 The purpose of this hearing is to examine the current state of the United States foreign policy in the Sahel. The Chair announces that he may recess the Committee at any point without objection, so ordered. I now recognize myself in an opening statement. The Sahel region of Africa is undeniably in crisis and has become the global hotspot for Islamist extremism. In 2022, the region accounted for 43 percent of global terrorism deaths, up from 1 percent in 2007. Only one out of every three people who call this region home need humanitarian assistance. Rule of law is floundering, and there have been no fewer than seven military power grabs since 2020. Russia has exploited this instability primarily through the Wagner Group to gain geopolitical influence, expand access to the de-dollarized assets like gold mines and pressure NATO's southern flank. At the same time, United Nations-led peacekeeping missions are failing to deliver while anti-French sentiments driven by missteps in French policies and magnified by adversaries have created a crisis of confidence about Paris' future role and policy toward the region. We have seen that a military response alone will not address counterterrorism, democratic backsliding, and rising anti-Western sentiment. We must have a strong coordinated U.S. response that appropriately balances our diplomatic development and defense efforts to build partner countries' capacity to address the root causes of their growing list of problems. We know that retrenching and isolationist policy will not make these problems go away. In fact, it will make them worse, which is why I've called this hearing today to speak about the increasingly dire situations in Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Sudan is perhaps the most concerning country in Africa now. Conflict has raged for seven months, and U.S. diplomatic efforts have consistently proven unable to curb the fighting. Many prominent media and Sudan experts have warned that genocide has returned to the Darfur region, where survivors have reported mass slaughter, murdered babies, and kill lists. The world is watching to see if the United States will stand by as Al-Fashir, the only capital city in Darfur not yet captured by the RSF, becomes a site of refuge or slaughter. I note the announcement yesterday of sanctions against Bashir-era Islamists, who have contributed to Sudan's destabilization, but am concerned that they do not appear to be part of a strategic framework. Sanctions are effective only as a means to clearly articulate it in goal and are not sufficient policy in and of themselves. The administration must articulate a clear and coherent policy. It is not enough simply to issue periodic statements of condemnation as to how its current actions are contributing positively to achieving a return of civilian rule and end fighting in Sudan. Fragility in Shad is creating hard-bed fellows for the DB government and internal fissures within the ruling Zagawas. Despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, Shad hosted 1.3 million forcibly displaced persons as of September 2023. Reports suggest that United Arab Emirates is using an airfield in eastern Shad to funnel weapons and supplies to RSF, who are direct evolution of the Jangerweed militias from Darfur genocide 20 years ago. The palace coup and Niger, caught everyone by surprise, and the current leadership in Niami appears struck. Unable to move forward and credible solutions that would see sanctions relief allow safe relief of the democratically elected leader, Mohammed Bosum, and instead is looking to Moscow for solutions. Just yesterday, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, Niami, signing a military cooperation agreement among Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The junta and Mali has doubled down on reliance in Wagner in Russia following the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country. The junta kicked out peacekeepers following an investigative report detailing a massacre that took place by the Malayan Russian personnel in August 2023. Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN sanctions program for Mali, which focused on the conflict in the north. Jihadists in Mali have almost doubled the territory they control in Mali in less than a year. This sows the seas for emergence of Islamic state that exercises territorial control over West Africa. Burkina Faso experienced two military coups in 2022. Successive governments have been unable to contain the spread of violence by insurgents affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic state. In November 2023, Burkina Faso upgraded its relationship with Russia, and 20 Russian soldiers arrived in the country. Russia's growing entrenchment across the Sahel and Africa as a whole is extremely concerning, testing Western influence on several fronts. I have yet to see a comprehensive strategy from this administration to combat Russia's influence and address the shortcomings of our economic and diplomatic tools. I would like to thank the witnesses for their appearance today and for their frank assessment of the security vacuum that is being filled by our adversaries in these countries. The descent into chaos in the Sahel is far from over, and there is urgency to develop a comprehensive approach to stabilizing the region, not just containing it. Chairman I will recognize a ranking member, a congresswoman from California, Ms. Jacobs, for any statements you may have. Thank you Chairman James and Assistant Secretary Fee, Assistant Secretary Gwallander and Mr. Jenkins for testifying before the subcommittee today on US policy in the Sahel region. The past few years have shown that US policy and that of the international community towards the Sahel region have come up short. We've seen a string of coups and democratic backsliding across the Sahel region and the broader continent, including in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. As a result, over 4 million people have been displaced in the Sahel alone, adding to global migration levels while the climate crisis and violence continue to affect food crops and food prices. And we have started to see insurgent violence spread its way toward the coastal West African states, particularly Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo, which are working to secure their northern borders and address vulnerabilities to violent extremism. It is clear the United States needs to prioritize this region of the world, which is why I'm so focused on the implementation of the Global Fragility Act and the resulting 10-year strategy to prevent conflict in coastal West Africa. We know that a key driver of violent extremism is lack of responsive governance. In many places that have experienced coups, young and marginalized populations don't feel like they have a voice in their governments and aren't properly represented. This is especially important on the African continent, where young people are the majority. Africa has the youngest population in the world, with 70% of sub-Saharan Africa under the age of 30. So we need to make sure that national, regional, and international government responses to violent extremism address governance instead of prioritizing a security first response. Too often, security forces have responded with a heavy hand and caused civilian harm, which only fuels underlying grievances against the state more. I saw this when I worked at the State Department. Security forces, abuses, and human rights violations are some of the biggest drivers of violent extremism. So as we provide support to security forces working to address violent insurgents and secure their borders, we need to emphasize human rights and professionalization. With thoughtful implementation, the Global Fragility Act has the power to modernize our foreign policy and center conflict prevention and peacebuilding into the heart of our strategy. But one of the biggest tactics that we can't overlook in addressing conflict is the importance of locally led peace building and development. Working in people who are involved and most affected by violent conflict to create solutions is the most effective, efficient, and equitable way to do development and conflict-related work. We need to empower local people, not tell them what to do, and perpetuate harmful cycles of colonialism. And this is increasingly relevant in light of the Civil War in Sudan, where young people have led