 My name is Tsuyoshi Nohara, I'm for the record, I'm sitting here as a secretary general for U.S. Japan Project, Japan Center for Economic Research, JSA, which is an affiliated body of Nikkei Inc. I'm still a semi-journalist, but I'm sitting here again as a secretary general, so whatever I would say, you know, with my capacity and not related to my company. Anyway, so I'd like to introduce my colleagues here, both from the United States and Japan, and it's always nice to be back here, my second hometown, Washington, and it's always nice for me to see my old Washington friends. First of all, Shira Sumi-san, nice to see you again, and welcome. And Sakoda-san, during the 90s, Robin Sakoda used to be my very strict teacher of Pentagon when I was a young journalist to cover Pentagon, so it's always nice to be with you. And from Japanese side, we have a very famous Navy Army Club from Navy, or Japan Self-Defense Maritime to Self-Defense Admiral Koda from Japanese Self-Defense Grand Force and General Yamaguchi Nobo, and welcome. And first, I'd like to ask those four panelists to make brief comments on the future course of the U.S. and then we're going to touch on three categories. Number one is, again, future cooperation and the possibility and potential of the U.S.-Japan alliance across the Pacific. Number two is how to deal with rise of China. And number three, Korean Peninsula. So first, I'd like to ask you, Shira-san, to start with your remark, please. Thank you very much, Sonohara-san, and thank you for including me. I will warn the audience that I just got back from Tokyo, so I think I'm a little bit, they wanted me to speak first before I fell asleep. But I thought what I'd do here is talk a little bit about what Kitagawa-sensei and Mike were talking about in the first panel. I've just come back from a week or so of really trying to take a look at the political dialogue in Tokyo and collect a self-defense on the alliance. And I talked to uniformed thinkers as well as civilians as well as some of Japan's politicians. And there's been a couple of things for me from the perspective of somebody who sits inside the Beltway at the Council on Foreign Relations that I think is interesting about this current debate. It's different. All of the factors, I think, that Kitagawa-sensei outlined about Mr. Abe's leadership, about the change in the region, the context within which Japan and the United States now have to think about the alliance. All of those are very relevant. Let me talk a little bit about the politics as I see them. When we sit here in Washington, we tend to think that alliance changes are too slow. Japan is incremental, doesn't change. It's very grudging change when it happens, right? But of late, you'll read a lot of media headlines that are a little bit alarmist about Mr. Abe, right, about his leadership, about Mr. Abe moving too fast. So there's always this debate, I think, about Japan's defense, especially the military component, transformations and changes in policy debate. And I'm here not to reassure you that the third Goldilocks version is correct, but that some things actually are moving rapidly. And they have been long on the back burner, perhaps, but they are moving quickly. And I think it's for two reasons. One is, I think there's largely a consensus. And I think Kitagawa-sensei was right to point out the fact that many of the policies being discussed were policies discussed under a DPJ leadership, as well as under an LDP leadership. And the reason they're being discussed is because many people in Japan feel the time has come, these policy changes are really overdue. And so the regional context within which some of these changes are being made, I think, is first and foremost one of the motivators or drivers, if you will, of the pace of change in Japan. I think lots of people worry about Mr. Abe's politics. I don't think that's what I saw when I was in Tokyo this last week in terms of the dynamics at home in Japan. So let me give you a feel for what I saw this week. Abe-san, once he received the report that Mr. Kitoka's commission presented him with, which was a very thorough, extensive look at the questions on use of force, on where and how and when Japan should embed its military capability in global cooperation, Mr. Abe selected a very narrow range of recommendations on that report for the first piece of the conversation, at least the piece that's going on now with the Kometo. So already I think you see the political factors that are coming to bear in terms of how this conversation over collective self-defense will move forward. I got to Japan a week ago, last weekend, and already the Kometo and the LDP, the ruling coalition, had had a fairly smooth conversation about gray zone activities, right? Things that, even though Kitoka-san was critical of, they felt that were prior to the initiation of a conflict. There wasn't a whole lot of difference between the Kometo thinking and the LDP. On collective self-defense, you'll see the conversation moving this week in a day-by-day sort of manner. On Monday, Mr. Komura came out with his tatakidai, or his draft of three new principles that would govern Japan's use of force, and that is collective as well as individual. The very little changes, frankly, from the three principles that had been the accepted parameters on the use of force. The one place, however, where the Kometo and LDP are struggling, frankly, to reach a conclusion, I suspect, is on this area of collective self-defense, and that is both the timing of Japan's military becoming engaged with the United States and also the mission-specific conditions under