulty for the social democrats to keep their positions a strong pressure on the ideological ploy and on the right side of the PPE it's the same thing the PPE is deeply divided it will keep Orbán it's certain but the essential is to recover Poland if we recover Poland and the elections are not bad from this point of view if we recover Poland the Hungarians will become what they have always been that is to say the most intelligent of the marginals and the most marginals of the intelligent but that's another thing so we have an implosion and so the condominium can no longer work but at the same time the partisan system I forgot in the conservatist values I would like to mention but the ecology finally in the center we will have a system Macron had hoped to do a kind of hegemonic party in the center because the forces are too implausible there are too many conservatists there is no will to go too far and now we have a partisan system which will be extremely complex because it will mix a part of progressism which will remain very strong at the commission whose mainstream will be the conservatist-gathopardist which will be flanked which have for them the logic that is to say if you want to do something in Europe you have to have money so a budget and you have to have institutions therefore of the qualified majority but that's not at all the fashion I finish and you have finally the ecologists all this will build a system which will be in reality quite central which will remain quite central but which will be confused and we can quote in conclusion the true aim of Europe it has always been that of the great Belgian poet Henri Michaud never despair make an advantage very obvious we have 25 minutes left in this particular session and Michael are you giving me the cue that you have to depart? I have to catch an airplane you have to catch an airplane so ladies and gentlemen it's really the airplane it's not symbolic that the UK member is leaving the panel that's not what it is not about the thank you very much very nice to be here thank you Michael we won't overestimate and read into the symbolism of this particular act but we wish you a safe flight back if you will safe flight back Michael if you will you can push up the seat that way it probably looks a bit better on the picture ladies and gentlemen I'm fairly certain that in the midst of these very interesting presentation we'll have an accumulation of some comments remarks and questions if that's the case please indicate so that we can do a very quick Q&A session in the remainder of the time if there are questions please let me know by indicating and I will incorporate you based at this particular point I have a couple of questions on my own Minister Borel the issue of migration obviously and it's become very clear throughout the presentations here on this panel has led to a rise of populism and populist parties throughout EU national parliaments Spain on the other hand despite having gone through some hardship economic hardship itself part of this particular phenomenon there's no significant populist movement in Spain to speak of what do you think the Spanish case is so different I wouldn't say that in Spain we don't have populist movements yes we do we don't have xenophobic reactions we don't have anti-migrants reactions but there are populism that are not like that and that's a good question why does Spain first of all Spain did not receive the number of migrants who received Italy Italians have been abandoned by a European they have asked for help and we the Spanish and the French have looked on the other side while in Spain we did not have this great concentration like in Italy, like in Germany there are two summer now it starts we have almost 40,000 arrived during this year but there would be in the background of the Spanish society a sense of solidarity that is shown every day in the support of migrants in the south in Andalusia maybe because we were a people of migrants maybe because we needed a lot of work maybe because our migration was mainly Latin American and it is much easier to integrate someone who speaks the language and who shares a cultural, religious tradition it is much easier much easier to integrate people from South America than people from Africa, I think it played but in Spain we do not cross our fingers this reaction against migrants, this reaction against foreigners, this idea which is developed in the east of Europe to say we want to be a pure society we refuse migration we close ourselves we do not see migrants and we have had the great failure to try to attribute obligatory quotas in the east it did not work and normally it must not work the desire is deep in society I think this is the most important reason I hope that we will continue to be a land of support and we will continue to have with our neighbors from the north of Africa, Morocco a policy of cooperation that helps us a lot Thank you so much The cooperation obviously when it comes to migration is a very important one Your government particularly its junior partner has been making statements that could be defined and interpreted as xenophobic and anti-refugee anti-migrant issues now the criticism that your government and your junior partner has received in the international sphere is widely known Would you say when we talk about the future of Europe and Austria in particular that there is no danger that Austria is drifting to the right on this particular front Do you think that the concerns that your government has been issuing and voicing these refugees and migrants are very much in place Could you be a bit more specific about your junior partner No about your criticism because I don't understand your question At this particular point the xenophobic sentiments that your junior partner has Can you give me a particular example because I'm not aware of a particular example You're not aware Well I'm German speaking as well To be more