the democracy movement and heroically stepped in to provide for their communities when the international community has been unable to operate. Even before the fighting started, 16 million people were already in need of aid. Many civilians lacked the basics for life, food, water, shelter, medicine, and security, while SAF and RSF continue hostilities and make clear that they are not serious about peace. I'm glad to see the Biden administration designate three former Bashir officials for their role in threatening peace, security, and stability in Sudan, but let's be clear, more is needed to bring this war to an end and enable a viable pathway to peace and democracy for the Sudanese people. I'm horrified by the mass atrocities committed by the RSF, particularly in Darfur but also in Khartoum, and look forward to hearing from the administration on what they're doing to prevent further atrocities, hold the RSF accountable, and recognize these atrocities for what they are. It is also clear there is more pressure the United States can bring to bear on the UAE and its role in providing weapons to the RSF, violating the UN arms embargo and enabling mass atrocities. Any path to peace in Sudan must be inclusive, credible, and transparent, and I hope to hear more from the administration today on a strategy to meet these standards. So I'm looking forward to hearing from you all today about the path for the U.S. policy in Sahel and Sudan, and especially how the U.S. can work with local communities to create long-term peace, stability, and security. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Ranking Member. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel witnesses before us here today. Once again, the Honorable Mali Fee is the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. The Honorable Celeste Wallender is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Rob Jenkins is the Assistant to the Administrator in the Bureau for Conflict Prevention Stabilization and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Thank you each for being here today. Your full statements will be made a part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks for five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Assistant Secretary Fee for opening statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jacobs. We appreciate this opportunity to, together, the 3Ds discuss the Sahel and other issues of concern. As you know, the Biden-Harris Administration recognizes Africa as a major geopolitical force and seeks to be a partner on shared values and interests. The recent coups in the Sahel can be attributed to the enormous challenges facing the region, notably a tradition of weak democratic governance, an acute terrorist threat, insufficient economic and educational opportunities for the region's young population, and climate-related water and land shortages, which lead to conflict over resources and contribute to food insecurity. We also know that Africa is disproportionately affected by upheaval in the global world order. When similar global disruptions occurred for example in the 1960s and the 1990s, civil wars and coups proliferated then. Today, the ongoing destabilizing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war in Ukraine, the surge in climate shocks, and the global contest between democracies and authoritarian regimes, these are driving instability in Africa. While each country in the Sahel is unique, we assess weak governance as the core vulnerability that opens the door to poor choices by military leaders and malign actors like the Wagner Group. We are adapting our response to these coups to promote responsive governance. For example, following the July military coup in Niger, we suspended nearly 140 million in security assistance programs, more than 300 million in our MCC compact and our security cooperation. To bolster the regional African body known as ECOWAS, which shares our alarm at the proliferation of coups, we are actively supporting their negotiations with the Hunta in Niger by enabling them to leverage our assistance to craft actionable terms for a democratic transition timeline and for the release of former President Bazoum. The objective is to employ the prospect of resumed U.S. assistance to demonstrate that embracing the path to democracy is in Niger's interest. And we remain steadfast in our support for the people in Niger by maintaining our humanitarian health and essential food programming. Mali and Burkina Faso are challenging cases, as you both noted. In Mali, prospects for the return of democracy are increasingly grim as the Wagner-supported transitional government, once again, has chosen to delay elections and is forcefully seeking to exert control in Northern Mali. The deterioration in security, the rise in civilian casualties, and the exploitation of the country's natural resources illustrate convincingly the dangers of the Wagner role. Burkina Faso faces a dramatic security in human rights crisis. We are urging the Burkinaabe to employ a counter-terrorism strategy that prioritizes civil security institutions. We know an overly militarized approach to counter-terrorism, like the one adopted in Mali, is bound to fail. To address Burkina's ongoing political instability, we are pressing for a democratic transition in line with a publicly declared timeline. In Chad, we are pushing the transitional government to adhere to its transitional timeline and to preserve political space for opposition and civil society groups so they can freely participate in next year's election. As Chad confronts surging refugee flows from Sudan, we are mobilizing humanitarian support to minimize the resulting security risks. To promote good governance, we have eagerly embraced the tool Congress provided us with the Global Fragility Act. Drawing on those resources, we are acting to help insulate neighboring countries in coastal West Africa, vulnerable to democratic backsliding. As we support our African partners in navigating these challenges, we believe leading with our values will best support our national security strategy. I want to turn to a topic that is of grave concern to us all, the military conflict in Sudan, which threatens to destroy the unity of the country and destabilize the region. The escalating violence, especially attacks by the RSF and Darfur have included, as you know well, mass killings, ethnic targeting of non-Arab communities, widespread rape and obstruction of humanitarian aid. By their actions, the two forces have disqualified themselves from a role in governance and demonstrated there is no acceptable military solution to the conflict. Following the inspirational 2019 overthrow of the military led by a broad-based popular movement, there have been two serious attempts to achieve a civilian-led transitional government through a joint negotiation process between civilian and military leaders. Twice, the security forces have trampled on these democratic aspirations. First, in October, 2021, when the military conducted a takeover and second in April, 2023, when they went to war. As a result of these hard lessons, Sudanese civilians now seek to negotiate among themselves to resume and complete the democratic transition. These discussions are taking place in Addis Ababa with our active support. The conflict in Sudan is too big for any one country or any single platform to resolve. Our diplomacy is based on close coordination with African, regional, and international partners to build on our comparative strengths and those of our partners. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Feeb, that your time has expired. In the interest of time, I now recognize Assistant Secretary Wollander for her opening statement. Chairman James, ranking member Jacobs, members of the committee, thank you for having me here today to discuss the situation in the Sahel and Niger in particular, as well as the continuing importance of U.S. presence, operations, and security force assistance to our African partners. Security in the Sahel has steadily declined since the Libyan crisis of 2011. Violent extremist organizations, VEOs affiliated with both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have taken advantage of weak governments and failed states. These VEOs have overstretched the defense and security forces of many regional governments and carved out safe havens to progressively expand their operational reach. This has allowed these VEOs to expand their influence and operations towards the literal countries along the Gulf of Guinea. The Department of Defense's strategy focuses on two main lines of effort. In the short and medium term, we will support African-led counterterrorism operations to disrupt the most acute terrorist threats with a particular emphasis on those targeting U.S. interests. In the long term, we will emphasize bilateral security assistance to African defense and security forces in order to build their own homegrown capacity to counter these threats without excessive external assistance. Over the last three years, significant changes in the political environment in the Sahel have affected our ability to work with both African and international partners. Successive military coups in Mali in 2020, in Burkina Faso in 2022, and now in Niger in 2023 have resulted in restrictions on DOD's operations and assistance programs. Other international allies and partners have also reconsidered their presence in the region, requiring us to reevaluate our own posture. We remain concerned that these developments will provide more space for VEOs to operate and make it more challenging to address those threats. VEOs survive and thrive in areas of instability and seek to leverage that instability for their own ends as evidenced by the attacks we have seen in Niger since the coup. Within this context, our strategic competitors have seized the opportunity to increase their own access and influence. Russia has been particularly active in stoking anti-Western sentiment and presenting its military contractors or Russian private military companies, PMCs, such as the Wagner Group, as practical alternatives to Western trainers. We are at a crossroads. On one level, on the one hand, we cannot afford to ignore the sustained challenge to democracy by military junta's, nor turn a blind eye to their misuse of power. As Secretary Austin noted during his recent trip to Africa, when generals overturn the will of the people and put their own ambitions above the rule of law, security suffers and democracy dies. We also cannot afford to compromise our regional influence and security partnerships, which are threatened by competitors who are less concerned with democratic values and human rights and threatened by the fragility of Sahel States. There is also a significant risk that VEOs might expand their influence or capabilities in the region if counterterrorism pressure remains at reduced levels. Given this elevated threat environment, the Department of Defense is committed to working with our interagency partners to continue to monitor and disrupt the EO threats emanating from the Sahel while constructively engaging with regional states to restore productive democratic governance in those countries. In doing so, we are consistently working to strike a balance between offering the practical assistance that our African partners need to face emergent threats while reinforcing our professional values to help them build strong resilient institutions that will reinforce not only their physical security but their democratic stability. Our success depends on continued investment in West Africa. To do this, we must maintain some continuity with past efforts while adjusting our approach to reflect changes in the environment as well as the actions of our African partners, international allies and partners, and strategic competitors. DoD's requirement to monitor indications and warnings of VEO activity in the Sahel and prevent threats to U.S. interests emanating from the region has not changed. For the last 10 years, our posture in Niger has proven critical to this effort. Moving forward, we have worked side by side with the Department of State and other interagency partners to define conditions for restoring our activities and partnership in Niger. Nigerian officials must quickly and credibly transition back to a democratically elected civilian government. Thank you, Madam Assistant Secretary. Mr. Jenkins, I now recognize you for your opening statement. Thank you for inviting me to testify and for your support of this vital region whose peace and stability is deeply intertwined with that of the United States and of the world. To address the root causes of violence and conflict in the Sahel, we need to support peaceful transitions back to democracy and lay the foundations for improving governance and building trust between citizens and their governments. Improved governance is critical to promoting stability. It is as important to focus on the delivery of basic services as it is to focus on inclusive, fair, and transparent institutions and political processes. Democracy needs to deliver. For example, in Mali, USAID works with local governments on the development of community plans for water, sanitation, and hygiene and ensures that local civil society participates in planning. The region's population is among the youngest in the world. Youth can be champions of democracy and reinvigorate economies or can serve as foot soldiers for extremist organizations and further destabilize the region. This will be determined by their education, agency, and opportunities. When youth can seek an education and gain the skills they need for life and work, they can build more hopeful and prosperous futures. The US has been the third largest contributor to the global partnership for education, a multilateral organization providing education services in several countries across the Sahel. To build trust and good governance, USAID works with people in country who are most impacted. We can't solve the problems in the Sahel alone. We're working with communities on the ground and with other bilateral, multilateral, and private sector partners, such as the re-energized stabilization leaders forum. We're seeking solutions by integrating our efforts more strategically across the US government with long-term shared goals. This is the paradigm shift that Congress envisioned in the Landmark Global Fragility Act and Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability. We've developed 10-year whole-of-government plans that are guiding our development, diplomacy, and defense in five partner geographies, including Libya and coastal West Africa, a country and a region inextricably linked to the Sahel. Peace and stability in the Sahel requires bringing peace and stability to Libya, which is served as a source of and destination for weapons and armed fighters. The 10-year plan in Libya is working in the southern part of the country to increase legal economic opportunity, invest in community advocacy to counter militia influence, and build local capacity to deliver public services to Libyans. Much of our work under this innovative strategy is concentrated in critical northern regions of coastal West Africa that border the Sahel. This includes a joint US-German initiative, the Coastal States Stability Mechanism, which leverages shared funding and partners with local communities. Through it and other USAID programs, we're hearing directly from communities about what they need. Based on community feedback in Togo, for example, we partnered to build a new bridge, a youth center, and a community radio station to improve economic opportunities in disconnected towns, foster a sense of belonging, and promote access to credible information. We are grateful for the congressional leadership and vision to pass the Bipartisan Global Fragility Act. Congress can continue to lead us in realizing this vision by enacting legislative reforms to reduce bureaucratic challenges and help us work across the US government to address root causes and prevent conflict before it starts. We must continue to work creatively with people in the Sahel. We must support timely democratic transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Guinea, and Mali, so that critical political, social, economic, and governance reforms can be realized to reduce corruption, prevent further democratic erosion, and rebuild a social contract. None of this work will take root without strengthening and expanding the role of African institutions in balancing regional threats and opportunities. The US is improving its coordination to increase burden sharing and synchronization across development, humanitarian, and peace-building programming while also countering propaganda and disinformation from strategic competitors. In addition to our conflict prevention work, USAID is providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance and early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience programming, almost $390 million in the Sahel during fiscal year 23rd-23. Through our development and humanitarian assistance, we can make the United States a partner of choice. We can demonstrate that democracy delivers by partnering to tangibly improve the lives of the millions in the Sahel, searching for hope and opportunity, opportunity they deserve. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak and for convening this important meeting. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. I'm just gonna go off. Ukraine has a population of approximately 43.79 million people. Sudan has a population of approximately 45.66 million people. Yet the non-military assistance that has gone to Ukraine is $12.4 billion. And the humanitarian assistance to Sudan is $620 million. I've heard things like, we need to do everything we possibly can. But what I see is you have almost identical population sizes, but 20 times the commitment financially to the people of Ukraine than the people in Sudan. Are the lives in Sudan less important by 20 times? And if not, how are we going to address that gap? Let me rephrase it. Are you receiving support from the administration as much to do your jobs as your colleagues are doing theirs? Mr. Chairman, the situation in Sudan is commanding much time and attention from the administration. For example, we are seeking to help the civilians be in a position to take power when the conflict has abated. So that is why Ambassador Godfrey and the embassy that was previously located in Khartoum is now in Addis Ababa, where the preponderance of Sudanese civilians are meeting to support them in that effort. Ambassador Rubenstein is in Jeddah, working to try and- Madam Assistant Secretary, that sounds great. You've been to Africa and spent a lot of years in Africa. And you understand that part of the reason why the Russian misinformation is working is because for a large population in Africa, they see it as true in their lived experience. They see it as true that the commitment is not there to their plight. And so part of the reason why we're experiencing these issues in the backs of democracy, governance, the economic and educational opportunities that we're able to participate in is because they see us as hypocrites. How are we changing that narrative through action? Mr. Chairman, my contacts with the Sudanese people tell me that they believe that we are the best friend to the nation. It is not Russia or China who showed up to try and help end this conflict. It was the United States. We are perceived to be disinterested and care about the civilians and care about the stability of the state. That is not the position of other partners in the international community. The strength we have is that they want to have a partnership with us and they want our help to resolve the conflict. Just before Thanksgiving, Kenya's President, Ruto, and the SAF leader, General Burrum, met in Nairobi and issued a joint statement which called out the general process for being too slow. Assistant Secretary Fee, how realistic is it to expect that Jedha produces anything of value when one of our strongest partners in the region meets with a belligerent leader and calls for an alternative aura? We work very closely with the Kenyan President. In fact, he has invited the United States to join an IGAD summit that will be held this coming weekend. I speak with him regularly. The Secretary speaks with him regularly. We are working very closely with our partners in the East African Regional Organization of IGAD, of which he is a leading member, as well as with the African Union. Is the UAE a friend or foe in ending this conflict diplomatically? We share the concerns that ranking member Jacobs identified about UAE support to the RSF, and that is a topic of conversation, including most recently during the Vice President's visit to the UAE for COP. What are some ways that we can hold the UAE, those actors in UAE who are fomenting this conflict, accountable? I think the publicity of this hearing and your statement and request to the UAE to consider the detrimental impact of their support to the RSF would be very helpful. Absolutely, you'll have our support. Mr. Jenkins, please describe how programs in your bureau continue to work with partners in support of a democratic transition in Sudan and where? Addis, Cairo, Jedha? So thank you. Those of us that have been working in Sudan for a generation or more have, our heart has broken quite a few times, but we stand firmly with the people of Sudan, and we strongly, strongly, strongly support civil society, including the movement movements that got us to the moment in 2019 and are gonna be the hope for Sudan once they get out of their current nightmare. We're currently located temporarily in both Egypt and in Nairobi, and they're in the process of having a footprint of formal expat positions in both Egypt and in Nairobi, and our dark team, the disaster assistance response team is 12 people that's based in Nairobi right now. Thank you, sir. My time's expired. I now recognize Ranking Member Jacobs for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is incredibly timely, particularly after Niger became the latest in a string of coups across the Sahel. In Niger in particular, the United States was invested heavily, particularly militarily, and particularly in their army and their special forces, and despite that, despite all of that investment and apparent influence and the security gains from those joint operations, the coup in Niger was ultimately successful and revealed some deep-seated grievances among Nigerians towards the democratically elected government, and the United States was frankly caught off guard. So Assistant Secretary Fee, Assistant Secretary Wallander, what happened? Besides not having an ambassador, why do you think the State Department did not have a good understanding of grievances towards the Pesum's government? What lessons can we learn from this to apply towards U.S. policy in the Sahel and coastal West Africa? And Assistant Secretary Wallander, how do you explain the Department of Defense not seeing this coup coming, given the vast amounts of training and cooperation that the U.S. military did with our Nigerian counterparts? And again, what lessons can be learned on the DOD side, especially as the interagency is implementing the Global Fragility Act? We share your disappointment in the outcome in Niger. I think the statistics would you know well in terms of the security incidents and civilian casualties that we've seen in Mali and Burkina, in contrast to the very positive progress that was underway in Niger by the efforts of the Nigerian, as well as the U.S. and other European partners. It makes the coup confusing and perplexing. What we understand is that the president, I'm sorry, the commander of the presidential guard who was in a dispute with President Bazoum is the one who initiated this action and then persuaded other members of the military to join him. It does not appear to us at this time that this was a well-prepared or well-thought-out action. He was also able to successfully exploit anti-French sentiment as well as you noted concerns about the leadership, the democratically elected leadership. In terms of lessons learned, absolutely, we need to have an important team on the ground, a team led by a confirmed ambassador to engage. But in this particular instance, it does seem as if it was a specific grievance that mushroomed. Thank you, ranking member Jacobs. Share, of course, Assistant Secretary Fee's analysis and to your point about how could this happen when the United States trained and worked with the Nigerian armed forces. The experience at the working level was positive in the interests in reducing violence against civilians in the country and pushing back and containing violent extremist organizations. The rates of violence had fallen in the years of our successful cooperation. And since the select leaders of the Nigerian military leadership chose to violate their country's constitution and overthrow democratic rule, in fact, incidences of violence and their ability to live up to their duties to protect their country have been eroded because of their actions and their failures. One of the lessons learned is exactly to reinforce that message with our partners, that