 In that case, we would now like to officially start. Welcome. Hello. Thanks for joining us this evening for our event with the title, a strategic compass for Europe's return to power politics, online study representation and discussion. Welcome to all of you. Thank you very much for joining tonight our study launch and discussion as strategic compass for Europe's return to power politics. This meeting will be in German most of the times, but we have English translation ready for you. You find the interpretation button down there in the zoom taskbar and then you can choose the English channel for English interpretation. At that point, already big thank you to our two interpreters, Babette Siebel and Leon Kassmann for being our interpreters tonight and providing interpretation. All right, I'll continue in German then. My herzlich willkommen. Right. Welcome. Thanks for joining us. As I said, if you want to listen to the event in English, do feel free to use the English channel. My colleague Louise Schmidt this year this evening too, in case there are any technical difficulties or issues, do feel free to write to Louise directly in order to hopefully solve any potential issues you may have. I'm very pleased to welcome us in demirel. She's a member of the left party in the European Parliament. She's a spokesperson for labor market, peace and security policy, and she is one of the most important left critical voice when it comes to the militarization and military cooperation at a level. I'm very pleased that you have taken the time to join our discussion this evening. I'd also like to welcome Jochen Wagner. He works for the Office for militarization IMI and has published a number of articles relating to security policy 2018 with Claudia Haeter. You released a book about Europe and its past towards militarization. And you are also the author of the study we're going to be discussing this evening. The study with the title as strategic compass for Europe's return to power politics. In the study, he criticizes the approach, provides an analysis, explains what the intentions of the compass are and says a few things about European autonomy and then also explains why we are missing an opportunity. The study is available in English and German on our website and the link to the study can be found in the chat. Our event this evening is taking place in very busy days. The Russian war in Ukraine hasn't finished yet and it's quite hard to keep track of all of the developments at a European and national level. The EU has delivered 2 billion euros of weapons. Denmark has decided to participate in European defense policy. Sweden and Finland want to join NATO and Emmanuel Macron, the French president, spoke about the future of an arms economy. That's only a small snippet of the current developments at a European level. We also have a continuing food crisis and the Swedish Institute Cyprus on Monday in its report warned of the dangers of a European war. So there's a lot to do when it comes to multilateral cooperation, disarmament, and when it comes to exiting the escalation spiral. But as Jurgen explains in a study, the EU is going down another path with the strategic compass and I very much look forward to hearing more about this from Jurgen and to gain a better overview of what is currently happening in the EU. Jurgen, before you commence, perhaps a few words about our agenda. Jurgen Wagner is now going to present this study. Then Islam Demir is going to take the floor after which we'll have a joint discussion. And I would very much like to invite you to directly ask your questions. Feel free to post your questions into the chat. Once we have the open discussion, feel free to raise your hand. You will find the symbol for that by clicking on reactions and then you can raise your hand after which we'll gladly give you the floor. We're going to be recording the first part of our event and we'll publish it on our YouTube site. As soon as the discussion starts, we'll stop the recording. The discussion itself won't be recorded and also won't be published. That's it for me. Hopefully I haven't left anything important out. If I have, do let me know. And without further ado, I look forward to hearing to Jurgen Wagner's report. Thank you very much. I'll briefly upload the presentation. Hopefully this is going to work. First of all, thank you very much for your interest in the topic. This strategic compass, unfortunately, has somewhat been lost in the current news also because of the Ukraine war and all the terrible effects. Nevertheless, I believe that it is extremely important to deal with it. There are a lot of expectations as to the strategic compass on a political level on the 25th of March when the compass was adopted. Well, a few days later, Josep Borrell said that Europe now finds itself in a new era and has to learn to speak the words of power politics and that the compass is a tool in order to put this into practice. So it is a document that relates to power and to military might. If I take a look at the compass, it provides three things. First of all, it ensures that a concept is developed with regards to armaments planning in the European Union. Either two, we had a number of non-corresponding elements in this regard. Secondly, it ensures that civil aspects of foreign policy from my perspective are becoming increasingly marginalised. And thirdly, in my viewpoint, it provides an overview as to how Europe wants to set itself up in the global competitive landscape. Of course, the study talks about this in greater detail. If you take a look at the strategic process, well, then at the top level, we have the EU global strategy from 2016, which determines general goals and interests of the European Union, especially with regards to the strategic autonomy, but also speaks of interests and free trade routes, etc. But it lacks specificity. And then we have the military headline goals with the goal for the European Union to have two battle groups of 5,000 troops ready to be deployed. As I said, little is said here with regards to what is happening at the top level, rather what has been determined at the top level. But then at the lowest level, we have a translation with three mechanisms that were brought to life in 2017. First of all, priorities. For this, there's a process called CDPN card, where it is determined what cross-border armaments projects are to be implemented. These are then implemented in the so-called PESCO. And such projects are then financed by the European Defence Fund, the EDF. That's the attempt at the very lowest level to be able to implement these projects. Now, the most important thing of the European global strategy is the top goal of