specific because you're putting here a very general statement but I would be very keen to have for instance a kind of quotation or something just to be more specific So the proposal for instance to have people of Jewish faith to register is that something that in the news No sorry that's really Is that fake news? No I'm not saying this is fake news but this is something where you're not taking out something that was decided under a previous government in a specific province when it comes to distribution about ordering a certain type of food and this has been something that was decided in a province by a previous government so not by the current government but by the national government you're speaking about the regional government Well then let's put it very bluntly and clear with a very simple yes or no answer You're saying the government the Austrian government is not drifting towards the right Is that what you're saying? Your question was xenophobia So please give me a very specific example about the national government where anybody of us like the Minister of Foreign Affairs because I'm sitting here I'm in charge of foreign affairs can you please give me a very specific example where for instance I have been pronouncing myself as xenophobic The accusation or rather the statement is obviously not directed towards you personally or your particular party On the government But give me a specific example I can give you a specific answer Well obviously I don't have the statements now from your junior partner I'm making now statements and I don't like this kind of just putting accusations into the room so if you're specific I'll give you a specific answer So then let's broaden up because obviously at this particular point you're not comfortable No it's not about comfortable I would like to join here this conference is called World Policy Conference I would like to be specific on global issues But of course the topic that we're discussing here are about some basic strategic European issues So the more you become specific the more I can be also I don't like this kind of you know just general fluffy statement Well let's talk about the specific goals then of Austrian new presidency Let's talk about what Austria is in the midst of contributing to a sound safe and prosperous EU How about that? Yes with glider can answer on that Well wonderful we have come to an agreement Thank you very much specific question, specific answer We are now in the third fourth month of the EU presidency and what I as Minister of Foreign Affairs try in particular and I've briefly referred to it when it comes to Southeast Europe I've spoken about the vacuum that we have in Southeast Europe and where I think that we feel close geography is the constant factor of history as we know a large diaspora of people with Serbian, Kosovo, Albania whatever origin and we have an absence of perspective in particular for the young population there and my first visits all went to Sarajevo, to Belgrade, to Zagreb because it's a region that we know about its importance being surrounded by EU countries and not having the clear cut perspective versus a European future so I fully understand the scepticism and it was my deputy also referred to the European elections in Paris, in the Hague whenever you speak about enlargement in that part of the world you of course have a sceptic I think there is something that should be relativized I will end here with the big difference between the French and the Germans on Europe it's the following it's that in France you won't find the European status quo you will have either people who are against who want to come back or people who want to go further in Germany they are very happy of Europe as it is and if it doesn't work better it's because people don't respect the treaties as they are so there is a difference of approach which is sensible and it explains a little of the disadvantage that you pay to President Macron because he came with the idea of saying to him going forward, well no France takes the feet but Germany and since Maastricht, since the reunification is satisfied of Europe as it is but now Europe is threatened and you will have to leave from the front and keep track because I know we are running out of time Nicolas you are both based in Europe and the US so you have a double perspective if you will on issues now the current US President obviously has made no secret about it that perhaps he doesn't issues and relations with Europe are not his number one priority the relevance of the EU diminishing from where you standing when you are in DC and speaking to your American counterpart is that what you are encountering that Europe is losing in terms of influence and relevance in that part of the world I think there are different time cycles and different issues here in terms of the fact that Europe is not central in how the US looks at the world this has been a long standing trend President Obama was nicknamed the Pacific Presidency that he didn't have a background in Europe he wasn't interested in Europe so nothing very new here clearly the US sees a major security issues in the Middle East and in China the European Union has been seen as low priority simply because it was not a hotspot of problems and that's not the Trump presidency I think the question which is still unresolved like so many questions about the Trump presidency is whether this administration will be aggressively hostile to Europe because what President Trump has said that the European Union was set up to take advantage of the US and to put the US in a difficult position that is unprecedented this is something that no previous president has said so I wouldn't frame it in terms of relevancy relevance I would frame it in terms of is the US going to be aggressive against European integration or is it just a flutter and some things that will go away I think we don't know yet I would say that Europe is actually more