it is only with stability and democratic civilian control of the military that they have effective governments. And we believe that those of our partners who are trained and respect the importance of civilian leadership and democratic government are best positioned and demonstrate their ability to provide for security for their nations. Thank you. Assistant Secretary Phi, yesterday I sent a letter with my colleague, Congresswoman Omar, requesting information on the status of an atrocity determination in Sudan in response to RSAF's horrific atrocities and ethnically targeted killings in Darfur. At the end of October, you testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and committed to making an official determination. So can you commit here today that the State Department will make this determination and let us know when we can expect to see this? First of all, thank you very much for the letter to highlight the need for an atrocity determination. As you know, one of the reasons it's a powerful tool is because of the rigorous research undertaken to investigate and document, including by our attorneys. I had the opportunity to speak yesterday with Secretary Blinken, who as you know just returned from a trip abroad and I am pleased to report that you should see action on that shortly. Wonderful, thank you all. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Ranking Member. I now recognize Rep Kim for five minutes. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member for holding today's hearing on the side hill. Thank you, witnesses, for joining us today. As the author of our resolution condemning the conflict in Sudan, I'm interested in hearing from you about our policy towards the Civil War in Sudan. In recent weeks, the crisis in Sudan has worsened and the rapid support forces led multiple offensives during which it indiscriminately killed those in Masalit, ethnic community in West Dalford. European officials have also characterized those operations as part of a wider ethnic cleansing campaign by the RSF. These attacks happened while the US was facilitating the last round of talks in Jeddah. I'm gonna ask you, Ms. B, given the ethnic violence according in Dartford, are you concerned that another genocide is happening? We share the concern and the horror that all of us feel about the atrocities being committed by the RSF as well as the problematic behavior by the SAF in terms of reckless disregard for civilian fatalities. And as I mentioned, I think the Secretary will address that shortly. Can you tell me at what point would the State Department determine the ethnic violence occurring constitutes it declaring the violence as a genocide? That determination is based on legal criteria and would be best answered by our global criminal justice leader, Beth Van Schaak. But I know that the lawyers in reviewing the components of the atrocity determination have reviewed those matters closely and that should be announced in detail shortly. As I said, those attacks happened while the US was facilitating that talk in Jeddah. So what was United States doing during that Jeddah talks to try to stop the RSF's ethnic violence? I can confirm that we have regularly engaged and pressed the Sudanese parties themselves as well as African and Arab partners to try and convince them to desist from this destabilizing behavior which not only is horrific in terms of the human impact but also genuinely threatens the unity of the country. So we are using that platform to convey that message forcefully. Thank you. During the last or latest Jeddah talks, the warring parties make commitments with respect to improving humanitarian access. So what changes, if any, has that led to? Our judgment is that the changes have been insufficient. We are engaged in discussions and there will be a meeting this week led by the UN OCHA and other partners, including partners funded by the US government to try and implement those agreements, those confidence building methods. So if the talks in Cairo lead to any commitments, can we trust the RSF to maintain any of those commitments? We do not trust the RSF or the SAP. We trust the civilians. And the focus of the balance of discussions are actually being held in Addis Ababa and we are working hard with our partners in USAID with the OTI office as well as with Ambassador Godfrey and others to help them complete the democratic transition and be prepared to assume governance of the country once the conflict has ended. Thank you. The requirement for a violent extremist organization is not always driven by ideological affinity and often is caused by youth disillusionment associated with the lack of economic alternatives and a resentment towards the status quo. It has been reported that atrocities committed by state forces, militias, and Russian personnel may drive some VEO recruitment. So Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Jenkins, there you are. How is USAID seeking to balance the urgent here and there now need to support the fight against the violent extremism with the need to also address some of the longer term structural factors that continuously cause CEO recruitment? Well, thank you very much. Our humanitarian assistance provides life-saving assistance as urgently as we can, but that does not provide solutions. The long-term solution will take longer. And as you noted, it's not just about a job for youth. It's not just about ideology. It's about finding meaning in their life. It's about having agency and opportunity. And we have programs across the Sahel that work within communities to do exactly that, to provide youth a reason to believe that tomorrow might be better than today, to provide them with a group of where they can search out and find belonging and not have to turn to a violent extremist group. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Madam. I now recognize Rep. Kamalakar Dobe for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You know, I was heartened to hear the Chair reference the mass shootings and murdering of babies across the Sahel. I would note that these atrocities are also happening in the Ukraine by Russia. And I would hope that I would hear the same outrage from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle. I think our concern about and focus on Russia needs to be as consistent as their reign of terror. I have a few quick questions. Assistant Secretary Fee. So last week, actually, Ambassador Hammer talked about state capacity being stretched, which I think also compromises our ability to be successful with diplomacy. Can you talk to me about the personnel vacancies at the State Department and also with USAID at U.S. embassies in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger? And what you all are doing and what the plan is gonna be if we can't get our act together. Thank you for allowing me to request all of you to support the administration's budget, which would provide us with badly needed personnel and budget resources. Also, although many of the countries you identified now have a confirmed ambassador, we did not have a confirmed ambassador in Niger when the coup took place. We do not have a confirmed ambassador in Nigeria, which is the president of ECOWAS. I do not have a confirmed ambassador in Gabon where another coup took place. I do not have a confirmed ambassador in the African Union. I also need one in Somalia and Djibouti where we have U.S. forces and significant events in the upcoming year. So that would be the first way that we could drive forward our policy more effectively. Secondly, as I've discussed before with the chairman and the members, we lost a lot of staff during the previous administration when there was a freeze on hiring. We are working to improve that and the budget request would help. We do have shortages, particularly in the Sahel. That is sometimes in part because there are not adequate educational or health facilities and certain family members might require those. And then we get into a difficult dynamic where the great people who are there are working so hard they get burnt out. So we're trying to figure out ways to avoid that and to provide more incentives to attract more bidders to these challenging important and consequential countries. Thank you for a USAID, yes. Thank you for the question. Yes, we've had challenges in the past and the last 12 to 18 months, the picture has improved considerably. We are now fully staffed, USAID, in