obtaining strategic autonomy. And this can be split into three areas, starting with the political autonomy, with regards to decision-making processes, when it comes to military deployments or armament projects. Then we also have the operative autonomy, which can be defined as the capacity to have the ability to have military deployments. And then we also have the industrial autonomy, which is the ability to equip the military with your own production. Because of course, if you get your arms from abroad, you're not autonomous. So these are the three pillars that make up the strategic autonomy. And they are now to be operationalised by the strategic compass. So the goal for the strategic compass is to close a gap. The aim is to be more precise, to determine the threats, to then think about what means are required. But it's also about updating the military headline goal and for this to be the foundation for the future policy of the European Union. And that in itself allows for this armament process to come about. That's the aim. Now we've been dealing with this compass for quite an amount of time. The debate started early. The actual work started in the second half of 2020 under the German presidency. And then on March 25th, under the French presidency, the strategic compass was finalised. Now let's take a look at the time frame. It's foreseen for the next five to ten years when the most relevant decisions had to be taken. It starts with an analysis of the threats, which kind of updates the 2016 document. But then what is rather unusual for such a document, it goes into a number of detailed suggestions also linked to specific timings. That is perhaps due to the case that the European Union had hitherto taken a number of decisions that then weren't implemented on a member state level. The text should have been finished in February. We all know what happened on February 24th. After that, it was subject to a number of revision phases in order to do justice to the new circumstances. This almost solely happened with regards to the threat analysis and less so when it comes to the resulting suggestions. Now this threat analysis, which is the foundation of the compass, is confidential. So it is subject to confidentiality. Nevertheless, it is clear that what was published in the compass in the end found its way into this. The most important trait of this compass already ahead of February 20, 2021 is a stress of return to power politics, where the European Union needs to find the right response, which in turn means more military capacities. Ahead of the 18th of February, ahead of that 24th of February, this analysis was somewhat dispersed after the 24th of February, after the invasion of Russia. It was revised, and this meant that basically everything was kept as it is, but with an additional sentence, I need to do this because of Russia. Libya, Syria, Central African Republic, O'Malley, already before the 24th of February, these were defined as important to European interests. After the 24th of February, this stayed in this way, but then it was added that because Russia is present there now, we need to be very decisive in our actions. And that is something to be found all over the document. Everywhere we look, it says, because of Russia, we need a spatial strategy for defence, again, because of Russia, or we need to improve strategic communication, etc., etc. That's the principle of the mechanism of the current document at hand. Now, the most important capacity proposal in this compass is one that was also discussed in the wider public. Some of you might have heard about this, and that's the proposal to set up a new military intervention or reaction force in August 2021. Josep Borrell already alluded to this, speaking about Afghanistan according to the compass. The proposal is for a rapid deployment capacity to be created with up to 5,000 troops, and it was added here with all of the required strategic enablers This is an aspect where there are still things lacking and of course requires a lot of money as well. The setup of these troops that just started this year and the process is to be finished by 2025. Germany has already offered to provide the core, even though it's not quite clear what core actually means. This is something that we will probably find out in the next months and years. These rapid deployment forces are to have improved reaction times and therefore be better prepared for potential attacks. It was also mentioned that because of what happened in Afghanistan, it is important to be able to react and evacuate. And it also says something about stabilization deployments, which related to Afghanistan, but also to what happened in Mali. So basically we're speaking about much bigger troops and the battle groups which have also been deployed in the year or abroad of the European Union. Another difficulty that was mentioned is that the battle groups have not yet been used. And it was explained that the decision mechanisms didn't work very well. That such a military intervention must be agreed upon within the framework of the European Union from all the members you need consent. And you can also veto such intervention. So it's very difficult to actually reach the consensus. Now, that is something which is supposed to be changed by the compass. More specifically, there should be more flexibility brought about in the decision-taking process by A. For example, referring to Article 44 of the treaty and use simply those partners who are willing to cooperate. So not everybody needs to join forces. And also Article 31 of the TFEU can be referred to in order to facilitate a constructive abstention by certain member states. And thus come up with a coalition of the willing member states willing to actually intervene in a military way. And only if one-third of the member states who at least represent one-third of the population of the European Union abstain constructively then a decision on a military intervention of the European Union could no longer be brought about. So they're simply trying to put some order into the military responses. Everything is being described now in the strategic compass for up to 2023. But certainly the smaller member states have not really been reckoned with adequately. Another thing that is being considered in the compass is enlarging of the military compass, of the military planning in actual fact. This is something that was first initiated in June 2017 but was simply limited to 1,500 soldiers. A military and strategic planning, however, would allow to build troops up to the brigade size in order to allow for a rapid response capacity. And until 2025 this process is to be terminated in order to have an almost autonomous