which the Kometo feels comfortable. So as you watch this week, be very alert to timing in terms of initiation and placing of the Japanese self-defense forces along with the Americans or other foreign countries, and also be very attentive to the way the Kometo is moving forward with its kind of comfort about a very restrictive use of collective, the right of collective self-defense. I, too, I think perhaps, like Hitoko-Sensei, I was rather disappointed that Mr. Abe didn't include collective security. I don't think that Japan is not going to think about collective security in the future, but for this round, in this year, in this conversation, I suspect it was a bridge too far. I will also note, finally, on Mr. Abe's announcement, is that he stressed the minimal necessary use of force, which is a principle, I think, that has a broad consensus inside Japan, among political parties, as well as among the public. This is not a situation where Japan is willing to really move beyond its postwar interpretation that Article 9 allows the right of self-defense, but not the unlimited use of force for that purpose. I think these are the kinds of constraints within which Mr. Abe is working, and it has already been defined in a very limited way from the broad sweep of options that Mr. Abe could have thought about. One other piece of the puzzle in Japan that I don't yet have a conclusion about, but for those of you watching in the months ahead, because there will be a parliamentary debate about revised laws in the fall, and you will continue to hear debate in Japan, not about specific missions, but about the process by which this decision is being made. This is the political consensus part of what's going to happen, not just the military rationale for a change in Japanese policy, but the political consensus building process that I suspect is the first step, is the Kometo discussion, but it'll be a broader discussion going forward. Whether a cabinet decision is sufficient, you already hear critics talking about we need a broader parliamentary bill, right? It ought to take place in a broader framework in the diet, and I think there's always this question of, is interpretation the right way to go? And I think inside from both progressive left parties as well as those who are more conservative in origin, there is a conversation about perhaps we should just simply reinterpret or revise the Constitution rather than relying on reinterpretation. I suspect that these process level concerns are going to continue to be a source of criticism for the Abe cabinet, but I don't know yet how they're going to resolve themselves in terms of policy. In conclusion, this is the third round of conversation between the United States and Japan on the bilateral defense cooperation guidelines. Those of you, many of you in the room know this already, but for those of you who don't, the first one of course was in 1978. The second one was in the mid-1990s, and my colleagues to the right here participated in that process. What's different I sense on this round is that it's largely being driven by Japan's needs. And I'm not saying that to say the United States doesn't have a role in shaping the conversation in Tokyo, certainly. The United States is actively engaged in talking with Japanese counterparts, but really the streamlining of laws, the refinement of principles, the question about just how much and how far Japan has to prepare to use force is really being driven by an internal process within Japan, both among the security planners and those extended experts outside of the planning community. Streamlining laws is a result in large part about experiences that the Japanese self-defense forces have already had. We forget that the Japanese self-defense force has been a very active participant in PKO. It has been a very active ally with the United States. And really a lot of the process that I see, the specific targets of reform, are really dedicated to those areas where the SDF and the civilian planners have understood that these limits imposed are barriers to effective cooperation. They are not being drawn out of nowhere. They actually come from experience. Finally, let me conclude by talking a little bit, but I think where Mike was leaving us off here, which is what is the function of the guidelines? What is the function of these changes in the bilateral relationship as well as in Japan's own thinking? And that is the, how do we think about the United States and Japan as we move forward ensuring Japanese defense and effective alliance cooperation? How do we make sure this reassures the region as opposed to startles the region? And I think clearly what is different from the 1990s is the Japan-South Korea relationship is on a different footing. The last couple of years of estrangement in that relationship have made communication about strategic interests and strategic cooperation more difficult than in the past. So I think it will be who both Japanese and American policymakers, as well as the experts community, to seek out partners in South Korea, both in the public domain as well as inside the government, to make sure that that reassurance message is there. I think so, because since they said it very clearly, there is no intent in Tokyo in taking the Japanese military anywhere near the Korean Peninsula without the express permission of the Korean government. China, I suspect, will not want to be reassured. And I think we should just accept that. That doesn't mean, however, that the United States and Japan then do not have to put effort into the kinds of engagement processes that we have already supported in the past. The Mill-Mill Dialogue, the broader regional context of both humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, finding opportunity like their impact exercises for greater Chinese participation. It will be just as incumbent upon both sides of the alliance to pursue those avenues of engagement. But I don't think we should be too optimistic about Beijing's desire for engagement, at least not on the terms that the U.S. and Japan are comfortable with at the moment. So let me stop there. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Yosemite. So, let me know. Mr. Yosemite. Thank you very much. I am Mr. Yosemite. I am Admiral Yosemite. Perhaps I am not so well known in this arena. I was just a lazy former destroyer driver. And also the brother-in-law of the SAC for years, we promised. But Shira mentioned something about the defense guidelines. But especially for Japan and the United States, my point, which I'm going to speak today, is how well should Japan and the United States build a future posture to meet the coming Chinese challenges, security challenges. And of course, especially after the Cold War, end of Cold War, or demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been a key stabilizer for the security of the region, together with the security of Japan. And this is very clear. But especially after the mid-1990s, U.S. and Japan have started facing the new challenges generated by rising China. And this Chinese strategy is characterized as the A280 strategy. And how well are we going to be able to meet. And perhaps Shira mentioned the Japanese high interpretation of the Japanese, the political situation or revision of the Japanese new defense policy. And I'm going to speak mainly from the military force built up point of view. And both Mr. Kitaka and Shira mentioned the last year, the new security, the Japanese new security strategy and defense NDPG and the five-year program were issued. And yes, for the first time after the World War II history of Japan, the Japanese government issued the security document. In that sense, I to grade the document as A. But at the same time, when I look, especially the security strategy, there are several things which are missing from the military point of view. And that's the subject of my today's speech. And first, what is A280? Is that the operational plan? No. That's a Chinese rationale to build its own military, to meet the U.S. capability perhaps 10 to 20 years from now. So is today's China giant? No. They are not so capable. But they are today building their military under the rationale of A280 to meet the U.S. capability in 10 or 20 years from now. That's, so please do not confuse. This is not an old plan or campaign plan. This is the force-built-up rationale. This is one thing we should remember. And what is the objective? Of course, the U.S. forces operating and, you know, the station in this area, in this area, not in our area. Okay. What are the U.S. forces in our area? There are basically two forces. One U.S. force is in the U.S. forces in Korea. They are the tailored force against the North Korea. So perhaps the less flexibility in terms of the deployment other than the Korean Peninsula. And U.S. forces stationed in Japan, is that, are those forces are the dedicated forces to only defend Japan? No. That's the real driving force, which really realize the U.S. global structure, strategy. Without the U.S. forces in Japan, perhaps the U.S. regional and global strategy would be very difficult. And what are the U.S. forces in Japan? Please think about that. Do you know the size of Japan? What U.S. state is the closest to Japan? Many say California. No. Montana, state of Montana. Okay. But think about that. Okay. State of Montana and Japan's 65% is mountain. There are six jet U.S. bases. Okay. Fifty-five thousand U.S. service personnel. Two naval bases. And that's the U.S. forces, okay. Which those U.S. forces stationed in Japan are the real enabler of the U.S. global strategy. And that's the Japanese responsibility and also the U.S. responsibility to maintain those forces in the area and to maintain the stability of the region. Okay. Then there are, there will be Chinese challenges under the rationale of the AT&T. Okay. And my observation, three areas. One is the area where we should focus mainly on the maritime domain. Okay. The first, China is pretty well known by its development of the anti-ship ballistic missile. That's a new challenge for U.S. and Japan. U.S. and Japan are doing the post-missile defense. But the story would be very different. To protect U.S. carriers or amphibian forces from the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile. Because the terminal phages, okay, the trajectory is normal ballistic. That made us our defense posture very difficult. Do we do nothing for the future? No. That's the new area where U.S. and Japan should allocate a lot of resources. Okay. Please think about that. Okay. If the U.S. loses two carriers, heavily damaged by one, what's your rationale in our sentiment in Washington, DC? Do you still maintain the strong motive to come in? We believe so. But maybe not. In order to minimize those risks, both U.S. and Japan have to have the good new posture to maintain our fleet under the idea of new fleet anti-b ballistic ship missile. That's something we should do for the future. Second is anti-submarine warfare, which is something still true today from the Cold War days. Japan is responsible for the anti-submarine warfare in the Pacific and which substantially reduced Chinese submarine threat, which convinced U.S. leaders to deploy your forces to the area. It's our