both Chad and in Mauritania. We're 83% staffed in Mali and we're 72% staffed in Burkina Faso. Earlier this year, both Niger and Burkina Faso were added to the list of countries, it's about 13 countries including Mali that receive a difficult to staff differential in their pay. Basically, they receive 15% more per year if they agree to stay for three years and that's helped considerably. Thank you. Thank you. I would also add, I guess not just a freeze on hiring but also a disdain for the continent of Africa by the prior administration. So next question, this crisis has been ongoing in the Sahel and I think that it requires some engagement at the highest levels of US government. Obviously we have hotspots all around the world and Secretary Blinken is challenged because he's only one person. So Assistant Secretary, how are you going to elevate this to his level so that we can get that kind of daylight on the crises that are happening here, especially in the Sahel? As I mentioned earlier, I had the opportunity to speak with Secretary Blinken and Acting Deputy Secretary Nuland yesterday. They will be engaging leaders of ECOWAS member states. ECOWAS is hosting a summit this weekend and I will be participating, representing the United States so they're calling in advance of that discussion. They remain available to help at all times. In September at UNGA, Secretary Blinken hosted a meeting of his Foreign Ministry counterparts, Foreign Minister counterparts of ECOWAS member states. So we have support and attention from the leadership. Thank you. I have a quick question maybe for Assistant Secretary Wollander. Just what's going to happen if this conflict expands? How will it continue to destabilize the region? Thank you for the question. Well, we've already seen an increase in violence, violence of the EOs against the Malian and the Wagner forces, which then expands to violence against civilians in Mali. We have seen an uptick in a considerable increase in violent incidents in Niger as the military is not focused on its real mission, which is to provide for the security of the country. We are concerned that as the space for VEOs to operate and operate freely in territory in the Sahel may expand as a result of this security vacuum that those VEOs may be tempted to act and strike and expand into Western Africa. Thank you. The general release time has expired. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Rep. Cain for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now I thank our witnesses for being here with us today and you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. First, terrorist groups have engaged in hostilities over control of UN bases after the junta in Bamako ended the UN's peacekeeping mission. The UN had sought to transfer the bases to state control. Some separatist rebel factions have coordinated with one terrorist group, JNM, to challenge the military's expansion into former UN bases. With Russian tactical support, Mali's military seized Kedal in mid-November, a goal that has eluded successive Malian governments for over 11 years. Assistant Secretary Walander, how do you expect the capture of Kedal to affect Afghan leader's perception of Russia defense cooperation? Thank you for that question. We, this is clearly why the Malian government asked Manusma, or ordered Manusma to leave to enable their forces and the Russian forces to have greater running room in seizing territory controlling locations in order to improve their ability to operate for their own ends. It is a concerning development, because we, as you noted, we do not want other African partners to see benefit in allowing Russia, allowing Wagner-free reign. So what we work with African partners for them to understand is that, again, this is not enhancing the security of their country, it's actually increasing the activities and the vulnerabilities of their countries to the VEOs, to the drawing of these violent extremist groups, and that is a model they absolutely should not follow. Thank you. Over the last two decades, United States health policy has been in concert and often backstopping the foreign policy of France. That status quo is no longer possible. As the French have been kicked out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the last year and a half, Assistant Secretary Walner, as France's policy in Africa is being forced to change, how is the Department of Defense ensuring that U.S. strategic interests continue to be met in the Sahel? Well, first and foremost, we work closely with the State Department and with our colleagues in USAID for a 3D approach, democracy, development, and defense, because that is ultimately the solution that will bring stability and security anywhere in Africa, especially now in the Sahel. In terms of partners, we are still working with European partners, other partners globally, who want to contribute to counter VEO operations, to building capacity. Different countries have different relationships, different countries in the region by working with an array of partners in Europe and elsewhere from across the region. We believe that we can continue to build capacity for those partners that seek it and continue to be committed to a democratic path. And how is the Department of State and USAID ensuring that anti-French sentiment across the Sahel does not become anti-U.S. sentiment? So thank you very much. Information manipulation, sometimes called disinformation, is now a plague throughout the region and we have upped our game significantly in the last 18 months with quite a few programs throughout the region and the continent to make sure that we get better information out there about what we're doing, something we've always been a little bit bad at, and make sure that we help people be more, better generators of real information and better consumers of false information so they know what it is when they can spot it and to keep a distance between the false information and the truth as we stand by it, over. The Hunto's and Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have all recruited the services of the Russia-slash Wagner Group, security personnel in attempts to ensure regime strength. On November 27th, Niger's Hunto signed a decree evoking 2015 law that was enacted to curb smuggling migrants traveling from African countries to create migration routes in Niger and around to Europe. Curbing illegal migration in Russian influence led to the biggest policy priorities of our European allies. French withdrawal from these countries creates a real risk of security vacuums forming, which will only exacerbate these issues while providing increased space for violent extremist organizations to strengthen. The Acre Initiative, promising a concept, has failed to gain support from all the involved countries. So can you talk to us in my remaining time about how we create more cooperation, U.S. and European cooperation to strengthen security in the region? In the small time we have, we are actively engaged with quite a few bilateral partners in a multilateral and bilateral way in coastal West Africa, exciting partnerships with the German government, the Dutch government, the British government to do everything that we can to prevent the spread and the overflow of the violent extremism into coastal West Africa. Thank you, and I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I now recognize the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Mike McCall for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses for being here. I've been focused on this area for a while in my career, the Trans-Saharan Partnership Act, but obviously the cell is getting very dangerous. I mean, it's always been problematic, with the latest events in Sudan. I had called for a special envoy previously that would report to the President. Would that be a helpful office to have? Hello, Mr. Chairman, it's good to see you. You too. Thank you for the advocacy for an envoy. We would agree that having a U.S. government envoy to focus on Sudan would uplift the already considerable efforts by three ambassadors who are focused full-time on Sudan as well as the Africa Bureau. And I want you to know that's under active and serious consideration by the administration. Great. Well, I look forward to working with you and my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to perhaps move that process forward. It's been, I guess, about seven months since we