brigade. This is simply the operative arm of military cooperation. At the same time, however, the strategic compass also announces that the military planning objective will be revised up until 2023 and perhaps the rapid response capacity will go beyond the 5,000 soldiers. The overall planning objective would then become the main guideline for a further expansion of all the military cooperation and would be the basis for the greater military project in the European Union. That at least is the intention that was formulated. Beyond that, the compass also looks at the armament and industrial armament processes and projects going on between France and Germany, for example, drones which will be delivered up until 2029 but also new fighter aircrafts will come about and they will probably be delivered even later. They will also be developed, these products will be developed within the framework of the PESCO and will also receive funding from the European Defence Fund. These are really projects that go far beyond the rapid response capacity which are sort of of medium intensity. These will be more far-reaching strategic military objectives and will allow for the European armament industry to produce these military goods rather than buying them from the United States. The strategic compass also envisages higher military expenses. Rather concrete objectives in this regard are being set. The investment quota for the armament budget, for example, is being considered. And a rather far-reaching project is also to exempt future armament projects from the value-added tax. That should start at the beginning of 2023. The Council, however, on the 30th of May already decided that it should be allowed that defence consortia may be built for the procurement of armament and of weapons and military goods over the long term. And such expenses would actually be that exempt. Sixty individual proposals are contained in the compass. I've simply picked out those which I consider the most important. But let me return to another question. Why does the European Union now strive for autonomy in the military area and what does that do to the relationship with the United States? For example, the compass tries to bring those two sides together that the strategic autonomy will always only be an add-on to NATO and therefore not jeopardise the good relationships. That's, however, only partly true when you look at the measures that are envisaged in the compass. And it's quite interesting to look at one of the EU think tanks of the ISS that looked in 2018 at some of the major criteria. That must be considered a strategic autonomy can be looked at and rapprochement to the United States. You would then not become fully autonomous. You would not build up your own capacities, really. You would be buying up everything from the United States, which might probably be less expensive than developing it yourself. And it would all take place within the framework of NATO, more or less. And the second possibility would be the hedging. And that would mean that you achieve a partial autonomy, still cooperate with the United States. But perhaps if the relationship between us and the United States was to deteriorate, look at the experience that we had with Trump, then you could switch to full autonomy. So first of all, a partial autonomy which allows for lower intensity and semi-intensive interventions. And the last criterion would be a full autonomy, planning your own interventions and responses and being totally independent in taking on and using your own nuclear capacities, for example, with expenses of up to 2% of the national budgets. There are certainly some projects underway which will take longer in development, but they could probably be concluded more rapidly if the relationship with the United States was to deteriorate. The United States, for the time being, are a firm partner of the European Union. In my view, this is a fatal development, because if you look at the compass, then you find very little of what the European Union in 2012 really had going for it when it received the Nobel Peace Prize. Many of those core values are no longer there, like, for example, disarmament, non-proliferation, things like that. That's all been reduced to just a bare half page. And then there are no more time frames, no more objectives clarified or identified for moving towards further disarmament. So apparently now the interest and the focus has been switched completely, and therefore the compass really initiates a complete armament process and that goes a long way to explain what Borel already announced by speaking the language of the power. Everything that was done with the view to the reaction to the Ukraine invasion was really more or less geared to measures that allowed to the defense and to deliver weapons, but not really to seek peace. So that is the very fast track forward in this study. I think I gave you a broad overview on the study itself. Of course it looks much more into detail into all the questions that I just briefly mentioned. Thank you very much, Jürgen. Thank you for the presentation and for your assessment. I think that is rather fascinating. I already have quite a few questions in my head and for all of those who've joined us, I would like to invite you to enter your questions on Jürgen's presentation in the chat because we will certainly be returning to them later on. So please insert them there. Then I would like to inform all of those who are English speaking. Here's PowerPoint. You can find them in the study link is in the chat on the pages 8, 16 and 30. There you find the crafts on strategic autonomy and also one of the last charts that Jürgen shared. I find them really informative and a really good overview. Check them out in the study and sorry that we could only provide them in German for now. Now the question has been put to us whether the presentation of Jürgen will be shared with us. I take that as a given. Yes, I can see Jürgen nodding his head. Very well then. I would now like to give the floor to Erzlem. Jürgen, perhaps you could finish your screen sharing and Erzlem now has the floor and give us her view on the presentation of the study and on things evolving at the European level. Thank you very much. Excellent. Thank you very much, Jürgen. I think that Jürgen gave an excellent overview on the strategic compass. I don't really want to go into any further details here, but I would like to move to the political topics and much rather and perhaps come back to some of the points that Jürgen already mentioned. He's talked of the threats assessment which is not available for the members of parliament and I would like to share my personal experience with you on precisely