responsibility, but coordination is also necessary. That's the first area. And second area is basically Japanese mainland or homeland defense. What's homeland defense? This is very different from the Cold War days. In Cold War days, that Sheila mentioned, and also you understand, we focus mainly on the north. We prepared ourselves against the invasion from the Soviet, and we did that. But today, no, the western island. And what's the threat? Chinese ballistic missile, cruise missile, and sabotage. Subtrage is the very new thing for Japan. Japan has exposed many Achilles' Heels, like the nuclear power plants or the fossil fuel fuel burning the power plants, or HAB for the transportation, or, you know, the high speed train, everything. They're vulnerable. And China may deploy its special forces, not the major invasion. But a small group of special forces are good enough to really destroy our key HAB of those infrastructure. Maybe the Fukushima disaster, okay, that size of the confusion could happen, or ten times a dodge, or a hundred times a dodge at that one. That's something we have to prepare. And another part is the choke point. For Chinese military to realize it's a 280 strategy, they need to have a capability to penetrate the Okinawa island chains. Those traits we call the choke point, who controls we. And that's Japanese responsibility. By so doing, what Japanese contribution enable US forces to operate any area in our region? That's the Japanese defense and the responsibility. But in order to realize that responsibility, Japan has to protect and defend our own mainland as well as the western islands. That's the value of the Japanese operations. So we need to have the clear understanding between Washington and Tokyo, how well we will establish, how soon, and where to protect. Those are the kind of the agreement should be incorporated into the defense guideline and roles capability review. And the third one is okay, we are now basically reacting in the maritime area and homeland defense. But okay, that's part of a strategy. What is lacking now in my story is a kind of the offensive. China also has a huge Achilles heel. For example, the treasure in the story area, stretching from the Hong Kong to Tianjin. Many American said, or Japanese media said, Japan is vulnerable against Chinese cruise missile attack. Yes. But how about China? Those Chinese treasure area from Hong Kong to Tianjin. How about the US swarm tomahawk attack? That's the way how we deter China. So without those capability, we may invite Chinese adventurism. So this is some, this is my third area. The offensive capability by fully utilizing their Achilles heels. So how about their slugs? In Cold War days, Soviet Union was not the slug's dependent country. Their slug in the Far East is almost nothing. But today, where are the Chinese slugs? Indian Ocean, many. Pacific Ocean, many. How many submarines we have? We are going to have 23, 22. US, perhaps 30 in the area. India, many. So China will also expose its vulnerability of the slugs to us. So my point is, we do not fight, but at least in order for us to deter China, we should have capability. This is our rationale. And also the chalk point. Why do we control the chalk point in the southwestern island? This will really block and disable Chinese operations. Chinese capability to operate their naval and air forces, which realize their A2AD strategy. And you know, I think you understand. What I told you now, these are not difficult operations for us because we have capability. And if our leadership, both political and military leadership, is wise enough, we will be able to realize this thought point, offensive capability. And then we will be able to deter China. So those three areas, okay, that's a kind of new and old idea mixed together, but should be incorporated into our undergoing the defense guideline and the roles mission capability review by lateral effort. And if those, you know, the new ideas and the old ideas are pretty well taken into those two strategies, coming documents, I think cooperative posture would be very, would become very robust and will contribute to the stability and security of the region, as well as the security of Japan. This is my point. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Koda. So please go ahead. Saksana. Thanks to Mike and your team for having me, Kito Sensei, for your presentation and your hard work and in helping to reform this alliance in a really positive direction. I think this is a really, truly remarkable time for the alliance when it comes to the reforms that are being considered, some that have already recently been done, and the outcome for all of these have not yet been set. As I look around the room, you know, I've been focused on U.S.-Japan alliance management for about 20 years, but I see some faces of folks that have much deeper experience in me, Tom Hubbard, Stanley Roth, Russ Deming, Robin, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think you would agree this is this is quite a remarkable time. Part of it is for reasons that Sheila outlined for why this time is different than the previous rounds she referred to them. I was not present at the first round, but I was at the second, and because as I look around this audience, I see a lot of younger faces, and I'm very encouraged by that. Let me give a quick sense of how and why this is so different. I remember when we issued the Joint Security Declaration in 96, the Gehinkan in Tokyo, and there was a press conference that was in the outside of the facility, and one journalist asked Prime Minister Hashimoto, the Joint Security Declaration is the