withdrew and abandoned our embassy in Khartoum. That's of grave concern. I think this conflict is getting worse, not better. Worried about the atrocities committed by the Wagner Group and their rapid support forces, formerly known as the Janjewid. These horrendous crimes include Motivek killing in Darfur that echoes the genocide 20 years ago. In further west of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, there have been hundreds of recorded terrorist attacks by ISIS in the Sahel. They appear to be coordinated with the foreign terrorist organization known as JNIM, a French acronym that stands for Union for Supportive Islam and Muslims. As I mentioned, I championed the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership. It acted many years ago. Can you give me an update on how that is working and how that's being applied to the situation? Mr. Chairman, when that program was first developed with support from leaders like you, it was an innovative approach to addressing the problems in the Sahel. But over time, it became less effective in part because of the changing conditions on the ground and in part because the way the program was structured, we didn't optimize, I think, the interoperability that you see here. We have suggested to Congress that we would like to talk with you about how to update that program. I can tell you that both the benefits and the drawbacks of that program were considered in the design of the Global Fragility Act and in the policy that we developed on the basis of the GFA, the strategy to promote stability and prevent conflict, which were focused in coastal West Africa to prevent the expansion of the problems in the Sahel to our friends and partners in coastal West Africa. Okay. Can you tell me about, because you have the Wagner Group trying to provide stability, sort of like a military police force, and then you've got the radical Islamists in the Sahel. Then you have the French. What does it look like for the French now in that part of the world? French forces have been withdrawn from Mali. They've been withdrawn from Burkina Faso, and now they are undergoing, they're in the last weeks of their full withdrawal from Niger at the requirement of the Nigerian junta. So that leaves. The vacuum. That leaves, well, worse than the vacuum, it leaves Wagner, it leaves Russian influence, and it leaves leaderships, certainly in Mali. That are not respecting civilian security. The Islamic extremist. I think that is clearly solidly in Mali. It is still on the, it's not fully developed in Burkina Faso and in Niger. It is very concerning that we have seen Wagner officials in speaking to the leadership in Burkina Faso, and then we are seeing Russian Defense, Ministry of Defense officials in Niger. Yeah, especially for Gosian, I think. Well, when actually the merchant of death that we traded for the basketball player, the vape pipe, he, the Russians sent him down to negotiate with a Wagner group in Africa to swear their allegiance to Putin. And after they did that, within the matter of days, Progosian was shot down out of the sky. About two months after his unsuccessful coup, I found that interesting. Do you, are you concerned about, when I chaired the Homeland Security Committee, it was during the rise of ISIS and the Caliphate, are you worried about that phenomenon happening in the Sahel right now and how sophisticated could they be in terms of external operations? One of the reasons why we have a, had a long standing security cooperation relationship with the Nigerian armed forces was exactly because of the concern that control of territory, freedom to operate, would, could create a even more complicated situation if the ISIS forces and the JNM forces in the region believe they then have the ability to operate externally. And it's the reason why we need to continue to work with those partners that we can work with to counter that. Have you seen any designs or plans of them to aspire to external attacks, or is it just more focused on in the Sahel? At this point, the focus of those groups is assessed to be in the Sahel. Right. I just met with a lot of the top Ukrainian military leaders and I have to say I'm always amazed that their strength and courage and their tenacity and their fighters, they envision the time where moving in the future, hopefully when there's more success on the battlefield where they could take the place of the Wagner group and replace them. And I think that would be a change for the better. So I just throw that out to you as an interesting side note. But anyway, I appreciate the work you do. This area has always been tricky and troublesome. And I worry that our Belt and Road Initiative has not been successful in Africa. And if they don't have an alternative, they're gonna turn to other groups like Wagner, like China, who obviously does participate quite a bit in the African continent. And this will be the largest continent in the world population-wise in the next decade. And I think it's very important we keep our eye focused on it. And finally, I'll give you an update, Mr. Chairman, on our PEPFAR negotiations. We're very committed to a reauthorization of PEPFAR and it's a tricky process up here, but I've been up here long enough to know how to get things done. And it's my intention to get this one done too. So with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'd like to echo the Chairman's sentiments. He is personally committed to reauthorizing PEPFAR, and so am I. And he is personally committed to supporting your efforts in the African region, in the continent of Africa, to the benefit of the American people. The Chair will now recognize Ranking Member Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So under the GFA, the interagency is required to align and integrate all relevant diplomatic development and security assistance of the U.S. government. I understand state and USAID have not used all the flexibility Congress has provided under existing earmark requirements. What are the barriers to additional alignment and what more help do you need from us? Well, thank you very much. I believe you're referring to the 10% variance on earmarks, which we are working with our lawyers and others across aid and state on how we can better utilize that. And as we're working right now through the budgets for the next year, we're taking that into account. There are a lot of things that we're learning under the GFA implementation. One of them is we still need some changes to the authorities, particularly with the peace and security funding, so that we can then actually meet the mandate of the act and use that funding to monitor and evaluate things other than just foreign assistance. And one of the key things we need is a reauthorization of both the PSF funding and also the complex crisis fund. Thank you. So support for Mali's 2015 peace accord between the government and Northern ethnic separatist groups has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy towards the Sahel. Yet the accord now appears to be more abundant, especially given the resumption of hostilities in Northern Mali in mid-2023 in the Malian military's seizure of Kedal, a rebel stronghold, a goal that has eluded successive Malian governments over the past 11 years. Assistant Secretary, do you expect the Malian military to continue to expand its footprint in Northern Mali with Russian support? What other scenarios might emerge? What opportunities exist for U.S. diplomats to support a political process that could actually deliver greater stability in Mali? I regret to tell you that I'm not very optimistic about the situation. I believe that Fama, the Malian armed forces with support from Wagner will continue to prosecute a military campaign in Kedal and other areas of Northern Mali against Tuareg rebels. That their inattention and actual actions to undermine the Algiers Accords as one of the factors that affected our shift in position toward the transitional government. We are speaking to the Algerians and other partners to see how we can address this challenge, but I do expect it to continue into worsen. Thank you. Members of the committee have received outreach from humanitarian NGOs and Sudanese civil society about concerns about potential drastic cuts in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. Either Assistant Secretary for your Mr. Jenkins, can you speak to that and outline how a significant cut to assistance would