that. The fact is that my colleagues in the German parliament at the time asked whether they could have access to the threat assessment which was of elementary importance for the drafting of the compass and the federal government said that no, unfortunately nobody could view the threat analysis because it was drafted at the European level and not by the Federal Republic of Germany and therefore the German government couldn't and parliament could not take any official decisions on it and that is why I asked Mr Borel, being a Vice-Chair of the Committee on Security, could we please have a look at it because it was the basis for the strategic compass and the commission replied no, unfortunately not because the information contained in the threat analysis is information that was provided by the individual member states. Why do I tell you this? Well because we tend to think that the European Union has some democratic principles and some shared values and so on and so forth and perhaps we also look together at the defence and the security issues and the policy and perhaps we overcome some of the problems in our own countries but this precise experience with really having access to all the information leaves me to believe that unfortunately we don't get more transparency and more of a democratic participation. I think that's very obvious from what I just reported to you. Now Jürgen said that the strategic compass was redrafted. The Russian Federation in violating international law attacked Ukraine and of course we denounced the aggression against Ukraine and I would have thought that this would really lead the European Union to stop and to reconsider but unfortunately in the strategic compass nothing else but those concrete proposals were still there. I mean they were not amended. The only thing that was added was the threat analysis which was limited to saying that Russia constitutes a threat to our security and this again is ample proof of the fact that the European Union or rather the European Commission and the member states used this in order to argue for a rearmament of our forces because of course the general public is normally rather skeptical when the discussion is started about spending more on the defence budget and expending armament projects but the objectives have now really been defended by this aggression of Russia against Ukraine. The strategic compass really is an exercise of bundling a lot of expenses and projects in order to achieve a European defence union. I prefer the term military union because we're not really talking about the capacity to defend ourselves. It really is the central objective of building up the military power. Now the strategic compass may probably also serve to go over a few values and objectives that were very important during the face of the founding of the European Union and which have always prevailed. The idea at the time was to become political and an economic power but this is being brushed off now. The unanimity rule which really was of fundamental importance for the European Union for the enlargement of the union for example it was a very important element or aspect for the smaller member states. All these things are slowly but surely being considered an obstacle and should be done away with in my party. Of course we have had huge debates about the rule of unanimity but the rules under which we normally operate mean centrally that France and Germany almost on their own can decide if we don't have the principle of unanimity. They could for example veto certain responses or interventions because they are the biggest member states with the largest number of European citizens and they would only have to look for one or two other partners and the smaller member states would simply have no say any longer and the military capacities of the huge members of the European Union are to be optimized. They must be adaptable and in the best case then EU armament projects will be pushed along and expended and the weapons or the military goods produced under these projects are to be sold to the member states. Big member states like the Federal Republic and France already have a big weapons industry or armament military industry which of course has a very strong lobby so big projects are being drawn up which would allow for quite a different way of waging wars and preparing us for a war situation and those joint possibilities of the member states and of the European Union would probably provide very new generations of weapons and military goods. Mrs. von der Leyen said quite a while ago that we are living in times of huge competition between those superpowers and the European Union is part and parcel of this game and in her speech at the time she said it was in 2021 that the European Union was not only part of this competition but that it will also have to show its own capacity and its willingness to actually implement its own military and strategic wishes and have to master the the power and the strategic compass is very much based on PESCO and the militarisation of the European Union is continuously growing. We have adopted budget lines which are completely new at the European level which will expand the military capacities of the European Union they are going to be carried forward the political possibilities will also be enhanced like for example revising the principle of unanimity and the European Union should be willing and capable of entering into such conflicts. Mr Borrell is already considering how the European Union can spend more on military capacities because in the past the population at large and also the members of parliament were rather critical about huge military expenses and I remember when President Zelensky came to the European Parliament and Mr Borrell in great speech here the irony and you were not willing to spend more funds on it in the future we will be spending more in order to finance the military capacity so this is already an announcement of enlarging the military budget and it's it's already happening not in the Europe not only in the Federal Republic of Germany but also in other countries the defence budget lines are being increased and of course there's a huge competition on the new markets and competition around the resources everyone wants to enlarge their military capacities and I have to say I am very fearful I am afraid of the the danger of the of the threat of another war and that might be the consequence of all of these individual steps that we are taking right now I am very much in favour of an autonomy and a strategic autonomy but we're not talking about a strategic autonomy we're talking about military capacities and we need to strongly criticise that and reject it