declaration that set forth both sides to review the guidelines, and one journalist asked the Prime Minister why did you decide to review the guidelines at this time, and I remember that the Prime Minister paused. I got a little nervous for him, but he paused, and he was thinking, and finally he said we decided to review the guidelines because it's unclear what are the areas that we can and cannot do when it comes to defense and the alliance, and that shocked me. That was stunning to me because I thought as the Japan Country Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, maybe I didn't know, but surely the Prime Minister knew why what are the things that Japan and the U.S. could and couldn't do, but I took that as homework and then we moved forward with reviewing the guidelines with my colleagues, then Colonel Yamaguchi and Captain Koda, and we did the deal, but the context then was that we were trying to figure out what it is that we couldn't couldn't do. We were trying to bring clarity to the situation that we had at hand. This is very different. This is changing the framework within which we will operate. Back then it was how are we going to cooperate bilaterally, regionally, and globally as an alliance, and again within the framework that was in place. This is changing the framework. This is trying to figure out adjustments to collective self-defense. Japan has recently made an adjustment to its arms export control principles, and that will change how we are able to cooperate, how we can become more efficient and a better alliance. The point that I'd like to make in my three minutes remaining here is, so what? The so what of after these reforms are made, how can that change the alliance and how we do business? When I think most people look at adjustments, potential adjustments in the collective self-defense, and how Japan deals with that, it brings to mind, okay, these then are areas that we can cooperate in more. And the thing that comes to mind probably foremost is how do we deal with a specific situation now? Given this situation, how do we respond to it? Well, we can do more together, and that's the context of contingency planning. How do we prepare for something that may pop up? And contingency planning is how do we respond to a situation with the force at hand? Back in the day in 96, 97, when we were working on guidelines, that's pretty much what the guidelines was all about. Mostly, how do we change the way that we do contingency planning? But the combination of a lot of these reforms really changes a lot of things on how the alliance can become more efficient, more effective. Arms escort control principles, because they've been relaxed more formally. That has an implication for how we go about doing defense planning. And defense planning is more about what is the future force that we need to have? What are the capabilities that we should have? How do we develop those capabilities, and how do we bring them to fore? And so the implication here is that collective self-defense will identify areas where we can do more. In the here and now for a specific situation with forces that we have on hand. But it also identifies openings for what are the capabilities that we should have in the future? And should we be working on those things together? And that gets into more of defense planning. And defense planning is a very sensitive, very secretive work. And I'm not suggesting that both sides turn over their work to the other. But I think missile defense, for example, was an opportunity that Japan by ad hoc specifically accepted missile defense from its arms export control principles that allowed us to move forward with working together on research and development, working together on production, and working together on cooperation of that system. This now opens it up to, I think, greater possibilities. And those are the things I think we need to think about. One question in the earlier session kind of suggested that. But I think this opens it up to a lot greater possibilities to become more effective. Thank you, Saku-san. So thank you for your patience, General Yamaguchi. Please go ahead. Thank you very much. I, too, I'm very glad to be here to see many of, not, I'm not talking about age, but the old friend of mine. Anyway, I have, I have given, I was given five minutes to talk. And I, I I have maybe one hour strength lengths. But I will strictly limit three things, three determined things. One, North Korea is going to be threat for the foreseeable future. Two, China is rising. Three, United States is going to be Japan's ally. That's three. One, North Korea, we have to get together. Japan, US, South Korea, along with other countries, even, even Chinese, China, we have to deal with North Korea threat period. The second, China's rise is given, but to what, to which direction China rises is not given. We can, if we are strong enough and if we are smart enough and we, we can get together, we can shape the, shape the course. That is not, that is good for us, but it's not for only us, but for, for, for Chinese, too. So we have to do our best to shape the course of China's rise. In that sense, Japan, what can Japan do is two, two things. We have to engage China and we have to hedge China. And hedging and engagement are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing, because Chinese, as I have been dealing with Chinese friends, they are, they are not, they, they cannot be, be serious to talk to me when I'm so stupid and I am so weak. I have to be, I have to at least look, look smart and I have to, I have to be strong. So getting stronger for Japan is very important