relevant in a way because it is more of a counter way to some impulses of the Trump administration certainly in trade or in climate change there was an American administration that it was in a previous certainly under the Obama administration so that creates conflict and conflict creates relevance but we're not it's basically too early to tell Minister Krasil we're almost out of time but I do want to get a sense because when we talk about Europe and this particular panel has been no exception of course the needs for solidarity is always being stressed if you look at the future and talking to your European counterpart such as Minister Borrell what is your sense since we're slowly winding down how optimistic are you about the state of the European Union about the role of the European Union going forward and its relevance in world affairs well what I have always been proud of as a European citizen is that it is built on treaties and just a few days ago in October we had the signing 370 years ago of the Treaty of Westphalia which was in my assessment the beginning of modernity in Europe because it was the beginning of the territorial state it was the beginning of the equality of the sovereigns and also of international laws so everything we have seen in terms of evolving also of multilateralism but Grotsios Richelieu an idealist and a realist one of them who had been drafting to a certain extent the Treaty of Westphalia and later much later that is that for me is what Europe is about normative basis and credibility and here I think in order to remain credible in particular with regard to China it's all about are we complying with our own normative obligations and this leads to what has been stated also when it comes to currency affairs this in my opinion right now in foreign affairs is a lot about the Iran nuclear disarmament treaty the JCPOA a phrase that all of us have studied once upon a time when going into international relations is Pactos on Savander treaties have to be preserved the trust in the end is all about the trust in signatures that we have what Europe has always been standing for so in order to remain credible to be considered a player we have to fulfill our own obligations on a normative level and here going far beyond solidarity because solidarity is a nice catch word but you have to enshrine it into norms and I would like to see and I repeat myself a Europe moving out of this mentality of bean counting the crema sealant that we have the buddha procs that we have here and there and going more into understanding the bigger geopolitical challenges and this I miss on many levels and for that it's a level of humanistic education that sometimes you have backbone and a certain degree of courage and self-confidence and that's how I understand my work as in my current position as EU chair from time to time it's necessary to call it spade as spade courage for rather the desire for a more courageous and self-confident Europe going forward we're going to end this panel the way we started at Minister Borrell I want to give you the opportunity to wrap up this particular session with the very same question of course forward about the future of the European Union the union that your country has been a part of for many decades you also somebody in your role you travel all over the world you talk to people what is the assessment the international assessment of Europe do we still have the means do we still have the influence to be a relevant player in world affairs not as much as needed you know before the EU crisis when I was traveling by South America people asked me you are a success story tell us how we should do in order to repeat your integration process it was before the crisis we were economically booming absorbing a lot of migrants and being something that people were looking at us as something to be followed to be imitated then the crisis came and I think we have lost ten years for many European countries and today we don't make the weight in front of the big big powers that are emerging I think the future of Europe passes through bigger integration stronger integration but not all of the members are ready to do so for them they are not willing not just United Kingdom who is living other countries don't want to integrate better Germany is at their optimum is in a situation where it's very good the situation he has why should Germany change but if you want to have a role in the world if you want to influence the global world then even Germany alone is too small we have to integrate better and more but knowing realistically there is not the will for doing that in many European countries so the key word for me is differentiated integration around the Eurozone and the Schengen zone two track Europe we are ready to track Europe some members share currency others don't share the member states have abolished their borders others they are very much stick to their borders two of the most important characteristics of a state the currency and the border some of us we are sharing it and others we refuse to share it so the differentiated integration is there it's nothing new I'm trying to end on a hopeful and optimistic note but I understand and appreciate your honesty of course about the concerns that you have vis-à-vis Europe particularly with as you've said and I quote you some member states are not ready willing to move this union along now ladies and gentlemen some basic European strategic issues obviously this is a topic that we could have gone on for the next 2-3 hours a topic that will be with us for a very long time because I think that much has become clear throughout the very passionate and eloquent statements here Europe will have a place and will have a role to play in role affairs whether I would like to or not the question is of course in what scope size and capacity ladies and gentlemen John Louis Boulange please join me in thanking them thank you so much