impact the Sudanese people? Thank you very much. As you know, for the last few years, because of supplementals, we've been the benefit of on humanitarian assistance, particularly of a very generous Congress. Looking at a new reality budgetary wise moving forward, we also have grave concerns about what will be necessary cuts, not just in Sudan, but in many if not almost all places around the world where we've had the benefit of increased levels that we aren't anticipating. So looking forward to that in the future. Thank you. May I just add, may I use this opportunity to please ask for congressional support for the administration's request for humanitarian assistance. The crises that we're discussing here in the Sahel are also present elsewhere in the globe and we urgently need the continued support of the American people. Mr. Chairman would like to know how much. I would refer you to the President's budget request on that one. And lastly, Assistant Secretary Fihau, is the State Department adjusting the GFA strategy in coastal West Africa in light of the coups in the Sahel? We are shifting the security assistance which had initially been conceived to focus on the challenges from the Gulf of Guinea to help them engage more effectively with the communities on the northern border. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I now recognize we have about five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses for being here and sharing your perspective on the region and that will be an asset for us making legislative decisions. But my first question deals with the fact that there's been some media reports that indicate a small, Russian security attachment of roughly 20 men arrived in the Burkina Faso in November. So Assistant Secretary Fihau, what is known about this unit and its mission and what might such a deployment mean for US engagement? Thank you, sir, for the question. Since the coup occurred, the second coup, if you will, occurred last year about this time, we have been trying to convince the Burkinaabe authorities to choose a different path than the path chosen by Mali where we can see the deteriorating security situation. We also are convinced that supporting what is effectively the second coup government in Burkina Faso would not be helpful in terms of our lessons learned about the need for a durable solution, which would require a democratic government that looks after the rights and concerns of its citizens. So we have been trying to have a conversation to say, if they move back to the path of democracy, we're going to be able to be a better partner on the security situation and not to follow the Russian example. So in short, the visit of these Russian soldiers is not welcome news and we will continue to try and press the Burkinaabe to avoid going down the Mali path. Anyone else have a comment? I would just, the DOD fully supports the Department of State in this approach and we stand ready. We continue to hold off on security assistance, but should the leadership in Burkina Faso follow that path, we would be ready to re-engage with them. Thank you. I also serve on the Agriculture Committee. So Mr. Jenkins, in the past three years, how much U.S. humanitarian aid has Mali, Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso all received? And who determines how much aid is spent and where? Well, thank you very much. For all of sub-Saharan Africa in FY23, USAID spent approximately $12.5 billion. Of that 7.5 was development assistance and over four billion of that was humanitarian assistance. Now, how we determine how much humanitarian assistance goes into which countries win is a rather complicated art more than it's a science. Things are constantly changing, constantly shifting, and especially right now with the movements of people, the way they are throughout the region, we often find that with our partners we have to chase the displace to where they're going. In Sudan right now you have seven million people displaced alone in Sudan. You have over three million IDPs in the five countries of the Sahel. All of them badly in need of humanitarian assistance, but it also goes beyond that. There's people that are not displaced that also need life-giving assistance that they're receiving right now. So in your opinion, do you feel that our USAID is competing well with the Belt and Road Initiative from China? So we are the largest humanitarian donor in the world, with the largest humanitarian donor in Africa, and with the largest humanitarian donor in the Sahel. When you look at what the Chinese provide for humanitarian assistance, it is a rounding error. So they've preferred to go on a different tack asking and demanding loans for long-term development that already many in the continent have realized that they should not have gotten into the agreements they got into. Meanwhile, we lead with values and principles, as the Assistant Secretary said. We are the most generous humanitarian donor on Earth by way of dollars, and we'll continue to do that with the support of Congress. So you feel the recipients are aware of where this support is coming from? We make very, very, very sure that all of our assistance is branded from the American people unless it's in those rare circumstances where that puts our partners at risk. I guess my time's up, so I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Beard. Just a couple of last questions, and we'll conclude. All witnesses, to your knowledge, what U.S. security assistance or counterterrorism cooperation remains ongoing, if any, in countries subject to Section 7008 aid restrictions in Mali, Niger, Nijer, excuse me, or Burkina Faso? There are no security assistance programs subject to 7008 ongoing in those three countries. Assistant Secretary Wallander, I would actually appreciate your feedback here. The ranking member addressed this earlier, but I just want to put a finer point on it. You expressed regret at the fact that forces that we train may end up a part of these coups, but how are we changing the strategy on how we've trained or how we're training, and what are some of those lessons learned, because this is not only something that we've seen in the continent of Africa, but we see it around the world, that folks who have been trained with U.S. tax dollars by U.S. forces seem to miss the memo when it comes to the next steps. What are we doing better? What are we learning? And what do we have to change in how we train? Thank you for that question. I want to reassure you and reassure the American people that we do not believe there is a causal relationship between the quality of the training that our U.S. military provides to partners globally and also in Africa. In fact, in Africa, since 2008, the United States, I'm sorry, between 2010 and 2022, the U.S. trained 21,000 African military personnel in IMET and other senior military education programs, and of those 20 were involved in COUS, which is 0.01% of those who were trained. The focus of those training programs is not just on military capability and leadership, but on civilian control of the military, on respect for rule of law and constitutional order, on the requirements to serve the interests of the people. And so I believe the lesson learned is to refocus and recommit to serving for our U.S. military to serve as both a model and as a mentor and to ensure that that is a focus of every training program, senior military education training program that the United States develops and executes with our partners. Yeah, hopefully that will be sufficient to end what many Americans see as a revolving door of coup leaders and despots that are trained by American forces. As a United States Army veteran myself, it does pain me to see my brothers and sisters in our put in harm's way to train who we intend to be allies and then end up going in the opposite direction of good governance, democracy and human rights. So I look forward to continuing to work with anyone, my colleagues, administration for the purpose of peace and stability, which will have a direct positive effect on the security of American people and their home and abroad. So with that, I'd like to conclude by thanking the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we ask that you respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions and extraneous materials. For the record, subject to length and limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. It was one minute late.