to, to engage China. In that sense, the last thing comes. Our relations with, with United States, along with our own defense capabilities may enforce our capability to hedge and engage China. That is really important. In that context, guidelines, which second quarters and I, I used to work hard, 96, 97, that, that work is really, really important. In that sense, just one suggestion for the next generation, you know, people who might have to work really hard, like Sekiguchi, Sekiguchi, is that there are differences, particularly differences between U.S. and Japan, perhaps even among Japanese, you know, among, among Americans, differences on threat perception and differences on policy priorities and differences on sensitivities in, in their minds, in terms of talking about declaratory policy. So, but first thing we need to do is understand the differences and then secondly, we have to overcome the differences to reach the consensus. Which part we should, we should take the energy first and prioritize the mission and we have to do every effort to make, make the concrete case on which Japan and U.S. should work together. And what can do is the question, was a question for us, but this, this time, in addition to what can Japan do or what can the United States do, we might have to think about what Japan should or wants to do, what, and also what does the United States want to do. Those things should be discussed again. We are not living in the limited box. So we have to be creative and particularly this is important when we talk about, when we talk about how we engage rising China. Thank you. Thank you so much. First, and I need to complain to Mike that this time shortation, because of this time shortage that our time is running out, it's only 20 minutes to go. So I'd like to ask you for partners to discuss simultaneously what I said earlier, U.S.-Japan future course on the China rise and North Korea thing. And I believe that here, as a moderator, as a journalist from Tokyo, that the Japan's strategic goal is to keep a peace and prosperity in this Asia-Pacific region together with the closest friends and ally in this region, United States of America. And because of internal political warfare in Tokyo, there's so many negative reports on what's going on inside our administration in Tokyo, including what Mitsa Kitaoka has explained kindly today to you all. But please do not misunderstand what we are trying to achieve is not another invasion, another fight, not at all, but to keep prosperity and peace in that region so that everybody, every player in that region can enjoy any outcome of those kinds of peace and prosperity. That's for that sake, we are trying to set up a new, what I say, joint deterrence. Together again, you, United States of America. Having said that, would you please anybody start on the future course US-Japan and including, of course, simultaneously you can touch upon how to deal with rise of China and North Korea contingency or whatever. Anybody, please go ahead. I forgot to mention one thing, our relations or our relations with South Korea or the relations between US-Japan alliance and ROK-Japan alliance are really, really important. For Korean contingency, Japan should become the backyard for the main fighters. And in terms of security of Japan, China provides 100% South Korea provides 100% secure flank on Kyushu, particularly north of Kyushu. Those importance and mutual reliance should be widely shared by the Koreans and Japanese. And we have to think of that. And in that sense, the guidelines review may give us a golden opportunity. I remember that 1996 and 97, when we worked to revise the guidelines with SAC and my green here, and Koreans were so sensitive about what Japan and US were doing. And they are very much interested in what we are discussing. So both governments decided to have trilateral. And whenever we talked about what Japan and US doing to Koreans, all the generals and admirals started taking notes. At the same time, US and Korea did start kind of a new operational planning thinking. That was totally new to Japanese. So when Korean Korean briefer began his explanation about what US and Korea were discussing, all the participants from the Japanese side, including me, all of a sudden started taking notes. So we are very much interested in what would happen in Korean Peninsula. They are very much interested in what would happen between US and Japan. So this will become a very, very strong incentive for the both defense military authorities of Korea and Japan and to deepen that mutual understanding. That might lead to kind of better relations between the two people. Thank you. Shirazan, do you have any? I just very briefly thank you. I think there's a couple of thoughts I had on the just the alliance management side, mostly because Noburo was just talking about the Japan-ROK relationship. It seems to me that there's a little learning that can go on between the US and ROK and the US and Japan. Since 2010, the United States and South Korean governments have been talking about a provocation, anti-provocation measures, right, in the wake of the Cheonan sinking and then in the wake of the Yongkwang shelling. The South Korean government and the US government had to think of very different kinds of contingencies rather than the straightforward war contingency between North and South. I think there's a lot of learning perhaps, maybe not indirectly, because the command structure is different and the situation may be different, but I think an anti-provocation strategy and a way of talking about provocative behavior below the level of actual conflict is going to be very useful for the guidelines review in and of itself. For those of us who sit here in Washington, we will have heard a lot about US considerations and US planners worried about emboldening allies and thinking about this new risk setting in Northeast Asia. And again, I think here the guidelines review is one piece of the prescription for the guidelines review is for us to have a much clearer sense of how the two militaries were interact, but I also think it's going to be imperative for the US and Japan to talk very carefully about our political crisis management scenarios. And I think a lot of the discussion that's going on inside Tokyo today about grace-owned contingencies will help the US and Japan have a very careful conversation about what would happen if in a variety of settings that the alliance really hasn't had to deal with and specifically those are maritime kinds of contingencies. One last piece of the frame we haven't really talked about, and I don't know soon how to sign if you wanted to talk about it here, but everybody to the right of me has a lot of experience thinking about these things. But risk reduction frameworks are clearly one piece of the puzzle not just for us in partnership, but also in partnership with ASEAN countries and that's a place also where we obviously have to get China at the table. We can't have a one sided risk reduction regime in the Asia Pacific, but on the other hand I think there's lots of things we can do in terms of maritime domain awareness, the technologies, the open transparencies. There's a lot we can do with partners in Southeast Asia as well and we shouldn't hesitate or wait until China decides it wants to have risk reduction measures. We should engage a lot more forcefully across the region and hopefully that will provide venues of dialogue with with the People's Republic of China. Thank you. Thank you, Sira-san. Any additional comments, Saku-san? No? No, no. Then we'd like to go to Q&A, please. And just one point for related to risk reduction. This is really important. Military to military dialogue is quite important. In that sense I have not given up yet. Even the relation with China and Korea. Korea has kept sending three cadets to National Defense Academy. They bring a number of Japanese friends back home and we send three students to Korean three different academies and China has kept sending a scholar for the National Defense Academy's international conferences for military academies. This year too in early next month we will have senior colonel from Chinese National Defense University and they have kept invited students our students or cadets to their own international conferences. So we are doing our best to keep the communication channel and they are doing the same. They are seemingly doing the same thing. Thank you. And just with regard to the risk reduction with China. I was a frequent visitor to China. Many of you visited Beijing but in Japan there is no formal official meal-meal relationship. So I as a retired senior officer I visited Beijing last year to five times and the year before and three times and mainly we discussed the risk reduction. But the reality or fact is China never tried to separate the Senkaku issue with all the other security issues. So that makes the dial very difficult. Very difficult. This is the reality. Please understand. Okay. So now the floor is open. Anybody would like to ask any questions? Please go ahead. Hi I'm Brant Pasco from the law firm K-Scholler. There's been brief mention of industrial defense cooperation but not much discussion of it today. I've just observed that you know a typical feature of U.S. military alliances is deep industrial cooperation. And so for example there are several hundred companies in the United States that are foreign owned and do classified work for the U.S. government. I don't think probably even one percent of those companies are Japanese. I'm curious what can be done to deepen the industrial cooperation between Japan and the United States and further the alliance. Please. You know the best way to describe is you know the Japanese participation should be the area where the U.S. are not so good at. For example conventional submarine or some specific guidance equipment or chip or whatever. But in Japan Japan Japanese defense industry even the Mitsubishi I think their share is very very low in the total sales. So perhaps the and also you know the no major M&A among the Japanese major industry. So if you take a look at the each independent company or capability of each independent company they are not so strong or good. But you know but as I mentioned for example the conventional submarine which Australia really wants you know Japan is the only nation which can provide the technology and also the building capability. So you know the U.S. and Japan should wisely allocate their area of responsibility depending on the area where the U.S. is good at and Japan is good at. And this is all I can say. Thank you. Thank you. So next question. Go ahead. Please. Thank you so much Chris Nelson Nelson report. Thanks for a great discussion especially thanks to my friend Johnny Amaguchi for reminding us about the Korea angle. But just on that last point quickly it's also we'd love to see but I'd sure like to hear the Armed Services Committee reaction to American contractors not getting a contract as Mitsubishi got it. You know that's always the terrible conundrum isn't it. We want all our lives to help except it cost us a job. But anyway on the Korea angle how important is Japanese Korean military professionalism. Can it influence the politics that's currently in the way of a more rational alliance relationship. Are there things that at the mill level at the senior friends level of the retired level that it would be good to see to try to calm down some of these things that are so difficult. We've got Mr. Suga and his little investigation due to be announced by the end of the week and maybe nothing's gonna happen maybe all hell's gonna break loose and that's gonna set everything back. So just on that on that issue alone and then in the strictly military sense is there any point yet in talking about Korean naval strength and air strength as part of the combined asset of U.S. Japan assets. We never hear anything about that and yet I've always been told Koreans have a hell of a good navy. Why don't we hear about that and is it too soon to be thinking about them as part of this force. Thank you. General, you ready? Are you ready to answer? Okay. I admire the kind of professionalism of current Korean forces. They are so professional and apolitical. That is what I admire but they are under political control so I have a feeling that you know the higher the rank becomes they they tend to be more sensitive the more sensitive to to the direction which political leadership takes. So in that sense you know I I would say Kano below are okay now the Brigadier or the Major General or above they are very much cautious but that is that that's the nature of you know democratic military so that that is a good sense but anyway as soon as political political leadership says says go ahead we are we are we are totally ready to to do many things together and as to navy and air force of course we are neighbors and we are allies allies so the there was actually a discussion from Korean site several several several years ago he was talking about air force to air force corporation of air patrolling it's not it's not a wartime mission but he was talking about east side of Korean peninsula and west side of Korean peninsula which can be can be patrolled by joint joint air forces that was three years ago but those professionals are dealing with air or maritime issues may must have the good idea how to cooperate in the future if the political climate permits. Okay one last question up yeah Arthur Herman Hudson Institute very fascinating discussion but nothing has been said so far about security cooperation on cyber threats whether when it's talking about advanced persistent threats or non-state actors and I'm wondering what the panel's view is on what would constitute a suitable framework for that kind of security cooperation. Anybody? It is yes it is really important this and also this building is a very appropriate place because Dr. Hamlet when he was the number two at the DOD he was very much eager to teach us teach us about how we should deal with cyber threat just after DOD was attacked by by a high school hijacker and it took more than 10 months to find out who did it so since that time we have been discussing cyber cooperation over cyber threat and Japan is getting slowly ready to do because last year we established a joint small but joint command to deal with cyber cyber cyber operations so we are now getting ready to to discuss with American counterpart with a single contact point at least at the MOD. The especially I didn't mention this area in Chinese 8 to AD but China adds a weaker side today you know the using those cyber or anti-satellite or the seabed fiber cable network destruction or even the EMP those are the strategy and tactics of the weaker side so there will be a greater chance for China to develop the capability they already have some but will be more and more robust in the future so especially from the policy side and force developing side both use in Japan has to allocate as much and many resources possible to develop the real capability to cope with the growing you know those new domain denial area EMP cyber anti-satellite and the seabed fiber optics network destruction you know US forces supported by JSDF very strong but if the China or any adversary will be able to kill the cut the nerve okay US muscle won't work and China would be able to kill the US forces as if they were shooting the sitting back that is the last thing for us to do so we need to develop the frontline pigment together with this area and this should be involved in the the defense guideline and roles of mission capability in and by this December yep okay thank you so much thank you very much for your participation today we are very much very much pleased to be here and please join me to praise um good hands for for families so much let me let me just close let me close briefly by thanking our colleagues who came across the pacific sack across the river she'll across the street although i guess you just came back from the pacific as well um a lot of the agenda is not new 1990 keep talking since they said uh 1996 but there's a definite urgency to it and it's really striking uh when you listen to the panels how much the US and Japan are going to be depending on each other read the quadrennial defense reviews in black and white in the US we're going to need each other more than ever before for somebody like me was a graduate student under George Packard at the end of the Cold War when most people were predicting this alliance would fall apart and we would be economic enemies it's remarkable it will not put anyone in this room out of business though because as you've heard the more we depend on each other the more complicated it gets we have a lot of things we have to figure out together and we'll keep talking about those so thank you all for coming and thank you for joining us